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This thesis contributes new evidence and analyses on the effects of cash transfers on 
adolescent school attendance, work participation and marital status. The mixed-methods 
study investigates the effects of Nepal’s Old Age Allowance (OAA), an unconditional 
cash transfer, on adolescents who co-reside with older persons using primary data from 
a household survey (n=2018) and in-depth interviews (IDI) (n=55) conducted in 
Rautahat district in the Terai region. The quantitative analysis exploits the age criteria 
for OAA eligibility to isolate its effects on co-resident adolescents. Using a hybrid 
thematic approach, IDIs are used to elucidate whether and how the OAA was factored 
into household decision-making and its relation to other factors that influence decisions 
about adolescents’ lives. 
 
The findings show that the OAA supports households to fulfil existing preferences for 
adolescents, which depend on the socioeconomic status, decision-making dynamics and 
religion of the household, the type and quality of local schools, the nature of local credit 
markets, and gendered social norms and expectations attached to transitions to 
adulthood. For many adolescents, this means increased access to school, whether public, 
private, or religious. However, some households support adolescents to access private 
school by taking loans in anticipation of OAA eligibility but fail to sustain the costs in 
the face of delays in registration and receipt of the first payments. Some out-of-school 
adolescents are prevented from engaging in paid work. However, other households use 
the OAA to accelerate transitions to adulthood, supporting economic migration of older 
boys and expediting the formalisation of marriage of older girls. 
 
This study makes five main contributions to the literature. First, studies on income 
effects on access to education tend to consider school as a homogenous entity, but the 
findings show that a UCT can expand school choice with different effects for different 
types of school. Second, the findings on adolescent marriage are novel for a dowry 
context and should prompt the research and policy literature to recognise the possibility 
that UCTs can increase the risk of early marriage. Third, this study provides unique 
evidence on the role of cash transfers in leveraging loans for human capital investment 
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and marriage. Fourth, the study examines the dynamics of household decision-making 
in relation to causal processes and shows that variation in outcomes according to the 
gender of the cash transfer recipient may stem from differences in bargaining power and 
economic opportunity as much as from differences in preferences. Finally, most studies 
on cash transfers often fail to account for the complexity in people’s lives which may 
lead to blunt or erroneous conclusions. This study shows that adopting the tenets of a 
critical realist perspective and placing decision-making about the outcomes of interest at 
the centre of the analysis focuses attention on the diverse contextual factors that shape 
the effects of cash transfers on individual household members, and provides for richer 
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Adolescence represents a critical period of life-course transitions and junctures, the 
nature of which can determine the quality of life-long opportunities and well-being 
(Lloyd, Behrman, and Stromquist 2006; Morrow 2012). Research on developing 
countries often overlooks the particular needs of adolescents, either focusing on the 
early years or grouping all school age children together (Bundy et al. 2017). However, 
adolescence ‒ commonly understood to mean the second decade of life but argued by 
some to extend into the early twenties ‒ involves unique periods of biological, 
psychological, social, and economic change that demand specific attention (Banati and 
Lansford 2018; Sawyer et al. 2018).  
 
Transitions to adulthood typically involve decisions about education, work, and 
marriage; decisions that are often connected and that are shaped by the cultural, social 
and economic context. Poverty can limit opportunities and put pressure on adolescents 
to adopt adult roles and responsibilities at a young age. This can be detrimental to their 
physical, cognitive and emotional development, put them at risk of harm, and lead to 
negative outcomes over the life-course. Limited access to education is associated with 
fewer economic opportunities, lower earnings and, for girls and women, earlier 
marriage and lower levels of empowerment (UNICEF 2011). Participation in work can 
form an important part of adolescent development (Morrow 2012). However, 
adolescents who are engaged in employment for a significant amount of time often lose 
out on schooling and other important aspects of childhood such as play, and occupations 
that are hazardous can harm their “health, safety, or morals” (ILO 2017b, 21). Earlier 
age-at-marriage for girls is associated with early child-bearing and the associated health 
risks, higher fertility, lower levels of empowerment, and greater exposure to domestic 




Globally, gains have been made in improving adolescents’ lives but there is still some 
distance to go. The proportion of adolescents who are out of school declined in the first 
decade of the century (UNESCO 2019). However, progress has stagnated and the most 
recent estimates indicate that 16% (61 million) of lower secondary age children and 
35% (138 million) of upper secondary age children remain out of school (UNESCO 
2020a). The proportion of children in employment has also reduced, but in 2016 around 
11% (79 million) of 12-17 year olds were considered to be in child labour, of which 
7.5% (54 million) are in hazardous work (ILO 2017b). In addition, while some amount 
of domestic work is commonplace, approximately 9% of 12-17 year olds are engaged in 
household chores for an excessive amount of time.1 Early marriage has also declined 
globally and the most recent estimates suggest that 21% of women aged 20-24 were 
married before age 18 and 5% before age 15 (UNICEF 2018; 2019). There is no global 
estimate for men, however, among the least developed countries, 6% of men aged 20-24 
were married before age 18 compared to 39% of women (UNICEF 2019). 
 
While there are multiple reasons for being out of school, in work, or for marrying early, 
income poverty is known to be an important driver (Verma 2018). The child 
development literature shows that households with higher levels of income tend to 
invest more in the goods, services, and time that children require to grow, develop, and 
learn (Gennetian, Castells, and Morris 2010; Cooper and Stewart 2013). In the same 
vein, there is a growing body of literature that investigates income effects on 
households, children, and adolescents in low- and middle-income countries, largely 
focused on the impacts of conditional and unconditional cash transfers. Conditional 
cash transfers (CCT) provide cash payments on the condition of certain behaviours, 
typically requiring children’s attendance at school or utilisation of health services by 
mothers and young children. Evaluations of the impacts of CCTs are generally unable to 
disentangle income effects from the behavioural requirements. In contrast, the effects of 
unconditional cash transfers (UCT) depend entirely on how recipient households 
consume, invest, or save the additional income. Given the interest of this study in 
income effects on adolescents, the review of the literature in Chapter 2 focuses mostly 
on UCTs. This review shows that UCTs tend to have positive impacts on access to 
 
1 Figures are based on author’s calculations using data from ILO (2017b). ‘Excessive’ is defined as 14 
hours or more domestic work per week.  
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school and can be helpful in reducing the supply of adolescent paid labour, although 
impacts on other kinds of work and on marriage timing are more varied. The review 
identifies several gaps in knowledge about how cash transfers alter investment decisions 
made by parental or caregiver households in relation to their adolescent children, which 
provide the primary areas of inquiry for this study.  
 
First, there is some consensus that UCTs tend to increase access to education through an 
income effect, allowing households to invest in the costs of school, especially among 
adolescents as they transition to more costly secondary education (Sabates et al. 2019; 
Kilburn et al. 2017; Baird et al. 2014). However, theoretical discussions about the 
effects of income on access to education largely ignore the question of school choice. 
Schools can vary by cost, quality, and even purpose, but most of the relevant studies 
only measure binary indicators of school attendance or enrolment. Little is known about 
how additional investments in education interact with a heterogenous supply of 
education. This is particularly pertinent for developing country contexts where full-time 
religious education is common, particularly among Muslim communities (Park and 
Niyozov 2008), and low-fee private schools (LFPS) are mushrooming to meet demand 
among even the poorest communities (Tooley and Dixon 2007). Understanding income 
effects on school choice can be revealing about (perceptions of) school quality and 
inclusivity and help policy makers to find the right balance between demand and supply 
side interventions for improving educational outcomes. 
 
Second, economic theory about the relationship between cash transfers and labour 
supply described in Dammert et al. (2018) and Porreca and Rosati (2018), indicate that 
effects are ambiguous and can be different for children and adults. The relevant 
literatures tend to focus on adults over the age of eighteen, or younger children up to 
mid-adolescence, and with limited differentiation by narrower age groups. However, 
adolescence represents a period of transition from childhood to adulthood, during which 
social and economic incentives to work and the trade-offs with education are likely to 
change. Moreover, very few studies incorporate analysis of both economic and unpaid 
domestic work, meaning that the full potential range of effects on adolescent time-use 
are not accounted for, especially among girls (Bastagli et al. 2016). A better 
understanding of income effects on the full range of work activities among adolescents, 
the thresholds at which effects occur, and how these may differ by socioeconomic 
Chapter 1 
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status, can inform design and targeting of cash transfers and other policies that aim to 
reduce detrimental work or promote access to better employment opportunities.  
 
Third, higher rates of early marriage tend to be associated with poverty (Bajracharya 
and Amin 2012) and current theory about income effects on marriage timing point to a 
positive association between income and age at marriage. Dake et al. (2018) and Handa 
et al. (2015) suggest that higher incomes allow households to delay the marriage of their 
daughters, either through a consumption effect by maintaining her upkeep for longer, or 
through prolonged investment in her education. However, while evidence on the effects 
of UCTs on early marriage is thin, it points to both decreases and increases in marriage 
rates among adolescents. Moreover, there are apparently no studies that examine the 
effects of UCTs on marriage timing in a dowry culture, where there are strong economic 
and social incentives for girls to marry early, but high costs, borne by the brides 
household, for the dowry and ceremony. In this context, a “social investment” pathway 
may exist, whereby an increase in income helps the household to overcome the financial 
barriers to marriage. This has important implications for social policies that aim to raise 
incomes if, among certain groups, they inadvertently lead to an increase in early 
marriage rates. 
 
Fourth, adolescents may independently out-migrate for the purpose of education, work, 
or marriage. Hagen-Zanker and Himmelstine (2013) show that cash transfers can affect 
decisions to migrate; however, most studies that examine cash transfer effects on 
migration focus on adult populations. At the same time, the studies reviewed in Chapter 
2 that are concerned with adolescent outcomes, tend to measure income effects on static 
populations. Consequently, adolescents who have out-migrated due to the cash transfer 
are either invisible or the true nature of the effects on their lives are not identified. Cash 
transfers may allow certain sub-groups of adolescents to access higher quality education 
or better work opportunities, but others may be more vulnerable to exploitation and 
harm after leaving the parental home. To gain a fuller understanding of income effects 
on education, work, and marriage, requires deliberate incorporation of migrant 
adolescents into the analysis.  
 
The thread that connects these issues is the nature of investment decisions about the 
common set of life-course options for adolescents in developing countries. The 
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literature on household decision-making shows that the preferences and interests, 
resources, and opportunities of household members are influenced by household- and 
community-level factors (Yoong, Rabinovich, and Diepeveen 2012; Doss 2013). In 
turn, these shape how additional income interacts with decisions about adolescents’ 
lives. However, studies on cash transfers and adolescent outcomes often ignore, or have 
insufficient data to analyse, the dynamics of the household economy and wider 
contextual factors. This is especially the case for studies relying solely on econometric 
methods and which take a narrow positivist stance that decontextualizes outcomes and 
the processes through which they occur, essentially ignoring much of the complexity of 
people’s lives (Adato 2008; Mahendru and Tasker 2020). To overcome some of these 
shortcomings, this study adopts an analytical framework that puts decision-making 
about the outcomes of interest at the centre of the analysis as a locus to consider the 
multiple contextual factors, both within and outside the household that shape the effects 
of cash transfers on individual household members. 
 
This thesis contributes new evidence and analyses on the effects of an unconditional 
state cash transfer on multiple dimensions of adolescent school attendance, work 
participation and marital status. The mixed-methods study investigates the effects of 
Nepal’s Old Age Allowance (OAA) on adolescents who co-reside with older persons 
using primary data from a household survey (n=2018) and in-depth interviews (IDI) 
(n=55) conducted in Rautahat district in Province 2 in the Terai region. The study 
focuses on a sub-set of adolescents aged 10 to 17 years because of the typically early 
social and economic transitions to adulthood in Nepal, the structure of the education 
system, and the legal age of marriage.2 The quantitative analysis exploits the age criteria 
for OAA eligibility to isolate its effects on adolescents and the household economy. 
Using a hybrid thematic approach, IDIs are used to deepen understandings of whether 
and how the OAA was factored into household decision-making and its relation to other 
factors that influence decisions about adolescents’ lives. The rest of this chapter 
introduces the study context and the status of adolescents’ life-course circumstances, 
 
2 Adolescents are commonly defined as persons aged 10-19 years although some argue that the period 
extends into the early twenties (Sawyer et al. 2018). This study focuses on a sub-set of adolescents for 
several reasons: (i) the majority of 18-19 year olds in the study area, especially girls, are expected to have 
passed through transitions to adulthood; (ii) secondary education is officially provided up to the age of 
16; (iii) the legal age of marriage (with parental consent) is 18 years; (iv) limiting the age range provides 
greater internal validity of the research findings. 
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describes the rationale for using the OAA as an instrument for the proposed 
investigation, and introduces the research questions and the thesis outline. 
 
Adolescent life-course circumstances in Nepal and Province 2 
Nepal’s population of 28 million exhibits significant ethnic and linguistic diversity. The 
country is landlocked between India and China with three distinctive eco-geographic 
zones: the Himalayan mountain region, the middle hills, and the Terai or plains 
bordering northern India. Although geographically and culturally rich, Nepal is one of 
the poorest countries in the world. Despite slow growth and low GDP, Nepal has 
gradually increased investment in the social sectors and achieved significant gains in 
several areas (Cosic, Dahal, and Kitzmuller 2017). The poverty rate reduced from 31% 
in 2003 to 25% in 2011 and youth literacy rates increased from 70% in 2001 to 92% in 
2018 (Central Bureau of Statistics 2011c; UNESCO 2020b). Moreover, Nepal is ahead 
of the global trend in terms of education access, with an estimated 3% (0.05 million) of 
lower secondary age children and 19% (0.49 million) of upper secondary age children 
out of school (UNESCO 2020a). 
 
However, certain parts of the country lag in economic and social development. This 
study focuses on Rautahat, one of the most underdeveloped districts in Nepal, with 
household consumption and human development indicators among the lowest in the 
country (Central Bureau of Statistics 2013; Sharma, Guha-Khasnobis, and Raj Khanal 
2014). Rautahat is situated in Province 2 in Nepal’s Terai belt and borders the northern 
Indian state of Bihar with which it has close cultural, social and economic ties. The 
population is largely Hindu with many caste-based sub-divisions, but also includes the 
largest minority of Muslims in the country. 
 
In Nepal, and even more so in Province 2, adolescents often face rapid transitions to 
adulthood. Figure 1 shows the secondary school net attendance ratio (NAR) with 
estimates from 2016. Nationally just over 65% of secondary age children are in 
secondary school with near parity between girls and boys. The NAR drops to just 45% 
in Province 2 and with girls more disadvantaged than boys.3 Low attendance rates relate 
 
3 The NAR only considers school attendance at the expected grade level for a given age group. Because 
some secondary school age children attend primary school the NAR does not represent the percentage of 
secondary age children who are attending school. 
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to both supply and demand for education. Public schools suffer from a lack of quality 
manifest in poor exam performance and high dropout rates (Parajuli and Das 2013; A. 
Thapa 2015). To fill this gap, Nepal relies heavily on private schools which tend to be 
of higher quality but are beyond the financial means of many. The private sector 
provides approximately 18% of schools, rising to nearly 30% at secondary level 
(Ministry of Education 2018). Survey estimates suggest that 27% of school goers attend 
private school, rising to 60% among the richest wealth quintile (Central Bureau of 
Statistics 2011b). There is very limited data available on religious school attendance in 
Nepal, however, the Ministry of Education (2018) recognises 1,121 religious schools, of 
which 907 are madrassas, representing approximately 12% of all schools in the country. 
 
There are also deficits in demand due to the direct and indirect costs of school. Direct 
costs include school fees, textbooks, uniforms and other school materials, and transport 
or living costs where schools are far from home (UNICEF 2011). Indirect costs include 
the forgone income from adolescent labour as well as other, often gendered, cultural 
barriers. In Nepal, girls and women are often constrained by limited mobility, have 
lower employment prospects and thus lower expected returns to education, and face 
rising social and economic pressures to marry (Ghimire and Samuels 2014). 
 
Figure 1 Secondary school net attendance ratio (NAR) 
 
Data source: NDHS 2016. n = 5825 for Nepal and n = 992 for Province 2. The secondary school NAR is 
the proportion of 11-15 year olds attending secondary school (Ministry of Health, New ERA, and ICF 





















Figure 2 shows the percentage of adolescents aged 12-17 years who are involved in 
economic and domestic work. Approximately 61% participated in at least one hour of 
economic work during the reference week and 9% did so for an excessive number of 
hours. At the same time, 90% of adolescents undertook domestic chores, of whom 5% 
did so for an excessive number of hours.4 There is a substantial overlap between those 
involved in economic work and those involved in domestic work. The burden of work 
on some adolescents is even higher. Notably, girls are more likely to work and to work 
longer hours than boys. Adolescents in the central Terai region where Province 2 is 
located are less likely to work and less likely to work excessive hours than the national 
average.  
 
Figure 2 Percentage of 12-17 year olds involved in economic and domestic work by level of 
hours 
 
Data source: Adapted from NMICS 2014. n = 8296 for Nepal and n = 1394 for the Central Terai. 
Reference period is the week prior to the survey. Excessive work refers to age and sector specific 
thresholds in the number of hours worked (see Central Bureau of Statistics 2015; ILO 2017b). 
 
Demand for adolescent labour outside the household occurs where employment 
opportunities are suited to the physical attributes and abilities of adolescents; where 
employers value more docile and pliable workers who are willing to work for less; and 
 
4 Excessive hours are based on ILO definitions of child labour, which combine age-specific thresholds for 
the number of hours spent in economic work (any time if less than 12 years and 14 hours or more if 12-14 
years) with any amount of time in work activities considered to be hazardous including for 15-17 year 
olds. There is not yet consensus on the definition of excessive time spent in domestic chores but these 
figures are based on 14 hours or more per week (see ILO 2017b for a detailed description). 
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where employment legislation is absent or weakly enforced and cultural norms are 
accepting of the practice (ILO 2007). Demand comes from within the household where 
children and adolescents contribute towards the family business or domestic chores. 
Households tend to supply adolescent labour (externally or internally) when they are 
otherwise unable to meet their basic consumption needs or when there is a reduction in 
adult labour supply, for example through illness (Nepal and Nepal 2012). Estimates 
from 2008 show that median monthly income from working children aged 5-17 is NRs 
2,167 (US$ 19) per month, notably more than the monthly per capita poverty line of 
NRs 1,605 (US$ 14) (ILO, IPEC, and Central Bureau of Statistics 2011; Central Bureau 
of Statistics 2011c). 
 
Figure 3 shows the percentage of 20-24 year olds who were first married by specific 
ages. Early marriage disproportionately affects girls. Nationally, 40% of women aged 
20-24 years were married by age 18 and 7% were married by age 15. In Province 2, the 
rates of early marriage are substantially higher, with 65% of young women married 
before age 18 and 13% before age 15. The risk of early marriage is much lower among 
men. Nevertheless, in Province 2, 16% of men aged 20-24 years are estimated to have 
married by age 18. Early marriage persists due to a complex interaction of cultural, 
social and economic factors (Sundaram, Travers, and Branson 2018). Traditionally, 
girls and women in Nepal are expected to adopt domestic and caring roles within the 
family and to be subservient to men, whereas boys and men are expected to be earners 
and decision-makers (Karki 1988; Black, Haeri, and Moodie 2001). Girls’ education 
tends to be valued less because sons will earn income and provide economic security to 
their parents in old age. Moreover, high value is placed on preserving girls’ virginity 
and preventing them from engaging in pre-marital sexual relationships. Many men 
prefer younger and less well educated wives who are assumed to be more obedient and 




Figure 3 Percentage of 20-24 year olds first married by exact age 
 
Data source: NDHS 2016 and authors calculations from NDHS 2016. n = 2306 for women and n = 633 
for men in Nepal; n = 360 for women and n = 97 for men in Province 2. 
 
Cultural and social preferences interact with economic incentives related to dowry 
practices and the pressures of poverty. Parents faced with the continued cost of caring 
for a daughter, and where opportunities for education and employment are costly, low 
quality or culturally inappropriate, may view marriage as the best alternative to ensure 
her protection and economic security (Morrow 2012). Added to this, the dowry system 
reflects preferences for younger brides. Dowry demands rise with age, putting further 
pressure on parents to secure the early marriage of their daughters (Sah 2012).  
 
Adolescents sometimes leave the home to access education or employment 
opportunities. For girls in Nepal, marriage inevitably means moving into her husband’s 
household. This could be within the local area but often means moving further afield. 
Data on adolescent out-migration is scarce. The Nepal Demographic and Health Survey 
(NDHS) 2016 recorded the reason for migration of individuals who left the household 
within the past 10 years. More than two-thirds migrated when they were younger than 
25 years and 44% of women did so when they were aged 15-19 years (Ministry of 
Health, New ERA, and ICF International Inc. 2017). In most cases, women migrated 
due to marriage and men migrated for employment. However, around 11% of women 
and 14% of men did so for the purpose of education. Poverty may drive out-migration 
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however, low incomes may also prevent beneficial out-migration when local education 
and employment opportunities are poor (Hagen-Zanker and Himmelstine 2013). 
 
Social protection in Nepal and the Old Age Allowance (OAA) as a household 
income transfer  
Social protection is one means by which governments aim to raise the incomes of poor 
households and to support investment in human capital. Nepal’s wide range of social 
protection programmes make it unusual among lower-income countries. While social 
insurance and public sector pensions are available to only a small proportion of the 
population, Nepal has several non-contributory cash transfers that are universal in 
nature and reach across the country. Khatiwada and Koehler (2014) propose that at the 
turn of the Century, Nepal had emerged as a “nascent welfare state” (p. 132), with 
social protection at the heart of national development frameworks and plans. This grew 
out of legislation introduced in the 1980s and early 1990s on the rights of persons with 
disabilities, retirees, and children, and on social welfare in general.  
 
The first major non-contributory cash transfer was the Old Age Allowance (OAA), 
introduced by the Marxist-Leninist faction of the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN-ML) 
under Prime Minister Manmohan Adhikari. The OAA started as a government led pilot 
in fiscal year 1994/5 but was scaled-up in 1995/6 to include all persons over the age of 
75 nationally (National Planning Commission 2012). Subsequent governments led by 
different parties not only maintained the OAA but expanded it by increasing benefit 
levels and lowering the eligibility age. Moreover, social security was extended to other 
vulnerable groups starting with allowances for widows and single women and people 
with disabilities. Social security was further expanded in fiscal year 2009/10 to include 
allowances for ethnic groups at risk of disappearing and the child nutrition grant for 
families from the Dalit caste and in the geographically excluded Karnali region. At the 
time of writing, this collection of cash transfer schemes were the responsibility of the 
Department of Civil Registration (DOCR) under the Ministry of Federal Affairs and 
Local Development (MOFALD), implemented at the local level by the District, 
Municipal, and Village Development Committees (D/M/VDC). In addition, the 
Ministry of Education introduced state scholarships in fiscal year 2011/12 for girls and 
children of Dalit families, indigenous ethnicities, and very poor households, to support 




While little has been documented about government thinking at the time, one of the 
objectives for introducing the social security schemes, and their expansion in the post-
conflict period in the late-2000s, is thought to have been “as a policy tool for nation 
building and political healing” (Koehler and Mathers 2017, 348). This is reflected in 
the combination of egalitarian universalist approaches and identity-based and 
geographic targeting to address historical disadvantage. Moreover, since their inception, 
the recurrent budget for the social security schemes has been entirely allocated though 
government general revenue (Khadka 2017; Koehler and Mathers 2017). A universal 
social pension went against the grain of mainstream economic development thinking at 
the time, which was dominated by the IMF and World Bank, for whom social protection 
constituted short-term, poverty-targeted, safety-nets intended to mitigate the negative 
consequences of structural adjustment policies (Paitoonpong, Abe, and Puopongsakorn 
2008). Nevertheless, Nepal’s social security schemes have not gone entirely without 
donor assistance. There have been a number of major projects co-funded by donor 
countries to support capacity building of central and local governance structures and 
systems including those responsible for delivery of the cash transfer programmes.5 
Moreover, in 2016, Nepal accepted a major World Bank grant for strengthening civil 
registration and social security systems.6 Nevertheless, the role of foreign aid appears to 
have had limited influence on the decisions to introduce the social security schemes, 
and on their main design parameters. 
 
Despite the range of social protection programmes in Nepal, there is limited economic 
support for the specific needs of families with adolescents. The child grant is moving 
towards national coverage but remains targeted to children under five years of age 
(Garde, Mathers, and Dhakal 2017).  The scholarships for girls and disadvantaged 
children are small, poorly implemented, and have limited impacts despite the minimal 
direct costs of public education (Educational Resource and Development Centre 2011; 
Datt and Uhe 2019). With no effective social transfers specifically for adolescents, 
 
5 See for example, Ministry of Federal Affairs and General Administration (MoFAGA), Local 
Governance and Community Development Programme (LGCDP) - II, http://lgcdp.gov.np/, accessed: 10th 
February 2021. 
6 The World Bank, Strengthening Systems for Social Protection and Civil Registration Project, 2021, 




examining income effects on this age-group is problematic. The solution comes from a 
number of studies, mostly from South Africa but also Mexico and Brazil, that show the 
efficacy of using an old age pension to determine the effects of unconditional cash 
transfers on young people (Duflo 2003; Case 2004; Edmonds, Mammen, and Miller 
2005; Edmonds 2006; Ndlovu, Mohapatra, and Luckert 2017; Gutierrez, Juarez, and 
Rubli 2017). Nepal’s Old Age Allowance (OAA) presents a similar opportunity to 
investigate income effects on co-resident adolescents. 
 
The OAA is the most generous of Nepal’s non-contributory social security schemes 
and, at the time of this study, provides NRs 24,000 (US$212) annually to all citizens 
from the age of 70 years, equivalent to 137% of the regional per capita poverty line 
(Central Bureau of Statistics 2011c). In addition, members of the Dalit caste receive 
NRs 12,000 annually from the age of 60 years until reaching full pension age. Take-up 
has been estimated at approximately 80% using national budget and census data 
(Samson 2012), but this varies between administrative areas. Beyond its potential effect 
on household income, the OAA is a useful policy to investigate the effects of a UCT on 
adolescents for three main reasons. First, eligibility is determined exogenously, by age 
of the elder, and is not influenced by other household members. This makes the OAA 
amenable to discontinuity approaches to causal inference, discussed in detail in Chapter 
3. Second, multi-generational households in Nepal are common, with approximately 
half of children co-residing with an over-fifty year old.7 Thus, while adolescents who 
co-reside with elders are a sub-set of the population, they are not uncommon and 
findings can plausibly be generalised to the wider adolescent population. Third, as most 
households engage in some level of economic cooperation and risk sharing (Doss 2013), 
the OAA is akin to a family income transfer. Given certain assumptions, discussed in 
detail in relation to the analytical framework in Chapter 2, the OAA can theoretically 
affect the life-course circumstances of co-resident adolescents. 
 
Despite its prominence in Nepal’s social policy sphere, there is relatively little evidence 
on the impacts and efficacy of the OAA. Uprety’s (2010) analysis of spending patterns 
using survey data from 13 districts indicates a significant degree of resource sharing 
 
7 Based on author’s analysis of data from the Nepal Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) conducted in 
2016 by the Ministry of Health, New ERA and ICF. 
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including direct expenditure on children’s education. Using micro-simulation, Samson 
(2012) estimates that the OAA reduced Nepal’s poverty gap by 1% when it was 
introduced but suggests its impact has likely increased with later reforms of the OAA. 
Li and Mora (2014) apply a difference-in-difference approach to historical cross-
sectional data from just before and after the introduction of the OAA and find that it led 
to improvements in survival rates of co-resident infants. At the same time, several 
studies reveal challenges in management and implementation of Nepal’s social security 
schemes including the OAA which may limit its effectiveness (Uprety 2010; Upreti et 
al. 2012; KC et al. 2014; Drucza 2015). 
 
Research aims and questions 
The main purpose of this study is to examine the effects of additional household income 
on adolescents’ life-course circumstances and the related decision-making processes, 
with the aim of generating new evidence and theory in several specific areas. Primarily, 
the analyses and findings are relevant for the literature concerned with income effects 
on child and adolescent development and for social policies that aim to increase 
household incomes and to improve adolescent outcomes related to education, work, and 
marriage timing. By examining the dynamics of, and impacts on, the household 
economy to better understand effect pathways, the study also aims to contribute to the 
literature on household decision-making. In this regard, the use of a social pension for 
determining income effects on co-resident adolescents is instrumental. It is not intended 
for this study to caste judgement on the efficacy of the OAA as a policy to support the 
economic security of elders. However, there will be secondary implications from the 
findings related to the design and implementation of cash transfers in general, and for 
the role that social pensions play in household, not just elder, economic security. 
 
More specifically, the thesis has four main aims that determine the research questions 
and approach. First, the research aims to fill an evidence gap of policy relevance to 
Nepal and similar contexts by measuring and explaining the effects of a UCT on 
adolescent life-course circumstances. Second, decisions about the common set of 
adolescent life-course options are interrelated, complex, and often more diverse than is 
accounted for in the existing literature. The research aims to analyse the effects of a 
cash transfer on education, work, and marriage together, distinguishing between 
different types of school and work, and marital status and cohabitation, and including 
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analysis of adolescents who recently left the home. Third, taking the household 
decision-making process as the starting point for a new analytical framework, the 
research aims to provide a detailed understanding of the pathways through which cash 
transfers affect adolescents and to contextualise the role of the cash within the numerous 
and potentially competing social, economic and cultural incentives and disincentives for 
each life-course option. Fourth, the research aims to contribute knowledge to the 
application of mixed-methods approaches in research about the effects of cash transfers 
on individuals. 
 
To fulfil these broad aims, the overarching question of the study asks: How does 
Nepal’s Old Age Allowance (OAA) change decision-making about adolescents’ life-
course circumstances in multi-generational households? 
 
Situated within a critical realist perspective, the question emphasises how the effects 
occur and focuses on the process of decision-making to highlight the importance of 
understanding the underlying pathways and other influencing factors. Life-course 
circumstances refer to the typical set of options facing adolescents through their 
transition to adulthood including education, work and marriage. The overarching 
question is broken down into three interrelated sub-questions which aim to reveal 
different aspects of the problem. 
 
Research question one (RQ1) asks: what are the gendered effects of OAA income on 
adolescents’ education, work, and timing of marriage? RQ1 focuses on quantitative 
methods and aims to draw causal inferences about realised outcomes. The analysis is 
multi-layered with respect to each life-course outcome and differentiates by gender of 
both the adolescent and the elder (the UCT recipient) to reveal insights into the 
gendered nature of household preferences and decision-making. 
 
Research question two (RQ2) asks: what are the pathways through which the OAA 
affects adolescents’ life-course circumstances? RQ2 draws on both quantitative and 
qualitative data, to explore and test the pathways through which effects occur and the 
underlying assumptions. The analysis focuses on the impacts of the OAA on the 
household economy, specifically income, expenditure and credit, as well as examining 
Chapter 1 
30 
the nature of resource sharing between the parental and elder generations, and control of 
OAA income, and how these may influence adolescents’ lives.  
 
Research question three (RQ3) asks: how is OAA income factored into households’ 
decision-making about adolescent life-course options? RQ3 is primarily qualitative and 
draws on the experiences of adolescents, parents and elders in selected households that 
receive the OAA. The analysis situates the role and relative importance of the OAA 
within the context of the multiple factors, constraints and enablers, that influence 
household decisions about adolescent life-course options. 
 
Thesis outline 
This thesis is structured as a continuous and cumulative analysis of the research topic. 
Chapter 2 provides a critical review of the literature on the impacts of UCTs, and CCTs 
where relevant, on adolescent school attendance, work and marriage, and the theories 
and evidence relating to the pathways that lead to the observed changes. Building on the 
review, it then presents an analytical framework for understanding the gendered effects 
of a UCT on adolescent life-course circumstances that centres on household decision-
making and that is situated in the local socioeconomic context.  
 
Chapter 3 provides a detailed description of the quantitative and qualitative methods 
including the research design, tools, planning, data collection and quality, analytical 
approach, and research ethics. Chapter 4 then lays the foundation for subsequent 
analyses by describing the household population and the state of schooling, work and 
marriage among adolescents in the survey population.  
 
Chapters 5 to 7 broadly respond to the three research questions in turn although with 
some overlap. Chapter 5 analyses the quantitative effects of the OAA on adolescents’ 
life-course circumstances. The analysis exploits the age eligibility criteria of the OAA 
to make causal inferences about its effects on the school attendance, work participation, 
and marriage status of co-resident adolescents. Additional analysis explores how the 
observed effects vary by certain individual and socioeconomic characteristics.  
 
Chapter 6 integrates quantitative and qualitative data to explore how the OAA interacts 
with the household economy to better understand the pathways through which the OAA 
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affects adolescent life-course circumstances. The analysis also examines resource 
sharing and decision-making to reveal insights into observed variations in the effects of 
the OAA. Chapter 7 uses qualitative data, complemented by survey data, to situate the 
role of the OAA within the multiple cultural, social and economic factors that affect 
decision-making about adolescents’ life-course options. The findings are triangulated 
with results from previous chapters and further explain why certain effects occur, or do 
not occur, for adolescents in different circumstances.  
 
Chapter 8 draws together the different strands of the analysis into a final discussion. The 
chapter summarises the findings in relation to the research questions, discusses the 
contributions of the study in relation to the literature, critically reviews the research 










This study investigates the effects that additional income has on adolescents’ life-course 
circumstances in a low-income context. The literature on the relationship between 
household income and children’s well-being and development proposes two 
complementary theories about the effect pathways: the family investment model and the 
family stress model (Cooper and Stewart 2013; De Walque et al. 2017). In the 
investment model, families use additional income to invest more in the goods, services, 
and time required to improve children’s outcomes. In the stress model, increased 
financial security reduces stress among parents or caregivers, thereby improving their 
psychological well-being and parenting behaviours. Evidence from rich countries 
suggests that stress pathways better explain behavioural outcomes, while investments 
better explain differences in children’s physical and cognitive outcomes (Yeung, 
Linver, and Brooks-Gunn 2002; Gennetian, Castells, and Morris 2010). Given the focus 
of this study on life-course circumstances that are associated with significant direct and 
indirect financial costs and benefits, the overarching assumption is one of an investment 
model, whereby parental or caregiver households use additional income to secure the 
desired outcomes for their adolescent children. With the notable exception of Kilburn et 
al.’s (2017) study on the effects of a cash transfer on education outcomes in Malawi 
(discussed shortly), the literature reviewed in this chapter assumes the investment model 
to be the primary driver behind changes in the outcomes of interest.  
 
In rich countries, the literature on income effects on low-income children and 
adolescents focuses on a range of state interventions including direct cash transfers, tax 
credits and minimum wage policies. In low- and middle-income countries, the literature 
is dominated by studies of cash transfer programmes which have proliferated in the past 
20 years. The literature includes several systematic, or systematic-like, reviews focused 
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on child and adolescent education, work and marriage (see for example IEG 2011b; 
Lee-Rife et al. 2012; IEG 2014; de Hoop and Rosati 2014; Baird et al. 2014; Bastagli et 
al. 2016; Kalamar, Lee-Rife, and Hindin 2016; Dammert et al. 2018).  
 
While the body of literature is large it exhibits certain biases, initially towards 
conditional cash transfers (CCT) in Latin America and more recently, unconditional 
cash transfers (UCT) in sub-Saharan Africa. These mostly donor-supported schemes 
have benefited from rigorous, often experimental, impact evaluation. The existence of 
high-quality survey data led to a multiplier effect, with further quantitative studies on a 
range of issues beyond the primary objectives of the programmes. There is much less 
evidence from Asia, and South Asia in particular, where cash transfer programmes are 
more likely to have been initiated and funded by the state, as in the case of Nepal. This 
has implications for our understanding of how cash transfers affect households and 
individuals in cultural, social, and economic contexts that may be substantially different 
to those in much of literature.  
 
Focusing on UCTs in developing countries, but also CCTs where relevant, the first part 
of this chapter summarises current knowledge about how and why cash transfers affect 
adolescents’ life-course circumstances and which other proximate factors may mediate 
these impacts. While the focus of this study is on adolescents, the review refers to both 
children and adolescents due to the variety of age groups across the literature.8 
Importantly, specific gaps are identified in the understanding of how cash transfers 
affect adolescent school attendance, work and marriage, especially as they pertain to 
Nepal and similar contexts. These gaps constitute the primary areas of investigation in 
the study. 
 
A recurrent criticism of the literature is that many studies, especially those relying 
solely on econometric methods, decontextualize outcomes and the processes through 
which they occur, essentially ignoring the complexities of people’s lives (Adato 2008; 
Devereux et al. 2013; White 2015; Mahendru and Tasker 2020). Taking a critical 
realistic perspective, the final part of the chapter presents an analytical framework that 
 
8 In most cases, ‘children’ is used when the population of interest in a study crosses the boundary between 
middle childhood (5-9) and early adolescence (10-15). Specific ages are stated where this is relevant to 
interpretation of the findings. 
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puts decision-making at the centre of the analysis. In so doing, this provides a locus to 
consider the multiple contextual factors, both within and outside the household, that 
shape the effects of cash transfers on adolescents. 
 
The next section presents the review of existing empirical evidence on the impacts of 
cash transfers on adolescents’ life-course circumstances, as well as current theories and 
evidence of the pathways that lead to the observed changes. The second section 
summarises evidence on how individual characteristics and household- and community-
level factors moderate the impacts of cash transfers on adolescents. Building on the 
literature review and models of household bargaining, the third section presents the 
framework for analyses in the remainder of the study. The final section summarises and 
concludes. 
 
The effects of cash transfers on adolescent life-course circumstances 
 
Cash transfers and adolescent school attendance 
Around the world, cash transfer programmes are found to have positive and sometimes 
large average effects on school attendance. Baird et al.’s (2014) systematic review of 
cash transfers in 25 low- and middle-income countries finds that UCTs increase the 
odds of enrolment on average by 23% and attendance by 42% among children and 
young people ranging from five to 22 years old.9 A smaller sub-group of studies allows 
for analysis by gender, with average impacts moderately higher for girls. Of direct 
relevance to this study is evidence from South Africa, Brazil and Mexico showing that 
old age pensions can have substantial positive impacts on enrolment and attendance 
rates of co-resident adolescents. Enrolment rates are higher by as much as 20-33pp in 
the case of Mexico (Gutierrez, Juarez, and Rubli 2017). Moreover, in Brazil and South 
Africa, effects are shown to vary by gender of both the adolescent and the recipient, 
with some indication of same-gender favouritism between the generations (Edmonds 
2006; de Carvalho Filho 2012). These findings imply the existence of heterogeneous 
preferences or bargaining power within the household, discussed later in the chapter. 
 
 
9 This compares to 36% and 65%, respectively, in the case of CCTs, which have the specific objective of 
improving enrolment and attendance and with the additional inducement of conditions. 
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Despite these findings, impacts on school attendance are not guaranteed. Among the 20 
studies identified in Bastagli et al.’s (2016) systematic review that report on overall 
school attendance, seven find no significant effects. Reasons posited for the lack of 
impact, although with limited evidence, include lack of compliance with conditions in 
the case of CCTs, high base-line attendance rates, and low transfer size. However, 
effects could also be diminished by low preferences for education, whereby gender 
norms, school quality and other factors that modify the expected future returns to 
schooling (Eyal and Woolard 2014).  
 
Theoretically, UCTs affect school attendance through an income effect, allowing 
households to invest in the direct and indirect costs of school, the latter typically 
constituting forgone income from labour. Several studies on UCTs find increases in 
education-related expenditure concurrent with school attendance (Edmonds 2006; 
Miller and Tsoka 2012; Handa, Natali, et al. 2015; Kilburn et al. 2017). Kilburn et al. 
(2017) provide a rare example of a study that tests both the investment and stress 
pathways between income and children’s outcomes. They find that increases in school 
enrolment and decreases in drop-out associated with an income transfer in Malawi are 
explained entirely by increased education-related expenditures. At the same time, 
Sabates et al. (2019) show that increased investment in education as a result of a UCT 
does not necessarily lead to wider access to school, highlighting the need to understand 
the wider contextual factors that shape outcomes.  
 
Around the world, the education fabric of most countries is diverse. Education supply 
can vary by regulatory status, funding model, cost, and even purpose. In contexts such 
as Nepal, costs can differ substantially between public schools and the relatively large 
private school sector (Ministry of Education, UNICEF, and UNESCO 2016) with 
implications for the potential effect of additional income on schooling. Tooley and 
Dixon (2007) show that low-fee private schools (LFPS), which cater to low-income 
households, are mushrooming in developing countries. In many parts of the world, 
including much of South Asia, religious schools offer an alternative to mainstream 
education, especially among Muslim communities (Park and Niyozov 2008). Despite 
this variation in the supply of education, studies on income effects on access to school 
rarely distinguish between public, private, and other types of school. One exception is 
the World Bank Independent Evaluation Group’s (IEG) (2011a) evaluation of 
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Pakistan’s Female Secondary School Stipend Programme (FSSP), a CCT. The authors 
find that as well as improving girls’ school attendance as intended, the additional 
income allows co-resident boys to shift from state school into private school. This raises 
an important aspect of the relationship between income transfers and education that is 
largely overlooked in the literature; cash transfers may impact on school choice, 
supporting access to better quality education including schools which require out-
migration from the parental home. In a qualitative study, Deshingkar, Godfrey-Wood 
and Bene (2013) found that some recipients of Malawi’s Social Cash Transfer Scheme 
(SCTS) use the money to support their children to access education away from home. 
UCTs may even expand school choice beyond their direct value by facilitating access to 
credit. However, investigation of the effects of cash transfers on access to credit tends to 
focus on subsistence consumption smoothing and economic activity and not on human 
capital investment. 
 
Schooling may also increase if cash transfers are of sufficient value to supplement 
forgone income from child or adolescent labour. Several studies find that UCTs result in 
decreased work participation concurrent with increased school attendance (de Carvalho 
Filho 2012; Handa, Natali, et al. 2015; Gutierrez, Juarez, and Rubli 2017). However, it 
is questionable that an increase in household income alone, even of equivalent value to 
forgone income, would induce families to shift children from full time work into school 
considering the many potential barriers to late enrolment (Ministry of Education, 
UNICEF, and UNESCO 2016; Singh and Mukherjee 2018). Indeed, Edmonds and 
Schady (2012) find that the declines in paid labour among 11-16 year olds associated 
with Ecuador’s Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH), a de facto UCT, are concentrated 
among school goers. There is also evidence that UCTs prevent children from dropping 
out of school (Baird, McIntosh, and Özler 2011; Kilburn et al. 2017) which, in part, 
may be linked to a reduction in household reliance on child work as a response to 
income shocks (de Hoop and Rosati 2014). 
 
Finally, by increasing household consumption in general, UCTs may also improve 
children’s nutrition which consequently increases willingness to attend and 
attentiveness at school (Bastagli et al. 2016). Evidence for this pathway is thin. 
However, Miller and Tsoka (2012) identify an increase in household food expenditure 
alongside the increase in school enrolment associated with Malawi’s SCTS. They 
Chapter 2 
37 
provide a rare example of a mixed-methods study with complementary qualitative 
evidence. Children and their parents clearly articulate that the additional food means 
children do not feel hungry and find it easier to attend school and to learn. 
 
Cash transfers and participation in economic and domestic work 
Cash transfers can lead to changes in child and adolescent work, in many cases with 
reductions in participation rates and the hours engaged in both economic and domestic 
work (IEG 2011b; de Hoop and Rosati 2014; Bastagli et al. 2016; Dammert et al. 2018). 
However, effects are highly variable across studies, with some finding increases in 
participation rates and shifts between types of work. Moreover, Bastagli et al. (2016) 
find that more than half of the studies in their systematic review that measure child 
work participation identify no significant effects. Beyond low transfer levels, few 
explanations are provided for the absence of effects on work. In some cases, this may be 
due to the coarse specification of the units of analysis, for example not differentiating 
by gender or age-group, the limited measures of work such as focusing only on paid 
employment, and the fact that some amount of home-based work is often beneficial, and 
even necessary, for children and adolescents’ socialisation and development (Morrow 
2012).  
 
Effects on remunerated employment are most common, with UCTs in Malawi, South 
Africa, Ecuador, Zambia, and Lesotho all reducing child participation in paid work 
outside the home (Covarrubias, Davis, and Winters 2012; DSD, SASSA, and UNICEF 
2012; Edmonds and Schady 2012; Handa, Natali, et al. 2015; Porreca and Rosati 2018). 
Brazil’s social pension reduced overall participation in economic work for 10-14 year 
old boys. However, while girls’ participation in market work reduced if the pension 
recipient was female, it increased if the recipient was male (de Carvalho Filho 2012). 
Pakistan’s FSSP also resulted in small but statistically significant increases in paid work 
for older girls (Alam and Baez 2011) which may reflect that social and economic 
incentives to work increase with age. Evidence on adolescent economic migration is 
thin. However, Mexico’s Oportunidades, a CCT, reduced the likelihood of 9-15 year 
old boys migrating out of the household, with stronger effects for older boys, which the 
authors speculate represents a reduction in migration for work (Behrman, Parker, and 
Todd 2008). Overall, the evidence suggests that most households are averse to 
children’s participation in market work. However, some increases in paid work are 
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identified, which suggests that circumstance matters. In particular, as children pass 
through adolescence towards adulthood, incentives to work will change, especially 
where education offers a poor (or costly) alternative (Lloyd, Behrman, and Stromquist 
2006). Yet, little is known about the factors that will change incentives to invest 
additional income in developmental outcomes or labour market access. 
 
It is less common to find impacts of cash transfers on unpaid work for the family 
business and domestic chores. In part, this may be due to a scarcity of relevant data, 
with particular implications for understanding the effects on girls who are more likely to 
engage in unpaid work (Bastagli et al. 2016). Households may also have expectations 
that children and adolescents contribute a certain amount of time to the domestic 
workload and to the family business. Nonetheless, Ecuador’s BDH reduced both paid 
and unpaid economic work among 11-16 year olds and Nepal’s state scholarship 
programme, a CCT, decreased unpaid economic work for 8–16 year old girls (Edmonds 
and Schady 2012; Datt and Uhe 2019). Malawi’s SCTS demonstrates shifts between 
types of work, with reductions in external paid work but increases in family farm work 
for boys and domestic chores for girls (Miller and Tsoka 2012). This highlights the 
importance of measuring the full range of work that young people may engage in to 
properly understand income effects on time allocation. 
 
Some studies examine the effects of cash transfers on hours worked. IEG’s (2011b) 
review of programmes supported by the World Bank suggests that both CCTs and 
UCTs reduce the hours spent working more consistently than participation rates. 
However, Bastagli et al. (2016) show that effects on work hours are generally not large 
relative to school hours, with a maximum reduction of 2.5 hours per week among the 
five studies reported. Exceptionally, South Africa’s pension, which has a particularly 
large transfer value relative to household consumption, brought about a reduction of 
around one hour per day, mostly in market work for boys and domestic work for girls; 
and with no difference in participation rates (Edmonds 2006).  
 
There are three main pathways through which cash transfers can affect adolescent 
labour in poor households; by increasing or smoothing household consumption, through 
a school effect, and by altering the returns to labour through investment (de Hoop and 
Rosati 2014; Bastagli et al. 2016; Dammert et al. 2018). Looking first at the 
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consumption effect, if an adolescent is engaged in paid work to contribute to household 
subsistence and the transfer is enough to compensate the foregone income, then work 
should reduce. This assumes that the household is averse to child paid work and that the 
effect represents an investment in children’s well-being. Households in receipt of cash 
transfers generally see increases in consumption (Hagen-Zanker, McCord, and Holmes 
2011) and are better able to meet subsistence needs in the face of chronic poverty and 
following income shocks (de Hoop and Rosati 2014). However, the balance of positive 
and zero effects cited above suggest that this is not always the case. Paid work hours 
tend to be rigid which may be why there are reductions in participation rates but not 
substantially in hours (Edmonds and Schady 2012); and the value of the transfer relative 
to foregone income must be enough to tip-the-balance between a fixed amount of paid 
work and no paid work. Moreover, for older adolescents, paid work may be a positive 
opportunity rather than an undesirable necessity, and additional income could be 
invested in accessing the labour market (discussed shortly).  
 
Second, if the cash transfer prevents an adolescent from dropping out of school by 
meeting the direct costs, as well as any foregone income from paid work, then the 
adolescent may also be exempted from unpaid economic and domestic work at home. 
This implies that the school going adolescent’s labour can be substituted with other 
household or paid labour (Bastagli et al. 2016). However, the reality for many 
adolescents is that work continues concurrent with schooling and often has positive 
benefits, and the evidence suggests that reductions in unpaid work are less common. 
Moreover, the Malawi case shows that if paid work is reduced then some of the gains in 
time may be spent on more home-based economic or domestic work as well as 
increased schooling (Miller and Tsoka 2012). 
 
Third, returns to adolescent labour may change if cash transfers lead to more or better 
productive opportunities. A UCT can be invested in the household business or used to 
meet the financial costs of entering the labour market including for economic migration, 
possibly by facilitating access to credit (Hagen-Zanker and Himmelstine 2013). If there 
is no surplus adult labour in the household then adolescent work will increase, either by 
engaging directly in the new economic activity or by taking on the unpaid 
responsibilities of an adult who has an increase in economic work. Malawi’s SCTS 
demonstrates this effect, with increases in work on the household farm concurrent with 
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higher expenditures on agricultural inputs (Covarrubias, Davis, and Winters 2012; 
Miller and Tsoka 2012; de Hoop and Rosati 2014). Moreover, there is evidence that 
cash transfers can facilitate access to loans for productive purposes (Mathers and Slater 
2014). In Malawi and Kenya, Deshingkar et al. (2013) find qualitative evidence that 
UCTs facilitate economic migration of young people because of limited opportunities at 
home. The South African pension has also led to increases in economic migration by 
relaxing liquidity constraints (Sienaert 2007). While the findings are for adults, they 
could plausibly be generalised to older adolescents, which again highlights the need to 
measure income effects on more specific age groups to understand thresholds at which 
incentives to work change. 
 
Cash transfers and adolescent marital status 
Compared to education and work, evidence of the effects of UCTs on adolescent 
marriage status is thinner and almost all from sub-Saharan Africa (Lee-Rife et al. 2012; 
Kalamar, Lee-Rife, and Hindin 2016; Bastagli et al. 2016). Moreover, there is 
considerable variation in the findings, with most studies identifying no effect but some 
identifying negative and others positive effects on marriage status.  
 
Marriage rates of girls and young women were found to be unaffected by Kenya’s cash 
transfer for orphans and vulnerable children (CT-OVC), Malawi’s SCTS and Zambia’s 
Multiple Categorical Targeting Grant (MCTG) (Handa, Peterman, et al. 2015; Dake et 
al. 2018). The UCT arm of Malawi’s Zomba cash transfer reduced marriage rates 
among out-of-school girls during programme implementation, however, rates increased 
slightly among girls 15 years or older and effects were not sustained two years later 
(Baird, McIntosh, and Özler 2011; 2019). Siaplay (2012) finds that South Africa’s 
pension, one of few studies to look at both female and male marriage rates, reduced 
rates among boys but not girls. However, when differentiating results by gender of the 
recipient, female elders were found to reduce marriage rates for both girls and boys 
while male elders increased rates for both.  
 
The literature identifies two pathways through which UCTs can affect adolescent 
marriage, a school effect and a consumption effect. First, Dake et al. (2018) propose 
that, for as long as a UCT allows an adolescent to continue at school, then marriage will 
be delayed. However, their own findings indicate no effect on marriage rates and there 
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is little other evidence of UCTs reducing marriage rates through a school effect. In 
contrast to UCTs, several CCTs have been shown to delay marriage by inducing school 
attendance including Mexico’s Oportunidades, Pakistan’s FSSP and, in the longer term, 
the CCT arm of Malawi’s Zomba programme (Gulemetova-Swan 2009; Alam and Baez 
2011; Baird, McIntosh, and Özler 2019). This difference in marriage outcomes may 
occur because cash transfers by themselves do not change inherent preferences (Amin et 
al. 2017b). UCTs will support school attendance for those households that already 
prefer schooling over marriage but are financially constrained. The conditions of CCTs, 
on the other hand, may incentivise school attendance even for those households that 
have a stronger preference for marriage over schooling. Indeed, some CCTs and other 
marriage disincentive schemes that transfer cash or material benefits at a certain age, 
have been shown to delay marriage only for as long as the benefits are provided (Lee-
Rife et al. 2012; Amin et al. 2017b). While UCTs can have large positive effects on 
school attendance, it is uncertain that they will reduce marriage rates.  
 
Second, in addition to the school effect, Handa et al. (2015) suggest that, where 
traditional marriage practices involve a transfer of social and economic responsibility 
for the daughter to her husband’s household, additional income allows poor households 
to support the upkeep of their daughters for longer. While the authors find no evidence 
to support this in their own study on Kenya’s OVC programme, lower marriage rates 
were found among out-of-school girls in Malawi’s Zomba programme (Baird, 
McIntosh, and Özler 2011). However, as with the school effect, there is an underlying 
assumption that households prefer later marriage. Societies with traditional dowry 
practices tend to value earlier marriage for both social and economic reasons (Anderson 
2007). Thus, an additional pathway exists whereby a UCT could facilitate earlier 
marriage by covering the costs associated with dowry and the ceremony. Moreover, as 
with private education, it is possible that a UCT could facilitate access to loans large 
enough to cover the costs of marriage, which can be a significant financial burden on 
the bride’s household in contexts such as Nepal (Anderson 2007). 
 
The role of individual characteristics and other moderating factors 
The literature reveals that the effects of UCTs vary depending on the individual 
characteristics of the adolescent and various moderating factors, constraints and 
enablers, at the level of the household and the community, as well as the design of the 
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cash transfer and the effectiveness of implementation.10 This section briefly reviews 
some the most common factors that are relevant to this study. 
 
Evidence shows that the likelihood and magnitude of income effects vary along three 
main individual characteristics of the adolescent; gender, age and pre-treatment status. 
First, differences in effects by gender of the adolescent typically stem from the role of 
social and gender norms. These are discussed shortly in relation to the community 
context. However, it is worth noting that, despite the likelihood of gendered income 
effects, many studies do not differentiate analyses by gender. This is the case for 
approximately half of the studies related to education cited in Bastagli et al.’s (2016) 
systematic review.  
 
Second, transitions to adult roles become more likely with age. Several studies showed 
that cash transfers are associated with increases in economic work participation and 
marriage rates among older children. Moreover, cash transfers often have larger impacts 
on school attendance at specific junctures. Brazil’s social pension had a greater effect 
among 13-14 year olds in line with the local grade structure (de Carvalho Filho 2012). 
Third, pre-treatment status also matters. Whether an adolescent is already in school, 
married, or working before additional income is received by the household has 
implications for the potential impact on their life-course options. For example, it was 
shown earlier that UCTs are more likely to prevent school drop-out than to support 
(re)enrolment and adolescents who are already out of school may be more at risk of 
marriage or economic migration. 
 
At the household level, the effects of UCTs on adolescents are likely to vary by 
economic status, existing levels of human capital, household size and composition, 
ethnicity and caste, and the dynamics of intra-household decision-making and resource 
sharing. First, cash transfers are consistently shown to have greater effects on school 
participation and child work among the poorest households because they face liquidity 
and credit constraints (de Hoop and Rosati 2014). Ecuador’s BDH reduced adolescent 
labour participation but only among the poorest 25% of the target population (Edmonds 
 
10 Less proximate factors such as the wider political, legal, institutional and economic context are also 
important but are beyond the scope of this study. 
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and Schady 2012). However, it may be that the very poorest households are too poor to 
experience higher level benefits. Evidence from Nepal suggests that in the poorest 
households, OAA income is more likely to contribute to communal household needs 
such as food rather than children’s education (Uprety 2010). 
 
Second, better educated adult household members may place greater value on education 
and be better able to navigate access to services. While Pakistan’s FSSP had greater 
effects on delaying marriage and reducing work participation among the poorest, 
significant effects on school enrolment were more likely among adolescents with more 
highly educated parents (IEG 2011b). Better educated adults may also invest more in 
children’s development when they are young, providing a stronger foundation from 
which to benefit from a cash transfer during adolescence (Kilburn et al. 2017). Third, 
household size will affect the per capita value of the transfer and the dependency ratio 
in the household has been shown to moderate how a UCT affects adolescent work when 
the transfer is invested.  
 
Fourth, ethnicity and caste suffuse everything in Nepali society and are strong 
determinants of economic and social opportunities (Aasland and Haug 2011; Wagle 
2017). For example, in Nepal, Muslim households have strong religious obligations to 
educate their children in the Madrassa rather than the mainstream education system 
(Hafiz, Prakash, and Rajbhandari 2008). Employment opportunities are also strongly 
determined along caste lines. Despite receiving economic support, Dalits in India have 
been shown to withdraw young people from secondary schools due to their exclusion 
from employment opportunities in sectors requiring higher levels of education (Jeffrey, 
Jeffery, and Jeffery 2004). 
 
Fifth, the dynamics of intra-household decision making can be affected by a cash 
transfer and may determine how it affects household members. There are two important 
dimensions to this: who makes decisions about adolescents’ lives and who controls the 
resources. Cash transfers may have greater beneficial effects on children when received 
by women (Yoong, Rabinovich, and Diepeveen 2012). This suggests there are 
heterogeneous gendered preferences within the household. Studies on the effects of 
pensions cited previously all show that effects vary depending on the gender of the 
recipient, implying differences in preferences but also that resources are shared between 
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the generations. Case (2004) shows that effects of the South African pension on 
children are stronger in households that are reported to pool resources. It will be argued 
shortly that intra-household decision making is of central importance to analysing and 
understanding the effects of cash transfers on adolescents’ lives. 
 
The nature and magnitude of the effects of UCTs also depend on the local community 
context including livelihood risks and opportunities, the availability and quality of 
services and markets, and social and gender norms. First, evidence from Malawi 
showed that home-based work increases among agricultural households if the transfer is 
invested in productive inputs. India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Scheme resulted in a shift from distress migration in response to local shocks 
to more planned migration, but without changing overall migration levels (Pryia 
Deshingkar et al. 2010).  
 
Second, Mexico’s Oportunidades led to increases in migration to attend school where 
schools were not locally available (Rubalcava and Teruel 2006) and to increases in the 
number of years of schooling where there was access to better quality schools 
(Behrman, Parker, and Todd 2008). Pakistan’s FSSP had greater effects on school 
enrolment among girls in urban areas with better access to secondary schools (IEG 
2011b). Third, social and gendered norms and expectations about the roles of women 
and men in society will moderate the effects of UCTs (Lundgren et al. 2013). In Nepal, 
for example, the norms surrounding education, work and marriage make it more likely 
that additional income is prioritised towards boys’ education and potentially towards 
girls’ marriage. Prevailing social norms and expectations intersect with several other 
dimensions including the gender and age of the adolescent, intra-household resource 
sharing and decision-making. 
 
Both the design and effectiveness of implementation also determine how a cash transfer 
affects households and individuals. The literature points to several programme 
characteristics that are important including transfer size, frequency and reliability, 
duration of programme exposure, and targeting in terms of eligibility criteria and 
coverage (Bastagli et al. 2016). First, there is generally a positive association between 
transfer size and the range and size of impacts, but with some evidence of diminishing 
returns (Schady and Filmer 2009; Saavedra and Garcia 2012; Ferrarini, Nelson, and 
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Palme 2016; Datt and Uhe 2019). Davis and Handa’s (2015) analysis of 12 cash transfer 
programmes in sub-Saharan Africa suggests that a transfer size of 20% of household 
consumption is the threshold between seeing selected, shorter-term impacts and 
achieving more widespread and transformative impacts.  
 
Second, independent of transfer size, the frequency and reliability of transfers can 
determine how they are used. Smaller more frequent transfers tend to be prioritised 
towards basic consumption whereas larger less frequent transfers are more likely to be 
invested or used to purchase assets. At the same time, unpredictable transfers make it 
difficult for households to invest and commit to time-sensitive expenditures such as 
school costs (Slater, McCord, and Mathers 2014). 
 
Third, duration of programme exposure is important, especially for longer-term 
cumulative outcomes. South Africa’s Child Grant had greater effects on grade 
progression the longer children were enrolled in the programme (Eyal and Woolard 
2014) and reduced the chances of 15-17 year olds working outside the home if they had 
received the grant from an early age (DSD, SASSA, and UNICEF 2012). Nonetheless, 
cash transfers that have been evaluated after just one year of implementation still 
demonstrate significant short-term effects (Edmonds and Shrestha 2009; Miller and 
Tsoka 2012). Finally, programme targeting has two main dimensions: who is eligible 
and how effectively are the eligible reached. As already discussed, the gender of the 
recipient and their relationship to the rest of the household can influence outcomes. It is 
also essential to understand the extent of exclusion from the programme, and who is 
excluded, to properly interpret results, especially when take-up is low. 
 
Cash transfers and household decision-making: an analytical framework 
This section presents a framework for understanding the gendered effects of a UCT on 
adolescent life-course circumstances that centres on household decision-making and 
that is situated in the local cultural, social, economic and physical context. 
 
Many studies in the existing literature, especially those relying solely on econometric 
methods, take a narrow positivist stance that decontextualizes outcomes and the 
processes through which they occur, essentially ignoring much of the complexity of 
people’s lives (Adato 2008; Mahendru and Tasker 2020). The common assumption is 
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that a cash transfer, T, leads to an outcome, O, in a linear fashion via different pathways 
relating to consumption or investment decisions, E. Thus, T → E → O. At the point of 
expenditure or investment decisions, the household is assumed to act either as a unitary 
entity or as a collective unit whereby effects can vary according to who receives the 
transfer. Some studies that tend more towards a post-positivist stance (B. Johnson and 
Gray 2015) recognise that contextual factors at the level of the household and 
community, C, may moderate the effects of the cash transfer on the outcome of interest. 
Thus, T → (C)E → O (see for example Yoong, Rabinovich, and Diepeveen 2012; 
Bastagli et al. 2016).  
 
While these contextual factors are occasionally incorporated into the analysis, typically 
they are presented as speculative explanations for the observed results. For example, 
Bastagli et al.’s (2016) systematic review of the impacts of cash transfers in developing 
countries considers variation in outcomes by gender and major design and 
implementation features of the transfer. While the authors’ conceptual framework 
recognises that impacts can vary according to contextual constraints and enablers, they 
are not systematically discussed in the review ‒ a reflection of their secondary (or even 
tertiary) status in much of the literature. This appears to stem from a thin 
conceptualisation of people’s lives that has consequences for the research design and 
leads to potential misinterpretation of results and limited generalizability. Especially 
where no statistically significant results are found, explanatory capability is left 
wanting. In contrast, development anthropologists have long recognised that the 
subjects of policies and projects have their own agendas and interests and, from an 
outsider’s perspective, can behave in unexpected ways (Long 1990; Mosse 2004). To 
properly understand the effects of a cash transfer requires (re-)imagining it from the 
perspective of the household, and the individuals within it, as a resource that is 
incorporated into the on-going and complex reality of their lives. This study aims to 
incorporate some of this diversity and complexity.  
 
Philosophically, this study is perhaps most closely aligned with a critical realist 
perspective, integrating a realist ontology with a form of constructivist epistemology 
(Archer et al. 1998). The critical realist perspective has informed formation of the 
research questions and the analytical framework, and the choice and application of 
methods to address the research problem. In particular, the analytical framework, 
Chapter 2 
47 
depicted in Figure 4, draws on three central tenets of critical realism: an emphasis on 
thick causal description in addition to causal explanation; an understanding that values 
and beliefs form a part of reality and inform people’s actions; and a recognition of 
diversity as a real phenomenon (Maxwell and Mittapalli 2015). As such, the analytical 
framework recognises that ‘contextual’ factors are central to the analysis because, even 
more than the cash transfer, they determine decisions made about the outcomes of 
interest. The cash transfer is just one other element that enters the existing complexity 
of people’s lives, thus: C(+T) → E → O. Whether and to what extent the cash transfer 
affects the outcome of interest is determined by these factors and how they interact. 
 
Figure 4 Framework for analysing the effects of a cash transfer  




At the centre of the framework are decisions about adolescent life-course options which 
depend on the gendered preferences or interests and available resources of household 
members including parents or guardians, elders, and adolescents. Primary decision 
makers in this study are assumed to be parents but, in some cases, may be non-parental 
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caregivers. It is also recognised that elders, typically grandparents, can also influence 
decisions. In Nepal, elders have a particularly strong voice within the household 
especially if they are the household head. Gram et al. (2018) show that, among 
communities in the Terai, households tend to have a financial guardian who receives 
most income and is responsible for day to day expenditures, but that the household head 
may have the final say over major expenditures. In some cases, the elder may be the 
primary guardian of the adolescent, although analysis in Chapter 4 suggests that these 
households constitute only a small minority of the study population. Most adolescents 
are unlikely to control significant financial resources but are nevertheless able to 
influence decisions about their own lives to some extent, and increasingly so as they 
grow older. The effects of a cash transfer on their lives is contingent on their 
cooperation and thus their perspectives are also important.  
 
In the context of this study, the UCT enters the household via the elder recipient and 
becomes part of the decision-making process. For the UCT to affect adolescent 
outcomes it should lead to an increase in resource allocation towards the adolescent, 
towards household consumption in general, or towards the productive activity of the 
household. Whether and how this occurs is dependent on the dynamics of resource 
sharing within the household. In the economics literature, collective bargaining models 
recognise that households have multiple actors with different and often conflicting 
preferences or interests and with variable ability to fulfil them (Agarwal 1997; Thomas 
1990).11 Collective models tend to fall into two categories, cooperative and non-
cooperative.  In cooperative models, incomes are assumed to be pooled; however, there 
is substantial literature to suggest that households in developing countries often only 
partially pool resources (Alderman et al. 1995).12 In contrast, non-cooperative models 
recognise that both preferences and consumption decisions can be made individually 
based on non-pooled incomes (Doss 1996). Individual household members control their 
own income and bargain over how much to contribute to shared household goods and 
for other purposes.  
 
11 Alderman et al. (1995) argued more than twenty years ago that collective models should be the 
standard approach rather than the unitary model that assumes a single set of preferences for the 
household. 
12 In cooperative bargaining models, household resources are assumed to be pooled and consumption 
decisions are determined by each individual household member’s dissolution threshold, typically in 




Thus, while they may not be the primary decision-maker in relation to adolescents’ life-
course circumstances, the recipient of a UCT, in this case the elder, may influence 
expenditure or investment decisions in a way that affects co-resident adolescents. Even 
if the UCT is spent on the needs of the recipient this may result in a reduction in other 
household resources allocated towards the recipient (Alderman et al. 1995). In other 
words, the transfer expands the total household budget and other incomes may be 
allocated towards the adolescent. It is also possible that the recipient relinquishes 
control or is dispossessed of the transfer income, in which case it could still affect 
adolescents but would reduce the recipient’s influence in decision-making processes. 
The pathways through which the OAA affects adolescent outcomes, including its 
impact on the household economy and processes of resource sharing and decision-
making, are the focus of RQ2 and are analysed primarily in Chapters 6 and 7. While the 
study is unable to incorporate characteristics of parental decision-makers into the 
quantitative analysis (for reasons explained in Chapter 3), several approaches are taken 
to understand the dynamics of the decision-making process. These include describing 
household structures (Chapter 4), analysing heterogeneity in causal estimates by 
household structure (Chapter 5), investigating the role and influence of OAA recipients 
in household bargaining (Chapter 6), understanding parental or primary caregiver 
expectations about school completion and marriage timing, and drawing on the 
perspectives of adolescents, parents and elders in relation to the multiple factors that 
influence decision about adolescents life-course circumstances (Chapter 7). 
 
Adolescent life-course circumstances, shown in the lower part of Figure 4, are the result 
of this dynamic decision-making process. Focusing on decision-making requires 
consideration of the potential alternative outcomes and how they interact. This study is 
interested in adolescent transitions to adulthood. Thus, the framework incorporates the 
common, and often competing, set of life-course options together. The literature review 
identified the theoretical effects of UCTs on school attendance, work and marital status, 
depending on how additional income is allocated. School access may increase when a 
cash transfer helps to meet the direct costs of school, compensates opportunity costs, or 
enhances nutrition, but a cash transfer may also expand school choice, for example from 
public to low-fee private school. Average effects on work participation are ambiguous 
but can be specified by type of work. Paid economic work may decrease if the 
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additional income compensates lost income; but may increase if the income is used to 
meet labour market entry costs. Home economic and domestic work may decrease via 
the school effect; but may increase if the income is used for investment that increases 
labour demand at home or takes adults away from home. Marriage rates may decrease 
via the school effect or by meeting the adolescent’s basic cost of living but may increase 
if there is a preference for earlier marriage and the additional income contributes to the 
associated costs. Measurable changes in adolescent outcomes resulting from the OAA, 
and how they relate to each other, are the focus of RQ1 and are analysed primarily in 
Chapter 5. 
 
The upper part of Figure 4 shows that both the preferences and interests of households 
(parents, elders and adolescents) in relation to adolescents’ life-course circumstances, 
and the resources and opportunities available to them, are dependent on the cultural, 
social, economic and physical context in which they live. The literature review 
identified proximate moderating factors at the level of the household and the 
community, as well as the design of the UCT and effectiveness of implementation. 
These moderating factors are the focus of RQ3 and are analysed in Chapter 5, which 
incorporates more refined variable analysis related to individual and household 
characteristics, and Chapter 7, which provides a richer account of causal processes, 
embedding the role of the OAA within the cultural, social and economic diversity of the 
study community.  
 
Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed the existing literature on the effects of cash transfers on 
adolescent schooling, work and marriage, summarised current understandings of the 
theoretical pathways through which effects occur and identified common moderating 
factors at the household- and community-level. It has also introduced an analytical 
framework that guides the approach taken in the rest of the study. 
 
While some clear patterns have emerged in the literature over the last two decades, 
especially in relation to education, there is still considerable variation in the magnitude 
and sometimes direction of the impact of cash transfers on adolescents and, in some 
cases, an absence of effects. Most studies provide insufficient explanation for the 
variation in effects and largely overlook the complexity of people’s lives. In part, this 
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may be due to data limitations related to the units of analysis and measures of the 
phenomena of interest. However, it has also been shown that there are shortcomings in 
the analytical approach in many evaluative studies, especially those that rely solely on 
econometric methods.  
 
Drawing on a critical realist perspective, the analytical framework describes the 
contextualised processes and underlying assumptions that determine the nature of the 
effects of the OAA on adolescent life-course circumstances. At the heart of the 
framework is the process of household-decision making which draws on the non-
cooperative household bargaining model. This recognises that the nature of gendered 
preferences, resources and bargaining power within the household will determine 
expenditure decisions, and that additional resources may increase the bargaining power 
of the recipient. The effects of additional income on the adolescent depend on how it 
interacts with the household economy and how resource allocation decisions are 
influenced by the various moderating factors at the level of the household and the local 
community. It has been argued that a deeper understanding of these causal processes 
and greater recognition of social diversity are necessary for proper interpretation of 
marginal changes in average outcomes. 
 
Several key gaps in the literature have also been identified that are of relevance to Nepal 
and similar contexts and form the key areas of inquiry for this study. First, education 
provision is often assumed to be homogenous but can consist of state, private, and 
religious institutions. Understanding how cash transfers impact on school choice, not 
only school attendance, can reveal important insights into cost barriers, quality, and 
culturally determined preferences for education. Second, some studies propose, 
although with limited evidence, that cash transfers impact school attendance due to the 
relaxing of credit constraints. However, no studies have been identified to date that 
include investigation of the effects of cash transfers on loan taking for investment in 
human capital.  
 
Third, theoretical models indicate potentially different effects of cash transfers on child 
and adult paid work, but few studies focus on the period of adolescence during which 
incentives to work may change. Little is known about the thresholds at which 
households may choose to invest in adolescent work opportunities rather than in further 
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education. Fourth, the theoretical possibility that cash transfers may hasten marriage 
decisions is largely overlooked in the literature. This is particularly relevant for societies 
that favour early marriage and where dowry practices create economic incentives for 
earlier marriage. Fifth, cash transfers may induce adolescent out-migration, whether for 
education, work, or marriage. However, adolescents who have left the home are 
invisible in most studies that examine the effects of cash transfers on adolescents’ life-
course circumstances. Sampling of the population of interest should be inclusive of 
recent out-migrants. 
 
The next chapter provides a detailed account of the quantitative and qualitative methods 








This study makes use of integrated mixed-methods for data collection and analysis, an 
approach that is increasingly advocated for in the evaluation of economic and social 
development policies and projects in developing countries (Adato 2008; Devereux et al. 
2013; Bamberger 2015; Mahendru and Tasker 2020). The practice of mixed-methods in 
international development has primarily focused on integration of qualitative 
approaches into quantitative evaluative research (White 2008). Informed by the critical 
realist perspective, this study places equal emphasis on quantitative and qualitative 
methods. Maxwell and Mittapalli (2015) argue that critical realism is compatible with some 
of the important assumptions of both quantitative and qualitative paradigms. It provides a 
perspective in which to situate quantitative and qualitative approaches and specific 
methodological strategies to study the social phenomena of interest.  
 
The combination of methods can strengthen understanding of causal mechanisms by 
providing a balance between description and explanation. Moreover, by gaining 
subjective perspectives, including those of adolescents, qualitative methods can provide 
more interpretive understandings of the motivations behind the quantitatively revealed 
decisions that households make and provide insights into why different households may 
respond to the same UCT in very different ways. The critical realist emphasis on social 
diversity does not imply a preference for certain methods but has implications for the 
range of data collected, the need for adequate sample sizes to allow for differentiated 
analyses, and, in qualitative approaches, to allow for emergent ideas. While critical 
realism asserts that knowledge of social phenomena can only be subjective, it accepts 
that claims can be tested empirically. Importantly, it focuses attention on “…the specific 
plausible threats to the conclusions drawn in a given study, which depend on the context 
and purposes of that study as well on the methods used” (Maxwell and Mittapalli 2015, 
17 emphasis added). Collectively, the integration of methods provide a richer 
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understanding of what is happening, for whom, and why, and allows for more reliable 
generalisation of the findings (White 2015; Bamberger 2015). 
 
Household survey data is used to answer research question one (RQ1) to identify 
changes in adolescent life-course circumstances resulting from the Old Age Allowance 
(OAA); and to explore the assumptions and causal pathways underlying the effects of 
the OAA on adolescents proposed by research question two (RQ2). The quantitative 
analysis centres on making causal inferences about first order (income and expenditure) 
and second order (changes in life-course circumstance) outcomes. The qualitative data 
provides triangulation points for the quantitative data as well as deeper insights to 
interpret the findings of RQ1 and RQ2, especially in understanding the causal pathways 
through which effects occur. Qualitative data is also used to answer research question 
three (RQ3), to understand whether and how consideration of the OAA was factored 
into households’ decision making; and to situate the OAA within the context of other 
factors that influence decisions about adolescents’ lives. In-depth interviews (IDI) with 
members of OAA recipient households provide material to understand decision-making 
processes: who was involved and the range of factors – cultural, social, economic and 
environmental – that were considered, the weight that was given to economic 
opportunities and pressures, and whether the OAA was an explicit part of this thinking.  
 
Existing quantitative data was found to be inadequate to answer the research questions. 
OAA administrative data is of poor quality, difficult to access for researchers, and does 
not include information relevant to the outcomes of interest. National household surveys 
either do not include data on the OAA or have significant limitations including missing 
control variables, thin data on the nature of life-course outcomes, too few data points 
given the specific sub-population of interest, and the need for strong assumptions about 
co-residence status and the timing of life events.13 It was therefore necessary to conduct 
primary data collection for both the quantitative and qualitative components of the study.  
 
 
13 Surveys examined include: 2014 Nepal Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (NMICS 2014), conducted by 
the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) with support from UNICEF; 2016 Nepal Demographic and Health 
Survey (NDHS 2016), conducted by the Ministry of Health and Population (MOHP), New ERA and ICF 




Figure 5 depicts the chronology of the quantitative and qualitative research components. 
Quantitative data was collected in the form of a household survey, the Cash Transfers 
and Adolescent Life-Course Survey (CTALS), while qualitative data was collected in 
the form of in-depth interviews (IDIs). Data collection was structured such that the 
qualitative component followed and was informed by the CTALS before integrating the 
findings and analysis.14 While data collection was necessarily sequential, the theoretical 
placing and design of the research involved concurrent consideration of the two 
approaches and analysis was fully integrated in the overall study, reflecting the mixed-
method design typology of concurrent transformative (Alavi et al. 2018). More detailed 
accounts of the iterative and reflexive relationship between the quantitative and 
qualitative components of the research are provided later in the chapter. 
 




The rest of this chapter provides a detailed description of the quantitative and qualitative 
methods in turn, including the research design, tools, planning, data collection and 
quality, and analytical approach, as well as the main challenges encountered. The chapter 
ends with a consolidated discussion of the approach to research ethics and a reflection on 
the author’s positionality. 
 
Quantitative research methods 
This section describes the quantitative research methods including the analytical 
approach and CTALS design, development of the survey questionnaire, sampling 
strategy, survey team and training, data collection, and data management, cleaning and 
quality. Figure 6 depicts the quantitative research process. It shows how each stage of 
survey design, planning and implementation informed the subsequent stage, how 
iteration and reflection were built into the process, and the interlinkages with the 
qualitative component. The following sub-sections can all be related to stages in Figure 6.  
 
14 For reasons explained later in this chapter, qualitative data collection could not be done after 


















Figure 6 Quantitative research process and relation to qualitative component 
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Analytical approach and survey design 
Survey design was primarily informed by the main data analysis strategy required to 
answer RQ1 and aspects of RQ2. The following describes the theory behind the analysis 
and how this determined the data requirements and the main elements of survey design. 
 
The causal relationship proposed by RQ1 requires a valid counterfactual. The age 
eligibility criteria for the OAA provides a mechanism to identify such a control group. 
The approach involves comparing adolescents who live with elders who are eligible for 
the OAA to those who live with elders just under the age of eligibility. It is informed by 
several similar studies that make use of the South African old age pension to determine 
the effects of income on young people (Duflo 2003; Case 2004; Edmonds, Mammen, 
and Miller 2005; Edmonds 2006; Ndlovu, Mohapatra, and Luckert 2017) but with the 
primary difference that the data come from a bespoke survey. 
 
The approach comes under the umbrella of regression discontinuity designs (RDD) but 
is distinct from a standard RDD approach. Standard RDD implies that, given certain 
assumptions, units close to and either side of a cut-off point for eligibility are similar 
enough in relevant characteristics as to approximate random assignment (Angrist and 
Pischke 2009). This idea is valid when exogenously determined rules with a clear cut-
off threshold, such as an academic test or poverty score, determine access to the 
treatment. In such cases, randomisation is not simply an assumption but is the 
consequence of the individual’s “inability to precisely control the assignment variable 
near the known cut-off” (Lee and Lemieux 2010, 282). However, when age is the 
assignment variable, as is the case with most old age pensions, the approach is more 
akin to a “‘non-randomised’ discontinuity design” (ibid, 345). The implications of this 
are discussed in detail in Chapter 5 but the main structural requirements for the data are 
similar to the standard RDD and are depicted in Figure 7. 
 
Data were collected on the life-course circumstances of adolescents who co-reside with 
at least one OAA eligible elder, the treatment group, and those who co-reside with at 
least one non-eligible elder (and no eligible elder), the control group. The two groups 
represent similar households with the same long-term income but that differ in the 
timing of that income (Edmonds 2006). Data were also collected on a range of factors 
that may confound the comparison of the two groups, not least the age of the elders. 
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Adolescents, the primary unit of analysis, are defined as any current, or recently 
migrated, household member aged 10-17 years.15 In the majority non-Dalit households, 
co-residing elders are aged 65-74 years, representing a 10-year bandwidth around the 
OAA eligibility age of 70 years. Dalits are eligible for the OAA from age 60 as a 
response to their long-standing political and socioeconomic marginalisation (Gellner 
2007).16 In Dalit households, approximately 12.9% of the sample population and 13.6% 
nationally (Central Bureau of Statistics 2011a), co-residing elders are therefore aged 55-
64 years.  
 





The 10-year bandwidth was chosen to allow for short to medium term exposure to the 
treatment and to strike a balance between achieving the proposed sample size and 
maximising the internal validity of the study. Ten years is narrower than the bandwidth 
used in similar studies including Case (2004) with no limit, Duflo (2003) with a lower 
 
15 See the footnote on page 4 for the reasons for focusing on 10-17 year olds. The definition of current 
and recently migrated household members is provided later in the chapter. 
16 It is commonly stated by development practitioners in Nepal that the lower eligibility age is because of 
the low life-expectancy among Dalits. While this may have been the case historically, the 2006 Human 
Development Report (Bishwa Nath et al. 2009) estimates that life-expectancy among Hill Dalits is 60.89 
years and among Terai Dalits is 61.26 years, compared to the national average of 63.69 years. The lowest 
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bound of five years and no upper bound, and Edmonds (2006) with 25 years. While this 
approach can provide reliable estimates, one of the limitations is that the results are 
directly generalisable only to adolescents who live with elders of a similar age. 
Nonetheless, the approach has the advantage of maximising efficiency in data collection 
by excluding more disparately aged elders and demonstrates the applicability of the 
approach for research involving primary data collection.  
 
Given the diversity in data requirements relating to adolescents’ lives, the 
socioeconomic characteristics of the household, and OAA income, expenditure and 
implementation, the survey included questions for three respondent types: the elder, the 
parent or guardian of the adolescent, and the adolescent. Detailed descriptions of the 
variables and estimation strategy for causal inference are provided in the relevant 
chapters. 
 
Developing the CTALS questionnaire 
The CTALS questionnaire was designed to provide data to answer the research 
questions in combination with the qualitative component. The following describes the 
processes for drafting the survey questions and structure, converting the questionnaire 
into digital format, logical and technical testing, and translation. 
 
The draft questionnaire was developed in three main steps. First, Table 1 shows how the 
research questions were elaborated into more specific sub-questions and variable groups 
considering the analytical framework and the approach to data analysis. The second step 
was to map the meta structure of the questionnaire as depicted in Figure 8, by grouping 
questions considering their thematic similarity, the order of the topics covered (e.g., 
general to specific, innocuous to sensitive), and the most appropriate respondent. Four 
questionnaires emerged from this process: (i) the household questionnaire for the 
household head or person most knowledgeable about the economics of the household, in 
most cases the elder or parent/guardian of the adolescent; (ii) the parent questionnaire 
for the parent/guardian of all currently resident and recently migrated adolescents; (iii) 
the adolescent questionnaire for all available adolescents aged 10-17; and (iv) the elder 




Parts of the adolescent questionnaire that were considered factual rather than subjective, 
and knowable by a close relative (e.g. school attendance status and current grade), were 
incorporated into the parent questionnaire for cases where an adolescent had recently 
migrated, was temporarily unavailable, or their parent/guardian had refused consent for 
the adolescent to be interviewed (one case occurred). Within each household, the parent 
and adolescent questionnaires were repeated for each adolescent that met the criteria 
and similarly for the elder questionnaire. In the third step, sub-questions and areas of 
inquiry were translated into specific closed questions with reference to existing 
standardized national household surveys including the NMICS 2014, NDHS 2016, 
NLSS 2011, and the 2008 Nepal Labour Force Survey (NLFS 2008) conducted by the 
CBS and supported by the International Labour Organisation (ILO); and other survey 
questionnaires relevant to the study including the World Bank’s 2016 Household Risk 
and Vulnerability Survey (HRVS 2016), Hagen-Zanker, Mallet and Ghimire’s (2014) 
Dalit Child Grant Assessment Survey (DCGAS 2014) and Statistic South Africa’s 1999 
Survey of Activities of Young People (SAYP 1999). 
 
Table 1 Elaboration of research questions into sub-questions and variables of interest 
How does Nepal’s Old Age Allowance (OAA) change decision-making about adolescents’ 
life-course circumstances in multi-generational households? 
What are the gendered 
effects of OAA income on 
adolescents’ education, 
work, marriage timing? 
Dependent variables: Adolescent life-course outcomes relating 
to education (school type, attendance, grade, study time), work 
(types and hours), marriage (status and expected or ideal age) 
and migration (reasons, timing) 
Independent variables: OAA eligibility, age and gender of elder 
Variables for sample verification and assumption testing: 
Receipt of OAA income, adolescent characteristics (age, 
gender), household structure, education level of adults, 
livelihood types, local administrative area (VDC) 
What are the pathways 
through which the OAA 
affects adolescents’ life-
course circumstances? 
Household income, expenditure and loans and resource pooling; 
amount and frequency of OAA income; control of OAA income 
and spending patterns; reasons for being out-of-school. 
How is OAA income 




Decision making about different aspects of adolescents’ lives; 
decision making about use of household and OAA income; 
parental and adolescent expectations about education completion 





Figure 8 CTALS questionnaire meta structure 
A Basic interview information  To be filled in and verified prior to starting interview 
  Household I.D.  Automatically generated 
  Eligibility (age criteria)  If no eligible people present, skip to end     
  Household questionnaire 
 
Respondent should be household head or the person 
most knowledgeable about the household economy 
  Informed consent  If informed consent is not given, skip to end 
B Household members    
  Household characteristics    
  Household member roster    
  Individual member characteristics    
C Assets and services    
D Livelihoods, income, debt and expenditure    
  Closing section        
E Parent questionnaire  Repeats for each eligible adolescent 
  Informed consent – respondent    
  Informed consent – adolescent 
 
Informed Consent – only for currently resident 
adolescents. 
  Adolescent migration/absence 
 
Migration/absence only for unavailable or recently 
migrated adolescents or those without informed 
consent 
  Adolescent education  Education for all adolescents 
  Adolescent time allocation 
 
Time allocation only for currently resident but 
unavailable adolescents or those without informed 
consent 
  Adolescent marriage  Marriage for all adolescents 
  Closing section  
 
    
F Adolescent questionnaire 
 
Repeats for each currently resident adolescent with 
parental informed consent 
  Informed consent    
 Relation to other household members   
  Migration    
  Education  
 
  Time allocation    
  Marriage    
  Closing section        
G Elder person questionnaire  Repeats for each eligible elder person 
  Informed consent    
  Expenditure on adolescent  Expenditure repeats for each eligible adolescent 
  Old age allowance  Most questions limited to those who receive it 
  Closing section        
  No cooperation  Confirm that consent was not provided. 
  Not eligible or available 
 
Confirm that no household members met the eligibility 
criteria. 






Concerns have long been raised regarding definitions of the household in survey design 
(Kriel et al. 2014). Close attention was therefore paid to defining the household and 
household members through review of definitions in the reference surveys, consultation 
with local researchers, and testing and piloting the survey tool. To be considered a 
household member, the individual must typically sleep under the same roof (at least 
four days in the week), or an adjacent roof within the same plot, for at least six months 
of the year. If the individual entered the household within the past six months (due to a 
new birth or recent in-migration) they were also considered a household member if they 
were likely to reside within the household for at least six months. Given the interest of 
the study in the role of resource sharing, and recognising that this may not always occur, 
the concept of ‘eating from the same pot’ was deliberately omitted from the definition. 
The full survey questionnaire is available in its print format in Appendix 1. 
 
Once complete in print format, the questionnaire was digitised for use on tablets using 
the Open Data Kit (ODK) platform. The digital questionnaire went through several 
rounds of iterative testing of individual questions and structural integrity. Compared to a 
paper-based format, the digitised questionnaire had numerous advantages that 
contributed to better data quality including clarity in data recording, obligatory data 
fields and automatic skips, logical error testing based on previous responses and 
numeric calculations, real-time data retrieval, and elimination of a separate data entry 
process. The digitised format also simplified physical data management and enhanced 
data security. Several disadvantages became apparent during piloting and survey 
implementation including the possibility of mistyping especially numeric responses, the 
difficulty reviewing the household roster and the complex process for adding or deleting 
a household member once the household roster had been completed (a paper-based 
household roster tool was used to improve accuracy), the absence of an auto save 
function, and form save times of up to 30 minutes for very large households. These 
technical issues remained a challenge but were mitigated through continuous review and 
training which was made easier by the ability to instantly retrieve and analyse the data. 
 
To ensure accuracy of the translation, the questionnaire was first translated from 
English into Nepali by the survey team co-supervisor and then back-translated into 
English and edited by an independent local researcher. Although the predominant local 
language is Bhojpuri, with a minority of people speaking Maithili and occasionally 
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Hindi, it is common practice for survey enumerators in Nepal to live-translate from 
Nepali into the most appropriate language. This approach constituted a significant part 
of the survey team training which resulted in further improvements to the Nepali 
translation and agreement on the accuracy of local terms. Translation issues 
occasionally arose in the early stages of enumeration but were identified and corrected 
through daily de-briefings and real-time data analysis. The most significant of these 
resulted in 117 cases of missing data for recent school attendance because the Nepali 
word bandha, meaning strike or closure, also refers locally to school holidays.17 
 
Sampling strategy 
The CTALS sampled all households with at least one adolescent and one elder of the 
specified ages within a contiguous sub-region of Rautahat district; effectively a 
localised census of eligible households. The following explains how the research site 
was chosen, the rationale for taking a census approach and the sample size calculation.  
 
For practical and budget reasons, it was decided to focus on a single district selected 
according to relevant socioeconomic indicators and accessibility. At the time of 
planning, the 75 districts of Nepal fell into one of three eco-regions (the mountains, hills 
and plains or Terai) and one of five development regions (eastern, central, western, 
mid-western, and far-western) creating 15 sub-regions. The Central Terai region was 
selected as the broad location of interest due to the relatively high rates of poverty, early 
marriage, and school drop-out (Central Bureau of Statistics 2011c; 2015; Ministry of 
Health, New ERA, and ICF International Inc. 2017), the flat geography and high 
population density relative to the hill and mountain regions, and its accessibility from 
Kathmandu. Much of the Central Terai region maps onto the new Province 2, excluding 
Chitwan district at the western boundary and including two districts of what was the 
Eastern Terai.  
 
Table 2 shows the district selection criteria. Rautahat was selected primarily because of 
the high poverty rate (33.4) and food poverty rate (24.0), low Human Development 
 
17 Questions about school attendance were in reference to either the last week or the last week of term if 
the interview occurred during school holidays. In cases where bandha was recorded as the response to the 
‘reason for not attending school in the past week’, subsequent questions regarding the extent of school 
attendance were automatically skipped. 
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Index (HDI) (0.386), and high Human Poverty Index (HPI) (46.43). Household size is 
large (6.4) and population density is also high (610) which makes survey work more 
efficient. The Department of Civil Registration (DOCR) efficiency score (6) is low 
which indicates relatively poor implementation of civil registration and social security.18 
Despite the challenges this might create, Rautahat was considered the most appropriate 
district. 
 
Table 2 District selection criteria for research site 
District National 
Central Terai districts 
Bara Parsa Rautahat Sarlahi Mahottari Dhanusa 
Municipality/VDCa - 99 83 97 100 77 102 
Households (’000s)a 5,423 109 96 107 133 111 138 
Average households 
per M/VDC 
- 1,097 1,151 1,100 1,328 1,445 1,355 
Population (2011) 
(’000s)a 
26,495 688 601 687 770 628 755 
Gender ratioa 94 104 108 105 103 98 101 
Average household 
size 
4.9 6.3 6.3 6.4 5.8 5.6 5.5 
Population densitya 180 578 444 610 611 626 640 
DOCR work 
efficiency scoreb 
- 7 8 6 7 6 7 
Poverty ratec 25.2 29.9 29.2 33.4 17.7 16.2 23.1 
Food poverty ratec - 21.1 22.2 24.0 21.1 20.3 18.2 
HDId 0.509 0.457 0.464 0.386 0.402 0.388 0.431 
HPId 35.4 40.09 36.37 46.43 43.86 44.75 41.72 
Travel time from 
Kathmandu (hrs)e 
- 5 5 5.5 6.5 6.5 6 
Data sources: a National census (Central Bureau of Statistics 2011a); b DOCR (n.d.); c Small Area 
Estimation of Poverty (Central Bureau of Statistics 2013); d Nepal Human Development Report 
(Sharma, Guha-Khasnobis, and Raj Khanal 2014); e Google maps (www.google.com/maps)  
 
Representativeness at district level was unnecessary given the case study nature of the 
research. The CTALS focused on a single cohesive group of Village Development 
Committees (VDCs), the smallest administrative unit with a government office at the 
time of data collection, removing the need for cluster sampling. One major challenge 
was the lack of a sample frame. Census lists were unavailable, voter registers could be 
obtained locally but were outdated and did not include data on adolescents. This left two 
options, either to conduct a census prior to the survey to construct a sample frame or to 
 
18 Department of Civil Registration, Nepal Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Government (no date) 
Work efficiency level in various districts. Kathmandu, Nepal. 
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conduct the survey as a census of eligible households. The latter was more appealing 
given the simplicity of a single process to identify and interview eligible households and 
their estimated density within the population. Within the defined cluster of VDCs, all 
households that met the eligibility criteria were selected for interview.  
 
Using data from the NMICS 2014, it was estimated that households with co-resident 
adolescents and elders of the required age constitute 8.7% of households in the rural 
Central Terai. Based on an initial sample size of 1,500 households (see below) this 
meant that a census approach would require an area comprising at least 17,241 
households. Official census data suggests that this equates to approximately 16 of 93 
VDCs in Rautahat district, providing sufficient area to ensure representation of different 
caste and religious groups and other geographic variation (Central Bureau of Statistics 
2012). VDCs were selected based on small area estimation poverty rates (Central 
Bureau of Statistics 2013) and such that they formed a contiguous area across both 
Muslim and Hindu communities and were commutable daily from the district capital of 
Gaur. Figure 9 shows the VDCs selected for inclusion in the survey within southern 
Rautahat district and its location within Nepal.  
 
Figure 9 Map of southern Rautahat district and selected VDCs 
 
Source: Adapted by the author from the Rautahat District Map published by the Office for the 




Power analysis was conducted to determine the minimum detectable effect (MDE) for 
key outcome variables for a given sample size, which were then benchmarked against 
existing studies. The literature review in Chapter 2 shows that a wide range of effect 
sizes are measured under different programme designs and socioeconomic and cultural 
contexts. The sample size and MDEs were benchmarked against studies that employ 
either a similar approach to causal inference or that use data from Nepal. The most 
relevant of these is Edmonds’ (2006) study of the South African old age pension with a 
sample of 1,387 13-17 year olds in rural households for the main ITT estimates.19 The 
main findings show a statistically significant 17.5pp increase in school attendance for 
boys (n=710); but the 7.8pp increase for girls (n=677) is not statistically significant. 
Moreover, there is a statistically significant 7.2pp decrease in any work participation 
among girls, but the 19.1pp decrease in market work participation is not statistically 
significant. The study also identifies statistically significant changes in daily hours 
worked varying between 0.049 and 1.249 hours. Using matching methods with a sample 
of 3,354 girls aged 8-16 years (of whom 812 are in the treatment group), Datt and Uhe 
(2019) show that ‘high-value’ scholarships in Nepal, equivalent to at least 5% of the per 
capita poverty line (or 4% of the intended value of the OAA), are associated with a 
statistically significant decrease of 4.1 hours spent doing extended economic work per 
week; but the decrease of 2.1 hours in economic work and 1.3 hours in chores are not 
statistically significant. Using an experimental design with 660 10-16 year olds whose 
families work in the Kathmandu carpet weaving industry, Edmonds and Shrestha (2014) 
show that those who received both a scholarship covering direct school costs up to a 
maximum of NRs 3,950 per year, and an in-kind food stipend worth NRs 1,000 per 
month conditional on at least 80% attendance, saw a statistically significant 4.9pp 
increase in school attendance; those who received only the scholarship saw a 2.3pp 
increase which was not statistically significant.20 There are apparently no studies that 
use data from Nepal or a similar methodology to estimate the effects of cash transfers 
on marriage rates. 
 
 
19 Others that use a similar methodology with the South African pension include Case (2004) with 517 
adults and Duflo (2003) with 1,547 females aged 0-5 years. All these studies use existing households 
survey data, and none discuss the implications of the sample size on the estimates. 
20 Several factors make this example substantially different from this study including the specific 
livelihood background of the children’s families, the urban context with much higher living costs, and the 
attachment of behavioural conditions to receipt of the cash transfer.  
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Given budget availability, the initial upper sample size was set at 1,500 households, 
yielding an estimated 2,700 adolescents or 1.8 per household.21 Four outcome variables 
were selected for the power analysis for which data is available in the NMICS 2014; 
school attendance in the past year, participation in non-agricultural economic work in 
the past week, hours spent in non-agricultural economic work in the past week, and 
marital status. Sample population estimates for the variables were produced for the 
population of adolescents aged 10-17 years from the Eastern, Western and Central Terai 
sub-regions, and separately for females including marital status for 15-17 year olds, 
which are shown in the first column of Table 3. 
 





1 − 𝑅2)    (1) 
  
where t1 is the T-value corresponding to the desired significance level of the test (α) and 
t2 is the T-value corresponding to the desired power of the design (β), P is the 
proportion of the study population that would have a value of 1 for the binary outcome 
in the absence of the program, T is the proportion of study sample that is randomly 
assigned to the treatment group, na(f) is the sample size for adolescents (females) and R
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is the proportion of outcome variance explained by level 1 covariate(s). For a single 
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21 Estimates are based on the author’s calculations using data from the NMICS 2014 for adolescent-elder 
co-resident households in the Central Terai.  
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𝑃𝑎 𝜎𝑦 𝑃𝑎𝑓 𝜎𝑦 na naf na naf na naf 
Sample size - - - - 2295 1211 2312 1144 1607 796 
Attended school, current year 0.91 - 0.89 - 0.035 0.053 0.035 0.054 0.042 0.065 
Participated in non-agri work, past week 0.22 - 0.24 - 0.051 0.072 0.050 0.074 0.060 0.089 
Married - - 0.12 - - 0.054 - 0.055 - 0.066 
Hours doing non-agri work, past week 8.76 9.24 8.85 8.33 1.13 1.40 1.13 1.44 1.35 1.73 
Data source: NMICS 2014. a Population estimates are for adolescents aged 10-17 years in the Eastern, Central and Western Terai; marriage rates are for 15-17-year-old 
females. b Initial estimates are based on a sample size of 1,500 households with an estimated 1.8 adolescents (0.95 females) per household and an OAA coverage rate of 
0.85. c Final sample estimates are based on the actual survey sample and OAA coverage rate of 0.663. d Final sample but without adolescents who co-reside with a widow 




The sample was adjusted to account for under-coverage of the OAA, initially estimated 
as 85% based on previous literature (Samson 2012). With this adjustment, sample size, 
na and naf, is calculated as 2,295 adolescents and 1,211 female adolescents from 1,500 
households, respectively. Sample proportions for binary variables, P, and standard 
deviation of the continuous variable, 𝜎𝑦, are given in column 1 of Table 3. One-sided 
hypotheses were assumed based on evidence in the literature for the main outcome 
variables (see Chapter 2). Significance was set at 95% and subject to the Bonferroni 
correction to account for the four most critical parameters of interest (Djimeu and 
Houndolo 2016), education, work, marriage, and migration (α = 0.05 / 4 = 0.0125). In 
line with common practice, statistical power was set at 80% (β = 0.8). The sampling 
approach allowed for equal distribution between treatment and control groups (T = 0.5). 
Several covariates associated with the outcomes, including age of the elders and 
adolescents, education status of the household head, ethnicity/caste, and locality, were 
known to be available and conservatively estimated to explain 10% of the variance 
(R2 = 0.1).  
 
Column 2 of Table 3 shows MDE estimates from equations (1) and (2) for the four 
outcome variables based on the initial target sample size of 2,295 adolescents (1,211 
female). The minimum detectable percentage point increase for school attendance 
(0.035 full sample; 0.054 females) and market work participation (0.05 full sample; 
0.074 females) are similar or smaller than most statistically significant estimates in 
comparable studies. The MDEs for work hours in the past week (1.13 full sample; 1.44 
females) are small enough to detect any meaningful change. Moreover, the estimates are 
conservative, given the modest adjustment for covariates and the Bonferroni correction. 
 
Two complications arose which affected the sample size. First, during data collection, 
data analysis showed that actual coverage of the OAA was closer to 65%, substantially 
lower than initially estimated. To maintain the target sample size of 2,295 adolescents it 
was necessary to increase the number of households by adding additional VDCs to the 
population area. The final sample included 2,018 households from 13 VDCs, yielding 
3,487 adolescents of whom 1,725 are female, and with an OAA take-up rate of 66.3%. 
Column 3 of Table 3 shows that MDE estimates using the actual sample size adjusted 
for OAA take-up are close to the initial estimates. Second, during data analysis it 
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became apparent that a non-trivial number of widows and single women (WSW) were 
receiving cash transfers prior to OAA eligibility in the form of the widows and single 
women’s allowance (WSWA). When applying a discontinuity approach, this has the 
potential to attenuate the estimated effects of the OAA. A detailed explanation is given 
in Chapter 5. As a result, adolescents who co-reside with a widow are removed from the 
main analysis, reducing the sample size by 30.5%. Column 4 in Table 3 shows MDEs 
for the final sample excluding WSW. 
 
Data collection 
The following describes recruitment, responsibilities, and training of the survey team; 
piloting and field testing; community access; household identification, interviews, and 
monitoring; and the consequences of extreme flooding that occurred during survey 
implementation. 
 
Figure 10 depicts the timeline for survey implementation from recruitment through to 
completion of data collection. The team was recruited in May and June 2017 through a 
local research institute, the Nepal Participatory Action Network (NEPAN).22 The survey 
team consisted of the Principal Investigator (PI, the candidate), one Nepali co-
supervisor (male) and 11 Nepali enumerators (3 male, 8 female). The co-supervisor was 
required to speak English, Nepali and Bhojpuri and enumerators were required to speak 
Nepali, Bhojpuri, Maithili and Hindi. The co-supervisor’s main responsibilities were to 
support the PI in planning and executing the survey including preparatory work such as 
planning, logistics, research site reconnaissance, translation and training; gaining access 
to selected communities; managing the sampling process; and oversight of the survey 
team in the field and delivery of the survey outputs. Enumerators’ responsibilities were 
to participate in training; contribute to survey planning and logistics; acquire access to 
local communities; ensure accurate sampling; identify, engage and interview sampled 
households; and participate in survey review meetings. Survey team members were 
provided a contract, insurance for the duration of the field work, and were subject to 
performance management. Terms of reference are provided in Appendices 2 and 3. 
 
22 NEPAN is a member organisation with nearly 300 members across Nepal. Professor Robert Chambers 
is an honorary associate member. The core team also undertakes primary research and has collaborated 
with development partners including UNICEF, ODI and HelpAge international (see www.nepan.org.np). 
The research was fully self-funded and the research team was paid directly by the PI. All support 




Figure 10 Timeline for CTALS implementation, May – November 2017 
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The PI led a six-day training programme for the team at the end of July 2017. The 
training covered the research background, questions and analytical framework; 
quantitative analysis approach; survey design and sampling; principles of good 
enumeration; questionnaire familiarisation and review; strategies for household 
identification and multi-member interviews; interview practice and piloting; 
questionnaire review and feedback; research ethics; and logistics and safety in the field. 
Most training time was dedicated to understanding and using the digitised 
questionnaire. As part of this, the PI led a pilot exercise in a semi-rural community in 
Dharmastali in Kathmandu district and the first two days in Rautahat district were 
dedicated to field testing in a non-sample area. Piloting and field testing resulted in 
various modifications to the questionnaire, use of the tablets, procedures for household 
identification, and interview technique, which are discussed where relevant. 
 
Data collection took place between 1st August and 10th November 2017 in two phases 
interrupted by flooding. To work in the district, a letter of introduction was provided by 
the Director General of the DOCR (see Appendix 9), and the District Development 
Committee (DDC) office introduced the VDC Secretary, the most senior local-level 
official. VDCs are divided into nine wards and enumerators worked ward-wise in pairs 
to make an initial list of eligible households. Local informants who helped with 
household identification tended to be male by default which risked overlooking eligible 
elder females. Where possible, the team engaged female informants, such as female 
community health volunteers (FCHVs), or requested other female elders to review 
initial sample lists. Local leaders occasionally accompanied the initial walk around the 
Recruitment 
Reconnaissance 





Training & piloting Elections 
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community. Despite the potential to undermine the perceived independence of the 
research team this was deemed necessary to facilitate community access. 
 
The main sample units are adolescents aged 10-17 years who co-reside with at least one 
elder aged 65-74 years (or 55-64 if Dalit). Adolescents were eligible for the sample if 
they were currently resident in the household or were previously resident but out-
migrated within the past three years. An elder was eligible for the sample only if they 
were currently resident. Explaining the household identification criteria to local 
informants was difficult. Instead, a protocol was devised such that households were 
initially identified based on the presence of an elder of the specified age. Enumerators 
then visited the household and verified the presence and age of the elder (for 
consistency, elders’ citizenship cards were requested for age verification) before 
determining the presence of adolescents, and double checking for those who were 
temporarily absent or had recently migrated.23 Married female adolescents who had left 
the household within the past three years were at risk of being overlooked due to no 
longer being considered part of the (maternal) household and may be underrepresented 
in the sample despite conscious efforts to identify them.  
 
Once a household was selected, the most appropriate informants were identified. In all 
cases, the household questionnaire was administered first. Where possible, the 
questionnaire order followed parent, adolescent(s) and elder(s) but could be reordered 
depending on availability of the respondents. All efforts were made to interview 
respondents in private, however, this was not always possible. In such cases, 
enumerators ensured that others did not interfere directly in the interview unless for 
clarification of a factual point on request of the respondent. Mitigating strategies were 
developed to deal with other challenges surrounding the interview, especially dealing 
with interested on-lookers and crowds. To complete one household typically took 
between one and 1.5 hours, but up to three hours for the largest households. The target 
was to achieve an average of four interviews per enumerator per day, but this was 
balanced with the need to maintain interview quality. 
 
 
23 Some VDCs included residents from VDCs of other districts, for example a cluster of households in 
Raj Devi which had relocated 12 years previously due to flooding. Such households were excluded from 
the survey as they still received services, including social security, from their VDC of origin. 
Chapter 3 
73 
The PI and co-supervisor were responsible for monitoring the field work and data 
quality. In the earlier stages of data collection, the PI spent time every day with each 
enumerator during interviews. This was later reduced to spot checks every two days 
while the co-supervisor remained in the field to respond to problems in person or by 
phone. In addition to the pilot and field tests, the first two interviews of each enumerator 
were reviewed in detail by the PI and co-supervisor. Subsequently, completed 
questionnaires were downloaded every two days and data was analysed by the PI to 
check for logical errors and outliers and to review data structure for non-obvious 
systematic errors or potential bias. Issues were discussed with the relevant enumerator 
resulting in either accepting the value, changing to a known value, verifying with the 
respondent (phone numbers were provided by 72% of households and return visits were 
made where necessary), or flagging where the correct value was unknown or uncertain. 
Common issues were then fed-back to the team in a daily de-briefing. This process saw 
a steady decline in the number of errors during the first week and led to enhanced 
interview technique and data quality throughout data collection.24 
 
One major challenge during data collection was the occurrence of extreme flooding 
across the region, reportedly the worst in more than 20 years in Rautahat district.25 The 
floods caused (relatively few) deaths among the local population, and widespread 
destruction of and damage to homes, assets, crops, and infrastructure (National Planning 
Commission 2017). The floods reached southern Rautahat on 12th August, 11 days into 
data collection. Following safe evacuation of the team and monitoring of the post-flood 
situation, it was decided to restart data collection on 1st October, after the local elections 
and Dashain, the largest of the Nepali festivals (see Figure 10). In addition to the 
overall delay and some increase in costs, the floods had several implications which 
could impact on data quality. The local elections ushered in a new federal era in Nepal 
with changes to local governance structures and administrative areas. However, this did 
not cause difficulty to community access or the sampling strategy. While some local 
roads were damaged and out of use, increasing travel times to certain locations, the 
 
24 The monitoring process identified malpractice on the part of one enumerator who was expelled from 
the team as a result. Out of 40 households interviewed by the enumerator, more than half were found to 
be ineligible and the remainder were re-interviewed in full. Monitoring and post-interview spot checks of 
other households did not reveal similar issues with other enumerators. 
25 The Himalayan Times, August 18, 2017. Rautahat Flood Victims Deprived of Relief Packages. 




selected VDCs remained accessible. All original team members were able to resume 
work in October, however, three members including the co-supervisor could not remain 
until the end. The most senior enumerator stepped into the co-supervisor role and three 
additional enumerators were recruited and provided intensive training and close 
monitoring by the PI. Despite the impact of the floods, communities and respondents 
remained cooperative. The team took additional care to explain the purpose of the 
research and to differentiate it from humanitarian needs assessments which had been 
conducted in the aftermath of the floods. Special attention was paid to the reference 
period for certain questions and the reasons for any recent changes to adolescents’ life-
course circumstances. While the floods and major festivals put considerable financial 
strain on households, the sampling strategy meant that the effects were distributed 
evenly between treatment and control groups.  
 
Data management, cleaning and quality 
A data management strategy was developed prior to data collection which covered 
sample unit identification and confidentiality, use of the tablets, and data storage. 
Households were allocated a unique I.D. consisting of a string of two-digit integers 
representing the enumerator, the VDC, the ward, and the household, the latter assigned 
by each enumerator in order of each interview within the ward. This system was used to 
identify saved questionnaire files and households within the dataset. Individual 
household members are further differentiated by their line number in the household 
roster. Individual names are recorded in the completed digital questionnaires and the 
exported raw data files but were deleted as part of the data cleaning process and do not 
appear in the master datasets. Prior to initiating the survey, regular checks were made to 
ensure all enumerators had the most recent version of the digital questionnaire. 
Protocols were established for managing data within the tablet including password 
protection, saving, editing and deleting files (the latter only actionable by the PI), 
managing incomplete forms, and file transfers. Completed forms were transferred to the 
PI’s laptop every two days, immediately backed up to a separate hard disk and cloud 
storage (both are password protected), and then deleted from the tablet.  
 
A data cleaning strategy was developed prior to data collection which draws on best 
practice (Ruel, William, and Gillespie 2018a). As described in the previous sub-section, 
data cleaning started during data collection with the daily monitoring process. A 
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detailed record was kept of all proposed changes which were applied during post survey 
data cleaning to ensure consistency. Data cleaning involved consistent formatting and 
labelling, identifying and investigating individual missing cases, don’t know and other-
specify responses, cross-tabulating variables based on skip and gateway patterns, and 
checking for other implausible values including outliers. A small number of missing 
values were imputed during the data cleaning process for the components of key 
explanatory variables including total household income (six cases) and expenditure (57 
cases). Imputation was done using linear regression in two stages, first using the 
maximum number of variables available that are plausibly correlated with income and 
expenditure, and second, estimating a reduced model with only significant predictors. 
Imputations were verified by examining the correlation between actual and predicted 
values and the plausibility of the predicted missing values. Data cleaning was done 
using Stata and all syntax and related notes are recorded. 
 
Total survey error (TSE) is an approach used to measure and enhance data quality in 
terms of its representation of the target population and measurement of the concepts of 
interest (Fuchs 2011). Representation considers coverage, sampling, non-response and 
adjustment error, while measurement considers error resulting from (mis)specification 
of the concepts, choice of survey mode, the questionnaire, interviewer, respondent, and 
data processing. The TSE framework was used to develop strategies to minimise each 
potential source of systematic and random error, many of which have been described 
earlier in the chapter.26 The following considers each component of TSE in turn. 
 
The potential for coverage error is effectively zero as the survey took a census approach 
and the target population was fully accessible. Sampling error may have occurred 
during the identification process through mis-identification of age or residence status or 
by simply overlooking eligible households. Although age reporting sometimes varies 
depending on who is asked (and when), spot checking of sampled households during the 
survey and qualitative data collection did not reveal any mis-identification of elders or 
adolescents. Apart from one uncooperative household for which eligibility was 
suspected but could not be confirmed, it is not possible to know if other eligible 
 
26 A formal TSE approach culminates in calculation of the mean square error (MSE). However, this can 
be prohibitively demanding in terms of data and analysis and was not applied here (Fuchs 2011). 
Chapter 3 
76 
households were overlooked. However, this type of error is thought to be low given the 
identification process.  
 
Non-response error can occur at household, respondent and question level. Once 
identified, no sampled households or individual respondents refused to cooperate. 
However, of 3,015 current adolescent household members, 389 (12.9%) were 
unavailable for interview due to temporary absence, for example, for work or visiting 
family. In this case, the full adolescent questionnaire was given to the parent which may 
have affected respondent error (see below).  
 
Specification error is concerned with whether the questions measure the target concepts. 
Most questions in the survey aimed to reveal (arguably) objectively verifiable facts such 
as age, enrolment status, and receipt of OAA income. However, certain questions, or 
groups of questions, represent more subjective or multifaceted concepts. The most 
complex of these are the composite measures of economic welfare including household 
income, consumption, and asset wealth. All three measures made use of short form 
modules. The asset wealth and consumption modules aimed to produce a relative 
ranking between households using a representative number of items. Both approaches 
have been shown to provide rankings that are generally consistent with longer form 
modules (Morris et al. 2000; Moratti and Natali 2012). The income module estimated 
total household income from up to four main livelihoods and all forms of transfer 
income. The methods for each are described in detail in Appendix 4. These variables 
measure different underlying constructs, however, they are related and should have 
some degree of concurrence (Ruel, William, and Gillespie 2018b). As shown in 
Appendix 4, the correlation coefficient is 0.63 for per capita household income and 
consumption; 0.48 for per capita household income and asset wealth; and 0.53 for per 
capita consumption and asset wealth. Income and consumption are conceivably more 
closely related to each other than with asset wealth, as is the case. The degree of 
correlation in the CTALS is also good by comparison. Using 20 datasets from 
standardised surveys (LSMS and similar) from developing and transition countries in Asia, 
Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe, Carletto, Tiberti and Zezza (unpublished) find 
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the average correlation between per capita income and consumption is 0.41, ranging from 
0.19 to 0.64.27 
 
Measurement error considers the characteristics of, and interrelation between, the 
survey mode, questionnaire, interviewer and respondent. The use of face-to-face 
interview was the only viable survey mode for a population with low levels of literacy, 
limited access to telephone and internet, and the absence of an existing sample frame. It 
also enabled interviews with multiple household members including adolescents. 
Trained interviewers have the advantage of securing higher response rates at the 
individual and question level thereby reducing non-response error, ensuring questions 
are correctly understood by the respondent, and minimising recording error. However, 
interviewer-led data collection may introduce social desirability distortion if 
respondents’ answers reflect what they perceive the interviewer wants to hear (Fuchs 
2011). Along with personal bias, this issue formed part of the training process to 
promote consistency within the survey team. Given the ward-wise distribution of 
enumerators, any enumerator effects are a combination of individual and ward level 
effects, both of which are distributed evenly between treatment and control groups.  
 
Regarding respondents, of some concern were adolescents interviewed in the presence 
of their parents (n=345) and parents interviewed in lieu of adolescents (n=389). 
Accompanied adolescents may have modified certain responses due to the presence of 
their parents. Parents of unavailable adolescents were not asked to speculate about the 
adolescent’s subjective expectations about their future level of education and age at 
marriage, however, they were asked to estimate adolescent time-use allocation for study 
and work. While these variations in interview approach are likely to have introduced 
some element of bias, it was considered preferable to obtaining no data. Moreover, any 
difference between the adolescents could result from an underlying qualitative 
difference in their circumstance as much as from the interview approach.28  
 
27 Carletto, Gero, Marco Tiberti, and Alberto Zezza. 2019. “Measure for Measure: Comparing Survey 
Based Estimates of Income and Consumption for Rural Households.” Unpublished. 
28 T-tests confirm that available adolescents did 0.61 hours more domestic work (t = 1.80, Pr(T>t) = 
0.036) and 1.16 hours less economic work (t=-2.30, Pr(T<t) = 0.011) in the past week than temporarily 
unavailable adolescents. Of greater note is that adolescents who were interviewed with their parents did 
4.91 hours more domestic work (t = 13.59, Pr(T>t) = 0.000) and 2.08 hours more economic work (t = 
6.73, Pr(T>t) = 0.000) in the past week than adolescents interviewed independently. Either adolescents 




Validity and reliability of the questionnaire and use of tablets was discussed in the 
previous section on data collection. One simple test that captured several aspects of 
measurement error was to cross-check the name and gender of household members. 
Assuming the name was recorded correctly, among 18,136 household members nine 
cases (0.05%) were identified as having the wrong gender (and were subsequently 
corrected) and five cases (0.03%) were ambiguous. Processing error was minimised due 
to use of technology which allowed direct importation of the data and the process of 
real-time and ex-post data cleaning described earlier. This also helped to identify data 
that was either illogical or implausible due to reporting or recording error. Missing data 
are found in 86 of 245 variables (35%); however just 27 variables (11%) have missing 
data for more than 1% of cases. These are clustered in three areas: respondent 
attentiveness and perceived veracity; hours engaged in work activities; and school 
attendance in the past week (discussed earlier). In addition, questions identifying the 
relationship of the adolescent to other household members were ineffective due to 
confusion over the direction of the relationship (e.g. specifying uncle rather than niece) 
and cannot be used. This was intended to form an integral part of the quantitative 
analysis to understand who in the household is primarily responsible for making 
decisions and to incorporate the characteristics of parents into the quantitative analysis. 
Nevertheless, some limited analysis has been possible in this area. Any issues related to 
missing data in the variables used in the analysis are discussed in the relevant chapters. 
 
In summary, while it was not possible to formally quantify TSE, application of the 
framework to the CTALS has demonstrated the steps taken to minimise error and 
provided some evidence of the level of bias and undue variation that may exist, 
especially for more subjective and complex concepts. In terms of the validity of the 
counterfactual for RQ1, given the structure of the sample around age of the elders, it is 
likely that survey error is relatively evenly distributed between the treatment and control 
groups, a hypothesis which is tested in Chapter 5 prior to the analysis.  
 
Qualitative research methods 
This section describes the qualitative research methods including the overall approach 
and how this relates to reflexivity, data quality, credibility and reliability; the planning 
stage including tool development and piloting and the research team and training; the 
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sampling strategy; data collection including the interview process, data management, 
and transcription; and coding and analysis. Figure 11 depicts the qualitative research 




In line with the integrated approach to mixed methods, the qualitative competent is 
indivisible from, and has equal importance as, the quantitative component. The 
qualitative aspects of the research questions are primarily answered through the stories 
of individual cases collected through semi-structured, in-depth interviews (IDI) with 
individual household members including the adolescent, a parent and the OAA 
recipient. IDIs were favoured over focus group discussions given the emphasis on intra-
household dynamics and the slight sensitivity of the topics. This approach supports the 
objective of seeking ‘deeper’ information concerning “…personal matters, such as an 
individual's self, lived experience, values and decisions…” (J. M. Johnson 2011, 104) 
about the topics of interest to the study. 
 
Organisation and interpretation of the qualitative data involved a hybrid thematic 
analysis (Hsieh and Shannon 2005; Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2006). Following 
Fereday and Muir-Cochrane’s (2006) analysis of their own qualitative research 
approach, the methods reflect Alfred Schutz’s (1899-1959) links between 
phenomenology and social science through two orders of verstehen, or interpretative 
understanding. 
The first order is the process by which people make sense of or interpret the 
phenomena of the everyday world. The second order of understanding 
involves generating “ideal types” through which to interpret and describe the 
phenomenon under investigation (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2006, 81). 
 
The sociology of Schutz is grounded in a realist view of the world but recognises that 
any interpretation of that must be subjective (Lewis, McLain, and Weiger 1993). This 
implies the need for a combination, or hybrid, of deductive and inductive inquiry. In 
practice, this is realised through use of an a priori analytical framework and codebook 
and an iterative process of empathetic investigation (Cornish, Alex, and Zittoun 2014) 




Figure 11 Qualitative research process and relation to quantitative component
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Schutz proposed three core postulates to ground the two levels of understanding in the 
“subjective meaning of human action” (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2006, 81): logical 
consistency, subjective interpretation, and adequacy. Adherence to these postulates is 
one basis for demonstrating credibility and reliability of the data. Logical consistency 
ensures rigour in the research process and is applied through systematic planning, as 
depicted in Figure 11, consistent application of the analytical framework to the research 
process, and (this) detailed description of the methods. Logical consistency applies 
equally to the quantitative methods and the process of integration. Subjective 
interpretation is demonstrated through use of inductive theme generation and analysis 
grounded in the data and the local context and direct reference to the raw data (i.e. use 
of quotations) in the presentation of the findings. 
 
Adequacy refers to the “consistency between the researcher’s constructs and 
typifications and those found in common-sense experience” (Fereday and Muir-
Cochrane 2006, 81). The most direct way to promote adequacy is to engage local actors, 
including respondents, in validating the findings or even in co-constructing meaning 
from their own data. Due to cost and time limitations, it was not possible to return to the 
research site during or after the qualitative analysis phase. However, the interviewers 
regularly summarised the conversation with respondents during the interviews to verify 
their responses and encourage greater reflection. Moreover, the qualitative component 
itself serves to validate the adequacy of the quantitative constructs and findings. 
 
Adequacy can also be improved by applying the philosophy of perspectivism, 
recognising that one’s own viewpoint is relative and that the sum of collective 
perspectives can elevate knowledge to a higher, more synthesised level through a 
collaborative research process (Cornish, Alex, and Zittoun 2014). Several steps were 
adopted to draw in multiple perspectives. The PI and the two research assistants (RA) 
held daily face-to-face debriefings during data collection to allow the data to be 
internalised, sense checked and to inform subsequent interviews. Codebook 
development included a process of double-coding with the RAs to improve coherence 
between the analytical constructs and reality. Points for reflexivity were integrated into 
the research process and findings have been shared with peers and experts at key stages 
including between quantitative and qualitative data collection, and during and after 
analysis. Collaborative analysis also helps limit the risks associated with an important 
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ethical concern, that “the interpreter has the power to shape what comes to be known 
about somebody's experience” (Willig 2014, 141). As well as explicit recognition of this 
fact, incorporation of multiple perspectives, especially those of the research subjects, 
provide a counterbalance to the inherent bias of the primary researcher. A statement of 
positionality is provided at the end of this chapter. 
 
Research planning 
The following describes development of the research tools, the research team, and the 
experience of training and piloting. Figure 11 shows how each step fed into an iterative 
process of review and adjustment throughout planning and data collection; the 
foundation for promoting logical consistency and credibility in the research. 
 
The planning stage took place between January and April 2018. While the intention was 
to complete the quantitative analysis prior to initiating the qualitative component, delays 
in survey implementation meant that only initial quantitative analysis could be 
completed. As a result, not all aspects of the quantitative findings could be explicitly 
explored in the IDIs. Nonetheless, the CTALS data informed the qualitative component 
in multiple ways including development of the topic guide, training the qualitative 
research team, sampling and generating household profiles, codebook development and 
qualitative analysis (see Figure 11). 
 
The main data collection tool is the semi-structured topic guide with five to six primary 
questions, each with a handful of secondary questions or areas of inquiry. For parents 
and adolescents, the topic guide starts by establishing the adolescent’s relevant life 
events, moves to decision making and influencing factors, and then focuses on 
economic considerations and the role of the OAA. For the OAA recipient, the topic 
guide begins with consideration of the OAA in general, moves to spending priorities 
and control of the income, and then focuses on the recipient’s role in the adolescent’s 
life decisions while linking this back to the OAA.29 The English version of the topic 
guides are available in Appendix 5.  
 
 
29 In cases where the OAA recipient and parent / guardian were the same person the OAA recipient topic 
guide was used as the primary tool with additions from the parent / guardian topic guide. 
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The topic guide was complemented by two other data collection tools. First, using 
CTALS data, a household profile was created to cross-validate data, suggest lines of 
inquiry during the interview and aid the interviewer’s contextualisation of the 
responses. The data was not used explicitly with the respondent but was reviewed and 
internalised by the RAs prior to the interviews. Second, a timeline sketch was used with 
the respondent to establish key transitions in the adolescent’s life. This aided the initial 
discussion and had the advantage of drawing attention away from sometimes reluctant 
respondents allowing them to express themselves more readily. 
 
Interviews were conducted by two female RAs who come from the local area and speak 
the local languages as well as Nepali. Both RAs were members of the survey team and 
were selected based on their high level of performance, previous experience of 
qualitative research and English language ability. Female RAs were preferred 
considering the potential cultural difficulty of pairing unrelated male and female 
researchers in the local context and the potential sensitivity of discussing early marriage 
with adolescents. In addition to the RAs, an experienced translator, also from the local 
area, was engaged to translate the digital voice recordings into English transcripts.30 The 
two RAs and the translator received a week-long training from the PI on the research 
objectives and methods, initial findings from the CTALS, IDI techniques, sampling, 
transcription, ethics, and field safety. The topic guides were translated as part of the 
training process. Piloting was done in three stages to thoroughly test the topic guide, 
interview processes and practical arrangements. During the training, practice interviews 
were conducted between the RAs and with the translator and other volunteer 
professionals. On the penultimate day of training the RAs interviewed two households, 
a total of five individual interviews, observed by the PI and the translator. Prior to 
starting the interviews proper, the RAs conducted interviews, observed by the PI, with 
two households from the research site selected from the survey sample.  
 
Sampling strategy 
The primary purpose of the qualitative research was to explore how the OAA is factored 
into decision making about adolescents’ lives. Initial findings from the CTALS data 
 
30 Ideally, the translator would have formed part of the interview team but she was unable to travel at the 
time and there were very few people available with the right combination of skills (research and 
translation experience with a high standard of English) from the local area.  
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pointed to changes in several areas that were likely to have been influenced by the 
OAA: school attendance, participation in paid economic work, and out-migration for 
education and possibly marriage. While it was possible to identify households from the 
CTALS data with in-school and out-migrant adolescents it was not possible to identify 
those where the decision was necessarily influenced by the OAA. As such, the sampling 
approach involved random selection within a predefined sub-pool of survey participant 
households. 
 
The sample was drawn from two broad types of household of interest: those with 
adolescents still at home and those where adolescents had departed. Within these two 
groups an even number of female and male adolescents were selected. For practical 
reasons, the geographic area of the sample was narrowed to three of 13 VDCs including 
a Hindu majority community, a Muslim majority community, and one mixed 
community. The sample pool was further narrowed by excluding households with 
certain characteristics that preclude them from being of interest: households with no 
member eligible for the OAA; households with an eligible OAA member but who does 
not receive the OAA; households in the highest per capita income quintile for whom the 
OAA is less economically significant; and, consistent with the quantitative analysis, 
households with adolescents who recently in-migrated to avoid double counting with 
the out-migrant population. 
 
How many respondents to include in qualitative research is a perennial question. In 
general terms, the sample size should aim to achieve saturation of the issues of interest 
within certain initial bounds based on the methodological literature and practical 
considerations. In a paper by Baker et al. (2012), a purposively selected seasoned group 
of qualitative researchers provide a wide range of suggestions for lower and upper 
bounds from one case to more than one hundred, but with most suggestions for 
publishable studies and PhD theses ranging from 30 to 60 cases.  
 
Ultimately, the common view of Baker et al.’s (2012) respondents on sample size is that 
‘it depends’. On what it depends includes the nature of the research question and the 
breadth and depth of the issues of interest, heterogeneity within the population of 
interest, the likely breadth and depth of the responses, and practical concerns such as 
availability of respondents, time and money. First, while there are several adolescent 
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outcomes under examination with a range of wider contextual factors, the essence of the 
question regarding decision making and the OAA is relatively narrow. Further, the main 
purpose of the qualitative interviews is to provide data for one of three research sub-
questions. This points to a sample size at the smaller end of the spectrum. Second, 
initial findings from the CTALS data suggested heterogeneity in the population along 
ethnicity/caste, livelihood, and demographic-lines which has some bearing both on how 
OAA income is used and on adolescents’ outcomes. The sample needed to be large 
enough to ensure representation of these differences. Third, several factors suggested 
that respondents would provide information of some breadth and depth, therefore 
requiring fewer cases; respondents were taken from a well-defined sample pool and 
should have highly relevant perspectives. Moreover, each case includes interviews with 
two or three respondents from the same household providing multiple perspectives 
across generations. The interviewers were also involved in the survey work and have a 
good understanding of the topic and connection with the local community. Fourth, on 
the practical side, respondents were drawn from the larger CTALS sample and were 
therefore not limited in number. However, time and financial constraints were a 
significant consideration. 
 
In conclusion, it was decided to sample up to 20 households from the pre-defined sub-
population including 10 households with an adolescent at home and 10 households with 
an adolescent who had recently migrated. The ‘at-home’ sample would yield 30 
interviews and the ‘recent-migrant’ sample would yield 20 interviews, a total of 50 
individual interviews. A lower bound of 12 households and 30 individual interviews 
was set depending on the emerging level of thematic saturation. In practice it was 
judged necessary to continue the interviews until the upper bound was reached. The 
final sample resulted in 21 households and 55 individual interviews including the two in 
situ pilot interviews which were deemed of sufficient quality to include in the analysis. 
 
Data collection 
The following describes the interview process, procedures for data management and 
approach to transcription. All interviews were conducted with one RA acting as lead 
interviewer and the other supporting, exchanging roles in turn. The supporting RA was 
responsible for operating the voice recorder, taking observational notes, contributing 
follow up questions, and managing external interruptions. All interviews were initiated 
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by obtaining verbal informed consent (see the topic guide in Appendix 5) from the 
respondent and additionally from the parents in the case of adolescents. In line with the 
perspectivist approach, RAs approached the interviews as a kind of guided conversation 
(Warren 2011) such that the responses and meanings conveyed by the respondent could 
shape how the interview unfolded.  
 
One of the main challenges in some interviews was eliciting meaningful and more 
elaborated responses. Of most concern were shy adolescents who are used to being 
submissive to adults, especially authority figures. Following Adler and Adler (2011), 
the team listed the factors that may affect responsiveness and devised strategies to 
minimise them that focused on status levelling, reassurance, timing and setting. The 
RAs were trained on the principles of reciprocity in qualitative research and how to 
engage respondents in a meaningful, two-way interaction, to “build the kind of intimacy 
that is common for mutual self-disclosure” (J. M. Johnson 2011, 103). At key points 
during the conversation, the interviewer summarised the discussion to validate and 
provide opportunities for reflection and questions, allowing respondents’ perspectives to 
shape the process. All efforts were made to interview respondents in private. However, 
the proximity of family members and neighbours meant that this was sometimes 
difficult to achieve. Each individual interview lasted between 15 and 45 minutes. No 
economic incentive was provided to participants. 
 
To avoid unnecessary disruption, the PI was not present during the interviews except for 
the pilot and four further spot checks. At the end of each day, the PI and RAs reviewed 
the interviews to discuss any practical concerns and to collaboratively identify common 
and emerging themes and other points of interest. Over time, the reviews provided the 
opportunity to observe transitions in the interview cycle from relative ignorance and 
exploration to verification and finally boredom, at which point saturation was deemed 
achieved (J. M. Johnson 2011). Interviews were recorded on a digital voice recorder and 
files were backed up daily to a hard disk and cloud storage, both password-protected. 
Observational notes were recorded by the RAs in notebooks which were scanned and 
similarly backed up daily. Only the PI and the translator have access to the digital 





The general approach to transcription was to minimise transcription error, assuming a 
‘verbatim’ written record could be produced (Poland 2011). Transcription was done 
line-by-line and included all verbal expressions by the interviewer and respondent. 
Given the added difficulty of concurrent translation and transcription, non-verbal 
notation was kept to a minimum but included: expressions such as laughter, pauses, 
emphasis, garbled words or phrases, quotation marks for references to internal thoughts 
and the words of others, and interruptions. During the two weeks of interviews, the 
translator transcribed six interviews for review by the PI and RAs jointly. This allowed 
the team, especially the PI, to gain a deeper understanding of the interview context 
during the interview process, and an opportunity to provide feedback on the translation 
and transcription. The remainder of the interviews were transcribed after data collection 
was complete. These were reviewed by the PI to identify irregularities or text that was 
unclear and were amended by the translator as necessary.  
 
Coding and analysis 
The first step in organising the data was to develop an a priori codebook derived from 
the research questions, the analytical framework, and specific hypotheses posed by the 
quantitative analysis to ensure logical consistency and enhance credibility through 
integration. Development of the codes recognised that a: 
…good thematic code is one that captures the qualitative richness of the 
phenomenon. It is usable in the analysis, interpretation, and presentation 
of the research (Boyatzis 1998, 31). 
 
The first draft of the codebook was developed at the same time as the topic guides and 
was then modified following scrutiny by the PI’s doctoral supervisors and two rounds of 
partial coding. The process of coding aimed to fulfil Schutz’s postulate of adequacy in 
the consistency between the research constructs and participants’ lived experiences. The 
first round involved double coding of three transcripts by the PI on the one hand and the 
RAs on the other. The team then reviewed and discussed the differences and modified 
the codebook accordingly. In the second round, the PI applied the modified codebook to 
six other transcripts which were reviewed by the RAs before making final adjustments.  
 
The coding itself involved three steps starting with an initial ‘free’ reading of the 
transcript, followed by line-by-line application of codes to the text, and ending with a 
review of the coded text. Under two main themes, OAA expenditure and life-course 
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circumstances, several sub-themes are specified, described and further sub-divided into 
categories in a way to “capture the qualitative richness of the phenomenon” (ibid.). To 
aid the process of double-coding each sub-theme was exemplified with a few short 
extracts from the transcripts and explicitly linked to the relevant research question. 
Ideally, double-coding would have been done for the entire corpus with face-to-face 
discussion throughout the process; however, this was not possible due to geographic and 
financial constraints. The initial codebook is presented alongside the final codebook in 
Appendix 6 to show the changes resulting from the hybrid approach.  
 
The PI analysed the coded text. Analysis involved identification of common themes and 
anomalies, clustering and mapping the themes, and cross-referencing and refining by 
the quantitative data (integration). Quantitative data used for the analysis included the 
interviewees attributes; the relevant elder and adolescent attributes; and household 
socioeconomic attributes. Close attention was paid to patterning in the data through 
constant comparison, both within and between transcripts, phrases and linguistic 
connectors indicating transitions and relationships, exceptions or deviant cases, and 
potentially missing data (Barbour 2014; Ryan and Bernard 2003). Care was also taken 
to contextualise the content analysis (code frequencies) in relation to the qualitative 
sampling strategy and the quantitative findings. Data coding and analysis was done 
using dedoose software, a web-based application for analysing qualitative and mixed 
methods research (www.dedoose.com). More specific details of the analytical approach 
are provided in the methods sections of Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
Research ethics 
Fujii (2012) argues that ethics in research must move beyond procedural ethics, 
generally limited to acquiring institutional ethics approval, towards on-going 
consideration and application of ethical principles throughout and beyond the research 
process. There are three guiding principles underling ethical research: respect, 
beneficence and justice (Fujii 2012; Powell et al. 2013). Respect pertains to valuing the 
research participants and the context of their lives. Beneficence means, in the first place, 
to do no harm, but also to ensure the benefits of the research reach the participants and 
potentially others. Justice is concerned with how participants are selected into the study 
and imbalances in power between stakeholders in the research and in the distribution of 
benefits. The rest of this section describes the specific steps that were taken to promote 
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ethical practice throughout the research process including ethics review and national 
and local permissions; informed consent; specific issues related to interviewing 
children; risks to the research team; and publication and dissemination. Issues 
pertaining to participant selection, respondent privacy and data management were 
addressed in detail in the previous sections. The section ends with a reflection on the 
positionality of the Principal Investigator. 
 
Ethics review and permissions 
The research proposal underwent the LSE ethics review process and received approval 
prior to commencement of the field work (see Appendices 7 and 8). The review 
identified three main ethical concerns related to: obtaining meaningful informed 
consent, the foundation of respect to participants; interviewing children, with concerns 
about power imbalances and the potential for harm; and the potential sensitivity of 
certain topics that may result in emotional or relational harm. The specific steps taken to 
mitigate these issues are discussed in detail shortly.  
 
Research conducted in a third country should seek ethics approval from an appropriate 
national institution (Cronin-Furman and Lake 2018). However, it was not possible to 
obtain in-country ethics approval due to the absence of any formal process for non-
medical research. The Nepal Health Research Council (NHRC), responsible for ethics 
review of medical research, declined to review the research on these grounds. The Dean 
of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Science at Tribhuvan University confirmed 
there was no national or University ethical review process for social science research at 
the time.31 In presenting the research to academics at Tribhuvan University, 
development practitioners in UNICEF Nepal, local researchers in NEPAN, and 
government officials at the DOCR, no ethical concerns were raised beyond those 
already identified. 
 
At the national level, permission to undertake the research was provided in writing by 
the Joint Secretary and Director General of the DOCR which is also responsible for 
social security (see Appendix 9). At the local level, permission was obtained from the 
 
31 At the time of meeting prior to data collection, the Dean confirmed that the Faculty was working on 
developing a research ethics policy but that it was incomplete. 
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Social Development Officer at the DDC and from the VDC Secretaries prior to 
engaging local communities. 
 
Informed consent 
Voluntary, informed consent represents the foundation of respect to the participant 
(Fujii 2012). For both the CTALS and IDIs, consent was requested by the interviewer 
by reading out a written statement (see Appendices 1 and 5). For the CTALS, the 
participant’s response was recorded on the questionnaire. For the IDIs consent was 
requested prior to starting the digital voice recorder and was not recorded in all cases. 
Verbal consent is standard practice for household surveys in developing countries, 
including the MICS and DHS, where illiteracy rates are high. In addition to participant 
consent, parental/guardian consent was obtained for all interviews with anyone under 18 
years of age. 
 
A concern prior to data collection was that consent may not be given entirely freely 
given the power imbalance between interviewers and participants. This imbalance stems 
from the caste system in Nepal which prescribes a strict social hierarchy as well as 
differences in levels of education. This issue formed part of the training to ensure all 
interviewers were conscious of the issue and understood the importance of following 
the informed consent protocols, especially emphasising the respondent’s right not to 
participate and to decline to answer any question. Research participants were also asked 
if they had any questions or concerns prior to starting the interview and at the end. No 
material incentives were provided to research participants. However, they were assured 
that the information provided would be made available (with anonymity) to inform 
future government policy. The steps taken in this regard are discussed shortly.  
 
Interviewing children 
Both the CTALS and IDIs included participants aged 10-17 years old. In addition to 
personal and parental/guardian consent, interviewing children raises several concerns 
primarily related to preventing harm and ensuring dignity and respect. Safeguarding 
protocols started with reference taking for all team members. Training included topics 
on good practice for interviewing children including issues related to consent and power 
imbalances, privacy, and practical protocols. Interviewers had to aim for a certain level 
of privacy to ensure integrity of the responses; however, they were required to ask 
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children where they feel most comfortable being interviewed and to ensure they were 
never alone with a child in a completely closed room. The co-supervisor made daily 
spot-checks on all interviewers during the survey. 
 
While none of the topics covered are sensitive enough to cause direct distress or harm to 
the participant, it was recognised that the context of a child’s life may make the child 
feel uncomfortable and possibly lead to repercussions from a family member if the 
response is overheard. In particular, the research aimed to identify girls and boys who 
married under the statutory age of 18 years and who are potentially engaged in 
excessive hours of employment. This required participants to report illegal activity. 
Interviewers were trained to be alert to any reluctance to respond and signs of emotional 
distress, and to regularly reassure children about confidentiality and their right not to 
respond and to terminate the interview. While enumerators and RAs reported that the 
behaviours of child survey respondents gave no significant cause for concern, several 
IDI respondents were either reluctant to talk or found it difficult to articulate their 
thoughts. Interviewers aimed to maintain respect for and the dignity of child 
respondents by talking at the same level (both physically and verbally) and promoting a 
sense of reciprocity by stressing the importance of their views, encouraging questions 
and clearly explaining the potential benefits of the research.  
 
Risks to the research team 
Major security concerns identified prior to the field work included civil unrest, seasonal 
flooding, road safety and personal safety. Following civil unrest in the region of the 
research site in 2015 and 2016 due to constitutional changes, the security situation was 
closely monitored. At the time of the survey in 2017 and the IDIs in 2018 the research 
area was consistently calm. The period around the local elections in September 2018, 
which proved peaceful, was deliberately avoided. As described in the sub-section on 
data-collection, unexpectedly severe flooding occurred during the survey field work. 
The survey team was stranded in the hotel for around 24 hours and in Gaur for 
approximately 72 hours before safe return to Kathmandu. The team only returned to the 
research site after local conditions were considered safe. Road transport comes with 
heightened risks in Nepal due to poor regulation of public transport, poor road 
conditions, and risks of landslide. While the use of public transport was unavoidable, 
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night-time travel between Kathmandu and Gaur was avoided. All team members were 
provided comprehensive accident insurance from a major national insurance company.  
 
Personal safety within the research area was addressed in several ways. Except for the 
PI, all team members come from within the Central or Eastern Terai region with two 
team members from the specific locality. This aided community access and acceptance. 
As well as obtaining relevant permissions and consent, the PI and co-supervisor met 
with the most senior district official, the Community Development Officer, and the 
Chief Security Officer prior to starting the field work and were assured of assistance if 
required. All field work was conducted during day light hours. Survey enumerators 
conducted interviews individually but worked in pairs at the Ward level to ensure there 
was always someone within proximity. The co-supervisor was always reachable by 
phone and had motorbike transport to respond promptly in the case of potential security 
issues. The two female qualitative interviewers worked together at all times. 
Throughout data collection only one incident was considered of concern when the 
resident of a potentially eligible household was uncooperative and expressed some 
verbal aggression towards the interviewer. Nothing further occurred, and the household 
was omitted from the survey. 
 
Publication and dissemination 
While this study is not a commissioned evaluation tied to a specific policy making 
process, one of the stated aims is to contribute towards knowledge for better evidence-
based policy in Nepal. The study was presented to stakeholders at all levels, including 
research participants, as having this stated goal in mind. There is therefore an ethical 
responsibility to meet the principle of beneficence not only to the research participants, 
but to Nepali society more broadly (Barnett and Camfield 2016). As such there is an 
obligation to seek opportunities to disseminate findings from the research to policy 
makers and practitioners in Nepal in a way that respects the principle of justice. 
 
Several steps have been or are planned to be taken towards this goal. First, the findings 
and implications of the research are primarily concerned with national policies and have 
been generalised to be of relevance to Nepali society. Second, the process of presenting 
the research proposals to various stakeholders in Nepal and obtaining the necessary 
permissions from state institutions means that the research already has some level of 
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acceptance, making dissemination of findings easier. Third, the research was developed 
in close coordination with several non-governmental development organisations, most 
notably NEPAN, which provide practical entry points for dissemination. Fourth, 
findings will be disseminated through networks in Nepal in written form including the 
thesis and as journal articles (at least two or three are planned). Fifth, opportunities will 
be sought to present the findings at appropriate fora. Selected findings have already 
been presented to a policy and research conference in Kathmandu on inclusive social 
protection in September 2019. Participation in the conference was broad and included 
government officials, development partners, and national and local NGOs and civil 
society. 
 
Statement of positionality  
For this statement I depart from the third person narrative of the thesis. The motivation 
for this study grew out of my long-standing concern for improving the lives and 
opportunities of children and young people. At the time of initiating the research I had 
spent nearly 15 years in international humanitarian and development work. As well as 
managing projects and interventions, my work involved research in poor communities 
in developing countries focused on poverty, vulnerability and issues affecting children. 
Nepal emerged as the case study for this research for several reasons. Immediately prior 
to starting my doctoral studies, I had been supporting research on Nepal’s Child Grant 
programme and had worked previously in Pakistan and India, including in the state of 
Bihar, one of the poorest areas of Northern India, which has close cultural, social and 
economic ties with the central Terai region of Nepal. I was aware of the intensity of the 
issues of interest, especially girls’ education and early marriage, and the Child Grant 
and Old Age Allowance both provided potential opportunities to investigate income 
effects on adolescents. Nepal also became practically convenient due to my wife 
gaining employment in Kathmandu. I believe in the importance of evidence for 
informing public policy with the purpose of improving people’s lives, especially those 
who are most disadvantaged, and I hope that this thesis will contribute to that. 
 
Prior to data collection, I had opportunities to gain a deeper understanding of Nepali 
culture and society, the issues affecting children and adolescents, and the role of the 
state in addressing these. Following the earthquakes in 2015, I interrupted my PhD and 
worked for UNICEF Nepal for nearly two years. This work focused on expanding social 
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protection for children and required occasional direct interactions with local 
communities across the country, including in the Terai. However, I recognise that in 
many ways, my own life experience lies in contrast to the individuals who are the focus 
of this study. I am male, of white European descent, am an agnostic atheist, and I 
benefited from quality public services throughout my life and received high levels of 
education. My views about society developed within this context, some of which differ 
in fundamental ways from many of the research participants.  
 
Of most relevance, is that I believe everyone has the individual right to choose who and 
when to marry, or not, and that religion should not play a part in mainstream education. 
However, from the start, the goal of my study was to examine processes of decision-
making, which requires investigation of and accounting for subjective perspectives, 
values and beliefs. The analytical framework, research questions, and data collection 
tools all aimed to allow for the emergence of these personal perspectives. Moreover, I 
draw the reader’s attention back to the points of reflexivity in the research process and 
the steps taken to draw in multiple perspectives described earlier in this chapter. 
 
Due to language barriers and the scale of the study I did not personally conduct 
interviews. However, I was present in the communities during data collection and in 
some interviews, especially at the start (see previous sections on data collection). I was 
very much viewed as an outsider and treated with the respect given to (male) officials 
from Kathmandu, or ‘Sirs’. I considered my presence to be a distraction and aimed to 
find a balance between adequate oversight of the data collection process and minimising 
disruption. However, it is my belief, based on feedback from the research team, that my 
presence did not unduly influence the respondents. I was viewed as ‘other’ to such an 
extent that I was simultaneously important (respected by being provided the best chair) 
and unimportant (ignorable during the interview).  
 
While my personal views have not changed, through the process of analysis I have 
come to a better understanding of the motivations behind the choices that people make. 
I have endeavoured to ensure that the conclusions and policy recommendations 
adequately contextualise the observed outcomes within the subjective perspectives of 
the research participants. I hope that the approach, methodologies and methods of this 
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thesis, and my description of them, allows the reader to adequately judge the analysis 










Adolescents in Nepal have seen important improvements in their lives over recent 
decades. However, national averages paint only broad strokes and many young people 
still face early transitions to adulthood. Adolescents from certain geographic areas or 
communities are disproportionately more likely to be out of school, to engage in full 
time work, and to marry. These issues are particularly acute in Rautahat district which 
has some of the worst human development indicators in the country (Central Bureau of 
Statistics 2013; Sharma, Guha-Khasnobis, and Raj Khanal 2014). While there are many 
social, economic, cultural and political reasons for this, household income is known to 
be an important factor in shaping the opportunities available to adolescents. Central to 
this thesis is the question of how and why an increase in household income affects 
decisions about adolescents’ lives.  
 
This chapter lays the foundation for the forthcoming analyses by describing the 
household population and the state of schooling, work and marriage among adolescents 
in the Cash Transfers and Adolescent Life-course Survey (CTALS). The purpose is 
threefold: first, prior to the main analysis, to provide the reader with a descriptive 
understanding of the context within which the adolescents live and the status of their 
main life-course outcomes of interest and how these vary by various individual and 
household-level socioeconomic characteristics; 32 second, to aid interpretation of the 
findings on the contextual factors that moderate the effects of the OAA on adolescents’ 
lives that are explored quantitatively in Chapter 5 and (primarily) qualitatively in 
Chapter 7; and third, to support generalisation and to understand the applicability of the 
findings within Nepal and in similar contexts globally.  
 
32 Due to the sample size and data limitations it is not possible to meaningfully analyse community-level 




The next section describes the data and the various measures of adolescent life-course 
outcomes. This is followed by a descriptive analysis of household structure and the 
socioeconomic characteristics of the household. Each of the main adolescent life-course 
circumstances are then described in turn and are analysed in relation to selected 
individual and household characteristics. The chapter concludes with a summary of the 
main findings, the relationship between them and their relevance to the research 
questions. 
 
Data and methods 
Data in this chapter comes from the CTALS conducted for this study in 2017 and 
described in Chapter 3. The survey sampled multi-generational households containing at 
least one adolescent and one elder five years either side of OAA eligibility age in a rural 
sub-region of Rautahat district in Province 2 of Nepal. Analysis of national survey data 
suggests that approximately 50% of adolescents aged 10-17 years live with someone of 
age 50 or older, while 14% co-reside with an elder of the specified ten-year bandwidth 
age.33 
 
The variables for household characteristics include income, livelihoods, ethnicity/caste, 
and education level of the household head. The CTALS asked multiple questions about 
household income which aimed to capture total annual income from all sources 
including livelihoods, remittances, government and non-governmental transfers, and 
gifts. Ethnicity/caste group was specified from a standardised list used in the national 
census and other common household surveys and then categorised into four coherent 
groups.34 Education level of the household head is based on the highest-grade level 
completed and categorised into the major education levels in the Nepali education 
system. 
 
Variables for education refer to attendance at school in the past 12 months with a 
distinction made between mainstream government (non-fee paying) and private (fee-
 
33 Based on author’s analysis of data from the Nepal DHS conducted in 2016 by the Ministry of Health, 
New ERA and ICF. See Chapter 4 for an explanation of the ten-year bandwidth age of elders. 
34 While Muslim may be better classified as a religious group and, even within Nepal, are ethnically 
diverse, Terai Muslims in this study are classified as a distinct ethnic group. 
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paying) schools, and religious (contribution-based) schools which, among the survey 
population, are all Muslim madrassas. While some government and private school 
attendees may also attend the madrassa, religious school attendance in this case is 
exclusive of formal schooling. Marriage rates are based on reported marital status of the 
individual. While options for separation, divorce and widowhood were available, these 
did not apply to any of the adolescents in the sample. 
 
Variables for participation in work are separated into unpaid domestic chores, unpaid 
economic work at home or for the family business, and paid work. Engagement in 
domestic work is derived from more detailed questions about the hours spent cooking 
and serving food, cleaning and tidying, doing minor household repairs, shopping, caring 
for the elderly, sick and young children. Home economic work includes home 
agriculture, any other family business, milling and food processing, handicrafts and 
tailoring, home construction and major repairs, and fetching water and fuel. Paid work 
refers to any level of paid employment in agricultural and non-agricultural work. For 
work participation and hours spent working, the reference period is the past week. If a 
respondent reported no engagement in an economic activity in the past week they were 
further asked if they had done so in the past year.35  
 
This research is interested in the common set of adolescent life-course circumstances 
about which households make decisions including those that result in leaving the 
parental home. Thus, for education and marriage, the analysis focuses on adolescents 
who are current household members and those who out-migrated within the past three 
years the latter representing 13.5% of adolescents in the survey population. Some out-
migrants move within their own community. Indeed, 30% of adolescent out-migrants 
moved within Rautahat district. To avoid double counting, the analysis excludes in-
migrants within the past three years; approximately 1.4% of adolescents in the survey 
population. For adolescents who left the household within the past three years, 
respondents were asked what the primary purpose was, including for education, work, 
and marriage.  
 
 




For comparison between the CTALS, provincial, and national populations, data is used 
from the 2014 Nepal Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (NMICS) and the 2016 Nepal 
Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS), both referred to in Chapter 1, and from the 
2016/17 Nepal Annual Household Survey (NAHS). 
 
Household structure and socioeconomic status 
This section first provides a description of household structures within the CTALS 
population to verify the sampling approach, to identify who may be responsible for 
decision-making about adolescents’ lives within multi-generational households, and to 
highlight how household structure may moderate the effects of the OAA on adolescents. 
It then describes the household population in terms of several socioeconomic 
characteristics and their relationship with household income to identify sub-groups 
within the population that may experience different opportunities and constraints that 
shape their response to the OAA. 
 
Household structure 
According to the 2011 census, national average household size is 4.8, while Rautahat 
district has the largest average household size across the country with 6.4 members 
(Central Bureau of Statistics 2011a). In the CTALS sample, households are even larger 
with an average of 8.0 members. There are several possible reasons for this: the CTALS 
population is exclusively rural, only multi-generational household were sampled, and 
the definition of a household member is more inclusive than in the census.36 
 
To verify the sampling approach and to aid analysis and interpretation of the effects of 
the OAA on household decisions about adolescents, it is helpful to analyse household 
structures within the population.  
Table 4 shows the percentage of households in the CTALS according to the number of 
current household members for specific age groups. The number of recent out-migrants 
for specific age groups are shown separately in the last row. In addition to adolescents 
 
36 Both the national census and this survey counted individuals as household members if they had been 
living or intend to live in the household for at least six months. Temporary short-term absences were not 
counted as living elsewhere in both surveys; however, the census excluded household members if the 
reason for their absence, regardless of duration, was for employment or study. 
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and elders, household members are categorised as children under 10 years, and 
working-age adults aged 18 to 64 (or 54 years if Dalit).37  
 
As described in Chapter 3, the sampling approach required that households contain at 
least one elder within the specified age bandwidth.38 The data confirm that all 
households contain an elder, with one elder in 69% of households and two or more 
elders in 31% of households. Very few elders have recently out-migrated. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, the effects of a UCT may vary depending on who is the recipient due to 
gendered and generational differences in preferences, bargaining power, and economic 
opportunity. The gender and number of elders in the household form an integral part of 
the analysis for causal inference in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
Table 4 Percentage of households according to the number of current household 
members for specific age groups 
  
Child Adolescent Working age adult Elder 
(< 10 years) (10-17 years) (18-64 years)† (> 64 years)†† 
n % n % n % n % 
Zero members 411 20.4 165 8.2 98 4.9 0 0.0 
One member 348 17.2 1021 50.6 308 15.3 1382 68.5 
Two members 444 22.0 588 29.1 651 32.3 623 30.9 
Three or more members 815 40.4 244 12.1 961 47.5 13 0.6 
Total households 2018 100.0 2018 100.0 2018 100.0 2018 100.0 
Recent out-migrants 93 4.6 362 17.9 574 28.4 13 0.6 
Data source: CTALS 2017. †Age 18-54 years for Dalits  ††>54 years for Dalits  
 
Adolescents are the primary unit of analysis, and the sampling approach required that 
households contain at least one adolescent aged 10-17 who is a current household 
member or who had out-migrated within the past three years. This is reflected in the 
household structure. While 8% of households have no adolescent at home, 18% of 
households have at least one adolescent who recently out-migrated. The analysis in 
Chapter 5 includes estimates of the OAA’s effects on recent out-migrant adolescents. 
Just over half of households have one adolescent at home and the remaining 41% have 
two or more adolescents at home. While it is not possible to explore sibling effects in 
 
37 The OECD defines the working age populations as those aged 15 to 64 years. In this study, the higher 
threshold of 18 reflects the specific focus on the adolescent age group. See OECD, Working age 
population, https://data.oecd.org/pop/working-age-population.htm#indicator-chart. Accessed: 23rd 
February 2021. 
38 65-74 years if non-Dalit and 55-64 years if Dalit to account for the policy difference in eligibility age. 
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the quantitative analysis, IDI respondents reveal insights into the different experiences 
of adolescents who live in the same household in Chapter 7. Turning to younger 
children, more than 20% of CTALS households have no children under the age of 10 
years. This is unsurprising given the purposive sampling of households with 
adolescents. Nevertheless, among households with younger children, the majority have 
three or more, suggesting a tendency for short birth spacing. The presence of younger 
children in the household may place a greater burden of care on co-resident adolescents 
but may also correlate with a greater number of working age adults, older siblings of the 
adolescents.  
 
Just 5% of households have no working age adult, meaning that the adolescent(s), and 
any younger children, are in the primary care of the elder. A further 15% of households 
have just one working age adult living at home. Some of these households have support 
from adults who send remittances. Just under half of households with one or zero adults 
at home have at least one adult who out-migrated within the past 3 years (data not 
shown). As explained in Chapter 3, anyone who left the household more than 3 years 
ago was not enumerated in the survey. Nearly one third of households have two 
working age adults at home, while nearly half of households have three or more 
working age adults. In Nepali society, it is common for more than one married son to 
remain in the parental home (Thornton, Ghimire, and Mitchell 2012).39 These findings 
suggest that the majority of adolescents who co-reside with an elder also live with a 
parental caregiver. However, as discussed earlier, the data do not allow identification of 
the specific relationship of adult household members to the adolescent. 
 
Beyond acting as a caregiver and decision-maker, the presence of working age adults 
can have other effects on adolescents’ circumstances. Globally, higher income countries 
are associated with smaller households (UNDESA 2017). However, in poor rural 
communities in developing countries, larger families can provide a greater degree of 
economic security, with more productive members of the households able to engage in 
more diverse livelihoods. These relationships are discussed in more detail in the 
following section in relation to household income. 
 
39 89% of working age adults are married while 11% either never married or are widowed, separated or 
divorced. There is at least one case in the IDIs of a woman whose husband lives with his other wife in a 




The socioeconomic status of survey households  
Table 5 shows annual household income and the distribution of socioeconomic household 
characteristics among the CTALS population. The first row of column 2 shows that mean 
household income is NRs 261,020 (approximately US$ 2,310). The most recent national 
household income data is from the 2010 NLSS and is considerably out of date (Central 
Bureau of Statistics 2011b). The 2016/17 NAHS provides more recent estimates of annual 
household consumption, which is NRs 301,824 (US$ 2,671) in rural households (Central 
Bureau of Statistics 2018). Given the conceptual and empirical differences between the 
measures, the comparison provides only a rough benchmark, but suggests that rural 
Rautahat may be somewhat poorer than average. This supports one of the underlying 
conditions necessary for cash transfers to have effects on adolescents, that households 
face financial constraints to fulfilling their consumption and investment preferences.  
 
Understanding the relative size in the population of different caste/ethnic groups and the 
social and economic inequalities between them is central to interpreting the findings in 
the following chapters. The distribution of ethnicity/caste in the CTALS reflects the 
communities in rural Rautahat. Column 1 of Table 5 shows that no single group 
constitutes a majority. Terai/Madhesi form the largest minority, followed by Muslims, 
Dalits, Brahmin/Chhetri, and finally Janajati and other caste groups.40 This differs to the 
national distribution with Brahmin/Chhetri constituting the largest minority (32%) 
followed by Janajati (31%), Terai/Madhesi (14%), Dalits (13%), Newar (5%) and 
Muslims (4%) (Central Bureau of Statistics 2011a). Column 2 shows that household 
income varies by ethnicity/caste, reflecting each group’s relative level of social 
advantage. Household income is highest among Brahmin/Chhetri, followed by other 
castes, Terai/Madhesi, Janajati and Muslim.41 Household income among Dalits, one of 
the most excluded social groups in Nepali society, lags all other groups. Both 
caste/ethnicity and household income have implications for where the effects of the 
OAA might be concentrated within the population. The OAA will have less relative 
 
40 There is substantial diversity within each group; the survey noted 43 distinct classifications of ethnicity 
and caste. 
41 A large proportion of income in Janajati households, the term for the indigenous tribes of Nepal, may 
come from government transfers provided to these groups. The scheme for ‘endangered ethnic groups’ 
provides each individual household member a transfer of NRs 2,000 per month (paid tri-annually) if they 
belong to one of ten specified sub-groups of Janajati. 
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value to the most advantaged caste groups, with the highest average incomes, but more 
relative value to Muslims and Dalits. The poorest households may focus additional 
expenditure on subsistence, while households with average incomes may be able to 
prioritise higher level needs and investments. Certain groups may also face different 
incentives due to other aspects of social exclusion. As discussed in Chapter 2, Dalits 
may see less value in education because it will not lead to better job prospects, and the 
Muslim population have cultural incentives to pursue religious, rather than mainstream, 
education. Perspectives on the value of education are provided by IDI respondents in 
Chapter 7. 
 









% n Mean S.E. 
All households 100 2018 261.02 3.94 
Ethnicity / caste     
Brahmin / Chhetri 4.4 88 347.01 24.00 
Dalit 14.3 288 201.13 8.47 
Muslim 36.9 744 250.01 5.90 
Terai / Madhesi 42.7 861 281.33 6.34 
Janajati / Other caste 1.8 37 271.53 35.53 
Education of household head     
None 79.8 1610 242.94 3.92 
Incomplete primary 3.3 67 260.67 22.49 
Incomplete secondary 9.7 196 306.46 14.30 
Completed upper secondary 5.7 114 401.34 22.74 
Bachelor or higher 1.5 31 397.60 55.49 
Main livelihood     
Agriculture 16.9 342 227.97 10.03 
Own business 19.4 392 273.47 8.28 
Private sector 39.9 805 206.78 4.89 
Public sector / other 4.1 83 411.18 18.05 
Remittance 19.5 394 357.34 9.77 
None 0.0 2 100.00 0.00 
No. of working age adults     
Two or fewer 52.4 1057 225.68 4.46 
Three or more 47.6 961 299.89 6.43 
Data source: CTALS 2017. †Total income has been winsorized at 99% to moderate the 




As discussed in Chapter 2, existing education levels among older household members 
can have an important bearing on the propensity of households to increase investment in 
adolescent education. Education levels among the older generation are extremely low in 
rural Rautahat with 79.8% of household heads reported to have no formal education and 
a further 3.3% who did not complete primary school. Just 9.7% of household heads 
completed primary school and gained some secondary education, 5.7% completed upper 
secondary, and less than 2% additionally gained a tertiary level qualification. Thus, 
average effects of the OAA on adolescents that are identified in the following chapters 
are likely to reflect the poorly educated majority. The figures for elder education are 
considerably worse than the national average. Estimates from the 2014 NMICS indicate 
that nationally, 41.9% of household heads have no education, 19.5% completed 
primary, 19.7% completed secondary, and 18.7% achieved higher level education 
(Central Bureau of Statistics 2015). Income is strongly associated with the level of 
education. Column 2 of Table 5 shows that household income increases with each 
additional level of education and is substantially higher where the household head has 
completed at least upper secondary. However, education and income may independently 
moderate the effects of the OAA on adolescents’ life-course circumstances. Thus, the 
causal estimates in Chapter 5 are differentiated by both income and education level of 
the household head.   
 
Despite agriculture still dominating the rural economy, column 1 of Table 5 shows that 
in the CTALS, livelihood strategies are quite diverse. Private sector work provides the 
main source of income for the largest number of households, followed by remittances, 
non-agricultural home business, agriculture, and public sector work. Moreover, 85% of 
households reported a second livelihood, approximately half of which is agriculture, and 
22% a third livelihood (data not shown). Two households reported no productive 
livelihood, relying solely on state transfers and gifts. While private sector work is the 
main occupation for most households, column 2 shows that it is associated with the 
lowest level of household income. Much of this work is likely to be low-skilled and 
irregular, undertaken by the poorest, landless households (ILO 2004; Central Bureau of 
Statistics 2009). This has implication for adolescents in the poorest Dalit households, 
who may be even more likely to engage in paid, private sector, work. Agriculture 
appears to pay moderately better, followed by households with their own non-
agricultural business. The highest incomes are associated with households relying on 
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remittances and the small minority with someone employed in the public sector. The 
high level of out-migration identified in the previous section and the relative wealth that 
comes with remittances may be an important driver of adolescent economic migration. 
The effects of the OAA on adolescent out-migration are identified in Chapter 5 with 
further insights provided into the drivers by IDI respondents in Chapter 7. 
 
Finally, the presence and number of working-age adult household members have 
implications for adolescent education and work through both income and labour effects. 
The data in Table 5 confirm that average incomes are higher in households with a 
greater number of working-age adults. As discussed in Chapter 2, the number of 
working-age adults may also change demand within the household for adolescent home-
based labour. These two factors are likely to be correlated in terms of their relationship 
with adolescent outcomes. In this low-income context, adolescents in richer households, 
and those with more adult labour, may be more likely to attend school and less likely to 
work. However, income and adult labour supply may have opposing influences as 
moderators of household responses to additional income. For example, the marginal 
effects of additional income may be larger in poorer households, who are more likely to 
see adolescents dropping out of school for economic reasons. At the same time, 
households with fewer working-age adults may be more dependent on adolescents for 
home-based work that is less responsive than paid work to additional income. To 
investigate these relationships, the casual estimates in Chapter 5 are differentiated 
according to the number of adults in the household, as well as by income, and further 
insights into these relationships are provided by adolescent, parent, and elder IDI 
respondents in Chapter 7. 
 
The status of adolescent school attendance, work, and marriage status 
This section provides descriptive statistics for the main adolescent outcome variables of 
interest related to education, work and marriage for the CTALS, provincial, and national 
level populations, and presents analysis of how adolescents’ circumstances vary by 
different individual and household-level socioeconomic characteristics. 
 
School attendance 
Table 6 shows summary statistics for various indicators of school attendance, which are 
the main outcome variables of interest in the analysis of the effects of the OAA on 
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schooling in Chapter 5. Mainstream schools, both public and private, deliver the 
national curriculum in Nepali, although many private schools also teach in English. 
Among the CTALS, 57.5% of adolescents aged 10-17 years attended a mainstream 
school in the past year. Rates are lower for girls at 53.4% compared to 61.4% for boys. 
A further 7.7% of adolescents who are not in mainstream school attended a religious 
school. In the CTALS, religious schools are all Muslim madrassas which principally 
teach Islamic studies in Urdu. Hafiz, Prakash and Rajbhandari (2008) show that many 
madrassas in Nepal have committed to integrate mainstream education with support 
from the state, but teaching of the national curriculum is limited in practice. Moreover, 
among districts with a high concentration of Muslims, only in Rautahat had none of the 
madrassas registered to provide the mainstream curriculum (ibid.). No adolescents in 
the CTALS reported being in any other kind of full-time education.  
 
Table 6 Summary statistics, schooling and study time of adolescents aged 10-17 years 
 
All adolescents Girls Boys 
 Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. 
CTALS 2017†       
Attends mainstream school 0.575 0.011 0.534 0.014 0.614 0.014 
Public school 0.390 0.011 0.420 0.014 0.362 0.013 
Private school 0.185 0.008 0.114 0.009 0.253 0.012 
Migrated for education 0.077 0.006 0.049 0.007 0.105 0.009 
Attends religious school 0.074 0.006 0.078 0.008 0.072 0.007 
n 3437  1689  1748  
NDHS 2016††       
Attends school – rural province 2 0.718 0.029  0.646 0.040  0.806 0.026 
n 841  460  381  
Attends school - national 0.870 0.007  0.843 0.010 0.898 0.007 
n 8966  4511  4415  
Data sources: CTALS 2017 and NDHS 2016. †Robust standard errors are used throughout, clustered at 
the level of household ††Estimates account for stratified cluster survey design. 
 
Rautahat is one of eight districts in Province 2 which spans the central belt of the Terai 
region. Data from the 2016 NDHS shows that in rural areas of Province 2, the school 
attendance rate is higher than in the CTALS, at 71.8% for all adolescents, 64.6% for 
girls, and 80.6% for boys. Nationally, the attendance rate is 87.0% for all adolescents 
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and is 84.3% for girls and 89.8% for boys.42 The low attendance rates in the CTALS 
reflect Rautahat’s status as one of the poorest and most disadvantaged districts in Nepal. 
While there is less gender disparity in access to education in the CTALS compared to 
Province 2, the disparity is still more extreme than the national picture.  
 
Mainstream schools can be distinguished between public (non-fee paying) and private 
(fee paying) schools with implications for the nature of income effects on school 
access.43 Table 6 shows that in rural Rautahat, 39.0% of adolescents attend public 
school while 18.5% attend private school. This implies that the private sector caters to 
32.2% of all school going adolescents in the CTALS sample. Nationally, private 
institutions are estimated to make up approximately 25% of schools at primary and 
secondary level (Ministry of Education, UNICEF, and UNESCO 2016). The large share 
of education provision by the private sector is likely a reflection of the weak 
infrastructure and management, poor quality teaching, and low achievement in public 
sector schools (A. Thapa 2015). 
 
There is considerably more gender inequality in access to private schools compared to 
public schools. Table 6 shows that, while slightly more girls (42.0%) attend public 
school than boys (36.2%), more than twice as many boys (25.3%) attend private school 
than girls (11.4%). Adolescents who live away from home to attend school generally do 
so in pursuit of a higher level or better quality of schooling. Overall, 7.7% of 
adolescents migrated within the past 3 years for the primary purpose of education; boys 
are more than twice as likely as girls to have migrated for education. While most 
education migrants are currently attending private school (59.4%), others are in public 
(21.4%) or religious (12.8%) school or have since left (6.4%) (data not shown). 
 
Figure 12 to Figure 15 show the correlation between mainstream school attendance and 
several individual and household characteristics that were identified in Chapter 2 as 
being potentially important moderators of the effects of additional income on adolescent 
 
42 The NDHS does not distinguish between types of education institution and the data may include 
religious schools. Thus, mainstream school attendance rates in rural Rautahat may be slightly closer to the 
provincial average. 
43 In Nepal, public schools are known as ‘community’ schools. In most cases these are ‘aided’ and receive 
government grants; but can be ‘unaided’ and are financed by the community and other voluntary 
contributions. Private schools are unaided institutional schools and are profit-making (A. Thapa 2015). 
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outcomes.44 Figure 12 reveals a distinct decline in mainstream school attendance rates 
as adolescents get older, with approximately 28 percentage points (pp) difference 
between 10 year olds and 17 year olds. Declining attendance may reflect a combination 
of increasing direct and opportunity costs. As adolescents get older, fees and other 
school costs rise and economic and social pressures to work and to marry increase. The 
decline in attendance is primarily associated with private school while public school 
attendance remains relatively flat. This suggests that the direct costs of school rather 
than opportunity costs such as work may be the more significant factor in limiting 
education access. It may also be that some adolescents drop out of public school while 
others shift from private into public school; however, this is not discernible from the 
data.  
 
Figure 13 shows the relationship between school attendance and per capita income. In 
mirror image to adolescent age, mainstream school attendance rises steadily with 
income, with approximately 20pp difference between the poorest and the richest 
quintile. As with age, the difference is driven by higher attendance rates at private 
school, while public school attendance remains relatively flat. This also suggests that 
declining school attendance is driven more by direct school costs than the opportunity 
costs of work and marriage.  
 
Both ethnicity/caste and education level of the household head were shown to correlate 
with household income in Table 5. However, they may also play their own part in 
determining access to school. Figure 14 shows that the mainstream school attendance 
rate is highest for Brahmin/Chhetri adolescents (90.0%), the most privileged social caste 
group; but is also high for Terai/Madhesi adolescents (80.9%), the dominant cultural 
and political group in the region. Brahmin/Chhetri and Terai/Madhesi adolescents also 
have the highest private school attendance rates. Being out of mainstream school is 
more of a problem among Dalit and Janajati adolescents; and is of drastically greater 
concern among the Muslim community. Just 23.6% of Muslim adolescents are in 
mainstream school, with only 12.9%. in public school. In part, this may be due to the 
poor quality of mainstream public education and the poor economic condition of most 
 
44 The data are not shown separately for girls and boys because the relationship between school 
attendance and the various characteristics is similar. 
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Muslim households; but may also stem from preferences for religious education and a 
sense of cultural exclusion from the mainstream public school system (Hafiz, Prakash, 
and Rajbhandari 2008). 
 
Figure 15 shows that mainstream school attendance rates tend to increase with the level 
of education of the household head. As with income and age, this is largely driven by 
changes in private school attendance although public schooling is also lower among 
those with no education. As shown in the previous section, almost 80% of household 
heads have no education so those benefiting from the intergenerational effects of higher 
education are in a minority. 
 
In summary, the initial findings in this section reveal the institutional variety in the 
education supply in the study area and the gendered nature of school access. This 
diversity forms an integral part of the investigation in the following chapters about how 
the OAA affects gendered decisions about both school attendance and school choice. 
Importantly, the OAA may increase access to public, private and religious schools, but 
also has the potential to support adolescents to shift from lower-cost to higher-cost 
schools. In terms of effect pathways, there are indications that both the direct and 
opportunity costs of school increase with age and that this affects private schooling to a 
greater extent than public education. Moreover, there is a large deficit in mainstream 
school attendance among Muslim communities which points to the significance of 




Figure 12 Mainstream school attendance rate by age of adolescent 
 
● Mainstream school  ● Public school  ● Private school 
Data source: CTALS 2017. n = 3437. Figure shows the linear fitted line and error bars 
(95% C.I.) using robust standard errors clustered at the level of the household. 
 
 
Figure 13 Mainstream school attendance rate by per capita income quintile 
 
● Mainstream school  ● Public school  ● Private school 
Data source: CTALS 2017. n = 3437. Figure shows the linear fitted line and error bars 
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Figure 14 Mainstream school attendance rate by ethnicity/caste 
 
Data source: CTALS 2017. n = 3437. Figure shows error bars (95% C.I.) using robust 
standard errors clustered at the level of the household. 
 
 
Figure 15 Mainstream school attendance rate by education level of household 
head 
 
Data source: CTALS 2017. n = 3437. Figure shows error bars (95% C.I.) using robust 
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Economic and domestic work 
Table 7 shows summary statistics for different kinds of adolescent work including 
participation and hours worked in paid employment, unpaid (home-based) economic 
work, and domestic work in the past week, as well as participation in paid and unpaid 
economic work in the past year. For reasons discussed in Chapter 5, the causal estimates 
in that chapter focus only on domestic work in the past week and paid and unpaid 
economic work in the past year. Nevertheless, it is helpful to have a broader 
understanding of the working patterns of adolescents as presented here.  
 
The data in Table 7 show that most adolescents (88.5%) engaged in work in the past 
week. Work activities are not mutually exclusive, and many adolescents engage in more 
than one kind of work. Indeed, 83.9% engaged in domestic chores, 60.5% engaged in 
unpaid economic work in the home or for the family business, and 5.3% engaged in 
paid work. This is also reflected in the hours spent working in the past week. 
Adolescents who engaged in any kind of work did an average of 10.8 hours in the past 
week, equivalent to 1.54 hours per day. Those who engaged in domestic work did an 
average of 6.9 hours, those who engaged in unpaid domestic work did 4.9 hours, and 
those who engaged in paid work did 15.9 hours. While most adolescents make some 
contribution to unpaid work at home, the small minority who engage in paid work are 
the most heavily engaged. Girls are more likely than boys to engage in unpaid work and 
do slightly longer hours; an average of 2.9 hours more domestic work and 0.7 hours 
more unpaid economic work in the past week. In contrast, girls and boys are equally 
likely to engage in paid work, but boys work for substantially longer; an average of 9.8 
hours more than girls in the past week.  
 
As economic work can be highly seasonal, the CTALS also asked adolescents who had 
not participated in an economic activity in the past week, whether they had done so in 
the past year. Table 7 shows that for both paid and unpaid economic work, participation 
rates over the past year are higher by approximately 4pp and 9pp, respectively. In the 
case of paid economic work, the participation rate is 60% higher for girls and 95% 
higher for boys. As with education, the CTALS asked whether any adolescents who left 
the home within the past three years had done so for the purpose of employment. Table 
7 shows that economic migration occurs exclusively among boys, with 6.1% having left 
the household within the past three years for the purpose of work. Approximately 70% 
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of economic migrant boys went to India while most of the remainder went to 
Kathmandu (data not shown). 
 
Table 7 Summary statistics, work participation, hours and economic migration of 
adolescents aged 10-17 years 
 
All adolescents Girls Boys 
n Mean S.E. n Mean S.E. n Mean S.E. 
CTALS 2017†        
Work participation, past week        
All work 2975 0.885 0.006 1531 0.950 0.006  1444 0.817 0.011 
Paid 2975 0.053 0.004 1531 0.052 0.006 1444 0.055 0.006 
Unpaid economic 2975 0.605 0.011 1531 0.674 0.013 1444 0.531 0.015 
Unpaid domestic 2975 0.839 0.008 1531 0.930 0.007 1444 0.742 0.013 
Hours worked, past week        
All work 2634 10.8 0.2 1454 12.2 0.2  1180 9.1 0.3  
Paid 159 15.9 1.2 80 11.0 1.0 79 20.8 2.0 
Unpaid economic 1799 4.9 0.1 1032 5.2 0.1 767 4.5 0.2 
Unpaid domestic 2495 6.9 0.1 1424 8.1 0.1 1071 5.2 0.1 
Work participation, past year 
Paid 2975 0.094 0.006 1531 0.083 0.008 1444 0.107 0.009 
Unpaid economic 2975 0.693 0.010 1531 0.749 0.012 1444 0.634 0.014 
Economic migration, past 3 years        
Migrated for work 3437 0.031 0.003 1689 0.000 - 1748 0.061 0.006 
NMICS 2014†† 
Work participation (all types), past week 
National 4639 0.818 0.010 2212 0.878 0.012 2427 0.758 0.014 
Rural Province 2 361 0.668 0.037 164 0.770 0.049  197 0.576 0.049 
Hours worked (all types), past week 
National 3909 15.5 0.5 1988 17.3 0.6  1921 13.5 0.5  
Rural Province 2 251 10.9 0.8 132 13.3 1.1 119 8.1 0.8  
Data sources: CTALS 2017 and NMICS 2014. †Robust standard errors are used throughout, clustered 
at the level of household ††Estimates account for stratified cluster survey design. 
 
Figure 16 to Figure 21 show the correlation between participation in paid and unpaid 
economic work in the past year and in unpaid domestic work in the past week and 
several household and individual characteristics that were identified in Chapter 2 as 
being potentially important moderators of the effects of additional income on adolescent 
outcomes.45 In mirror image to the declining rate of school attendance shown earlier, 
 
45 The analysis focuses on economic work in the past year rather than the past week because the longer 
reference period is less prone to seasonal variation and aligns with the reference period for school 
attendance. Repeating the analysis using data from the past week shows that the patterns are similar for 
both reference periods. Participation in domestic work was only measured for the past week. Data are not 
shown separately for girls and boys because the relationship with the various characteristics is similar; 
any exceptions are highlighted in the text.   
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Figure 16 shows that the likelihood of participating in work increases steadily with age. 
This is the case for all types of work but with the largest absolute increase in unpaid 
economic work at home, which rises by 31pp between 10 and 17 years old. This reflects 
the largely informal, self-employed nature of the local economy. At the same time, by 
age 17, almost a quarter of adolescents are engaged in paid work, rising to nearly one 
third among boys (data not shown). Figure 17 shows only a slight negative correlation 
between work participation and per capita income. Again, the largest change is seen for 
unpaid economic work. However, even among the richest households, adolescent 
participation in work is common. Factors other than income may be more important in 
determining adolescent work, such as the widespread reliance on own-agriculture as a 
secondary source of income, and expectations about the role of adolescents in the 
household.  
 
Figure 18 shows how work participation varies with the ethnic/caste group of the 
household. Differences between most ethnic/caste groups are small and have substantial 
overlap between the confidence intervals of the estimates. However, two observations 
can be made. First, Brahmin/Chhetri adolescents are least likely to engage in unpaid 
work, possibly a sign of their relative social and economic privilege. Second, Dalit 
adolescents are most likely to engage in paid work, with the participation rate almost 
double the average. This may relate to higher rates of landlessness among Dalits and 
their exclusion from certain types of employment (ILO 2004).46 Moreover, the 
difference is particularly pronounced for Dalit girls, 18.3% of whom are engaged in 
paid work (data not shown). 
 
Figure 19 shows the correlation between adolescent work and the education level of the 
household head. Only the small minority who live with a household head who has 
complete upper secondary or higher are slightly less likely to engage in unpaid work. 
There is a stronger correlation with participation in paid work, which declines with even 
a limited amount of education. This may have some association with ethnic/caste group, 
as Brahmin/Chhetri household heads are most likely be educated while Dalit and 
Muslim heads are least likely to be educated (data not shown).  
 
46 CTALS data shows that Dalit households own the lowest amount of agricultural land of any 
ethnic/caste group, an average of 0.23 bighas compared to the full sample average of 0.81 bighas. 
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Figure 16 Work participation rate by age of adolescent 
 
● Paid work (past year)  ● Unpaid economic work (past year)  
● Unpaid domestic work (past week) 
 
Data source: CTALS 2017. n = 2975. Figure shows the linear fitted line and error bars 
(95% C.I.) using robust standard errors clustered at the level of the household. 
 
Figure 17 Work participation rate by per capita income quintile 
 
● Paid work (past year)  ● Unpaid economic work (past year)  
● Unpaid domestic work (past week) 
 
Data source: CTALS 2017. n = 2975. Figure shows the linear fitted line and error bars 
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Figure 18 Work participation rate by ethnicity/caste 
 
Data source: CTALS 2017. n = 2975. Figure shows error bars (95% C.I.) using robust 
standard errors clustered at the level of the household. 
 
Figure 19 Work participation rate by education level of household head 
 
Data source: CTALS 2017. n = 2975. Figure shows error bars (95% C.I.) using robust 
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Figure 20 Work participation rate by main livelihood type 
 
Data source: CTALS 2017. n = 2975. Figure shows error bars (95% C.I.) using robust 
standard errors clustered at the level of the household. 
 
 
Figure 21 Work participation rate by mainstream school attendance status 
 
Data source: CTALS 2017. n = 2975. Figure shows error bars (95% C.I.) using robust 
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Figure 20 shows that unpaid work at home does not vary substantially with the main 
type of livelihood. This may be because many households have multiple income sources 
from different economic sectors.47 A more substantial difference is found for paid work, 
which is higher among adolescents whose household’s main income is from private 
sector work which also correlates with being Dalit who are more likely to be landless. 
Finally, Figure 21 shows that adolescents who attend school are as likely to participate 
in unpaid work at home as those who do not attend school. It might be expected that 
school attendance status affects the average number of hours worked; however, they do 
not substantially differ (data not shown). In contrast, approximately 12pp more 
adolescents who are not in school are engaged in paid work compared to those who 
attend school. In other words, non-school goers are 3.7 times as likely to engage in paid 
work than school goers. These findings confirm that home-based work is a common and 
necessary part of adolescents’ lives whether in or out of school; however, paid work is 
much more likely to be undertaken by out-of-school adolescents.  
 
In summary, the findings in this section suggest that unpaid adolescent work in the home 
is near ubiquitous regardless of ethnicity/caste, livelihood type, or school status, although 
participation is slightly lower among the highest income and most highly educated 
households. Given this, and that a cash transfer is not a direct substitute for the outputs of 
home-based work, it is perhaps less likely that a modest amount of additional income 
would make a difference in this area. Nevertheless, the theory presented in Chapter 2 
shows that a cash transfer may indirectly affect unpaid labour through investment and 
changes in adult time-use. In contrast, adolescent paid work is much less common, but is 
concentrated among older, out-of-school adolescents, from poorer, uneducated Dalit 
households that tend to engage more in low-wage private sector work. This suggests that, 
while additional income of sufficient value may prevent adolescent paid work, the 
magnitude of the effect may depend on the age of adolescents and whether they have 
already been pushed out of or given up on education. It is also possible that the OAA 




47 Analysis of four main livelihood types among the CTALS population shows that 85% of households 
have a second livelihood and 22% have a third. 
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Marital status and marriage migration 
Table 8 shows summary statistics for marriage rates of adolescents. Among the CTALS 
sample, 7.0% of 10-17 year olds are married. The rate is notably higher for girls at 
11.1% compared to 3.1% for boys. Other national surveys only ask marital status for 
those aged 15 years and older. To compare with provincial and national rates, the age 
range is limited to 15-17 year olds. Within this age range, the CTALS population and 
Province 2 exhibit relatively similar marriage rates at 16.9% and 18.9%, respectively. 
Again, rates are substantially higher for girls, with more than one quarter of 15-17 year 
old girls already married. Early marriage is a greater problem in rural Province 2 
compared to the national average, with 10.0% of 15-17 year olds and 15.5% of 15-17 
year old girls estimated to be married. As discussed in Chapter 1, there are strong 
cultural, social and economic incentives for early marriage, especially for girls, and 
especially in certain parts of Nepal including Province 2. 
 
Table 8 Summary statistics, marriage status of adolescents aged 10-17 and 15-17 years 
 
All adolescents Girls Boys 
 Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. 
CTALS 2017†       
n 1108  531  577  
Married (15-17) 0.169 0.012 0.262 0.019 0.083 0.011 
n 3437  1689  1748  
Married (10-17) 0.070 0.005 0.111 0.008 0.031 0.004 
Migrated for marriage (10-17) 0.017 0.002 0.033 0.004 0.001 0.001 
NDHS 2016††       
n 259  148  111  
Married (15-17) – rural province 
2 
0.189 0.025 0.277 0.036 0.072 0.025 
n 3077  1664  1413  
Married (15-17) – national 0.100 0.008 0.155 0.013 0.035 0.006 
Data source: CTALS 2017 and NDHS 2016. †Robust standard errors are used throughout, clustered at 
the level of household ††Estimates account for stratified cluster survey design. 
 
It is common practice in North Indian and Nepali society for a girl and boy to be ritually 
married, but for the girl to continue to live with her parents for up to several years 
before cohabiting (Collver 1963; Ghosh 2011). The initial marriage ritual is termed 
Shadi in Hindi and Nikah in Urdu, while the ceremony preceding cohabitation and 
consummation of the marriage is termed Gauna. Historically, Gauna would have taken 
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place when the girl reaches puberty. However, today this can occur later, often after the 
girl has reached the legal age for marriage. Because of this practice, as well as asking 
the marital status of girls, the CTALS identified adolescents who left the household 
within the past 3 years for the primary purpose of marriage. Migration for marriage is a 
less ambiguous indicator of a fully realised marriage.48  
 
Table 8 shows that 3.3% of adolescent girls left the home within the past three years for 
the purpose of marriage. This means that nearly 30% of married adolescent girls are 
cohabiting while nearly 70% are still living in their parental home.49 In contrast, less 
than 1% of married boys left the home because of marriage, the reasons for which 
remain unclear.  
 
Figure 22 to Figure 26 show the correlation between marriage status and several 
individual and household characteristics that were identified in Chapter 2 as being 
potentially important moderators of the effects of additional income on adolescent 
outcomes. The comparison of marriage rates between 10-17 year olds and 15-17 year 
olds already shows that the likelihood of marriage increases with age. Figure 22 
confirms this and shows that, for both girls and boys, the rate of increase accelerates as 
they become older. By the time they are 17 years old, 44.3% of girls and 14.0% of boys 
are married. Moreover, among married 17 year old girls, 53.4% left the home and are 
cohabiting (data not shown).50 
 
Figure 23 suggests there is a weak relationship between marital status and income. 
Income appears not to be associated at all with the likelihood of marriage among boys. 
There is a very slight upward trend in marriage rates among girls with higher levels of 
income, primarily related to differences in the second and third per capita income 
quintile. However, as indicated by the error bars, standard errors are large and so a firm 
conclusion cannot be drawn.  
 
48 Another consequence of the practice of Gauna is that girls who are married and present in the home 
when surveyed may have already moved into the home of their husband. Thus, adolescents who have 
resided in the household for less than three years are excluded from the data to avoid potential double 
counting of the population. 
49 Approximately 1.6% of married adolescent girls who are current members of the household moved in 
more than 3 years ago and are cohabiting with their spouse. 
50 The youngest reported married adolescent girl is 11 years old while the youngest reported married 
adolescent girl who left the home is 14 years old. 
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Figure 22 Marriage rate by age of adolescent 
 
● Girls  ● Boys 
Data source: CTALS 2017. nf = 1689, nm = 1748. Figure shows the cubic fitted line and 
error bars (95% C.I.) using robust standard errors clustered at the level of the household. 
 
Figure 23 Marriage rate by per capita income quintile 
 
● Girls  ● Boys 
Data source: CTALS 2017. nf = 1689, nm = 1748. Figure shows the linear fitted line and 
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Figure 24 Marriage rate by ethnicity/caste 
 
Data source: CTALS 2017. nf = 1689, nm = 1748. Figure shows error bars (95% C.I.) using 
robust standard errors clustered at the level of the household. 
Figure 25 Marriage rate by education level of household head 
 
Data source: CTALS 2017. nf = 1689, nm = 1748. Figure shows error bars (95% C.I.) using 
robust standard errors clustered at the level of the household. 
Figure 26 Marriage rate by mainstream school attendance status 
 
Data source: CTALS 2017. nf = 1689, nm = 1748. Figure shows error bars (95% C.I.) using 
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Figure 24 shows marriage rates within each ethnic/caste group and indicates that 
marriage for both girls and boys is strongly associated with the Muslim community. The 
marriage rate for Muslim girls is 21.9% and for boys is 6.8%; more than double the 
average in both cases. Dalit girls may also be more susceptible to early marriage; 
however again, standard errors are large and so estimates are uncertain. Because 
Muslim and Dalit households have the lowest incomes, this may mask a stronger 
positive association between income and marriage in Figure 23. In other words, higher 
incomes may have a greater role to play in facilitating early marriage than is first 
apparent. 
 
Figure 25 shows marriage rates by education level of the household head. Both girls and 
boys are more likely to be married the more poorly educated is the household head. As 
with work, both higher marriage rates and lower education of the household head are 
more strongly associated with Muslim and Dalit ethnic/castes groups. Figure 26 shows 
that there is also a strong correlation between adolescent marriage and school 
attendance. School attendance and marriage are not entirely mutually exclusive; 
however, 20.8% of girls and 7.1% of boys who are not in school are married compared 
to just 2.5% of girls and less than 1% of boys who are in school. Given the reference 
period of the question on school attendance (past year) it is possible that some of those 
who are reported as both married and in school have recently left school.  
 
In summary, the findings in this section show that early marriage increases sharply with 
age from mid-adolescence. While there is no clear relationship between household 
income and the marriage rate, early marriage is strongly concentrated among Muslim 
girls who are out of school. Earlier in the chapter it was shown that Muslim adolescents 
are the most likely to be out of mainstream school. This suggests that there may be 
certain cultural preferences for early marriage, which supports the possibility that 
additional income could increase marriage rates where these households face financial 
barriers to the payment of dowries and other costs. At the same time, adolescent 
marriage is a minority occurrence across the income spectrum and different social 
groups, which suggests that most households prefer to wait, at least until later 
adolescence. In this case, additional income may have the opposite effect if it allows 
girls to continue in school for longer. It is important to understand the diversity in 
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preferences, incentives, and barriers for early marriage within the study population to 
properly interpret any income effects on marriage timing.  
 
Summary and conclusions 
Data presented in this chapter has revealed the state of adolescent life-course 
circumstances in the CTALS sample from rural Rautahat, and their relationship with 
various individual and household characteristics. This will inform analyses of the 
effects of additional household income on adolescents in subsequent chapters and helps 
to contextualise the findings within the local context and more broadly.  
 
Like much of Nepal’s Province 2, the CTALS population is dominated by 
Terai/Madhesi but with large minorities of the most marginalised ethnic/caste groups, 
Muslims and Dalits. By national standards, households in the CTALS are large and 
poorly educated with many relying on low paying wage labour and subsistence-level 
agricultural and non-agricultural family enterprises. CTALS households likely have 
lower incomes than average, with the poorest households coming from the Dalit and 
Muslim communities. Adolescents in the CTALS sample are more disadvantaged than 
the national and provincial average; mainstream school attendance rates are 
considerably lower and work participation rates are higher. Girls are somewhat behind 
boys in overall access to school but are substantially disadvantaged in terms of access to 
private schools, which play a major role in education provision. Nearly nine in 10 
adolescents engage in work, mostly unpaid work at home, but on average for less than 
two hours per day. Girls are more likely to work than boys and spend longer hours 
working. A small minority of both girls and boys engage in paid work, but boys tend to 
do substantially longer hours. Marriage rates in the CTALS are similar to Province 2 but 
are well above the national average. While early marriage is predominantly an issue for 
girls it also affects a small minority of boys. Most girls have a transition period between 
the initial marriage ritual and cohabitation with their spouse.  
 
The findings show that adolescents’ life-course circumstances are shaped by their 
socioeconomic circumstances. Transitions to adulthood accelerate rapidly with age. 
Older adolescents are less likely to attend school, especially private school, and are 
more likely to work and to be married. Among girls especially, cultural, social and 
economic pressures to marry appear to build with age, accelerating from age 14 to 17. 
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Adolescents from poorer households with an uneducated head are less likely to be in 
school. Variation in school attendance rates are largely associated with private rather 
than public school, suggesting that direct costs may be a greater barrier to school 
attendance than the opportunity costs of work and marriage.  
 
Ethnicity and caste determine several aspects of adolescents’ lives. Adolescents from 
the dominant and more privileged ethnic/caste groups are more likely to attend 
mainstream school and are less likely to engage in work. Muslim adolescents are the 
most disadvantaged in terms of access to mainstream school. As well as low incomes 
and the poor quality of public schools, this may be due to preferences for religious 
education and a sense of cultural exclusion from public schools. Both adolescent girls 
and boys from Dalit households, which tend to engage more in low paid, private sector 
work, are most likely to participate in paid work. Early marriage is most common 
among the Muslim community but is also associated with low levels of education and 
possibly higher levels of income.  
 
The findings in this chapter show that the relationship between school, work and 
marriage is complex. Both school going and non-school going adolescents contribute to 
economic and domestic work at home. However, those who are out of school are much 
more likely to be engaged in paid work and to be married. The extent to which 
adolescents who have transitioned into adult roles have done so at the cost of their 
education or because of limited educational opportunities and other underlying factors 
will be explored in later chapters. This highlights the importance of analysing the 
common set of adolescent life-course circumstances together, as they represent trade-
offs with each other and can help explain why certain effects may or may not occur and 
for whom. 
 
Returning to the main purpose of this study, the findings in this chapter suggest that 
household income has an important role in determining the opportunities available to 
adolescents and the timing of transitions to adulthood, and that additional income in the 
form of a cash transfer, may change the available options. The effects of the OAA on 
the full range of schooling, work, and marriage outcomes are estimated in Chapter 5. 
For the largest group of adolescents, the OAA may support increased investment in 
education, especially private school, preventing adolescents from dropping out or even 
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allowing them to change schools. The poorest, landless households are more likely to 
rely on adolescent paid labour, thus the OAA may also affect adolescents through 
increased household consumption. The effects of the OAA on household income and 
expenditure are explored in detail in Chapter 6.  
 
The findings in this chapter also show that income is just one among a range of 
influencing factors on adolescent outcomes, many of which may mediate the effects of 
additional household income. Some of these factors, including adolescent age and 
household income, education, and adult labour supply, are explored in the quantitative 
analysis in Chapter 5, while Chapter 7 provides a deeper and more contextualised 
understanding of the varied cultural, social, economic and environmental dynamics that 
affect household decisions about adolescents.  
 
The next chapter identifies the extent to which additional household income, in the form 
of the Old Age Allowance (OAA) received by elders, affects the diverse life course 
circumstances of co-resident adolescents, and whether effects are concentrated among 








This thesis explores to what extent and why an increase in household income, in the 
form of an unconditional cash transfer (UCT), affects adolescents’ life-course 
circumstances. The analysis in this chapter answers part of this question by exploiting 
the age eligibility criteria of Nepal’s Old Age Allowance (OAA) to make causal 
inferences about its effects on school attendance, work participation, and marriage 
status, of co-resident adolescents. The OAA is a useful instrument to explore income 
effects on household members due to its relatively generous benefit value and the 
prevalence of multi-generational households in the study area. Assuming some degree 
of resource sharing occurs, the OAA is akin to an unconditional household income 
transfer. Controlling for several factors including differences in age, the analysis 
compares outcomes for adolescents who co-reside with an elder who is nearly eligible 
for the OAA to adolescents who co-reside with an elder of, or just above, eligibility age. 
 
Existing theories and evidence presented in Chapter 2 suggest that UCTs will generally 
have a positive effect on school attendance for both girls and boys but are more 
ambiguous about their effects on work and marriage. However, the complexities of 
adolescents’ lives are often oversimplified into binary options that mask the variety of 
changes that may occur and without accounting for the range of contextual factors that 
influence their lives. This has implications for our understanding of the true effects of 
cash transfers. The analysis in this chapter provides for more nuanced analysis of the 
effects of the OAA on adolescent life-course circumstances in three main ways.  
 
First, outcomes are more precisely specified than is typically the case. School 
attendance is differentiated by types of school relevant to the context including public, 
private, and religious, as well as education migration; work is differentiated by paid, 
unpaid economic, and domestic work, as well as economic migration; marriage 
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outcomes are differentiated by marital status and marriage migration, the latter 
synonymous with marital cohabitation for girls. Second, the analytical framework 
recognises that consumption and investment preferences of household members vary 
and that control over resources can determine their relative bargaining power in 
fulfilling those preferences. To this end, the estimation approach allows for 
identification of differences in the effects of the OAA depending on the gender of the 
recipient. The dynamics of household bargaining and their relation to decision-making 
about adolescents’ life-course options are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. Third, 
as demonstrated in Chapter 4, decisions about adolescent life-course circumstances are 
influenced by many other factors. Estimates are differentiated by gender of the 
adolescent and further analysis examines the main results allowing for variation in age 
and indicators of household socioeconomic status and structure.  
 
The next section presents descriptive statistics that indicate potential differences in 
outcomes for adolescents who co-reside with OAA eligible elders followed by an 
explanation of the estimation approach. The main findings are then presented for each 
outcome area in turn, followed by additional analysis that further refines the findings by 
narrower age groups and socioeconomic status. The chapter ends with a review of the 
robustness and applicability of the results, and a summary of the main findings and 
concluding comments. 
 
Data and descriptive statistics 
All data in this chapter comes from the Cash Transfers and Adolescent Life-course survey 
(CTALS). Variables used in the analysis of school attendance and marital status are the 
same as those presented in Chapter 4. The analysis of work focuses on participation in 
paid and unpaid economic work in the past year rather than on the short-term measures of 
participation and hours worked in the past week. This reflects longer-term decision-
making, aligns with the measures of school attendance, and removes potential variation 
due to seasonality.51 For domestic work, data is only available for the past week. 
 
 




The CTALS was designed to exploit expected discontinuities in outcomes of co-resident 
adolescents at the age of eligibility for the OAA. This approach supposes that the two 
populations, differentiated by age of the elders, represent similar households with the 
same long-term income but that differ in the timing of that income (Edmonds 2006). 
Table 9 presents descriptive statistics for adolescents living in OAA eligible and non-
eligible households. Column 1 shows means for the pooled sample, column 2 for 
adolescents who co-reside with elders who are not yet eligible for the OAA (control 
group), and column 3 for those who live with OAA eligible elders (treatment group); 
column 4 shows the observed difference between columns 2 and 3. An initial 
observation is that there are no tangible differences in the age and gender of adolescents 
in the control and treatment group. This is promising for the proposed estimation 
approach. There are, however, some notable differences in the life-course circumstances 
of adolescents. Looking first at education, column 4 shows that the mainstream school 
attendance rate for adolescents living with an OAA eligible elder is 6.2pp (12%) higher 
than for adolescents living with a non-eligible elder; the difference is larger for girls 
than for boys.  
 
Before going further, mainstream school attendance can be used to demonstrate the 
estimation approach. Figure 27 plots sample means of mainstream school attendance 
against the age of the co-resident elder. Age is indicated as relative to the age of OAA 
eligibility given the policy difference for Dalits; thus, age zero (OAA eligibility age) is 
70 for non-Dalits and 60 for Dalits. The figure also plots the linear trend for each half of 
the sample. Absent the OAA, the line should be smooth across the ages. The disjuncture 
or discontinuity in the line represents the effect of the OAA on school attendance. There 
is a slight upward trend in the data. One might expect the opposite due to the likelihood 
of a positive correlation between the age of the elder and greater economic and care 
burden on the household or the presence of older adolescents. The upward trend may 
reflect households’ anticipatory responses to future OAA income or some unknown 
underlying correlation between school attendance and age of the elder. Figure 28 plots 
the same data but limited to adolescents who live with elder women as these results 
emerge more strongly in the subsequent analysis. There is a clear and slightly larger 
discontinuity in the plotted data and a more horizontal trend. This signals the possibility 




Table 9 Descriptive statistics for adolescents in OAA eligible and non-eligible households 
 
Elders within +/- 5 years 
of OAA eligibility 
(1) 
Elder within -5 years of 
OAA eligibility 
(2) 
Elder within +5 years of 
OAA eligibility 
(3) 
Difference in means 
 
(4) 
 Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean diff. S.E. 
All adolescents, 10-17 years         
n 3437  1643  1794  3437  
Age 13.131 0.035 13.093 0.051 13.166 0.048 0.073 0.078  
Female 0.491 0.008 0.494 0.013 0.489 0.011 -0.004 0.017  
Attends mainstream school 0.575 0.011 0.542 0.016 0.605 0.015 ***0.062 0.017  
Public school 0.390 0.011 0.351 0.014 0.426 0.015 ***0.074 0.017 
Private school 0.185 0.008 0.191 0.012 0.179 0.011 -0.012 0.013  
Migrated for education 0.077 0.006 0.069 0.008 0.085 0.009 *0.017 0.009  
Attends religious school 0.074 0.006 0.077 0.008 0.072 0.008 -0.005 0.009  
n 2975  1448  1527    
Domestic work (last week) 0.839 0.008 0.829 0.011 0.847 0.010 0.018 0.013  
Unpaid economic work (last year) 0.693 0.010 0.696 0.014 0.690 0.015 -0.006 0.017  
Paid work (last year) 0.094 0.006 0.103 0.009 0.086 0.008 -0.016 0.011 
n 3437  1643  1794    
Migrated for work 0.031 0.003 0.026 0.004 0.036 0.005 *0.010 0.006 
Married 0.070 0.005 0.068 0.007 0.072 0.007 0.004 0.009  
Migrated for marriage 0.017 0.002 0.013 0.003 0.020 0.003 0.006 0.004  
Girls, 10-17 years         
n 1689  811  878    
Age 13.105 0.051 13.088 0.075 13.122 0.070 0.034 0.109 
Attends mainstream school 0.534 0.014 0.488 0.021 0.576 0.020 ***0.089 0.024  
Public school 0.420 0.014 0.382 0.020 0.454 0.020 ***0.072 0.024  
Private school 0.114 0.009 0.106 0.012 0.122 0.013 0.016 0.015 
       Continued 
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Table 9 continued         
Migrated for education 0.049 0.007 0.042 0.008 0.056 0.010 0.014 0.011  
Attends religious school 0.078 0.008 0.076 0.011 0.079 0.010 0.002 0.013  
n 1531  745  786    
Domestic work (last week) 0.930 0.007 0.933 0.097 0.927 0.010 -0.005 0.013 
Unpaid economic work (last year) 0.749 0.012 0.742 0.018 0.756 0.017 0.013 0.022  
Paid work (last year) 0.083 0.008 0.094 0.011 0.073 0.010 -0.021 0.014  
n 1689  811  878    
Migrated for work - - - - - -   
Married 0.111 0.008 0.109 0.011 0.113 0.011 0.004 0.015  
Migrated for marriage 0.033 0.004 0.027 0.006 0.038 0.006 0.010 0.009 
Boys, 10-17 years         
n 1748  832  916    
Age 13.155 0.054 13.097 0.078 13.207 0.073 0.110 0.111  
Attends mainstream school 0.614 0.014 0.595 0.020 0.632 0.019 0.037 0.023 
Public school 0.362 0.013 0.321 0.018 0.398 0.019 ***0.078 0.023 
Private school 0.253 0.012 0.274 0.018 0.234 0.016 *-0.040 0.021  
Migrated for education 0.105 0.009 0.095 0.012 0.114 0.012 0.019 0.015  
Attends religious school 0.072 0.007 0.078 0.011 0.066 0.009 -0.013 0.012 
n 1444  703  741    
Domestic work (last week) 0.742 0.013 0.720 0.019 0.762 0.017 *0.043 0.023  
Unpaid economic work (last year) 0.634 0.014 0.647 0.020 0.621 0.020 -0.026 0.025 
Paid work (last year) 0.107 0.009 0.112 0.013 0.101 0.012 -0.011 0.016  
n 1748  832  916    
Migrated for work 0.061 0.006 0.050 0.008 0.070 0.009 *0.019 0.011  
Married 0.031 0.004 0.029 0.006 0.033 0.006 0.004 0.008  
Migrated for marriage - - - - - - - - 
Data source: CTALS 2017. Robust standard errors are used in columns (1), (2) and (3), clustered at the level of household. Column (4) indicates the statistical 




Figure 27 Mainstream school attendance rate for adolescents living with an elder 
 
Data source: CTALS 2017, n = 3437. 
 
 
Figure 28 Mainstream school attendance rate for adolescents living with an elder woman 
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Looking separately at public and private school attendance rates, column 4 of Table 9 
shows that public school attendance is higher for both girls and boys in households with an 
eligible elder. However, while private school attendance does not change substantially 
overall, it is unexpectedly lower for boys who live with an eligible elder. Education 
migration is slightly higher overall and there is no apparent difference in religious school 
attendance. Turning to work, there is little difference in participation in domestic and 
economic work overall. However, boys who live with an eligible elder are more likely to 
be engaged in domestic work and to have out-migrated for the purpose of work. Finally, 
there is no apparent difference in the marriage rate or marriage migration rate.  
 
These initial results point to the possibility of income effects of the OAA on adolescents’ 
life-course circumstances. However, they do not account for systematic bias stemming 
from the difference in age of the elders nor allow for differences in the response to 
additional income between elder women and elder men. The following section describes 
the estimation strategy to account for these issues. 
 
Estimation strategy 
A simple comparison between adolescents who co-reside with non-eligible and eligible 
elders relies on the assumption that the two groups are similar in all respects except timing 
of OAA income; as if OAA receipt were randomised among the population. However, as 
described in Chapter 3, when using age as the assignment variable, the approach differs 
from a standard Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) because reaching a certain age is 
inevitable (barring premature death) and eligibility for the treatment is therefore 
guaranteed rather than approximately random (Lee and Lemieux 2010). This has two 
important implications. First, there may be systematic differences between households with 
eligible and non-eligible elders related to their difference in age. Second, receipt of the 
additional income can potentially be anticipated which, barring liquidity or credit 
constraints, may change peoples’ behaviour prior to eligibility. Discontinuities in outcomes 
may not, therefore, be at the cut-off. Potential anticipatory responses need to be understood 
in relation to prior knowledge of the programme, the nature of local credit markets and 
other contextual factors. The descriptive statistics in Table 9 provide an indication that 
anticipatory responses may be occurring in relation to private schooling. This will be 




Returning to the issue of non-random assignment of the treatment, there are several ways 
that households with older and younger elders can differ which have implications for 
adolescents’ lives. First, health issues are likely to increase with age, which can put more 
pressure on household budgets and impose a greater burden of care on other household 
members (Case 2004). Adolescents may lose out on income that would otherwise have 
been allocated to education or be required to increase their time commitment to care of the 
elder or other domestic and economic activities otherwise undertaken by their parents. 
Moreover, younger elders may be inclined to invest more in their grandchildren because 
they can expect to live for longer (Duflo 2003). Second, the household is older on average, 
which may mean there are differences in household structure such as the presence of an 
additional generation. The average age of adolescents in the household may also differ, 
although the data in Table 9 suggests this is not the case. Third, differences related to age 
cohort may exist. For example, younger elders may have benefited from a change in 
education policy during their youth and be better educated. This can have long-term effects 
on household income, access to resources, the value placed on education, and so on. 
 
Three main strategies are employed to account for the effects of systematic bias due to age 
differences of the elders. First, as with a standard RDD, the bandwidth of the assignment 
variable, in this case age of the elder, is restricted to maximise internal validity while still 
ensuring adequate sample size and some level of external validity (Ludwig and Miller 
2007). However, while in most RDD studies this is done by extracting a sub-sample from a 
larger dataset, this survey was specifically designed to sample only those households with 
at least one adolescent who co-resides with at least one elder of age 5 years either side of 
OAA eligibility. As described in Chapter 3, the ten-year bandwidth was chosen after 
reviewing previous studies of a similar nature and balancing proximity to the cut-off with the 
practical constraints of achieving the necessary sample size within a certain geographic area. 
 
Second, following Edmonds (2006) the estimation of differences in adolescent outcomes 
controls for age-related differences between the groups by including a third-order 
polynomial expansion of the age of the oldest elder within the bandwidth age.52 Third, due 
to the sampling approach, elders within bandwidth age are not necessarily the oldest in the 
 
52 Higher orders give more weight to older elders. First and second order terms have been tested and 
coefficients remain in the same direction and of similar magnitude as with third order terms. Fourth order 
terms and higher drop out in some cases. 
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household and any household member above the upper limit is also eligible for the OAA.53 
Therefore, the estimation controls for the presence of an elder who is 75 years or older in 
the case of non-Dalits and 65 years or older for Dalits. 
 
Factors other than OAA eligibility may also change at the age threshold; estimates 
represent the combined effect of the OAA and all other changes that occur (Lee and 
Lemieux 2010). In this case, there is one programme of concern for the analysis, the 
widows and single women’s allowance (WSWA). The WSWA transfers NRs 1,000 (US$ 
9) per month, half the value of the full OAA, through the same delivery mechanism as the 
OAA to widows of any age and single women from age 60. Nepal’s social security 
allowances are mutually exclusive at the level of the individual and so eligibility for the 
WSWA effectively ceases on reaching OAA eligibility age. Table 10 shows the proportion 
of adolescents who cohabit with a WSW; 29% of adolescents cohabit with at least one 
WSW (98% of whom are widows). Adolescents who live with an OAA eligible elder are 
3pp (13%) more likely to cohabit with a WSW suggesting that, as expected, widowhood 
increases with age.  
 
Table 10 Proportion of adolescents who cohabit with a widow or single woman (WSW) 
 
Elder within +/- 
5 years of OAA 
eligibility 
(1) 
Elder within - 5 
years of OAA 
eligibility 
(2) 
Elder within + 5 
years of OAA 
eligibility 
(3) 
 Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. 
Adolescents, 10-17 years 
n 3437  1643  1794  
WSW > 49/59 years in household† 0.29 0.01 0.28 0.02 0.31 0.02  
Data source: CTALS 2017. Robust standard errors are used throughout, clustered at the level of household. 
†WSW are included when >49 years in Dalit households and >59 years in non-Dalit households. 
 
Because WSW stop receiving the WSWA when they become eligible for the OAA, the 
presence of a WSW in a household with a non-eligible elder is likely to attenuate the 
effects of the OAA. Table 9a in Appendix 10 presents the same descriptive statistics as 
shown in Table 9 but excluding adolescents who cohabit with a WSW from the sample. In 
most cases, the differences that are ostensibly due to the OAA in Table 9 are accentuated with 
 
53 8.8% of elders within the bandwidth age co-reside with another elder above bandwidth age; the rate is 
13.2% among elders eligible for the OAA (treatment group) compared to 4.9% among non-eligible elders 
(control group).  
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the removal of WSW from the sample. However, widows may have certain characteristics that 
make them different to non-widows, such as where they may choose to prioritise additional 
resources. From this point forward, all estimates exclude adolescents who cohabit with a 
WSW. This also has implications for sample size and statistical significance as discussed in 
Chapter 3. Equivalent tables using the full sample are provided in Appendix 10 for 
comparison and any important differences are discussed in the main text.  
 
A further generally applicable issue is that take up of the treatment is not endogenous. 
Elders who are eligible for the OAA may be excluded for any number of reasons such as 
lack of knowledge, discrimination, or administrative failures, or choose not to collect the 
allowance if they are wealthy. Likewise, ineligible elders may find a way to claim the 
allowance. Among the survey sample, take-up of the OAA is 65% among those of eligible 
age and five years above; and less than 1% of non-eligible persons within five years of 
eligibility claim the OAA. While it is known which elders among the eligible failed to 
receive the OAA and which elders among the non-eligible wrongly received the OAA, it is 
not known who among the non-eligible elders will later fail to claim the allowance. Thus, 
comparing actual recipients to non-eligible elders would result in a biased estimation. This 
issue is dealt with by estimating average treatment effects (ATE) based on eligibility for 
the OAA, or intention to treat (ITT). The main shortcoming of ITT is that any effects may 
be lower than expected because it includes a substantial number of eligible non-recipients.  
 
Similar to Edmonds (2006), the initial regression approach, based on ITT and estimating 
the ATE, is: 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑗 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝐸𝑀𝑖 +  𝛼2𝐸𝐹𝑀𝑖 +  𝛽1𝑂𝐸𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑂𝐸𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑂𝐸𝐹𝑀𝑖 +  𝜋1𝐴𝐸𝑖 +  𝜋2𝑈𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗         (3) 
 
where D is any one of the outcomes of interest (see Table 9) for adolescent 𝑗 in household 
𝑖, 𝑂𝐸 is an indicator of whether there is an OAA eligible elder in the household, 𝑂𝐸𝐹 is an 
indicator of whether there is an OAA eligible woman in the household, and 𝑂𝐸𝐹𝑀 
indicates that there is both an OAA eligible woman and man (couple) in the household.54 
The equation includes dummy variables for the presence of an elder man, 𝐸𝑀, and for both 
an elder woman and man, 𝐸𝐹𝑀, with elder woman as the baseline category. This captures 
 
54 In all cases where there are two elders in the household within bandwidth age, one is a woman and one is a 
man. Hereafter, they are referred to as an elder or eligible couple. 
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any pre-treatment effects related to the presence of an elder man (𝛼1) or an elder couple 
(𝛼2). 𝐴𝐸 represents the third order polynomial expansion of age of the oldest elder in the 
household and all its interactions to control for any differences in income, domestic and 
economic labour demand, or any other confounding factor that may vary with age of the 
elders. 𝑈 is a dummy variable representing the presence of an elder whose age is above the 
upper limit of the bandwidth. Thus, 𝛽1 represents the effect on the outcome of interest of 
moving from an OAA non-eligible to an OAA eligible elder. 𝛽2 is the incremental 
difference in the change in the outcome from 𝛽1 if the eligible elder is a woman rather than 
a man; and 𝛽3 is the additional difference in the change in the outcome from 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 if the 
adolescents’ household contains an elder couple. 
 
In this analysis, regression estimates are understood as a timing of income effect (Edmonds 
2006). For this interpretation to hold, it must be shown that OAA eligibility is associated 
with an increase in actual receipt of the OAA. Table 11 presents sample means alongside 
the coefficients of 𝑂𝐸, 𝑂𝐸𝐹 and 𝑂𝐸𝐹𝑀 from equation (3) for OAA receipt and various 
other pre-determined characteristics that are useful for sample verification. The first row of 
column 1 shows that among the full sample, 33.4% of adolescents live in a household with 
an elder who has reported receipt of OAA income. Column 2 shows that the presence of an 
OAA eligible man is associated with a 57.7pp higher rate of OAA receipt compared to a 
non-eligible elder. Less than 1% of adolescents cohabit with a non-eligible elder who 
reported receipt of OAA income, so coefficients for income receipt effectively indicate the 
coverage rate. Having an eligible woman rather than an eligible man in the household is 
associated with a 10.3pp higher rate of OAA receipt, an approximate coverage rate of 68% 
(β1+ β2) among eligible (married) women. Where there is an eligible couple in the 
household the rate of OAA receipt is 22.6pp higher, indicating an approximate coverage 
rate of 90.6% (β1+ β2+β3).55 Table 11a in Appendix 10 shows that coverage rates are 
similar when including WSW.  
 
55 As take-up among non-eligible elders is close to zero, the coefficients effectively represent the coverage 
rate. Excluding WSW, 63.5% of adolescents live with an elder man, 22.1% live with an elder woman and 
14.3% live with an elder couple. The total coverage rate is therefore: 57.7 x 0.635 + 68.0 x 0.221 + 90.6 x 
0.143 = 64.6. In other words, among adolescents who live with an eligible elder, 64.6% live with one who 
reported receipt of OAA income. 
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OAA eligible in HH 
(OE) 
(2) 
OAA eligible is female 
(OEF) 
(3) 
OAA eligible female 
and male (OEFM) 
(4) 
Mean S.E. β1 S.E. β2 S.E. β3 S.E. 
Elder receives OAA income 0.334 0.014 ***0.577 0.029 0.103 0.067 ***0.226 0.077 
Household attributes          
Household size†† 10.252 0.193 -0.568 0.426 1.199 0.891 -1.714 1.164 
No. of adolescent girls 1.111 0.033 0.028 0.089 -0.110 0.210 -0.063 0.241 
No. of adolescent boys 1.122 0.037 0.063 0.080 0.194 0.173 -0.196 0.200 
Household head has education 0.207 0.013 *-0.062 0.032 ***0.199 0.073 **-0.177 0.083 
Ethnicity and caste         
Brahmin / Chhetri 0.034 0.005 -0.013 0.013 0.001 0.024 -0.020 0.028 
Dalit 0.144 0.010 ***0.337 0.012 ***-0.198 0.035 ***0.242 0.038 
Muslim 0.384 0.015 ***-0.178 0.035 0.061 0.077 **-0.200 0.092 
Terai/Madhesi  0.424 0.015 ***-0.149 0.035 *0.138 0.080 -0.007 0.093 
Janajati / other 0.015 0.003 0.004 0.009 -0.002 0.014 -0.013 0.015 
Location          
VDC         
Akolawa 0.114 0.010 -0.035 0.025 0.027 0.065 -0.104 0.070 
Bairiya 0.065 0.009 -0.017 0.020 -0.071 0.049 -0.021 0.050 
Basatpur 0.045 0.006 0.006 0.016 -0.040 0.034 0.044 0.041 
Brahmapuri 0.066 0.007 ***0.053 0.017 **-0.081 0.040 *0.078 0.044 
Fatuha Maheshpur 0.054 0.007 0.054 0.007 0.044 0.049 -0.069 0.053 
Jhunkhunwa 0.091 0.008 **0.059 0.024 -0.039 0.032 0.051 0.047 
Laxmipur Belbichwa 0.056 0.007 0.021 0.017 0.012 0.046 0.045 0.056 
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Table 11 continued          
Mudwalawa 0.064 0.007 0.009 0.018 0.042 0.040 -0.032 0.044 
Pipra Bagwanpur 0.082 0.008 -0.031 0.021 0.007 0.030 0.027 0.043 
Rajdevi 0.081 0.008 0.013 0.019 ***0.092 0.036 -0.047 0.045 
Rajpur Farhadwa 0.144 0.011 ***-0.080 0.027 0.081 0.060 -0.060 0.079 
Rajpur Tusli 0.057 0.007 -0.005 0.020 -0.008 0.033 0.015 0.039 
Saruatha 0.081 0.008 0.003 0.020 -0.067 0.043 0.073 0.053 
Adolescent attributes         
Age 13.127 0.042 ***0.316 0.110 **-0.471 0.221 **0.564 0.268 
Female 0.495 0.010 0.001 0.026 **-0.108 0.054 0.081 0.065 
Data source: CTALS 2017. †Excluding households with widows and single women, n=2424. Robust standard errors are used throughout, clustered at the 
level of household. Statistical significance is indicated by * = 90%, ** = 95%, *** = 99%. All regressions include a third order polynomial of the age of 
the oldest elder within bandwidth age; and dummy variables for the presence of an elder male and an elder female and male in the household and the 




While pre-determined attributes should not vary with OAA eligibility, there may be certain 
characteristics that are subject to a cohort effect or alter the likelihood of an adolescent (the 
unit of analysis) living with an eligible elder. Looking first at household attributes, Table 
11 shows that there is no discernible difference in household structure between adolescents 
who live with eligible and non-eligible elders. Including both current household members 
and recent migrants, none of the coefficients for household size or number of adolescents 
are significant. However, adolescents are 6.2pp (β1) less likely to have an educated 
household head when living with an OAA eligible man compared to a non-eligible man; 
13.7pp (β1+β2) more likely to live with an educated head in the case of eligible women; 
and 4.0pp (β1+β2+β3) less likely with eligible couples. These differences can be explained 
in two ways. First, in Nepal, the household head tends to be the elder man. A five-year 
difference in age cohort among the older generation may correlate with a difference in 
access to education, especially for men. Second, the husbands of eligible women are likely 
to be older and therefore more likely to have passed household head status to the younger 
generation.56 To account for this systematic difference in the sample, a dummy variable for 
education status of the household head will be included in equation (3). 
 
Table 11 shows that, overall, adolescents who live with any OAA eligible elder are more 
likely to come from a Dalit household and less likely to come from a Muslim or 
Terai/Madhesi household. There are two plausible and related explanations for this. First, 
because of the different OAA eligibility age for Dalits (60 rather than 70 years), elders in 
the Dalit sub-sample are 10 years younger on average than non-Dalits.57 Second, this 
structural difference in the household makes it more likely for there to be a greater number 
of surviving eligible elders who are Dalit compared to the other major groups. Despite 
common assumptions (or past realities), Dalits do not have a notably lower life-expectancy 
than other ethnic/castes groups (Bishwa Nath et al. 2009). As ethnicity/caste is correlated 
with adolescents’ co-residence with eligible elders and is a significant determinant of 
opportunities and outcomes, dummy variables for the main ethnic/caste groups will be 
included in the regression.  
 
 
56 24.5% of household heads are younger than 50 years old. 
57 While the coefficients for Dalit eligible men and couples are positive, the coefficient for Dalit eligible 
women is negative; most likely because elder women’s husbands are likely to be older. 
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Location may also have some bearing on the likelihood of adolescents living with an OAA 
eligible elder. For example, a good quality school in the locality, combined with receipt of 
the OAA, may induce an adolescent to move into the household of an eligible elder 
relative. It may also be that certain local officials, who administer social security grants for 
an entire VDC, are more prone to manipulate the age of elders on official documentation to 
facilitate earlier access, although this is not thought to be a significant problem.58 Location 
is also strongly associated with ethnicity/caste as social groups tend to cluster in certain 
areas. Table 11 shows that adolescent co-residence with an OAA eligible elder has some 
correlation with four of 13 Village Development Committees (VDC). Both Brahmapuri 
and Raj Devi, which are more likely to see an adolescent co-reside with an eligible elder, 
have the highest concentration of Dalits. In contrast, VDCs with negative coefficients have 
the highest concentration of Muslims. Jhunkhunwa also has a positive association with co-
residence with an eligible elder but has an even balance of Dalit and Muslim households. 
Jhunkhunwa is one of the most developed VDCs and may have better quality schools than 
other areas. Other unobservable differences related to location may exist. The final 
regression will therefore include dummy variables for all VDCs.  
 
Turning to adolescents’ attributes, Table 11 shows a small positive correlation between 
OAA eligibility and the average age of adolescents; 0.32 years (β1) in the case of 
adolescents who co-reside with elder men and 0.41 years (β1+ β2+β3) for elder couples.59 
Although this difference is small, estimates of equation (3) will also include a third order 
polynomial expansion in the age of the adolescent. Finally, the proportion of girls to boys 
appears to be 10.8pp (β1+ β2+β3) lower when moving from non-eligible to eligible women. 
The difference in gender ratio may relate to the removal of WSW from the sample; the 
same results are not significant in the full sample in Table 11a in Appendix 10. However, 
the underlying reasons remain unclear. Rather than control for gender of the adolescent, all 
findings in the next section are presented separately for female and male adolescents. 
 
Adding additional control variables because they are available is not necessarily helpful. 
York (2018) shows that this could introduce included variable bias and be detrimental to 
 
58 Citizenship cards were used to verify age during data collection. There were a very small number of cases 
where it appeared the age may have been altered. However, it is not known who may have done it, when and 
for what purpose. 
59 The result for elder women is statistically significant in terms of the difference compared to elder men but 
is small (-0.15 years) and not significant by itself.  
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identifying the true causal relationship between the OAA and the outcomes of interest. The 
assumption, hereafter, is that with the presence of the given control variables based on both 
theoretical and empirical grounds, the control and treatment groups are balanced in all 
other ways, in other words, as close to randomised as possible. 
 
The effects of the OAA on adolescent school attendance, work, and marriage  
Table 12 presents regression coefficients from equation (3) for each life-course outcome 
variable of interest for all adolescents and separately for girls and boys. Changes associated 
with moving from a non-eligible man to an eligible man (OE) are shown in column 3. For 
ease of interpretation, the results add the relevant coefficients to show the full effect for 
OAA eligible women (OE+OEF) in column 4 and eligible couples (OE+OEF+OEFM) in 
column 5.  
 
Columns 1 and 2 show any ‘pre-treatment’ differences between non-eligible elder men 
(EM) and couples (EFM) compared to the reference category of non-eligible elder women. 
The estimates exclude adolescents who cohabit with widows and single women (WSW) 
resulting in a substantially reduced sample size, especially for adolescents who live with 
elder women. Equivalent data tables with estimates for the full sample are provided in 
Appendix 10 and are referenced where appropriate. On calculating sample size, statistical 
significance was set at the 95% level. Moreover, results at this level or higher are 
conservative given the Bonferroni correction (see Chapter 3). Significance at the 90% level 
is also reported for which results can be considered marginally significant. The following 
describes the findings under the broad categories of school attendance, work, and marriage. 
 
School attendance 
The literature presented in Chapter 2 points to consistent positive effects of UCTs on 
aggregate school attendance. The following analysis aims to understand how a UCT affects 
marginal decisions about adolescent school attendance while accounting for greater 
diversity in education supply. The results in Table 12 confirm the initial finding that the 
OAA is associated with an increase in mainstream school attendance rates, regardless of 
the recipient type. However, differentiating results by school type and gender of the 




Table 12 Results from equation (3) indicating the effects of a difference in timing of receipt of the OAA on adolescent life-course circumstances† 
 
Elder male (EM) 
 
(1) 
Elder female and 
male (EFM) 
(2) 











α1 S.E. α2 S.E. β1 S.E. β 1+β2 S.E. β 1+β2+β3 S.E. 
All adolescents, 10-17 years            
Attends mainstream school 0.008 0.049 0.018 0.052 0.030 0.033 **0.096 0.042 0.048 0.050 0.368 
Public school -0.015 0.052 -0.059 0.056 **0.088 0.037 0.036 0.052 *0.095 0.057 0.202 
Private school 0.023 0.048 0.078 0.051 **-0.057 0.028 0.061 0.043 -0.047 0.049 0.137 
Migrated for education 0.015 0.035 0.057 0.040 0.005 0.023 **0.101 0.041 **-0.065 0.031 0.043 
Attends religious school 0.014 0.025 0.033 0.029 -0.025 0.021 *0.042 0.025 -0.028 0.032 0.158 
Domestic work (last week) 0.014 0.055 0.000 0.058 0.031 0.030 -0.033 0.046 0.045 0.043 0.030 
Unpaid economic work (last year) -0.067 0.064 -0.085 0.069 0.002 0.039 -0.042 0.062 -0.003 0.066 0.051 
Paid work (last year) 0.032 0.034 0.017 0.037 **-0.043 0.025 -0.013 0.032 -0.025 0.038 0.085 
Migrated for work **0.016 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.007 0.012 *0.016 0.009 -0.003 0.015 0.047 
Married -0.006 0.026 -0.004 0.028 0.020 0.016 0.018 0.027 0.021 0.027 0.160 
Migrated for marriage -0.004 0.014 -0.005 0.015 **0.017 0.008 0.005 0.008 *0.025 0.015 0.061 
Girls, 10-17 years            
Attends mainstream school -0.016 0.077 0.016 0.081 0.068 0.044 0.077 0.063 0.078 0.066 0.387 
Public school -0.081 0.077 -0.084 0.083 *0.095 0.049 0.025 0.066 **0.156 0.077 0.239 
Private school 0.065 0.057 0.100 0.062 -0.027 0.034 0.052 0.051 -0.078 0.050 0.105 
Migrated for education 0.044 0.040 *0.085 0.046 -0.012 0.028 0.061 0.049 **-0.078 0.035 0.060 
Attends religious school 0.001 0.034 0.022 0.040 -0.038 0.031 0.014 0.034 -0.024 0.044 0.156 
Domestic work (last week) 0.048 0.066 0.028 0.069 -0.005 0.032 0.031 0.060 0.008 0.046 0.020 
Unpaid economic work (last year) -0.060 0.085 -0.066 0.090 -0.001 0.050 -0.008 0.082 -0.006 0.078 0.049 
Paid work (last year) 0.031 0.051 0.008 0.053 -0.041 0.031 -0.045 0.041 -0.009 0.047 0.056 
Migrated for work - - - - - - - - - - - 
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Table 12 continued            
Married -0.015 0.047 -0.033 0.049 0.029 0.028 0.023 0.042 0.023 0.044 0.235 
Migrated for marriage 0.000 0.028 -0.003 0.029 **0.035 0.016 0.009 0.017 0.043 0.027 0.142 
Boys, 10-17 years            
Attends mainstream school 0.032 0.057 0.022 0.061 -0.016 0.043 *0.097 0.057 0.013 0.069 0.351 
Public school 0.023 0.066 -0.072 0.070 0.077 0.048 0.048 0.074 0.048 0.071 0.182 
Private school 0.008 0.066 0.094 0.071 **-0.093 0.041 0.049 0.069 -0.036 0.075 0.176 
Migrated for education 0.008 0.051 0.054 0.058 0.025 0.033 **0.124 0.062 -0.057 0.048 0.036 
Attends religious school 0.030 0.031 0.051 0.036 -0.004 0.024 **0.072 0.028 -0.032 0.038 0.168 
Domestic work (last week) -0.062 0.077 -0.083 0.084 0.060 0.048 -0.084 0.073 0.077 0.070 0.063 
Unpaid economic work (last year) -0.082 0.079 -0.140 0.089 -0.007 0.056 -0.052 0.084 0.005 0.090 0.048 
Paid work (last year) 0.035 0.045 0.034 0.051 -0.044 0.036 0.023 0.051 -0.046 0.054 0.123 
Migrated for work 0.023 0.016 0.018 0.022 0.014 0.023 0.025 0.018 0.003 0.031 0.090 
Married 0.002 0.023 0.013 0.026 0.009 0.016 0.016 0.027 0.008 0.023 0.101 
Migrated for marriage - - - - - - - - - - - 
Data source: CTALS 2017. †Excluding households with widows and single women, n=2424 for all adolescents, n=1200 for girls and n=1224 for boys; for work 
participation variables, n=2091, 1084 and 1007, respectively. Robust standard errors are used throughout, clustered at the level of household. Statistical significance is 
indicated by * = 90%, ** = 95%, *** = 99%. All regressions include a third order polynomial of the age of the oldest elder and of the adolescent; and dummy variables for 








Looking first at adolescents who co-reside with an elder woman (column 4), the results 
show a consistently positive effect of the OAA on access to education. Mainstream school 
attendance is higher by 9.6pp and statistically significant when elder women become 
eligible for the OAA. Individual results for private and public school are not statistically 
significant, but the larger proportional contribution to higher mainstream school attendance 
comes from private school. Education migration is also higher by 10.1pp and statistically 
significant while religious school attendance is higher by 4.2pp but only marginally 
significant at the 10% level.  
 
Both girls and boys who live with an OAA eligible woman appear to benefit from higher 
attendance rates, but the differences are larger and more robust for boys. Boys who co-
reside with an eligible woman have 9.7pp higher mainstream school attendance, 
marginally significant at the 10% level, with an equal contribution from public and private 
school attendance. Boys’ education migration is also higher by 12.4pp and statistically 
significant. This is a particularly large effect considering the pooled sample mean for boys’ 
education migration is 10.5% (see Table 9) and suggests that the OAA not only increases 
overall attendance rates but allows adolescents to access schools that have higher grade 
levels or are of better quality. Similarly, boys’ attendance at religious school is higher by 
7.2pp and statistically significant. This result is concentrated in the Muslim population and, 
again, is a large effect compared to the pooled mean attendance rate of 7.2% (see Table 9). 
 
Comparison with the results in Table 12a in Appendix 10 shows that differences in the 
results for school attendance between the sample that excludes WSW (Table 12) and the 
full sample are consistent with expectations. Households with an elder woman are much 
more likely to include a WSW than households with an elder man and are where the largest 
differences are found. Results for adolescents who co-reside with an elder woman are all 
positive and larger in the smaller sample, confirming that the presence of WSW diminish 
the effects of the OAA on school attendance.  
 
In households with an elder man or elder couple (columns 3 and 5), the effects of the OAA 
on mainstream schooling are more diverse. Overall attendance rates are positive but not 
substantially so. However, girls’ mainstream school attendance is moderately higher (β1 = 
0.068 and β1+β2+β3 = 0.078). While the coefficients are not statistically significant, the 
equivalent result for girls who co-reside with an eligible man in Table 12a in Appendix 10 
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which includes WSW, is slightly larger and statistically significant. Again, this is 
consistent with expectations. Households with an elder man or couple are less likely to 
include a WSW and exhibit only minor differences in the magnitude of coefficients. 
However, the larger sample size means that certain borderline results become statistically 
significant. Focusing on public school attendance, results are positive and statistically 
significant for all adolescents at 8.8pp and 9.5pp, respectively, in households with an 
eligible man or couple. While public school attendance rates are higher for both girls and 
boys, they are larger for girls at 9.5pp in households with an eligible man, marginally 
significant at the 10% level, and 15.6pp in households with an eligible couple, significant 
at the 5% level.  
 
So far, the observed effects align with existing theory and evidence presented in Chapter 2; 
UCTs tend to have a positive effect on school attendance. The boost to private schooling 
suggests a direct income effect, with the OAA supporting the cost of fees and other 
expenses. Nevertheless, other effect pathways cannot yet be discounted. Intriguingly, the 
OAA has a negative effect on private school attendance of adolescents who co-reside with 
an elder man or elder couple. The effect is strongest and statistically significant for boys 
who co-reside with an eligible man, with 9.3pp lower private school attendance. There is 
no similar difference in boys’ education migration which suggests that the reduction in 
private school attendance relates to locally available fee-paying schools. The negative 
effect on private schooling is also relatively large for girls who co-reside with an eligible 
couple but is not statistically significant. However, in households with an eligible couple, 
girls’ education migration is 7.8pp lower and statistically significant. While education 
migration can be to either private or public school, it is more likely that the difference 
relates to private school attendance given the concurrent large positive effect on public 
school attendance.  
 
These results confirm the initial finding of a negative effect of the OAA on private school 
attendance identified in Table 9 but are contrary to existing theory and evidence. As 
overall attendance rates are either positive or unaffected, the results may represent a shift 
from private into public school. But why would this occur; and why does it affect boys 
who co-reside with an OAA eligible man but girls who co-reside with an eligible couple? 
Because OAA eligibility is inevitable, and if credit constraints are not fully binding, the 
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negative effect may relate to changes in behaviour prior to, and in anticipation of, 
becoming eligible.  
 
Pre-treatment differences in adolescent outcomes depending on the type of co-resident 
elder offer some initial insights. The coefficients EM and EFM in columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 12 represent the difference in outcomes between adolescents who co-reside with an 
elder man and an elder couple, respectively, compared to those who co-reside with an elder 
woman, prior to OAA eligibility. In other words, differences in ‘pre-treatment’ status 
depending on the type of co-resident elder. While few of the results are statistically 
significant, coefficients are relatively large. The pattern in the data suggests that, compared 
to households with an elder woman, adolescents in households with an elder man or couple 
are more likely to be in private school and to have migrated for education and are less 
likely to be in public school. Prior to OAA eligibility, elder men and couples are better able 
than elder women to support co-resident adolescents to attend private school. These 
households may already be better off financially, but the data also supports the possibility 
of an anticipatory effect. Nevertheless, pre-treatment differences do not explain the 
subsequent decline in private school attendance once elder men and couples become 
eligible for the OAA. This issue is returned to later in the chapter. 
 
In summary, at the level of mainstream education, the findings concur with the bulk of the 
literature that cash transfers lead to moderate (although sometimes large) positive marginal 
effects on school attendance. However, the reality is shown to be more complex when 
accounting for greater diversity in school supply. How the OAA affects decisions about 
school attendance is shown to depend on a variety of factors. Marginal changes in all 
school types indicate the importance of understanding (perceptions of) school quality and 
cultural or religious appropriateness. Differences in outcomes for girls and boys highlight 
the mediating role of gendered social norms and expectations. These ‘contextual’ factors 
are returned to in greater detail in Chapter 7.  
 
Differences in outcomes according to the gender of the OAA recipient suggest that, while 
parents may be primary decision makers in most cases, elders also have some degree of 
influence, and it is important to understand gendered differences in preferences, bargaining 
power, and economic opportunity. Moreover, changes in private school attendance, 
especially education migration, and the occurrence of a possible anticipatory affect, 
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suggest that access to credit is an important factor in moderating effect pathways. Along 
with analysis of education expenditure, the dynamics and role of household bargaining and 
access to credit are investigated in more detail in Chapter 6. 
 
Participation in economic and domestic work 
The literature presented in Chapter 2 shows that the nature of the effects of a UCT on 
adolescent work are highly dependent on the type of work and other circumstances of the 
population. The following analysis aims to understand how a UCT affects marginal 
decisions about adolescent participation in paid and unpaid economic work and domestic 
work.  
 
The results in Table 12 indicate that the OAA is associated with both positive and negative 
changes in adolescent work. The most definitive results are for paid work which engaged 
9.4% of adolescents in the pooled sample in the past year (see Table 9). For adolescents 
who live with an OAA eligible man, participation in paid work is lower by 4.3pp and 
statistically significant. Coefficients are similar for both girls (β1 = -0.041) and boys (β1 = -
0.044) although individually the results are not statistically significant. Results are of a 
similar direction and magnitude for boys who live with an eligible couple (β1+β2+β3 = -
0.046) and girls who live with an eligible woman (β1+β2 = -0.045) but again are not 
statistically significant.60 Data presented in Chapter 4 suggest that the changes in paid work 
participation are more likely to occur in Dalit households that engage in low paying private 
sector work, and that girls are affected as much as boys. 
 
If adolescents do not have to engage in paid work, it is plausible that they are more likely 
to work at home. This may be the case for boys, for whom the domestic work participation 
rate is higher if they co-reside with an eligible man (β1 = 0.060) or eligible couple (β1+β2+β3 
= 0.077), although the results are not statistically significant. In contrast, the coefficients 
for girls’ participation in unpaid domestic and economic work are close to zero, suggesting 
that their contribution in the home is more inelastic.  
 
 
60 MDE estimates confirm that the coefficients are too small to detect among gender differentiated samples. 
Only in households with elder males are the coefficients of a similar magnitude and direction for both girls 
and boys, and so the result becomes detectable in the full sample. The variation in results for paid work by 
type of co-resident elder explains why differences were not apparent in the descriptive statistics in Table 97. 
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The negative effect of the OAA on participation in paid work is not completely consistent. 
Boys who co-reside with an eligible woman may be slightly more likely to engage in paid 
work (β1+β2 = 0.025) although the result is not statistically significant. More definitive is 
the 1.6pp increase in adolescent economic migration, which is marginally significant at the 
10% level. Economic migration occurs exclusively among boys, for whom the difference is 
slightly larger (β1 = 0.025) although not statistically significant by itself. Nonetheless, the 
increase is relatively large in relation to the pooled sample mean of 6.1% (see Table 9). 
Moreover, column 1 shows that the economic migration rate is 1.6pp lower and 
statistically significant in households with an elder woman compared to household with an 
elder man prior to OAA eligibility. The OAA appears to balance out migrant work 
opportunities for boys who live with an elder woman. Boys who co-reside with an OAA 
eligible woman may be less likely to do unpaid economic work (β1+β2 = -0.052) and 
domestic work (β1+β2 = -0.084). Although the coefficients are not statistically significant a 
lower rate of home-based work is consistent with higher rates of paid work for some and 
school attendance for others.61 
 
The relationship between the main results that exclude WSW (Table 12) and the full 
sample (Table 12a) again largely align with expectations. The most substantial differences 
are in households with an elder woman, where the presence of WSW erodes the increase in 
boys’ paid work and economic migration. WSW may already use their Allowance to 
finance either the direct or indirect costs of entry into the labour market. Further evidence 
about the dynamics of economic migration is presented in Chapter 7. WSW also attenuate 
the reduction in unpaid work at home. This may be inversely related to the attenuating 
effect of WSW on the increases in economic migration and school attendance, such that 
adolescents in households with WSW have more time available for work at home.62 
 
 
61 Participation in work was not measured for adolescents who have left the household. However, if 
economic migrants were disproportionately more likely to be working at home prior to leaving, then an 
increase in economic migration would also lead to a reduction in the rate of participation in home-based work 
among the remaining household population.  
62 One unexpected difference is that in households with elder men, the presence of WSW erodes the lower 
rate of boys’ participation in paid work but increases the lower rate of girls’ participation in paid work. Just 
1.3% of adolescents co-reside with both an elder male and a WSW and these households were sampled based 
on the presence of the elder male within bandwidth age and not the WSW. Thus, rather than an economic 
effect related to the WSW allowance, these WSW may have higher care needs or some other unknown factor 




In summary, the results in this section support the proposition in Chapter 4, and the 
findings in much of the relevant literature, that the OAA is more likely to affect adolescent 
participation in paid work than unpaid work. However, the OAA reduces participation in 
paid work in some circumstances while increasing economic migration in others. This 
implies different preferences and effect pathways, with increases in basic consumption on 
the one hand, and increases in productive investment on the other. While the results are 
associated with the gender of the OAA recipient, the underlying reasons for the different 
responses to additional income require further investigation. This is returned to later in this 
chapter, with the same estimates differentiated by adolescent age and household 
socioeconomic status; in Chapter 6 with analysis of the effects of the OAA on the 
household economy; and in Chapter 7 with a qualitative assessment of the range of factors 
driving these outcomes. 
 
Adolescent marriage 
The literature on the effects of UCTs on marriage rates is limited and suggests that 
additional income may reduce the risk of marriage in some circumstances but increase the 
risk in others. The results in Table 12 show that the effect of the OAA adolescent marriage, 
if any, is small but positive, and relates largely to girls. While the differences are larger 
than those in the initial findings presented in Table 9, they are not statistically significant.  
 
The practice of Gauna means that adolescent girls who are reported as married may still 
reside in their parental home. Marriage migration is a better indicator of girls who have 
undergone the ceremony and are now cohabiting. Columns 3 and 5 of Table 12 show that 
among girls, the marriage migration rate is 3.5pp higher and statistically significant if they 
live with an OAA eligible man, and 4.3pp higher if they live with an eligible couple. While 
the latter result is not statistically significant, the coefficient for all adolescents (β1+β2+β3 = 
0.025) is marginally significant. The increase in marriage migration rates are large in 
comparison to the pooled sample mean of 3.3% shown in Table 9. These findings suggest 
that households with an elder man or couple are using the OAA to hasten the formal 
marriage of co-resident adolescent girls. The data in Chapter 4 suggests that this is more 
likely to be happening among Muslim households than any other ethnic/caste group. 
Moreover, the costs of marriage, especially the dowry, are typically beyond the value of 
the OAA. This suggests that the OAA may increase access to credit to finance the costs of 
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marriage. Further evidence on marriage practices, costs, and the role of loans, are 
presented in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
Comparing the results with the full sample including WSW in Table 12a in Appendix 10, 
show similar findings for marriage migration but reveals interesting differences in the 
effect of the OAA on marital status. The positive effects on marital status in households 
with an elder man or elder woman are larger and statistically significant. In households 
with an elder man, the increase in the size of the coefficient is small and is driven by the 
effect on girls. This suggests that, in the case of eligible men, the inclusion of WSW 
sufficiently increases the sample size to detect the effect. In contrast, in households with an 
eligible woman, the coefficient is substantially larger and statistically significant for boys. 
In a dowry culture that values girls’ earlier marriage, the apparent increase in marriage 
among boys is puzzling. One possible explanation is that households with a WSW may 
want an additional female household member to contribute to domestic chores and care 
work. Thus, WSW may contribute financially to hasten the marriage of their grandsons. 
 
The moderating effects of adolescent age and household socioeconomic status 
The previous section focused on RQ1 of this thesis, identifying the effects that the OAA 
has on a diverse range of adolescent life-course outcomes. This section turns attention to 
RQ3, with quantitative analysis of some of the factors that may moderate the observed 
outcomes. The existing literature shows that responses to additional income can vary 
depending on the characteristics of the individuals and on the socioeconomic 
circumstances and structure of the household. Gendered social and economic norms shape 
the expectations of, and opportunities for, young people as they transition to adulthood; 
and gendered differences in the effects of the OAA have already been revealed in the 
results. Transitions to adulthood also tend to accelerate through the adolescent years with 
decreasing incentives to educate and increasing incentives to marry and to work. The OAA 
may therefore have greater effects at certain times in an adolescent’s life. Effects of UCTs 
also tend to vary depending on the relative social and economic standing of the household 
and on the availability of adult labour. For example, adults who are better educated may 
have greater ambition for their children or better access to opportunities. The poorest 
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households may need to prioritise additional income towards basic subsistence, while 
wealthier households can invest in education.63 
 
This section analyses selected adolescent life-course outcomes for which measurable 
effects were identified in the main results by more restricted age groups, education level of 
the household head, and per capita income. Table 13 duplicates results using equation (3) 
but with the sample restricted to adolescents aged 12-14 years (columns 1-3) and 15-17 
years (columns 4-6). A three-year cohort is the smallest age group that can effectively be 
analysed with the given sample size, thus the youngest age group, 10-11 years, is omitted.64 
Similarly, Table 14 shows results of the analysis separately for adolescents whose 
household head has no formal education (columns 1-3) and those whose household head 
has some level of education (columns 4-6).65 Table 15 presents results for adolescents 
whose household falls within the bottom two per capita income quintiles (columns 1-3) 
and those whose household falls within the top three income quintiles (columns 4-6). Table 
16 shows the same results but separately for adolescents who co-reside with two or fewer 
working-age adults in the household and those who co-reside with three or more.66  
 
School attendance 
Table 13 shows that the effects of the OAA on school attendance vary for adolescents of 
different ages. Before examining the results, it is helpful to understand the grade structure 
in Nepal and how this relates to age. Primary includes classes 1 to 5 and is intended for 5-9 
year olds and lower secondary includes classes 6-8 for 10-12 year olds. Together, primary 
and lower secondary are designated as basic education.67 Secondary level includes classes 
9-10 for 13-14 year olds and upper secondary, sometimes known as the plus-two (or +2), 
 
63 The analytical framework in Chapter 2 also identifies community level factors that can moderate the 
effects of a UCT. However, it is not possible to incorporate these into the analysis, given the large number of 
administrative units and the difficulty in interpreting the underlying reason for any differences. Insights into 
the issue of school quality and other community level factors are provided in Chapter 7. 
64 The reduced sample requires replacing the third-order polynomial expansion in age of the adolescent with 
a second-order polynomial. Controls for the age of the elder remain the same. 
65 Education level of the household was shown to have some correlation with the likelihood of an adolescent 
co-residing with an OAA eligible elder. It was suggested that this may related to cohort effects among elders’ 
past access to education and the passing on of household head status to the younger generation. In this 
analysis, education level of the household head has been removed as a control variable. 
66 While it is of interest whether there are differences in outcomes for those adolescents who are solely reliant 
on elders in the absence of parental caregivers, they represent just 5% of the sample which is too small to 
adequately replicate the analysis. Some qualitative analysis is provided on this question in Chapter 7. 
67 Despite statements of intent by the government, no level of education was compulsory by law at the time 
of the survey (Ministry of Education, UNICEF, and UNESCO 2016). 
Chapter 5 
153 
includes classes 11-12 for 15-16 year olds. Examinations taken at the end of primary and 
annually during secondary school are used to determine grade progression. The most 
important exams are the Secondary Education Examination (SEE) taken at the end class 10 
and the School Leavers Certificate (SLC) taken at the end of class 12.68  
 
To interpret the results correctly, it is also necessary to identify any lags in age relative to 
expected grade. In the CTALS, mean grade level among school goers is equivalent to class 
6, the first year of lower secondary, for which the expected age is 10 years. Average age 
among school goers is 12.8 years meaning there is an average lag of 2-3 years between 
expected grade-level age and actual age. This also reflects that 46.7% of school-going 
adolescents in the CTALS are still in primary school. Several studies have identified that 
large numbers of older children are attending lower grades in Nepal (Ministry of 
Education, UNICEF, and UNESCO 2016; Ministry of Education 2015).  
 
Table 13 shows that for most adolescents, the positive effect of the OAA on public school 
attendance is concentrated among 12-14 year olds (columns 1 and 2). In households with 
an eligible woman, although the coefficient is not statistically significant, it is large (β1+β2 
= 11.3), and overall mainstream school attendance is higher by 17.3pp and statistically 
significant. Considering the grade-age lag, the OAA may be preventing these younger 
adolescents from dropping-out of primary school or at the juncture between primary and 
secondary. Similarly, in households with an OAA eligible man, public school attendance 
among 12-14 year olds is higher by 14.1pp and statistically significant. At the same time, 
the negative effect of the OAA on private school attendance is also larger, at -11.1pp, and 
statistically significant. If, as proposed, the negative coefficient reflects an unsuccessful 
attempt to shift boys into private school in anticipation of OAA eligibility, the data 




68 The structure of the education system was modified in the revised 2016 (2072) Education Act. The SLC 
was previously taken at the end of class 10. 
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Table 13 Results from equation (3) indicating the effects of a difference in timing of receipt of the OAA on selected adolescent life-course 
circumstances by restricted age groups† 
 





























β1 S.E. β1+β2 S.E. β1+β2+β3 S.E. β1 S.E. β1+β2 S.E. β1+β2+β3 S.E. 
Adolescents, 12-17 years               
Mainstream school 0.030 0.047 ***0.173 0.062 0.025 0.067 0.406 0.019 0.052 0.106 0.087 0.118 0.085 0.256 
Public school ***0.141 0.053 0.113 0.078 0.089 0.084 0.242 0.054 0.055 -0.025 0.088 *0.157 0.089 0.158 
Private school **-0.111 0.044 0.060 0.067 -0.065 0.076 0.109 -0.035 0.035 **0.131 0.066 -0.039 0.058 0.101 
Paid work (last year) *-0.069 0.036 0.040 0.048 -0.045 0.054 0.069 -0.074 0.051 -0.109 0.083 -0.093 0.084 0.069 
Migrated for work -0.007 0.011 -0.001 0.005 -0.008 0.015 -0.003 0.024 0.035 *0.050 0.027 -0.012 0.046 0.020 
Migrated for marriage 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.002 -0.010 0.009 0.034 *0.045 0.024 0.006 0.024 **0.089 0.045 0.049 
Data source: CTALS 2017. †Excluding households with widows and single women. For 12-14 year olds, n=907 except for paid work where n=816; 15-17 year olds, n=783 
except for paid work where n=623. Robust standard errors are used throughout, clustered at the level of household. Statistical significance is indicated by * = 90%, ** = 
95%, *** = 99%. All regressions include a third-order polynomial of the age of the oldest elder and a second-order polynomial of the age of the adolescent; and dummy 





Table 14 Results from equation (3) indicating the effects of a difference in timing of receipt of the OAA on selected adolescent life-course 
circumstances by education level of the household head† 
 





























β1 S.E. β1+β2 S.E. β1+β2+β3 S.E. β1 S.E. β1+β2 S.E. β1+β2+β3 S.E. 
Adolescents, 10-17 years               
Mainstream school 0.024 0.038 *0.086 0.049 0.041 0.059 0.350 0.100 0.076 *0.123 0.071 0.124 0.093 0.202 
Public school 0.066 0.040 0.033 0.057 0.072 0.062 0.241 *0.175 0.097 -0.075 0.112 0.149 0.136 0.115 
Private school -0.042 0.029 0.053 0.046 -0.031 0.051 0.085 -0.075 0.095 *0.198 0.119 -0.025 0.140 0.117 
Paid work (last year) -0.046 0.028 -0.010 0.035 -0.011 0.044 0.093 0.000 0.051 -0.014 0.092 -0.054 0.050 0.015 
Migrated for work 0.012 0.015 **0.026 0.011 0.005 0.018 0.053 *-0.025 0.014 -0.021 0.014 -0.038 0.024 -0.005 
Migrated for marriage *0.019 0.010 0.004 0.006 *0.034 0.018 0.065 0.000 0.015 0.013 0.028 -0.016 0.014 0.049 
Data source: CTALS 2017. †Excluding households with widows and single women. For heads with no formal education, n=1922 except for paid work where n=1680; for 
heads with some education, n=502 except for paid work where n=411. Robust standard errors are used throughout, clustered at the level of household. Statistical 
significance is indicated by * = 90%, ** = 95%, *** = 99%. All regressions include a third-order polynomial of the age of the oldest elder and of the adolescent; and 





Table 15 Results from equation (3) indicating the effects of a difference in timing of receipt of the OAA on selected adolescent life-course 
circumstances by per capita income quintile† 
 





























β1 S.E. β1+β2 S.E. β1+β2+β3 S.E. β1 S.E. β1+β2 S.E. β1+β2+β3 S.E. 
Mainstream school *0.095 0.056 0.057 0.072 0.123 0.078 0.354 -0.011 0.041 **0.133 0.053 0.010 0.068 0.369 
Public school **0.144 0.059 -0.037 0.083 *0.156 0.080 0.253 0.055 0.047 0.103 0.068 0.080 0.079 0.180 
Private school -0.049 0.039 0.094 0.059 -0.033 0.061 0.118 *-0.067 0.040 0.030 0.064 -0.070 0.068 0.140 
Paid work (last year) -0.027 0.038 0.019 0.055 -0.033 0.057 0.077 **-0.072 0.034 -0.056 0.037 -0.036 0.053 0.099 
Migrated for work 0.018 0.013 **0.030 0.015  0.007 0.019  0.022 -0.000 0.019  0.004 0.013 -0.011 0.022  0.064 
Migrated for marriage 0.011 0.010 0.007 0.014 -0.002 0.021 0.084 **0.022 0.013 0.003 0.008 **0.041 0.020 0.064 
Data source: CTALS 2017. †Excluding households with widows and single women. For the poorest 40%, n=1034 except for paid work where n=970; for the richest 60%, 
n=1390 except for paid work where n=1121. Robust standard errors are used throughout, clustered at the level of household. Statistical significance is indicated by * = 
90%, ** = 95%, *** = 99%. All regressions include a third-order polynomial of the age of the oldest elder and of the adolescent; and dummy variables for the presence of 





Table 16 Results from equation (3) indicating the effects of a difference in timing of receipt of the OAA on selected adolescent life-course 
circumstances by number of working-age adults in the household† 
 





























β1 S.E. β1+β2 S.E. β1+β2+β3 S.E. β1 S.E. β1+β2 S.E. β1+β2+β3 S.E. 
Mainstream school 0.027 0.044 0.014 0.068 -0.030 0.067 0.389 0.048 0.049 ***0.172 0.060 *0.129 0.074 0.354 
Public school 0.047 0.049 -0.079 0.075 -0.036 0.078 0.224 ***0.143 0.053 *0.125 0.074 ***0.240 0.078 0.200 
Private school -0.020 0.039 0.093 0.068 0.005 0.067 0.167 **-0.095 0.040 0.046 0.059 -0.111 0.072 0.131 
Paid work (last year) *-0.078 0.041 -0.014 0.060 -0.018 0.063 0.092 -0.022 0.029 -0.027 0.030 -0.027 0.043 0.075 
Migrated for work 0.075 0.075 0.019 0.014 -0.007 0.023 0.063 -0.001 0.015 0.011 0.013 0.004 0.019 0.032 
Migrated for marriage *0.025 0.013 0.001 0.014 **0.041 0.019 0.048 0.008 0.011 0.003 0.011 0.001 0.022 0.076 
Data source: CTALS 2017. †Excluding households with widows and single women. For < 3 adults, n=1114 except for paid work where n=933; for > 2 adults, n=1310 
except for paid work where n=1158. Robust standard errors are used throughout, clustered at the level of household. Statistical significance is indicated by * = 90%, ** = 
95%, *** = 99%. All regressions include a third-order polynomial of the age of the oldest elder and of the adolescent; and dummy variables for the presence of an elder 
male and elder couple within bandwidth age, an elder above bandwidth age, education of household head, ethnicity/caste group, and VDC. 
 
  
As well as boosting public schooling for younger adolescents, households with eligible 
women use the OAA to increase private school attendance among 15-17 year olds, 
which is higher by 13.1pp and statistically significant (column 5). Greater educational 
investment at the point of transitioning to secondary level may be a response to the stark 
difference in examination pass rates between public and private school. In one study, 
the SLC pass rate in private schools is shown to be almost double that of public schools 
(A. Thapa 2015). In contrast, households with elder couples are more likely to boost 
public school attendance among 15-17 year olds, which is higher by 15.7pp and 
marginally significant (column 6). Results from Table 12 show that this primarily 
relates to girls, who are supported by the OAA to continue to secondary level. Given 
that girls education tends to be a lower priority compared to boys, this effect may only 
occur because these households are in receipt of double the income from the OAA. 
 
Table 14 shows the difference in effects of the OAA according to the education level of 
the household head, categorised as having no formal education or some primary 
education or higher.69 Among households with an uneducated head, the overall pattern 
is similar to the main findings in Table 12. However, the only result that remains 
marginally statistically significant is the 8.6pp higher level of mainstream school 
attendance for adolescents who co-reside with an OAA eligible woman (column 2), 
suggesting this is a particularly robust effect.  
 
In the approximately 20% of households with an educated head, differences in school 
attendance are exaggerated. In these households, adolescents who co-reside with an 
eligible man or couple see a much larger boost to public school attendance (columns 4 
and 6); higher by 17.5pp and marginally significant in the case of adolescents who live 
with an eligible man. This is well above the concurrent reduction in private school 
attendance (β1 = -0.075), suggesting that adolescents not only transfer from private 
school but benefit from greater public school attendance. In households with both an 
eligible woman and an educated household head, there is a particularly large increase in 
private school attendance; higher by 19.8pp and marginally significant (column 5). Like 
the results for older adolescents, the negative coefficient for public school attendance 
 
69 CTALS data shows that approximately 55% of co-resident elders are the household head; 85% among 
elder men and 24% among elder women. 
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suggests that this may include adolescents who transferred from public to private 
school. Overall, these findings suggest there are intergenerational benefits of education 
such as greater aspiration or a more supportive home learning environment. The higher 
level of education among the older generation may also be a correlate of higher income.  
 
Table 15 shows the difference in effects of the OAA according to per capita income by 
comparing households in the bottom 40% and in the top 60% of the income 
distribution,70 and Table 16 shows the difference in effects of the OAA according to the 
number of working-age adults in the household, comparing adolescents who co-reside 
with two or fewer adults to those who co-reside with three or more adults. Data 
presented in Chapter 4 showed a positive correlation between the number of working 
age adults and household income. However, it is possible that household income and the 
number of working age adults moderate the effects of additional income in different 
ways. Looking first at adolescents who co-reside with an elder woman, the largest 
overall effect on mainstream school attendance is in richer households, higher by 
13.3pp (Table 15, column 5), and where there are more working-age adults, higher by 
17.2pp (Table 16, column 5). In both cases, this is driven largely by higher public 
school attendance. Conversely, in poorer households with fewer working age adults, the 
OAA is more likely to support higher private school attendance (column 2).  
 
Consolidating the results from Table 13 to Table 16 for adolescents who co-reside with 
an elder woman, the OAA appears to allow older adolescents in the relatively small 
proportion of smaller, poorer households with better educated elders, to catch up with 
their better-off counterparts in accessing private school at critical grade-junctures. This 
suggests that there is an intergenerational education effect that is independent of, but 
interacts with, income. At the same time, in households with an elder woman, the OAA 
is more likely to boost public school attendance for younger adolescents in richer 
households with an uneducated head. As with earlier findings for eligible couples, this 
may reflect the ability of richer households, that are more likely to already have an 
adolescent in private school, to support the retention of other ‘second priority’ 
adolescents in public school. Data presented in Chapter 7 confirm that households adopt 
such strategies for prioritisation of educational investment. 
 




Turning to adolescents who co-reside with an elder man or couple, Table 15 and Table 
16 suggest that household income and the number of working age adults have a 
divergent moderating influence on the effects of the OAA on school attendance. First, 
the positive effect of the OAA on public schooling is larger for adolescents in poorer 
households (Table 15, columns 1 and 3), but those with more working age-adults (Table 
16, columns 4 and 5). Given that effects are also higher in the minority of households 
with better educated elders, this again suggests that the intergenerational effect of 
education interacts with additional income in poorer households to boost public school 
attendance, especially for girls, who were perhaps lower priority for educational 
investment. However, that these effects are only seen in households with more working 
age adults, suggests that demand for adolescent girls’ labour within the home may 
negate the potential of the OAA to support their education. Further qualitative evidence 
for the moderating effects of adult labour supply is provided in Chapter 7.  
 
Second, the negative effect of the OAA on private school attendance is slightly larger 
and marginally significant in richer households and those with more working age adults 
(columns 4 and 6 of Table 15 and Table 16). This suggests that households with higher 
incomes prior to the elder becoming eligible for the OAA may be in a stronger position 
to secure loans in anticipation of the OAA. The question of anticipatory responses will 
be taken up again in Chapter 6.  
 
Participation in paid work, economic migration and marriage 
The results in Table 13 show that the effects of the OAA on reducing adolescent 
participation in paid work increase with age. In households with both elder men and 
couples, coefficients are larger than the main results (Table 12) for 12-14 year olds (β1 = 
-0.069; β1+β2+β2 = -0.045) and larger still for 15-17 year olds (β1 = -0.074; β1+β2+β2 = -
0.093); although only the coefficient for 12-14 year olds who live with an eligible man 
is statistically significant (column 1). The negative effect is also larger for 15-17 year 
olds who co-reside with an elder woman (β1+β2 = -0.109). Households that require 
younger adolescents to engage in paid work may be in greater economic need, and the 
OAA is unable to compensate their earnings. This is supported by the findings in Table 
14 and Table 15, showing that for adolescents who co-reside with an eligible male, 
participation in paid work is lower in households with an uneducated head (β1 = -0.046) 
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and in richer households (β1 = -0.072), although only the latter result is statistically 
significant.  
 
Table 16 shows that, despite the reduction in paid work being larger in richer 
households, it is also concentrated in households with fewer working age-adults (β1 = -
0.078). Adolescents in households with fewer adults may be more likely to engage in 
paid work in the first place, while only relatively better-off households are able to limit 
their work following receipt of the OAA. Moreover, the previous section showed that 
households that are better off, have an educated head, and fewer working age adults saw 
little change in overall mainstream school attendance and only small increases in public 
school attendance. This suggests that households have an aversion to adolescent paid 
work regardless of school status, and that increases in school attendance associated with 
the OAA are more likely due to increased expenditure on direct costs than 
compensation for foregone adolescent income. This is supported by the estimates of the 
effects of the OAA on education expenditure in Chapter 6. 
 
In households with an eligible woman, the increase in economic migration is 
concentrated among 15-17 year olds; higher by 5.0pp and statistically significant (Table 
13, column 5). The effect is also larger than average and statistically significant in 
poorer households and those with an uneducated head, where economic migration is 
higher by 2.6pp and 3.0pp, respectively (column 2 in Table 14 and Table 15). Poorer 
households with an uneducated elder woman are seeking better employment 
opportunities for their older adolescent boys. While there was no decrease in economic 
migration apparent in the main results, households with better educated elders may use 
the OAA to prevent boys from leaving home to work. In households with an eligible 
man, economic migration is lower by 2.5pp and is marginally statistically significant. 
While these finding are not fully robust, they suggest that some households view 
economic migration as an opportunity and for others it is an (undesirable) necessity.  
 
Turning to girls’ marriage migration, Table 13 shows that the OAA has a larger and 
statistically significant positive effect on 15-17 year olds in households with an eligible 
man or couple (columns 4 and 6); higher by 4.5pp and 8.9pp, respectively. Because 
marriage migration only affects girls the change among girls will be substantially 
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larger.71 The OAA is further accelerating the rate of marriage as girls approach later 
adolescence. Table 14, Table 15 and Table 16 show that, in households with an elder 
man or couple, the OAA only affects marriage migration in households with an 
uneducated head (β1 = 0.019; β1+β2+β2 = 0.034), that are richer (β1 = 0.022; β1+β2+β2 = 
0.041), and that have fewer working age adults (β1 = 0.025; β1+β2+β2 = 0.041). It was 
suggested earlier that the negative effect on private school attendance occurs in richer 
households because they are in a better position to leverage the OAA as collateral for 
loans in anticipation of eligibility. The same may be true here. The costs of marriage are 
high and richer households may be better able to use the OAA to access credit, only in 
this case, after becoming eligible. Further analysis of this issue is provided in Chapters 
6 and 7. Moreover, the concentration of effects in households with fewer working age 
adults may be an indication that the adolescent girls who have out-migrated to their 
husband’s home are older siblings, without a married older brother in the household. 
Evidence presented in Chapter 7 suggests that households where an adolescent girl has 
older (married) brothers at home, are in a stronger financial position to have already 
completed the formalisation of her marriage. Pesando and Abufhele (2019) show that 
the sex and age order of siblings can affect the marriage timing of adolescent girls. 
 
Robustness and applicability of the results  
This section re-examines the main assumptions and potential confounders related to the 
estimation approach considering the subsequent analysis and results, and touches on 
questions of generalisability to the Nepali population. A separate discussion of the 
robustness and validity of the results in relation to the mixed-methods approach and of 
their wider generalisability in relation to the literature is provided in Chapter 8. 
 
Potential differences between control and treatment groups due to the age of the elder 
and adolescent are accounted for in the estimations by applying a third-order 
polynomial expansion in age and by including certain control variables on both 
theoretical and empirical grounds. All regressions have been tested with second- and 
fourth-order polynomials; although some variables drop out at the fourth-order in sub-
sample analyses. The main results in Table 12 are not sensitive to changing the order of 
 
71 Running the same analysis for girls only shows that marriage migration is higher by 9.5pp and 13.6pp, 
respectively, for 15-17 year old girls who co-reside with an eligible man or elder; both results marginally 
significant at the 10% level. 
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the polynomial for adolescent age. However, coefficients are slightly sensitive to the 
order of the polynomial for elder age. Results for adolescents who co-reside with an 
elder woman are unaffected except for the coefficient for adolescent religious school 
attendance which is slightly smaller and becomes marginally non-significant with the 
fourth order polynomial. However, the equivalent result for boys’ religious school 
attendance remains unchanged and statistically significant. In households with an elder 
man or couple there are small fluctuations in the magnitude of several coefficients with 
the second or fourth order polynomial. In most of these cases, statistical significance 
remains unchanged or becomes marginally significant when previously non-significant. 
Three coefficients, private school attendance for adolescents who co-reside with an 
elder man, public school attendance for girls who live with an elder man, and education 
migration for girls who live with an elder couple, become slightly smaller and 
marginally non-significant. However, the equivalent coefficients for boys’ private 
school attendance and adolescent public school attendance and education migration are 
stable and remain statistically significant. Overall, polynomials of different orders do 
not change the interpretation of the main results. Use of the Bonferroni correction in 
calculating sample size and the treatment of results with a p-value =<.1 and >.05 as 
marginally significant provides further confidence and transparency in the estimates. 
 
ITT estimates and the relatively low take-up rate of approximately 65% will have 
attenuated the results. Because those who do not take-up the OAA may be qualitatively 
different to those who do, more socially excluded for example, it cannot be assumed 
that the magnitude of the results is reduced proportionally. However, it is reasonable to 
expect that average effects on adolescents’ life-course circumstances would increase to 
some extent with improved take-up.  
 
Removal of WSW from the analysis was an undesirable but necessary step to better 
estimate the true effects of the OAA. WSW are eligible for the WSW allowance, at half 
the value of the full OAA, until becoming eligible for the OAA. The increase in income 
at the threshold is half that of non-WSW. Comparison with results using the full sample 
indicates that, as expected, their presence diminishes the effects of the OAA on school 
attendance, especially for adolescents who co-reside with elder women. Similarly, the 
increase in economic migration and the reduction in boys’ unpaid work at home are 
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both diminished. While exclusion of WSW means the results better reflect the true 
effects of the OAA, the smaller sample size may lie behind the lack of statistical 
significance for some of the moderate to large coefficients for adolescents living with an 
elder woman. Moreover, exclusion of WSW has implications for the generalisability of 
the findings as households with WSW are different in other ways that are associated 
with adolescents’ life-course circumstances. For example, WSW may have particular 
care needs, while married women may have absent husbands that provide migrant 
opportunities.  
 
Lead effects may occur in relation to private schooling; a theoretical possibility when 
eligibility for treatment can be anticipated and liquidity or credit constraints are not 
fully binding. Lag effects are also a theoretical possibility, whereby a delay occurs 
between treatment and the resultant changes in behaviour or between becoming eligible 
and actual receipt of the treatment; both of which will affect ITT estimates. If low take-
up of the OAA is concentrated among the recently eligible, then this points to delays 
between eligibility and receipt. Any financial commitments made in anticipation of 
eligibility may be unsustainable. This could explain the negative effect of the OAA on 
private school attendance: elders take loans in advance of eligibility to finance the cost 
of private school but are unable to maintain the payments when the OAA fails to come 
on time, resulting in drop-out or transfer back to public school. Evidence for this is 
presented in Chapter 6.  
 
Further confidence in the analysis comes from the internal consistency of the findings, 
which is apparent in three main ways. First, effects on school attendance for girls and 
boys are consistent for each type of elder; positive for both public and private school in 
households with elder women and positive for public school but negative for private 
school in households with elder men and couples. Second, patterns for elder couples are 
closer to those of elder men. This suggests that the presence of the male elder within the 
couple is dominant which aligns with expected gendered norms in Nepali society (Gram 
et al. 2018). Third, the concentration of effects among certain age groups are congruent 
with grade structures and expected life-course transitions. The moderating effects of 
education among the older generation and household income are also consistent with 
expectations; the better educated older generation enhance the effects of the OAA on 
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school attendance, while poverty limits the ability of other households to reduce 
adolescent paid work. 
 
Finally, while adolescents who live with elders are a sub-set of the population, these 
circumstances are common. Analysis of national survey data suggests that 
approximately 14% of adolescents co-reside with an elder of bandwidth age, while 50% 
live with someone of age 50 or older.72 A further consideration is that the CTALS was 
conducted in an area of Nepal with high poverty rates and low school attendance. The 
same level of impact would not necessarily be expected in wealthier areas with higher 
school attendance. Nevertheless, results conceivably can be generalised to adolescents 
in poor rural areas of Nepal and across large parts of Northern India with shared social 
and cultural practices.  
 
Summary and conclusions 
The analyses in this chapter have provided evidence towards the first fundamental 
question of this thesis; whether and to what extent additional household income in the 
form of a UCT affects adolescents’ life-course circumstances. The main analysis 
estimated the quantitative effects of Nepal’s Old Age Allowance (OAA) on the life-
course circumstances of co-resident 10-17 year old girls and boys. Subsequent analysis 
differentiated the findings by narrower age groups and the socioeconomic and 
demographic circumstances of the household.  
 
The findings suggest that variation in the effects of the OAA on adolescents’ life-course 
circumstance depending on their age and gender reflect differences in the priorities, 
opportunities, and constraints of households. Households appear to take strategic 
decisions about which adolescents receive additional investment in education, and 
when, while others use the OAA to hasten transitions to adulthood. 
 
The largest effects on education are among adolescents who co-reside with an eligible 
woman, for whom mainstream school attendance is higher by nearly 10pp, 
approximately 16% higher than the control group mean. The OAA is more likely to 
 
72 Based on author’s analysis of data from the Nepal DHS conducted in 2016 by the Ministry of Health, 
New ERA and ICF. 
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support younger adolescents to remain in public school and older adolescents, 
especially boys, to transfer into private school, sometimes away from home. This 
implies that increased investment may be made at more critical grade junctures. The 
increase in access to private schools is more common in poorer and better educated 
households where more adolescents have missed out on these opportunities but where 
(grand)parents may have higher aspirations or a greater ability to support learning 
(Kilburn et al. 2017).  
 
The OAA also supports boys to access religious school, with attendance rates higher by 
7pp, approximately 450% higher than the control group mean. This relates exclusively 
to Muslim adolescents who attend the madrassa and is therefore a particularly large 
effect within the Muslim population. At the same time, some poorer but less educated 
households with an elder woman use the OAA to support boys to migrate for work. The 
rate of economic migration among older boys is 5pp higher, approximately 49% higher 
than the control group mean. It is likely that these boys were already out of school and 
were looking for better employment opportunities. Using data from the Nepal Living 
Standards Survey (NLSS) 2011, Bossavie and Denisoya (2018) find that economic 
migration is more likely among lower educated male youth from agricultural areas. 
 
For adolescents who co-reside with an elder man or couple, the overall effect of the 
OAA on mainstream school attendance is positive but small. However, this masks a 
much larger positive effect on public school attendance of 9-10pp, 27-29% higher than 
the control group mean, concurrent with a negative effect on private school attendance 
of 5-6pp, 25-31% lower than the control group mean. The positive effect on public 
school attendance is largest for girls and is concentrated in poorer households but with 
more working age adults and better educated elders. Again, this may reflect that better 
educated (grand)parents have higher aspirations or a greater ability to support 
adolescent learning, while the greater number of adults reduce adolescents’ burden of 
work.  
 
While some boys also benefit from retention in public school, the effect of the OAA for 
other boys is markedly different. Households with an elder man appear to boost younger 
boys’ access to private school in anticipation of eligibility. It is proposed that the 
negative effect associated with the OAA occurs because the households are unable to 
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sustain the cost in the face of delayed entry into the programme. The limited change in 
overall mainstream school attendance suggests that at least some of these boys are able 
to transfer (back) into public school. A similar pattern is seen for girls who co-reside 
with an eligible couple, especially in relation to education migration. This potential 
anticipatory response is largest in richer households with a greater number of working 
age adults, which may have more liquidity or are in a better position to leverage loans in 
anticipation of the OAA. Evidence presented in the next chapter supports interpretation 
of the negative effect on private school as an unsustained anticipatory response. 
 
Some households with an elder man use the OAA to reduce participation in paid work 
for both girls and boys. Paid work is lower by approximately 4pp, 37% lower than the 
control group mean, and with larger effects among older adolescents. Moreover, effects 
are larger in richer households but with fewer working age adults; the OAA may be 
insufficient to compensate the poorest households that rely on the paid work of younger 
adolescents. Other households with an elder man or couple use the OAA to hasten the 
formal marriage of older adolescent girls. While the marriage rate according to marital 
status is not substantially affected, the marriage migration rate of 15-17 year old girls 
who co-reside with an OAA eligible man or couple is higher by nearly 5pp and 9pp, 
respectively, and is higher still in richer households but with fewer working age adults 
and less educated elders. Given the high financial cost of girls’ marriage it may only be 
richer households that can use the OAA to secure a loan for the dowry and other 
expenses. 
 
The analyses also provided initial insights into the pathways through which effects 
occur. That private school is more responsive to additional income suggests that direct 
costs may be a more important factor than opportunity costs in determining school 
attendance. Moreover, there is only a weak link between reductions in paid work and 
increases in school attendance, suggesting that households are averse to adolescent paid 
work regardless of school status. Certain effects are associated with particularly high 
costs, especially education migration and marriage. Along with apparent anticipatory 
responses, this suggests that loans may play an important role in enhancing the effects 
of the OAA. At the same time, the positive effects on retention in public schools, which 




Further evidence is required to substantiate these propositions and questions remain 
about other contextual factors that moderate the effects of the OAA. These issues are 
taken up in Chapter 6 which examines the dynamics of the household economy and the 
effects of the OAA on income, expenditure and debt; and in Chapter 7, which examines 
the other cultural, social and economic factors that shape households’ decisions about 




The OAA and the Household Economy:  




The analysis in this chapter integrates quantitative and qualitative data to explore how 
the OAA interacts with the household economy to provide further evidence towards the 
second main question of this thesis which asks, what are the pathways through which 
the OAA affects adolescent life-course circumstances. Much of the literature on the 
effects of UCTs on individual household members tends to overlook how the transfer 
interacts with the household economy.73 Data on transfer size and take-up are 
sometimes provided but other aspects of implementation that can affect outcomes are 
rarely considered. At the same time, most studies on the effects of cash transfers make 
implicit assumptions about how resources are shared within the household. This is 
problematic, especially when unexpected results are identified that contradict the 
prevailing theory. Incorrect conclusions may be drawn if important contextual factors 
are unaccounted for or the underlying assumptions, unknowingly, do not hold.  
 
The OAA has a range of effects on adolescent schooling, work and marriage, which 
vary in magnitude and sometimes direction, depending on the circumstance of the 
adolescent and their household. Several aspects of the findings suggest that household 
income, differential access to credit, and imperfect implementation of the OAA, are 
important factors in shaping outcomes and may explain possible anticipatory responses. 
Results also differ depending on the gender and cohabitation status of the recipient, 
which suggests that decision-making about adolescents’ life-course circumstances, and 
the extent to which the OAA plays a part, also depends on how household members 
 
73 There is a body of literature that examines the effects of cash transfers on income and expenditure (see 
Chapter 2). However, studies focused on second or third order outcomes of individual household 
members rarely include such analysis. In many cases, these shortcomings result from data limitations, 
especially in studies that rely on secondary data. 
Chapter 6 
170 
control and share resources. These, and other questions about the pathways through 
which effects occur, require further understanding.  
 
The next section describes the data and methods. The findings are then organised in four 
main sections. The first examines the economic status of the population and the value of 
the OAA to recipients and their households considering how the policy is implemented 
in practice. The second part investigates the effects of the OAA on general household 
expenditure and education expenditure. The third analyses how processes of resource 
sharing within the household shape decisions about adolescents’ lives. The fourth part 
examines loan-taking practices and investigates whether the OAA plays a role in 
accessing loans for adolescent education and marriage. This is followed by a discussion 
of the evidence for anticipatory responses to the OAA. The final section summarises 
and concludes. 
 
Data and methods 
All data in this chapter comes from the CTALS and in-depth interviews (IDI) unless 
otherwise stated. Quantitative data is used to provide a descriptive analysis of the 
household economy and, following the same estimation approach used in Chapter 5, to 
make causal inference about the effects of the OAA on income, expenditure and debt. 
The IDIs sought to place the role of the OAA within the complexities of the household 
economy and processes of resource sharing. Qualitative data is used to triangulate and 
provide a more nuanced interpretation of the quantitative findings. 
 
The quantitative analysis draws mainly on household income, expenditure and loan 
data. Total household income is an aggregate variable made up of four main earned 
income sources in the past year including remittances, as well as government and non-
governmental transfers, and gifts. Household expenditure is a proxy for total annual 
expenditure based on a representative number of expenditure items. It is a relative 
measure between sample units rather than an estimate of total expenditure. Both these 
measures are described in detail in Chapter 3. Adolescent education expenditure is an 
aggregate variable capturing all potential types of direct expenditure on the education of 
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the adolescent in the past 12 months.74 Recent loan value combined the most recent 
formal and informal loan taken by the household within the past 12 months. Other 
variables used in the analysis are described in the relevant section. 
 
Each section combines descriptive statistics with the estimation approach used in 
Chapter 5. Equation (3) (see p.136), including all additional control variables, is 
estimated with the natural log transformation of household income, household 
expenditure, adolescent education expenditure and recent loan value, as the dependent 
variables. Recent loan value has 1,346 zero values among 2,424 cases, so the tobit 
model is used in place of the linear model. The tobit model presumes that there is a 
latent variable 𝑦𝑖
∗ that, like the linear model, depends on 𝑥𝑖 via a parameter 𝛽 and with a 




∗    𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖𝑗
∗ > 0
  0   𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖𝑗
∗  ≤ 0 
   (4) 
   
where 𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1 + log 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 for adolescent 𝑗 in household 𝑖. Other terms in 
the model are the same as for equation (3) including the additional controls described in 
Chapter 5. Coefficients are interpreted as the effect of the independent variable 
(presence of an OAA eligible elder) on the latent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑗
∗ . They represent an 
element of both the binary status of having a loan (or not) and the value of the loan.  
 
Throughout the chapter, quantitative analysis is combined with data from the IDIs to 
provide respondent perspectives on the relationship between the OAA and the 
household economy. As described in Chapter 3, IDI transcripts were subject to a 
process of iterative deductive and inductive coding. The coding process organised the 
data into broad themes each with various sub-categories. The data focuses on how 
meaningful the OAA is perceived to be by the household and the reliability of the 
scheme; the dynamics of household resource sharing and bargaining; and how the OAA 
facilitates access to credit. Content analysis is used where it helps to triangulate the 
quantitative findings. Most qualitative data are presented and analysed as a narrative 
 
74 Adolescent education expenditure includes estimated annual expenditure on admission and other fees, 
books, transport and any other associated costs for each adolescent in the household. 
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with reference to the quantitative findings and the wider literature where relevant. 
Selected extracts from the IDIs are provided to exemplify commonalities and 
exceptionalities among the cases. Due to the nature of the topics in this chapter, most 
extracts are from elders and parents. Extracts are sometimes combined with survey data 
from the same household to contextualise the circumstance of the respondent. In some 
cases, extracts have been edited to remove repetitive material where this does not alter 
the meaning in any way. Otherwise, apart from the names of the respondents, direct 
quotations have not been changed from the original translation. 
 
The value of the OAA to recipients and their households 
This section explores the economic status of households in the CTALS population and 
the value of the OAA relative to household income. As well as examining quantifiable 
monetary measures, the analysis explores how household members perceive the value 
and usefulness of the OAA considering how the policy is implemented in practice. 
 
Household income and poverty 
Data presented in Chapter 4 suggest that annual incomes in the CTALS population are 
considerably lower than the national average for rural areas. Mean annual household 
income is NRs 261,020 (US$ 2,310) and per capita income is NRs 39,602 (US$ 350). 
Figure 29 shows the per capita income distribution of the CTALS population. Each 
current household member is represented on the x-axis in order of per capita income 
from lowest to highest. The distribution of income is very flat with a small minority 
who are considerably richer. As such, median rather than mean income better represents 
the economic circumstance of the population. Median household income is NRs 229,000 
(US$ 2,027) and median per capita income is NRs 27,714 (US$ 245).  
 
The official per capita poverty line is based on the cost of basic needs approach using 
NLSS data and was last set in 2011 at NRs 19,261 (US$ 170) nationally and NRs 
17,540 (US$ 155) in the rural central Terai region (Central Bureau of Statistics 2011c). 
Adjusting for inflation at an average of 7.9% per year from 2012-2017 the sub-regional 
poverty line is NRs 27,656 (US$ 245) in 2017.75 The straight lines on Figure 29 indicate 
 
75 Inflation data is taken from: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG?locations=NP. 
Accessed: 29th June 2020. 
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the official sub-regional poverty line (2010-11) and the inflation adjusted sub-regional 
poverty line (2017). The estimated poverty rates are indicated where the poverty lines 
cross the income distribution curve. 
 
Figure 29 Per capita income distribution for the CTALS household population 
 
Data source: CTALS 2017, n = 16,091.  
 
Applying the official sub-regional poverty line to the CTALS per capita income data 
gives a poverty rate of 26.2%. Because the income distribution is so flat, the inflation 
adjusted line more than doubles the poverty rate to 54.9%. The official 2010-11 poverty 
rate is 25.2% for Nepal and 23.1% for the rural central Terai (Central Bureau of 
Statistics 2011c). However, using small area estimation techniques, the poverty rate for 
Rautahat district is an estimated 33.4%; while many of the VDCs surrounding the 
district capital of Gaur, where the CTALS was conducted, have poverty rates of 
between 34.5% and 40.7% (Central Bureau of Statistics 2013), much closer to the 
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For several reasons, including the application of different measures of economic well-
being, the poverty rates are not strictly comparable.76 The analysis does not aim to 
provide an accurate estimate of poverty rates among the study population, but does 
provide an indication of their economic status and an approximate benchmark against 
national data. The broad conclusion is that the CTALS population is considerably 
poorer than the national, sub-regional and even district average, and is highly 
economically insecure.  
 
The value of the OAA relative to household income 
OAA policy is such that each eligible elder receives NRs 24,000 (US$ 212) per year; 
approximately 10.5% of median household income and 86.6% of median per capita 
income. Dalits receive half the full allowance from age 60 until they reach full pension 
age. To allow simultaneous estimates of the effects of the OAA based on eligibility, 
elder Dalits in the sample are 10 years younger on average than non-Dalits and 
therefore receive only the lower amount (see Chapter 3 for a detailed explanation).  
 
Table 17 shows the average amounts received by those eligible for the OAA and by 
those who reported receipt of the OAA in the past year. Data related to the last payment 
received (lower panel) is discussed later in this section. The upper panel of the table 
shows that among eligible elders the average amount received in the past year is just 
56% of the stated policy value for non-Dalits and 71% for Dalits. Among elders who 
received a payment within the past year, the amounts transferred are 88% of the policy 
value for non-Dalits and 106% for Dalits. This indicates that the low average transfer 
value among eligible elders is largely due to low take-up rather than under payment. 
Take-up was shown to be approximately 65% among eligible elders. Once registered 
and in receipt of payments, elders receive close to the correct amount, equivalent to 





76 The national poverty estimates use data from the Nepal Living Standards Survey (NLSS) and employ a 
total household consumption approach, while the CTALS uses estimates of total household income. 
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Last year - 12,667 312  - 1145 19,570 217 - 746 
Non-Dalit 24,000 13,497 353 56.2 952 21,015 195 87.6 616 
Dalit 12,000 8,573 517 71.4 193 12,727 387 106.1 130 
Last payment - 6,092 166  - 1145 9,425 151 - 746 
Non-Dalit 8,000 6,495 189  81.2 952 10,128 160 126.6 616 
Dalit 4,000 4,106 264 102.7 193 6,096 242 152.4 130 
Data source: CTALS 2017. Robust standard errors are used throughout, clustered at the level of 
household. 
 
Davis and Handa’s (2015) analysis of 12 cash transfer programmes in sub-Saharan 
Africa suggests that a transfer value of less than 20% of total household consumption 
will achieve only small and selective impacts. This study does not look at a 
comprehensive range of effects for all household members. Nevertheless, the OAA has 
large positive effects on school attendance in certain households and the effects on 
adolescent work and marriage are also large considering the low baseline rates. This 
suggests that even a relatively small injection of cash makes an important difference to 
those who receive it. On the other hand, the decline in private school attendance among 
some adolescents suggests that certain households struggle to use the OAA effectively.  
 
Low take-up will diminish the effects of the OAA and may have other implications 
depending on who is excluded. Figure 30 shows the percentage of elders who received a 
payment in the past year by their age relative to the age of eligibility; zero is equivalent 
to 70 years for non-Dalits and 60 years for Dalits. Take-up is lowest at 24% for those in 
the first year of eligibility and is still just 53% in the second year. Low take-up is 
largely related to delayed entry into the programme.  
 
While certain aspects of implementation may vary from one administrative area to 
another, late entry into the programme is systematic (Uprety 2010; Samson 2012). At 
the time of data collection, the OAA had an annual registration process whereby new 
applications are accepted in December and the first benefits are received in the new 
fiscal year, usually in September. If an elder person registers for the OAA at the first 
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opportunity on turning 70 (or 60 in the case of Dalits), they will receive the first 
payments 8-9 months later. The problem is compounded if applicants who turn 70 later 
in the same fiscal year are not accepted during the registration window. Further analysis 
of CTALS data (not shown) indicates little difference in rates of exclusion by gender, 
per capita income, education level, ethnicity/caste and VDC. Exclusion from the 
programme is largely a systematic problem related to the registration process rather than 
socioeconomic status or geography. 
 
Figure 30 Percent of elders who received the OAA in the past year 
 
Data source: CTALS 2017, n=2454. 
 
The findings in Chapter 5 show that the OAA has negative effects on private school 
attendance in certain households, which may relate to an anticipatory change in 
behaviour. If households with an elder man access credit to pay for school costs based 
on future eligibility, then delayed entry into the programme will have implications for 
their ability to maintain payments and to repay the debt. Adolescents may be withdrawn 
from private school when the OAA does not materialise.  
 
An anticipatory effect will not occur if delayed entry into the programme results from 
lack of knowledge about the OAA. The OAA is the longest standing and best known of 
the social security schemes in Nepal and knowledge of the eligibility criteria is high. 
Just 6% of non-eligible elders in the CTALS sample had not heard of the OAA, 
dropping to less than 1% among eligible elders; and 88% of non-eligible elders know 
the correct eligibility age, rising to 94% among eligible elders. Moreover, 60% of 
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eligible elders who are not registered for the OAA state that the reason is they are not 
old enough, not eligible, or their application was refused.77 A large proportion of elders 
are excluded from the scheme on becoming eligible despite knowledge of their entitlements. 
 
Effects of the OAA on household income 
For the OAA to affect education and marriage, it should lead to an increase in average 
household income. While UCTs are generally found to increase household income 
(Hagen-Zanker, McCord, and Holmes 2011; Bastagli et al. 2016), it is not guaranteed as 
cash transfers can potentially reduce work effort, not unreasonable in the case of a 
pension, and displace other forms of transfer income (Alderman et al. 1995). Nine of 21 
elder IDI respondents indicate that they, or others in the household, would need to work 
more if they did not receive the OAA. Moreover, the findings in Chapter 5 indicate 
some reduction in adolescent paid work. That said, the weight of evidence shows that 
cash transfers do not lead to significant reductions in work effort among adults in 
developing countries (Mathers and Slater 2014). 
 
Table 18 presents regression coefficients from equation (3) in Chapter 5 for measures of 
total household income, expenditure and loans. As before, columns 3-5 show 
coefficients associated with moving from a non-eligible elder man to an eligible man 
(OE), from a non-eligible elder woman to an eligible woman (OE+OEF), and from a 
non-eligible elder couple to an eligible couple (OE+OEF+OEFM). Columns 1 and 2 
show any ‘pre-treatment’ differences between non-eligible elder men (EM) and couples 
(EFM) compared to the reference category of non-eligible elder women. The estimates 
exclude adolescents who co-reside with widows and single women (WSW) and the 
equivalent data table with the full sample is provided in Table 18a in Appendix 10. The 
log transformation is applied to all measures. For ease of interpretation, some 
coefficients are presented in the text as a percentage change using ecβ, where c = the 
number of units in the independent variable and the natural base e ≈ 2.71828. This 
section is focused on income. Estimates for partial household expenditure, adolescent 
education expenditure, and recent loan value, are discussed in subsequent sections. 
 
77 During data collection, evidence was heard anecdotally of eligible elders being turned away from 
registration because local officials claimed they were not yet 70 years of age. 
Table 18 Results from equation (3) indicating the effects of a difference in timing of receipt of the OAA on household income, expenditure and loans† 
W/o WSW 
Elder male (EM) 
(1) 













α1 S.E. α2 S.E. β1 S.E. β1+β2 S.E. β1+β2+β3 S.E. 
All adolescents, 10-17 years             
Household income (log) -0.093 0.114 -0.011 0.120 *0.113 0.060 **0.188 0.096 **0.173 0.100 0.129 
Household expenditure [partial] (log) *-0.121 0.073 -0.111 0.078 0.051 0.047 0.096 0.072 0.045 0.067 0.122 
Adolescent education expenditure (log) ***1.721 0.525 ***1.924 0.570 -0.197 0.334 **1.202 0.489 0.201 0.525 0.225 
Recent loan value (log)†† 1.684 2.009 1.415 2.124 *-2.035 1.206 2.135 1.987 -0.627 1.892 0.014 
Girls, 10-17 years            
Household income (log) -0.116 0.152 -0.009 0.160 *0.134 0.074 **0.231 0.117 0.134 0.117 0.138 
Household expenditure [partial] (log) -0.096 0.090 -0.045 0.097 0.063 0.055 0.100 0.085 0.007 0.081 0.138 
Adolescent education expenditure (log) 1.278 0.767 **1.778 0.822 -0.343 0.453 0.549 0.684 0.444 0.655 0.245 
Recent loan value (log)†† 0.713 2.351 0.692 2.494 -1.953 1.486 3.148 2.375 -1.704 2.307 0.016 
Boys, 10-17 years            
Household income (log) -0.070 0.123 -0.016 0.132 0.096 0.071 0.150 0.113 *0.211 0.126 0.114 
Household expenditure [partial] (log) *-0.144 0.085 **-0.181 0.090 0.044 0.058 0.091 0.090 0.084 0.083 0.107 
Adolescent education expenditure (log) ***2.083 0.652 ***2.040 0.722 -0.029 0.426 **1.586 0.657 -0.103 0.771 0.207 
Recent loan value (log)†† 2.608 2.416 1.995 2.557 -2.003 1.433 1.480 2.314 0.747 2.272 0.016 
Data source: CTALS 2017 †Excluding households with widows and single women, n=2424 for all adolescents, n=1200 for girls and n=1224 for boys. Robust standard 
errors are used throughout, clustered at the level of household. Statistical significance is indicated by * = 90%, ** = 95%, *** = 99%. All regressions include a third order 
polynomial of the age of the oldest elder and of the adolescent; and dummy variables for the presence of an elder above bandwidth age, education of household head, caste 
group, and VDC. ††The Tobit model is used to account for the large number of households with zero values; coefficients represent change in the latent variable; the pseudo 
R2 is given. 
 
Looking first at columns 3-5, household income of adolescents who co-reside with an 
OAA eligible elder is consistently higher by between 12% (β1 = 0.113) and 21% (β1+β2 
= 0.188) and statistically significant. Considering that the OAA is just 8.5% of median 
household income among recipients, it may have a multiplier effect on the household 
economy through investment. However, standard errors indicate a relatively large 
margin of error so firm conclusions cannot be drawn beyond the overall positive trend. 
 
The effect of the OAA on household income is larger in households with an eligible 
woman or couple compared to an eligible man. It is logical that a larger effect occurs 
with eligible couples as they have double the OAA income. But why are eligible women 
associated with a larger effect on household income? Given that widows and single 
women (WSW) have been excluded from the main analysis, there are two possible 
explanations related to the circumstance of married elder women. First, as discussed in 
Chapter 5, some elders within the bandwidth age co-reside with an elder who is above 
the bandwidth age and hence are eligible for the OAA. The presence of an elder above 
bandwidth has been controlled for in the estimation; however, they are more commonly 
found in households with married elder women which may result in some residual effect 
from the additional OAA.78 Second, other married elder women may have an absent 
husband who is a remittance sender. In both cases, households with married elder 
women may be in a stronger economic position to utilise the OAA for investment. 
While this study does not look at economic investment specifically, this interpretation is 
supported by the increase in economic migration of older boys in households with 
(married) eligible women. 
 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 18 show that prior to eligibility, households with an elder 
woman have higher incomes than those with an elder man (α1 = -0.093), although the 
result is not statistically significant. Moreover, the equivalent results in Table 18a in 
Appendix 10 shows that WSW erode, and even reverse, pre-treatment differences and 
diminish the effect of the OAA on income in households with an eligible woman. In 
other words, households with WSW are poorer overall and experience less impact of the 
OAA on household income due to their prior receipt of the WSW allowance. In 
 
78 Excluding WSW, 77.1% of elder women within the bandwidth age co-reside with another elder above 
bandwidth age; the rate is 86.5% among elder women who are eligible for the OAA (treatment group) 
compared to 57.1% among non-eligible elders (control group). 
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contrast, households with a married elder woman are richer overall and see an above 
average effect of the OAA on income.  
 
In households with an elder man or woman, the effect of the OAA on income is also 
larger when the adolescent is a girl (β1 = 0.134 and β1+β2 = 0.231) rather than a boy (β1 
= 0.096 and β1+β2 = 0.150). The OAA is associated with reductions in paid work for 
both girls and boys for which higher household income is the most likely explanation. 
The difference in the net effect on income may be because boys earn more than girls. 
Data in Chapter 5 shows that among adolescents who are engaged in paid work, boys do 
twice as many hours as girls.  
 
Perceptions of the value and usefulness of the OAA 
Data from the IDIs reveal a range of perceptions about the value of the OAA to the 
household that broadly reflect the shape of the income distribution curve in Figure 29. 
In most cases, respondents reveal the precarity of their economic situation, into which a 
modest transfer of income is welcome and makes a difference, although sometimes falls 
short. The OAA generally makes an important contribution to running the household 
and is often prioritised towards the needs of the children, including paying for their 
education.  
 
In contrast, elders from households in the lowest per capita income quintile prioritise 
use of the OAA for daily subsistence and health needs and are conscious of the trade-
offs they make. 
I want to say that the OAA money should be increased, should I spend this 
money to buy clothes or to buy medicines?  
(Interview with Sumitra, female, 73)  
 
I have not given even five rupees [to my granddaughter] to eat or to do 
anything at all. If there is [OAA money] left over then I can give but there 
is no money left after my medication, so I do not give her at all.  
(Interview with Shiyabati, female, 70)  
 
The findings in Chapter 6 show that the OAA increases public school attendance in 
households in the bottom two per capita income quintiles. However, the poorest 
households, in the left-hand tail of the distribution in Figure 29, are more likely to 
prioritise basic subsistence and health care for increased expenditure, meaning that 
adolescents are less likely to benefit in terms of higher order outcomes. For very 
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different reasons, the OAA will make little meaningful difference to adolescents in the 
richest households where their life-course options are less economically constrained. 
One adolescent respondent, whose households falls within the upper end of the fourth per 
capita income quintile, suggests that the OAA is insignificant to the household given their 
relatively high income status. 
 
Independent of transfer value, the frequency and predictability of cash transfers has 
implications for households’ ability to smooth consumption, make investments, and 
meet time-sensitive expenditures. Returning to Table 17 (p.175), the lower panel shows 
the average amounts received for the last OAA payment. Among recipients, payments 
were 127% and 152% of the prescribed amount for non-Dalits and Dalits, respectively. 
Given that the annual value is close to the policy amount, this suggests that payments 
may have been consolidated into fewer than three transfers in the year. CTALS data 
shows that recipients reported an average of 2.5 payments in the past year, varying 
between one and four.79 This can happen due to budget delays from the central level or 
deliberate deviation from the triannual payment policy on the part of local officials.  
 
All elder IDI respondents raised the infrequency or irregularity of OAA distribution as a 
concern. Many complained that they had not received the OAA for between six months 
to one year and that irregular distribution causes them significant problems.  
Older pension was provided in four months duration, so it should be given 
on time. If people are used to having their meal at four o’clock and they 
are given it at ten, then they will face difficulties. So, they should be given 
their money in four months duration if it is scheduled like that, no matter 
two days late or early. If it won’t be distributed on four months and it is 
distributed in eight months and twelve months duration, then all have to 
face difficulty. So, it should be provided on time otherwise people will be 
angry.  
(Interview with Aabu Mahamad, son of Aflima, female, 78) 
 
Infrequent and unreliable distribution of the OAA causes multiple problems. The main 
festival season in Nepal exerts significant financial pressure on households, and the first 
of three annual OAA payments is scheduled immediately prior to this. However, for 
many respondents, the pre-festival distribution did not occur during the year of the 
 
79 Due to the timing of the survey, for many respondents the last payment was the last of the fiscal year. 
Any shortfalls in payments earlier in the year may have been made up at this time.  
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survey. For some respondents, irregular distribution limits their ability to make more 
strategic expenditures including on adolescent education. 
I can’t say [that my Granddaughter will go to study], I can’t take guarantee 
of that. I don’t have energy to say anything about that. I can eat till I receive 
the government’s money but cannot take guarantee to educate them.  
(Interview with Mahamad, male, 76) 
  
Infrequent payments also lead to loans being taken that would otherwise have been 
unnecessary. 
People borrow money when they do not get the [OAA] money on time and 
do their tasks and when they receive it they return the money to the money 
lenders… If money is given now, then we can invest it on farming. If we 
do not have [the money] how can we grow corns in our land. [If the money 
is given on time]… then why should we borrow?  
(Interview with Mahendar, male, 69)  
 
Poor implementation may lead to unnecessary debt; however, the OAA can also unlock 
access to credit for both consumption and investment. The relationship between the 
OAA and loans is discussed in detail later in the chapter. While one respondent 
expressed a preference for the OAA to be paid monthly, most recipients and their 
families simply wish the OAA to be delivered on time in accordance with the triannual 
schedule. A more reliable scheme may well result in larger marginal effects on 
adolescents and prevent the failure of investments made in anticipation of the OAA.  
 
Household and education expenditure 
This section investigates the effects of the OAA on general household expenditure and 
adolescent education expenditure.  
 
Effects of the OAA on household expenditure 
Returning to Table 18 (p.178), results are shown for estimates of equation (3) with 
household expenditure as the outcome of interest. The variable for household 
expenditure is derived from 10 key expenditure items that have a high correlation with 
total household expenditure. The coefficients indicate the relative effect of the OAA on 





The OAA is associated with higher household expenditure for all types of elder, with 
the largest coefficients in households with eligible women (β1+β2 = 0.096), although 
none are statistically significant. The existing literature shows that consumption is 
generally found to increase for households in receipt of cash transfers (Hagen-Zanker, 
McCord, and Holmes 2011; Bastagli et al. 2016). Like household income, pre-treatment 
differences indicate that expenditure is higher in households with elder women 
compared to elder men (α1 = -0.121) and couples (α2 = -0.111). Comparison with the 
full sample including WSW in Table 18a in Appendix 10, shows that WSW reverse pre-
treatment differences and attenuate the effect of the OAA on household expenditure. In 
other words, households with a married elder woman spend more in general and the 
OAA has a larger effect on expenditures. Overall, the OAA likely has a positive effect 
on general household expenditure that is consistent with the effects on income.  
 
Effects of the OAA on adolescent education expenditure 
The variable for household expenditure does not include any component of education 
expenditure. However, a separate module in the CTALS collected detailed data on 
education related expenditure in the past year for each adolescent in the sample. 
 
Table 19 shows mean education expenditure among school goers for each type of 
school and separately for girls and boys. Costs are highest for private school, equivalent 
to 85% of median per capita household income and 120% of the average amount 
received by OAA recipients in the past year. Expenditure on boys is higher than girls 
but not substantially so. Expenditure data is not available for adolescents who are 
resident elsewhere, but it is likely that those who migrated for education incur above 
average costs. Considering the high cost of private school, the OAA may prevent 
adolescents from dropping-out during periods of economic instability. Because the 
OAA is both infrequent and irregular it may also facilitate access to credit that allows 
households to smooth education expenditure over time; and in some cases, to transfer 
adolescents from public into private school by increasing education expenditures. The 





Table 19 Mean adolescent education expenditure among school goers in NRs 
 N Mean S.E. 
All adolescent school-goers, 10-17 years  
Mainstream school 1769       12,136           492  
Public school 1201         6,723           231  
Private school 568       23,581        1,238  
Religious school 166         5,524           581  
Girls    
Mainstream school         798          8,878           395  
Public school         627          5,733           205  
Private school         171        20,408        1,201  
Religious school           84          4,563           735  
Boys    
Mainstream school         971        14,814           778  
Public school         574          7,805           390  
Private school         397        24,947        1,655  
Religious school           82          6,508           778  
Data source: CTALS 2017. Robust standard errors are used 
throughout, clustered at the level of household. 
 
The costs of public school are much lower than private school but are not insignificant, 
equivalent to 24% of median per capita income and 34% of the average amount 
received by OAA recipients in the past year. According to the Nepal Education Act, 
public primary education, including textbooks, should be free (Government of Nepal 
1971). Public schools can charge fees for lower secondary and secondary level, but 
provision should be free for children from Dalit and Janajati ethnic/caste groups, girls, 
and students below the poverty line. The data in Table 19 shows that expenditure on 
girls in public schools is lower than for boys but it is not possible to know with the 
given data the extent to which this difference is due to scholarships.80 At least some of 
the expenses for adolescents in public school may be for private tuition. In Nepal, 
private tuition, or ‘coaching classes’, are taken to supplement public school education, 
especially to improve the chances of passing major exams including the Secondary 
Education Examination (SEE) at the end of secondary and the School Leavers 
Certificate (SLC) at the end of upper secondary (Subedi 2018). Some public schools are 
known to make private tuition a mandatory requirement for students at these grade 
junctures (Ministry of Education 2018).  
 
80 Further analysis shows that mean education expenditure on adolescents attending public primary 




The costs of religious school are slightly lower than for public school but are still 
equivalent to 20% of median per capita income and 28% of the average amount 
received by OAA recipients in the past year. Religious school expenditures are made up 
of the typical range of costs including fees, uniforms and books. This suggests that 
Muslim households opt for religious school as an investment and not because it is 
substantially lower cost than public school. Overall, the findings suggest that the OAA 
may have an income effect on public and religious school attendance, either directly or 
through access to credit. The data does not reveal how much of the expenditure is for 
private tutoring. However, given its widespread use, especially prior to critical exams, it 
is possible that the OAA improves retention in public schools at critical grade 
transitions. This interpretation aligns with the findings in Chapter 5 that suggest only a 
weak association, if any, between the effects of the OAA on paid work and school 
attendance. Direct costs appear to be more important than opportunity costs. 
 
If the OAA has an income effect on school attendance, then equation (3) should produce 
similar results for education expenditure. The results in Table 18 (p.178) show that this 
is the case. In households with an OAA eligible woman, education expenditure on 
adolescents is higher by approximately 233% (β1+β2 = 1.202) and statistically 
significant. This is largely driven by the results for boys, with education expenditure 
higher by approximately 389% (β1+β2 = 1.586) and statistically significant. The large 
differences support the notion that households with an eligible woman not only 
maintain education expenditures where they may otherwise have declined but increase 
investment in education. While this could be for private tuition or other material costs, it 
may also be supporting adolescents to transfer from public into private school, including 
schools further away from home. Several other studies on UCTs identify simultaneous 
increases in school attendance or enrolment and education related expenditure, but this 
has not been linked to expanding school choice. However, Pakistan’s Female Secondary 
School Stipend Programme (FSSP), a CCT, has been shown to benefit co-resident boys, 
allowing them to shift from public into private schools (IEG 2011a). 
 
The results for education expenditure in households with an eligible man are not 
statistically significant; however, the negative coefficients indicate a possible reduction 
in expenditure which is greater for girls (β1 = -0.343) than for boys (β1 = -0.029). A 
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reduction in boys’ education expenditure aligns with the decline in private school 
attendance. As proposed in Chapter 5, if households with an elder man access loans in 
anticipation of becoming eligible for the OAA but are unable to sustain the costs when 
the OAA fails to materialise, they would need to cut education related costs. Because 
boys’ education tends to be prioritised, it is possible that some of the cut-backs to 
education expenditure are passed onto girls. This does not necessarily mean that girls 
are withdrawn from school if investment in private tuition is redirected from girls to 
boys who have transferred (back) into public school. 
 
Pre-treatment differences in households with non-eligible elders provide further 
evidence for anticipatory responses. Compared to households with a non-eligible elder 
woman, adolescent education expenditure is notably higher and statistically significant 
in households with an elder man (α1 = 1.721) or couple (α2 = 1.924). In both cases, the 
difference is larger for boys but also large and statistically significant for girls who live 
with an elder couple. Despite household income and (general) expenditure being lower 
than households with a non-eligible elder woman, households with an elder man or 
couple find a way to spend substantially more on adolescent education. This could be a 
matter of different priorities. However, this is unlikely given that households with an 
elder woman substantially boost education expenditure once they receive the OAA. It 
more likely reflects a difference in timing in the response to additional income, with elder 
men and couples incurring debt based on future eligibility. This is returned to in the 
section investigating the relationship between the OAA and credit. 
 
Intra-household bargaining and decision-making about adolescents’ lives 
The results so far point to several measurable effects of the OAA on adolescents’ lives, 
with large differences in school attendance and education expenditure. Moreover, the 
OAA increases both household income and general expenditure. For the OAA to affect 
adolescents’ lives, the analytical framework in Chapter 2 assumes that some form of 
resource sharing occurs within the household. If resources are not shared, adolescents 
will be excluded from the benefits of the OAA. Moreover, the specific processes of 
household bargaining and who has primary responsibility for major decisions about 
adolescents’ life-course circumstances will determine the nature of the observed 
outcomes. This section first examines patterns of OAA expenditure and control, then 
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processes of resource sharing within the household, and finally responsibilities for 
decision-making about adolescents’ lives.  
 
OAA expenditure and control 
One way to look at resource sharing within the household is to examine how the OAA 
is spent. Similar to the findings in Uprety’s (2010) study examining the effectiveness of 
the OAA across 14 districts, recipients in the CTALS used the OAA in a diverse range 
of ways including expenditure on food, health care, clothing, and other personal items 
for both the recipient and for other household members, children’s education, 
investment, loan repayments, and social events including weddings.  
 
Table 20 shows the amount of the last payment allocated to different categories. Food, 
health, clothing, and personal items are consolidated into a single category of basic 
needs, separately for the recipient and for the household. Data is shown for all recipients 
and for those with non-zero expenditure in each category. Nearly all recipients spent 
almost 60% of the last OAA payment on basic needs, approximately equally divided 
between their own needs and those of the household. Most elders make a substantial 
contribution to the household pot, a strong indication of the interdependence of elders 
and other family members. Nevertheless, looking at recipients with non-zero 
expenditure shows that 11% of recipients did not contribute to the household more 
generally. 
 
A smaller proportion of the last OAA payment was spent on non-subsistence needs such 
as education and investment. For recipients that spend in this way, the amounts are 
more substantial: 35% of recipients spent NRs 1,291 (US$ 11) of the last payment on 
education while 10% spent an average of NRs 2,813 (US$ 25) on investments and 
loans. It is possible that these categories overlap if reported loan repayments relate to 
education expenses and vice versa. There are several other reasons why the amounts 
spent do not necessarily reflect the impact the OAA has in any given area. First, data 
only relate to the last of three scheduled annual payments, covering a relatively short 
period and 82% of recipients had not yet spent approximately one-third of the amount 
received. Moreover, the seasonality of livelihoods, structure of the school year, date of 
major festivals, and so on, means that expenditures will vary across the year. Second, by 
increasing access to loans, the OAA may support larger investments in livelihoods and 
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education. Third, substitutions may occur, whereby spending the OAA on basic 
subsistence frees up other income for priorities such as education. Equally, if the OAA 
is spent on education, contributions from other sources such as earned income may be 
reduced (Alderman et al. 1995). Nevertheless, that one third of OAA recipients use 
some of the OAA for education indicates that this is a priority for households, and the 
OAA makes important contributions in other areas that affect adolescents’ lives. 
 
Table 20 Mean expenditure of the last OAA payment by expenditure category in NRs 
 





Mean S.E. n 
% of all 
 recipients 
Own basic needs 2872 98 30.4 2918 99 734 98.5 
Household basic needs 2653 98 28.1 2989 102 663 89.0 
Education 437 40 4.6 1291 96 257 34.5 
Investment / loan 272 40 2.9 2813 261 72 9.7 
Social / other 347 34 3.7 904 79 286 38.4 
Saved 102 22 1.1 2399 307 33 4.4 
Unallocated 2755 134 29.2 3432 148 608 81.6 
Total received 9438 151 100.0 - -  - - 
Data source: CTALS 2017. Robust standard errors are used throughout, clustered at the level of 
household. 
 
Whether major decisions about adolescents’ life-course are primarily made by parents 
or elders, recipients of the OAA may exert some (additional) influence over expenditure 
decisions depending on the extent to which they control the OAA and their status within 
the households. Table 21 presents data on recipients’ control of OAA income by various 
individual characteristics. While most recipients claim to control OAA income, 15% 
report that they do not. Control may by relinquished due to societal norms, ill-health, 
physical or mental disability, or even coercion. Elders are less likely to control the OAA 
if they are female, married, not the household head, and have no formal education. 
There is likely to be some correlation between these factors given the traditionally 
subordinate position of women to men in relation to economic decision making and 










Gender Household head Education level Currently married 
Total 
Female Male No Yes None Some No Yes 
No 
69 41 85 25 106 4 34 76 110 
62.7 37.3 77.3 22.7 96.4 3.6 30.9 69.1 100.0 
18.1 11.3 22.0 7.0 15.1 8.9 10.9 17.5 14.8 
Yes 
313 323 302 334 595 41 277 359 636 
49.2 50.8 47.5 52.5 93.6 6.5 43.6 56.5 100.0 
81.9 88.7 78.0 93.0 84.9 91.1 89.1 82.5 85.3 
Total 
382 364 387 359 701 45 311 435 746 
51.2 48.8 51.9 48.1 94.0 6.0 41.7 58.3 100.0 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Data source: CTALS 2017. 
 
Causal estimates for the effects of the OAA on adolescents show marked differences in 
outcomes depending on the gender of the recipient. The data here suggest that these 
differences may, in part, be due to variation in control of OAA income. While elder 
couples may be more likely to share the OAA between them, single female elders are 
more likely to have relinquished control to the younger generation, the parents of the 
adolescent, with implications for the level of influence they have over decision-making.  
 
The OAA and household bargaining 
Turning to more general processes of resource sharing, the CTALS asked the main 
household respondent about resource pooling, defined as when adult household 
members typically contribute their income or labour and share food and other common 
assets. In 91.5% of households, all adult members pool resources, while in the 
remaining 8.5% of households only some members pool resources. No households 
reported that all adult members live economically independently. This is consistent with 
the OAA expenditure patterns in Table 20 and suggests that, in most households, the 
OAA can benefit other household members including adolescents.81  
 
Parent and elder IDI respondents provide further insights into the processes of resource 
sharing including between the generations. The data shows that households engage in a 
spectrum of approaches to resource sharing and decision making about expenditure, 
 
81 In a study by Case (2004) the estimation strategy makes use of differences in reported income pooling 
to identify the effects of South Africa’s Old Age Pension on the health status of recipients and co-resident 
household members. In that context 20-25% of households were reported not to pool income. 
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from almost complete resource pooling, through mutual exchange, to economic 
independence. These reflect aspects of the different economic theories of household 
bargaining described in Chapter 2 including the cooperative and non-cooperative 
collective models. 
 
Most commonly, respondents suggest that different incomes function as a kind of intra-
household safety net between the middle and older generations. This is perhaps closest 
to the non-cooperative model of household bargaining. Incomes are primarily controlled 
and used by the recipient or earner, but mutual support is provided on a case by case 
basis. Once shared, resources may or may not be returned, depending on ability to do so 
and the level of reciprocity that exists. 
A: Older pension is given to [my parents-in-law]; it’s not in my hand. They 
spend their money if we don’t have and later, we spend the money on older 
people. We spend the money in case of urgency and later we give them the 
money at the time of need. If I don’t have money in my hand old couple 
give me to spend it, and when I get money, I give it to the old couple back.  
Interviewer: Means when you need money to spend on [your children’s] 
education old couple give you? 
A: Yes, they give me and say: “Spend it now and when you have, give me 
back.”  
(Interview with Apsana, daughter-in-law of Sekh Basir, male, 74, and 
Rojidan, female, 71) 
 
In many cases, inter-generational transfers work both ways.  
M: When the children ask, I give [the OAA] to them. If I don’t have money. 
I borrow money from my son too… 
Interviewer: When you receive your money, do you return him or not? 
M: Sometimes I return and sometimes I do not… when he needs money he 
asks, and I give him if I have, and I don’t if I don’t have. 
(Interview with Mahamad, male, 76)  
 
This kind of mutual support means that the OAA expands the overall household purse 
but with the additional income in the hands of the elder. In these circumstances the 
OAA can affect the lives of other household members, including adolescents, in a way 
that reflects the preferences of the elder, especially if they already have a role in 
decision-making. 
 
In some households, while incomes are in the hands of the recipient, resource sharing 
may take more of a cooperative approach, especially in the case of basic needs. 
Respondents from both the older and middle generation suggest that sharing food is the 
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norm, whether purchased with the OAA or other income, and there is little question 
about contributing. This approach may be more common when the OAA recipient is 
also the head of the household. 
S: I spend money to run the house. I buy what are needed… Salt, oil, soap, 
vegetables… meat and fish. 
Interviewer: For your personal food or for whole family? 
S: It’s for whole family (laughs). If I eat something how can I alone eat. 
We all eat. Sometimes I eat alone outside. If I have to eat outside, then only 
I eat alone but if I eat in home, we all eat together. It’s not good that one 
eats, and others look at him. 
(Interview with Shekh Mubarak, male, 71) 
 
Some respondents indicate that incomes are controlled by different household 
members but are pooled under the management of one person for the common 
good of the household. 
R: Now [she receives the OAA], it is better. Children can eat something 
with that money. 
Interviewer: Does she give to the children? 
R: Its good for the poor, when she adds her [OAA] money we can buy the 
things two kilos more than what I could buy only with my own money. 
(Interview with Rita, daughter-in-law of Krisna, female, 72) 
 
Survey data shows that both these households fall in the third per capita income quintile 
and that, while the elders feel they have control of OAA income, expenditure decisions 
tend to be taken jointly. While the OAA is likely to benefit other household members in 
these circumstances, the extent to which the elder influences decisions may depend 
more on their status within the household than on their financial contribution.  
 
Several respondents describe resource sharing that is more clearly based on cooperative 
pooling, at least intergenerationally, whereby one household member primarily controls 
all income and expenditure. In some cases, this means that financial responsibility 
within the household has passed to the next generation. 
Interviewer: Do you give [the OAA] to [your son] yourself or does he ask 
with you? 
S: I can’t lie, he does not ask with me. I give it to him, sometimes I keep 
one or two hundred with me or even I do not keep it and give it to my son 
and grandson… 
Interviewer: Suppose if you need clothes, and need medication who takes 
care of yours? 
S: My son does everything, it’s not that I am sick and he does not care 
me… Listen, these days son and daughter lead the house not the parents. 
That age is gone when parents used to lead the family. I can oppose him if 
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he does wrong, but he does not do wrong so I cannot oppose him. When 
there is problem, he solves it. If he had done wrong, then I could oppose 
him. All the burdens are on him. 
(Interview with Shanti, female, 72) 
 
In this case, like the 15% of OAA recipients who do not control income, the OAA may 
affect adolescents’ lives but without much influence of the elder recipient. Again, this 
raises questions about how to interpret differences in adolescent outcomes according to 
the gender of the recipient and whether they reflect gendered or generational 
preferences. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, several respondents suggest that there is very limited 
resource sharing between the generations. In some cases, this may be because the 
household is relatively better-off. However, this also occurs in households that are 
among the poorest in the community such as the following case. 
R: No, I have not given [the OAA] for anything or to anyone. I eat sweets, 
fish, meat whatever I want and buy clothes for me. If I fell sick then there 
is no guarantee how much is spent on my own body, two, three and five 
thousand rupees. I do not give anyone, not even five rupees, not even to my 
husband. My husband also does not give to anyone, he eats fish  
daily, meat, fish, and meat. 
(Interview with Shiyabati, female, 70) 
 
In some cases, economic independence may be the norm, but incomes are shared, 
sometimes reluctantly, at times of critical need. 
B: When they give [the OAA] then it can be support, when older man says 
I will keep, and older woman also says I will keep then how can it be a 
support there? 
Interviewer: Don’t they give? 
B: Didn’t I say that if my son was not sick that time then old lady would 
not have given me a single penny…. I asked for it, I fell down in their feet, 
then they give 25 or 50 rupees, that’s it, not a single rupee than that. 
(Interview with Ram, son of Faguni, male, 64 and Prabha, female, 63) 
 
CTALS data showed that there is an absence of resource sharing in up to 10% of 
households. There could be several explanations for this, including poor inter-
generational relations, a high level of individual need in the case of poor health, or if the 
household is wealthy. Co-resident adolescents are unlikely to benefit from the OAA in 




There are occasional contradictions in the accounts of resource sharing between the 
older and middle generations. As far as possible, IDI respondents from the same 
household were interviewed separately, as in the following case.  
A: I keep [the OAA] with me, and buy medicines when I fall sick, when 
there is pain in my stomach. If I don’t have money, then I have to ask with 
others. I went to ask son and daughter in law, they did not give me. When 
I receive older pension, then I have money in my hand, and I can spend it. 
Interviewer: Did you spend on family or not? 
A: No, I don’t give to them 
(Interview with Aflima, female, 72)  
 
A: …But when someone falls sick and I don’t have money at that time I 
spend older pension money on medication…  
Interviewer: Do you return it or not? 
A: No, but if she needs money for something then I give her. I don’t say 
that I return that money, but as I ask money, I spend for her if she needs. 
 (Interview with Aabu Mahamad, son of Aflima, female 72)  
 
It is not uncommon for there to be divergence between a household member’s actual 
needs and contributions and how other household members perceive them (Agarwal 
1997). However, these differences may also indicate that a range of resource sharing 
strategies co-exist and may change over time depending on the fluctuating economic 
circumstances of the household.  
 
Overall, the data suggest that at the level of basic subsistence, most households take a 
more cooperative approach to resource sharing with at least some part of the different 
incomes under the control of one financial manager (Gram et al. 2018). This confirms 
that the OAA expands the total household budget which allows for re-prioritisation of 
other income(s) towards adolescents or for other needs. At the same time, expenditures 
on higher level needs are subject to a greater degree of negotiation over who contributes 
and how much, and with more influence from the senior decision-maker within the 
household, usually the household head. This is closer to the non-cooperative model of 
household bargaining. Thus, elders are more likely to influence major decisions related 
to adolescent education, work, and marriage, especially if they are the male household 
head and maintain control over the OAA, and where there is a substantial degree of 






Decision-making about adolescent education and marriage 
The OAA is associated with increases in income, general consumption and adolescent 
education expenditure. Moreover, the majority of households in the study share 
resources in such a way that the OAA expands the total household budget. However, 
control over OAA income and recipients’ influence over expenditure decisions varies 
according to gender and status within the household. The analysis now turns to which 
household members are involved in major decisions about adolescents’ life-course 
circumstances. Survey questions were asked to parents of adolescents about who in the 
household has the main say over adolescent education and marriage. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, challenges in data collection mean that it is not possible to identify individual 
household members by their relationship to the adolescent. However, it is possible to 
distinguish whether the decision-maker is the household head or not. In addition, elders 
and adolescents were asked the extent to which they are involved in decision-making 
about adolescent education and marriage. 
 
Table 22 shows the corelation between the household member who has the main say 
over adolescent’s education and marriage decisions. For over 90% of adolescents, the 
same person is responsible for both education and marriage decisions. The household 
head is the main decision-maker for just over half of adolescents. Although the age of 
household heads ranges from 21 to 86 years, mean age is 62 years and median age is 66 
years. For nearly 46% of adolescents, the main decision-maker is not the household 
head and is therefore more likely to be their parents. Excluding children and adolescents 
under the age of 18, mean age of other household members (non-heads) is 38 years, and 
median age is 33 years. 
 
Other data from the CTALS shows that just over half (55.1%) of elders within the 
bandwidth age are the household head. However, this rises to 85% among elder males 
and drops to 24% among elder females. Table 23 shows how much say that elders have 
over adolescents’ major life-course decisions. Overall, 73.3% of elders claim to have 
the main or a significant say over adolescents’ education and marriage. However, male 
elders and those who are the household head are much more likely to be a primary 
decision-maker. At the same time, 26.7% of elders have no or very little say over 




Table 22 Cross-tabulation showing household member with the main say over 











1,787 112 1,899 
94.1 5.9 100.0 
92.3 7.2 54.5 
Other household 
member 
150 1,438 1,588 
9.5 90.6 100.0 
7.7 92.8 45.5 
Total 
1,937 1,550 3,487 
55.6 44.5 100.0 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
Data source: CTALS 2017. 
 
Table 23 Elders' say over adolescents’ life-course decisions by gender and household 
head status 
Say over major 
life decisions 
Gender Household head 
Total 
Female Male No Yes 
Main or 
significant 
712 1,087 569 1,230 1,799 
39.6 60.4 31.63 68.37 100.0 
59.4 86.5 51.63 90.98 73.3 
Some or none 
486 169 533 122 655 
74.2 25.8 81.37 18.63 100.0 
40.6 13.5 48.37 9.02 26.7 
Total 
1,198 1,256 1,102 1,352 2,454 
48.8 51.2 44.91 55.09 100.0 
100.0 100.0 100 100 100.0 
Data source: CTALS 2017.  
 
These findings align with those in the previous section, that male elders and household 
heads are more likely to control OAA income. This gives further support to the 
interpretation that differences in observed outcomes according to the gender of the 
OAA recipient relate more to their relative power within the household than gendered 
differences in preferences. In households with elder females, decision-makers are more 
likely to be parents of the adolescent and the elder woman is less likely to control OAA 
income and to influence decisions. In contrast, elder males have greater control over 
OAA income and expenditure and exert more influence over decisions about 
adolescents’ lives. In Nepal, the older generation has a stronger preference for earlier 
marriage than the younger generation (Ghimire and Samuels 2014), but it may only be 
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elder men, including those in couples, who are able to use the OAA to influence 
marriage timing. This may explain why increases in marriage migration rates are seen in 
households with elder men but not elder women. 
 
Decision-making about adolescents’ life-course circumstances must, to some degree, 
involve their cooperation. Adolescents may be able to exert influence over expenditure 
decisions, especially in relation to education, and have increasing agency as they get 
older. However, Ghimire and Samuels (2014) show that while adolescents in Nepal are 
increasingly more likely to have a say over who they marry and when, the traditional 
role of parents and elders in marriage decisions is still the norm in rural areas. In the 
CTALS, all adolescents who were at home and available for interview were asked about 
the extent to which they are involved in decisions about their education and marriage. 
Table 24 shows that 35.6% of adolescents say they are always involved in decisions 
about their education, while 38.8% are sometimes involved. Boys are more likely than 
girls always to be involved, while girls are more likely never to be involved. These 
findings highlight the importance of gaining the perspectives of adolescents on their 
education to fully understand why or why not the OAA affects their lives in particular 
ways. It will be shown in Chapter 7 that for some adolescents, their own ambitions can 
be a driving factor behind increased educational investment, while for others, poor 
experiences at school can lead them to drop out against the wishes of their parents or 
caregivers.  
 
When asked about marriage, just 20.4% of adolescents said that they were fully 
involved in decisions about marriage. While only 5.4% said they are never involved, 
more than half of adolescents said there had not (yet) been any discussion about their 
marriage. Even if adolescents prefer to delay their marriage, most discussion and 
decision making is dominated by parents and elders within the household. Chapter 7 
provides more detailed analysis about parental expectations of age at marriage and 
adolescent, parent and elder perspectives highlight the social pressures for early 
















Female Male Female Male 
Always/fully 
involved 
442 487 929 284 249 533 
47.6 52.4 100.0 53.3 46.7 100.0 




543 470 1,013 303 223 526 
53.6 46.4 100.0 57.6 42.4 100.0 
38.9 38.7 38.8 21.7 18.4 20.2 
Never involved 
(don't know) 
410 259 669 97 45 142 
61.3 38.7 100.0 68.3 31.7 100.0 
29.4 21.3 25.6 7.0 3.7 5.4 
No discussion yet 
- - - 711 698 1,409 
- - - 50.5 49.5 100.0 
- - - 51.0 57.5 54.0 
Total 
1,395 1,216 2,611 1,395 1,215 2,610 
53.4 46.6 100.0 53.5 46.6 100.0 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Data source: CTALS 2017. 
 
The OAA and the role of loans 
This section examines loan-taking practices and investigates whether the OAA plays a 
role in accessing loans for adolescent education and marriage. 
 
Patterns of loan taking 
Among the CTALS population, informal money lending dominates the loan market. In 
the 12 months prior to the survey, 45% of households obtained a new loan. Of these, 
82% obtained the loan from an informal source such as a relative, friend, landlord, 
employer, local shopkeeper or other business; 29% obtained a loan from a financial 
institution such as a bank, cooperative, microfinance or savings association; and 11% 
received both (data not shown). While households are not completely credit constrained, 
more than half either did not require a loan or were unable to access one. It is possible 
that households have an outstanding loan that was obtained in the years prior to the 
survey. Data from the 2010-11 NLSS show a higher rate of loan taking across the rural 
central Terai. 73% of households obtained a new loan in the 12 months prior to the 
survey, mostly from informal sources; and households have an average of 1.4 current 
loans of which 26% were taken more than 12 months previously (Central Bureau of 




Table 25 shows the purpose and mean value of both informal and formal loans obtained 
by households in the past 12 months. Most commonly, informal loans were for health 
care; life events including marriages, births, and deaths, investment, and house building 
or repair. A small minority accessed informal loans for education, economic migration, 
and other reasons. Formal loans were taken largely for investment, but also for house 
building or repair, life events, and health care. Similarly, a small minority used formal 
loans for other unspecified needs, economic migration, and education.  
 
Table 25 Purpose and mean value in NRs of household loans in the past 12 months 
 
Informal loans Formal loans 
n % Mean S.E. n % Mean S.E. 
All loans 749 100.0 121,346 5,912 257 100.0 111,507 11,885 
Loan purpose         
Health 220 29.4 90,468 7,913 27 10.5 69,111 16,421 
Education 33 4.4 89,909 18,280 9 3.5 508,556 213,630 
Life events 177 23.6 162,611 16,804 38 14.8 92,726 12,782 
Home building or repair 119 15.9 125,412 11,375 47 18.3 90,045 29,163 
Investment 128 17.1 113,594 15,687 106 41.2 89,344 10,332 
Economic migration 32 4.3 145,156 21,412 13 5.1 170,385 51,448 
Other 40 5.3 128,175 19,062 17 6.6 163,118 43,024 
Data source: CTALS 2017. 
 
Among loan-takers, the average value of informal loans is NRs 121,346 (approximately 
US$ 1,074), slightly higher than formal loans at NRs 111,507 (US$ 987). NLSS 
estimates are similar, with an average loan value of NRs 111,749 per loan-taking 
household in the rural central Terai (Central Bureau of Statistics 2011b). In this study, 
formal loans for education are the largest, averaging NRs 508,556 (US$ 4,500), 
although this is due to a small number of very high value loans.82 In contrast, informal 
loans for education average NRs 89,909 (US$ 796). The data suggest that loans taken 
for education are more likely to be for higher cost private schools and may be to cover 
fees for multiple years and living costs away from home.83 This aligns with the findings 
that the OAA is linked not only to higher private school attendance but higher education 
migration and substantially higher education expenditures. 
 
82 Real-time data quality checks during survey implementation identified and verified any unusually high 
monetary values. 





Other loan categories vary between an average of NRs 69,111 (US$ 612) and NRs 
170,385 (US$ 1,508). Loans for life events including marriage average NRs 92,726 (US$ 
821) from formal lenders and NRs 162,611 (US$ 1,439) from informal lenders. By 
comparison, families of married adolescent girls in the CTALS paid an average dowry 
of NRs 162,393 (US$ 1,437) although dowry value varies considerably from a low of 
NRs 15,000 (US$ 133) to a high of NRs 700,000 (US$ 6,195). While the dowry only 
represents some of the marriage costs, it is typically the largest (Amin and Bajracharya 
2011).84 Loans taken for life-events including marriage are of sufficient value to meet 
dowry costs. The next section explores whether the OAA has a role in accessing these 
loans. 
 
The role of the OAA in accessing loans for education and marriage 
In the CTALS, the average amount of OAA received in the past year is NRs 19,570 
(US$ 173), equivalent to 16% of the average informal loan value. Data from the 2010-
11 NLSS show that 60% of loan taking households in the rural central Terai did so 
without collateral (Central Bureau of Statistics 2011b). The OAA could play a role in 
securing loans, especially for poorer households that do not have collateral in land or 
other property.  
 
CTALS data (not shown) indicates that 6% of OAA recipients used the last OAA 
payment for loan repayments with an average allocation of NRs 2,652 (US$ 23). In a 
separate survey question, 7.6% of elders reported that they had used the OAA as 
collateral to access a loan in the past 12 months. Given the long-term nature of loans 
and the limited reference period of the survey question, the proportion of households 
that have a current loan linked to the OAA may be underestimated. Moreover, smaller, 
short-term loans for consumption smoothing may by underreported in the survey. Data 
from the IDIs support this, with reference to the OAA being used to pay back loans in 
57% of sampled households.85  
 
 
84 No reliable data was found for national or regional comparison of dowry value. 
85 Loan access was not a direct line of enquiry in the IDIs. Any reference to loans was spontaneously 
raised by respondents. 
Chapter 6 
200 
Most commonly, OAA-facilitated loans are used to meet basic needs, especially 
medical costs. 
It was difficult when I did not receive [the OAA], when I receive it I buy 
rice, pulse and when fall sick ask money with others and buy medicines 
and when I receive pension I give it back to them. That is also 
development.  
 (Interview with Maya, female, 64)  
 
Fifteen [or] sixteen thousand [rupees] was spent on my eyes. I had 
borrowed that money, as soon as I received my [OAA] money I gave them 
back. And we also ate with that money.  
 (Interview with Mahamad, male, 76)  
 
Respondents suggest that loan repayments are a priority for allocation of OAA income; 
and that the OAA has increased their credibility as a debtor, which allows them to better 
support the household. 
Yes, [my status after receiving the OAA] changed… To whom I ask 
money they give us, with the money we fulfil our needs, we all together 
take care of children. 
 (Interview with Maya, female, 64)  
 
In some cases, the OAA supports access to credit for investment in the household 
enterprise as well as to meet basic needs. 
We do farming as Bataiya [crop share], the expenses are there in farming. 
We buy seeds, give the payment to the man who ploughs the land, spend 
the money on medication. We take loan in the village to do all these things 
and later when he receives the [OAA] money I give them back. We buy 
vegetables as we don’t have our own garden. We take loans and give them 
back later when he receives the [OAA] money.  
 (Interview with Renu, daughter-in-law of Bibat, male, 74)  
 
This supports the suggested made earlier in the chapter that, over time, the OAA may 
have a multiplier effect on household income. 
 
One case among the IDIs demonstrates how the OAA is used to facilitate small informal 
loans for education. A Dalit couple both receive the OAA. Survey data shows that there 
are eleven members of the household including an 11 year old boy, Ajay, the oldest of 
six children. Two adult males left the household within the past three years to work in 
India. Despite income from remittances, private sector work and a small business, the 
household falls within the second poorest per capita income quintile. Ajay had attended 
public school for three years but recently moved to a nearby private school. Ajay’s 
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grandparents were interviewed together and discuss how they support his education 
with the OAA and their reliance on loans to smooth education expenditures over the 
year, including for private tuition and private school fees. 
Yes, there is a drawback [to late receipt of the OAA] …, we have to give 
private tuition classes for the children and pay 200, 250, 300, 400 rupees 
per month… If we do not pay it monthly, then it becomes hard to pay all 
at once after seven or eight months…. If we get money on time, then our 
needs will be fulfilled.  
 (Interview with Mahendar, 69, grandfather of Ajay, 11)  
 
The school fee of our grandson is 2,000 rupees monthly; we had made the 
[admission] paper thinking that we would take a loan from the money 
lenders…. The month is complete in the school, so the teacher and the 
school are asking for the fees. If I don’t give them money, then do they go 
to study?... Yesterday, [my grandson] was saying that it's 2,000 rupees per 
month. “If you give me money to give to the school, I will go otherwise I 
won’t go.” … He has brought [a loan of] 2,000 rupees. Now he will give 
him [the money] and he will give to the school.  
 (Interview with Budhia, 63, grandmother of Ajay, 11) 
 
Sometimes I say [to my grandson]: "you go I will pay the fee", he 
sometimes goes to school when I say so, sometimes he does not go saying 
that first give me money or "teachers beat me for not paying the fee".  
 (Interview with Mahendar, 69, grandfather of Ajay, 11)  
 
In boarding [school] good clothes are needed, shirt, pants, socks, shoes etc. 
Those who are poor borrow the money and manage these things. Teachers 
say to wear this kind of dress, study, and buy bicycle. We bought a bicycle 
for the boy borrowing six thousand rupees.  
 (Interview with Budhia, 63, grandmother of Ajay, 11)  
 
If we get [the OAA] after nine months, then we have to pay more interest 
to the money lender. They give us money but while paying them back we 
have to add money from home because of the high interest rate. If we 
receive money after three or four months, then our house will run 
smoothly.  
 (Interview with Mahendar, 69, grandfather of Ajay, 11)  
 
This case highlights several challenges facing households that strive for a higher 
standard of education for their children. First, the initial costs to attend private school 
can be high, including uniforms and a bicycle in this case, putting the household under 
additional financial strain. Second, both private school and tuition classes incur 
recurrent costs for which timely payment is important. If payment is late, Ajay fears he 
will be beaten by the teacher. Even if a student is not excluded by the school for late 
payment, they may leave due to abusive treatment. Physical punishment is common in 
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Nepali schools (Mishra et al. 2010) and data presented in Chapter 7 shows that other 
adolescents have left school for this reason.  
 
Third, low and irregular income means that the household relies on short-term loans to 
meet both initial and recurrent costs. Ajay’s grandmother suggests that this is a common 
strategy among the poor and indicates that they committed to private school education 
knowing they would have to rely on loans to meet the costs. An elder who is nearly 
eligible for the OAA could plausibly do the same, on the assumption that they will soon 
receive additional income. Fourth, OAA transfers are too infrequent and unreliable to 
pay for school fees directly, but they play an important role in accessing and repaying 
loans. Despite the high level of financial risk associated with loan taking, the household 
appears to be determined to seek better quality education. Evidence presented in 
Chapter 7 suggests that most households across the income distribution want to get at 
least one child into private school. 
 
Two cases among the IDIs demonstrate the link between the OAA, loan-taking, and 
marriage. An elder widow lives with five other family members including three 
children. The household relies on paid housework as their sole earned income source 
and has one of the lowest per capita incomes in the survey sample. She explains how the 
OAA allowed her to borrow to support the recent marriage of her granddaughter. 
R: I spent five thousand for the marriage of my granddaughter. How could 
I not give money for the clothes and the other things to my son-in-law and 
granddaughter? I also gave money to my son.  
Interviewer: Was it from that [OAA] money? 
R: Yes. I have borrowed five thousand now…(interrupted) 
Interviewer: …except clothes and medicine what do you spend the money 
for? 
R: The money lender will take money adding the interest to it. Then how 
much will be left for me?  
 (Interview with Sumitra, female, 73)  
 
It is not known how instrumental the OAA was in determining the timing of the 
marriage. However, for a household this poor, marriage costs are likely to be lower. 
Mean dowry value is lowest among households in the lowest per capita income quintile 
and the lowest reported dowry for a married adolescent is NRs 15,000 (US$ 133).  
 
The effects of the OAA on recent loan value 
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Several studies point to the role of cash of transfers in leveraging access to credit (IEG 
2011b; Scott 2009; Adhikari et al. 2014; Hagen-Zanker, Mallett, and Ghimire 2015). If 
increased access to loans plays a role in financing private schooling and marriage, then 
differences in loan value associated with eligibility for the OAA should be observed. 
Returning to Table 18 (p.178), estimates for equation (3) are shown with recent loan 
value as the dependent variable. A tobit model is used to account for the large number 
of zero cases, therefore coefficients represent the change in the latent variable. Overall, 
the effects of the OAA on recent loan value reflect those of private school attendance 
and adolescent education expenditure; lower in households with an eligible man and 
higher in households with an eligible woman, although the only statistically significant 
result is for adolescents who live with an eligible man (β1 = -2.035).86  
 
Turning to pre-treatment differences, coefficients are also positive and large, although 
not statistically significant, for boys who co-reside with a non-eligible elder man (α1 = 
2.608) or couple (α2 = 1.995). Again, this aligns with the findings for education 
expenditure, suggesting that compared to households with a non-eligible elder woman, 
those with an elder man or couple access more and larger loans prior to becoming 
eligible for the OAA. Because households with an elder woman access more loans and 
spend more on education after becoming eligible, this supports the interpretation of a 
difference in timing in the response to anticipated income, rather than a difference in 
preferences. Female elders may be more prudent, but this is difficult to evidence. 
Alternatively, in Nepal, men tend to engage in livelihood activities that generate cash 
income more than women. Adhikari et al. (2014) suggest that, as a result, men are better 
placed to secure loans and that a cash transfer would therefore have a greater effect on 
enhancing women’s credibility as debtors. A perception of greater male 
creditworthiness may allow them to incur debt in advance of OAA eligibility, while 
elder women wait until the OAA is received. Moreover, in Nepal, money lenders are 
reported to be aware of social security distribution days, including the OAA, and pursue 
repayments accordingly (Drucza 2015). It is plausible that they are also aware of the 
eligibility criteria and may be willing to advance loans based on future eligibility. 
 
86 Given the short-term nature of the data on recent loans, longer standing loans that relate to changes in 
marriage rates may not be observed in the data. Moreover, the marginal effects on marriage are relatively 
small compared to those on education; positive effects on marriage loans in some households may be 




Interpreting the negative effects of the OAA on private school attendance 
The most unexpected aspect of the findings are the negative effects that the OAA has on 
private school attendance, education expenditures and loans in households with an 
eligible man or couple. This section draws together the various strands of evidence to 
interpret the results. Other findings are summarised in the concluding section. 
 
The results in Chapter 5 show that the OAA has a negative effect on private school 
attendance for boys who co-reside with an elder man; and on girls’ education migration 
in households with an elder couple. At the same time, public school attendance is 
positively affected, and overall rates of mainstream school attendance are positive or 
unchanged. The OAA appears to cause adolescents to leave private school and, at least 
in some cases, to transfer (back) into public school. 
 
An initial question might be whether the results reflect real changes in the population of 
adolescents. The validity of the estimation approach has been discussed in Chapter 5. 
Further confidence can be taken from estimates of the effects of the OAA on household 
income and expenditure; two similar but independently measured indicators of 
household economic well-being. In line with expectations and the existing literature, the 
OAA is associated with increases in both income and expenditure. Moreover, there is 
similar variation in the relative magnitude of the coefficients depending on the type of 
elder, and effects are diminished by the presence of WSW due to their prior receipt of 
the WSW Allowance. Accepting the validity of the results, there are two possible 
explanations for the negative effects of the OAA on private school attendance.  
 
The first interpretation is that households face financial constraints that prevent them 
from transferring adolescents from private school into public school or some other 
occupation; the OAA allows them to overcome these financial constraints. This scenario 
lacks credibility. By many measures, including achievement, private schools are better 
quality and the direct costs are substantially higher than public schools. One alternative 
occupation for boys is economic migration; however, this only increases in households 
with an elder woman. Girls in households with an eligible couple may be withdrawn 
from school to get married. However, evidence presented in Chapter 7 shows that 
households that invest heavily in girls’ education are unlikely to pursue early marriage, 
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regardless of school status. There is no other evidence that adolescents are engaged in 
alternative activities with financial barriers to entry. 
 
The second interpretation is that, prior to eligibility, households with an elder man or 
couple respond to the anticipated increase in income by accessing loans to transfer 
adolescents into private school. However, on becoming eligible, the OAA fails to be 
delivered on time, in some cases delayed for up to two years. As a result, the costs of 
private school and the associated loan repayments are unsustainable, and adolescents 
drop out or (re)enter public school. Programmes with age-based eligibility criteria can 
typically be anticipated. In low income settings it could be assumed that anticipatory 
responses do not occur due to the existence of liquidity and credit constraints. However, 
how anticipatory responses manifest themselves are highly dependent on the context 
(Lee and Lemieux 2010).87 In this case, multiple strands of evidence support an 
anticipatory response as the correct interpretation.  
 
First, most elders have prior knowledge of the programme and the eligibility criteria. 
Moreover, other studies have shown that local money lenders are aware of the OAA and 
receive repayments from it (Drucza 2015). Second, prior to eligibility, private school 
attendance and education expenditure are both higher in households with an elder man 
or couple compared to an elder woman; while household income and general household 
expenditure are lower. In other words, households with a non-eligible elder man or 
couple find a way to invest more in education than households with an elder woman, 
despite being economically worse off. This could reflect different priorities. However, 
households with an elder woman substantially boost education expenditure once they 
receive the OAA, suggesting that this is not the case. Rather, there is a difference in 
timing in the response to the additional income. Households with an elder woman boost 
private school attendance after becoming eligible for the OAA, while households with 
an elder man or couple do so in anticipation of eligibility. 
 
Third, the OAA supports investment in private school by facilitating access to credit. 
Loan taking is common in Nepal and among the CTALS population; households take 
 
87 Edmonds (2006) argues that anticipatory behaviour is unlikely to have occurred in relation to child 
work and schooling responses to South Africa’s Old Age Pension because households where the effects 
are greatest are also likely to be the most liquidity and credit constrained. 
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loans for education both in larger sums and for smoothing of smaller recurrent 
expenditures. Both quantitative and qualitative evidence show that the OAA is used by 
some households to facilitate loan access and repayments, and the effects of the OAA 
on recent loan value reflect those of private school attendance and education 
expenditure. Prior to eligibility, loan value is higher in households with an elder man or 
couple compared to households with an elder woman; while loan value is higher in 
households with an OAA eligible woman. The different timing of the response to the 
OAA (prior to and after eligibility) can be explained by differences in the level of credit 
constraints for elder men and women. Elder men are (perceived to be) more 
creditworthy and can access loans in advance of eligibility. Moreover, the reductions in 
private school attendance occur in households within the richer 60% of the per capita 
income distribution; households where the OAA is more likely to unlock access to 
credit; whereas most of the positive effects on school attendance occur in poorer 
households.88  
 
It is also possible that households with an elder man or couple are more determined than 
households with an elder woman to fulfil their ambition for private schooling and make 
greater sacrifices in other areas. In this case, education expenditure would increase at 
the expense of general household consumption for a limited period while awaiting OAA 
eligibility. Re-prioritisation may explain some of the observed difference in education 
expenditure; however, the costs of private school are high, equivalent to 85% of median 
per capita income and 120% of the average OAA amount received; and may be even 
higher for education migration. Considering the low levels of income among the 
population, a substantial and sustained reduction in basic subsistence seems unlikely. 
 
Fourth, increases in private school attendance in anticipation of the OAA should be 
sustained on becoming eligible, but are not. OAA recipients highlight the problems with 
infrequent, irregular, and unpredictable distribution which limits their ability to make 
more strategic expenditures including on adolescent education. More importantly, late 
entry into the programme is systematic despite knowledge of the scheme among non-
eligible elders. Waiting an additional one to two years for anticipated income will put 
 
88 The positive effects of the OAA on marriage migration, for which loans would also be necessary, are 
also only seen in richer households 
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substantial pressure on any related financial commitments, especially given the 
economic precarity of the population. Elders may be deterred from taking loans in 
anticipation of eligibility if they have prior knowledge of the delays in registration and 
receipt. However, it is not possible to say with the given data whether and to what 
extent to this occurs. 
 
The data suggests that adolescents who were supported to attend private school based 
on co-resident elders’ future eligibility for the OAA are subsequently withdrawn when 
the OAA fails to materialise. This primarily affects boys, who tend to be prioritised over 
girls for education. However, the findings in Chapter 5 showed that girls are also 
affected in households with an elder couple, who both receive the OAA, and who may 
have already secured private school education for co-resident boys. There is little 
measurable change in boys’ private school attendance in these households. At least 
some of the adolescents who are withdrawn from private school (re)enter public school; 
while some of the reduction in education expenditure is passed on to co-resident girls. 
Evidence presented in Chapter 7 confirms that most households strive to educate both 
boys and girls, but boys are prioritised for higher quality and higher levels of education. 
 
Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has presented data from the CTALS and IDIs on the household economy, 
exploring the relationship between the OAA and income, expenditure, and credit, and 
how these relate to differences in adolescent outcomes observed in Chapter 5. The 
findings show that, for most households, the underlying conditions necessary for the 
OAA to affect adolescent household members exist. The CTALS population is poor 
relative to national, and even district averages, and is highly economically insecure. 
Moreover, households are slightly more credit constrained than the national average but 
are not entirely excluded from access to credit. In this context, the OAA is shown to be 
of sufficient value to meaningfully contribute to subsistence and some higher level 
needs in most households and the majority of households share resources between the 
generations.  
 
At the same time, the magnitude of the effects on adolescents’ lives, especially on 
school attendance, are limited by several factors. The high degree of economic 
insecurity among the population, infrequent and irregular distribution of the OAA, and 
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delayed entry into the programme, limit the effectiveness of the OAA in allowing 
households to smooth consumption and to make more strategic expenditures. For very 
different reasons, adolescents in the poorest households at the bottom end of the lowest 
income quintile, and adolescents in the richest households in the top income quintile, 
are unlikely to benefit. Adolescents in the approximately one in ten households where 
resources are not shared between the generations are also unlikely to be affected. 
 
The findings reveal insights into the pathways through which the OAA affects 
adolescents’ lives. The evidence strongly points to a direct income effect on private, 
public, and religious school attendance, with increases in private school most likely 
facilitated by access to loans. While much of the increase in school attendance will be 
due to retention, possibly at critical grade junctures, the evidence also supports the 
notion that some adolescents transfer from public to private school. Reductions in paid 
work and increases in economic migration also align with differential effects on 
household income and expenditure. 
 
The OAA increases access to credit, both for lower value consumption smoothing to 
meet subsistence needs and smaller education related expenditures and for lumpier 
investments including entry into private school and marriage. The analysis also shows 
that the reduction in private school attendance should be interpreted as an unsustained 
anticipatory effect. With knowledge of forthcoming eligibility, elder men, who are 
perceived as more creditworthy than elder women, take loans to transfer adolescents 
into private school. However, long delays between eligibility and first receipt of the OAA 
mean the costs are unsustainable and adolescents drop out and (re)enter public school. 
 
Finally, variation in outcomes according to the gender of the recipient may reflect both 
gendered and generational differences in preferences or interests. While parents are 
important decision-makers in most cases, elders have an important role in major 
decision-making. However, the extent of their influence depends on their gender and 
status within the household. Male elders are more likely to be the household head, and 
nearly three quarters of male recipients, compared to just half of female recipients, both 
control OAA income and have a significant say in adolescents’ lives. Thus, elder men, 
including those in couples, have a greater degree of bargaining power within the 
household and can use the OAA to fulfil their preferences. Conversely, uneducated 
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elder women who are not the household head are least likely to influence decisions 
about adolescents’ lives and the younger generation is more likely to decide how 
additional income is used. Adolescents are also shown to have varying degrees of 
influence over major decisions about their education and marriage, which points to the 
importance of understanding their perspectives on how their experiences and agency 
shape the effects of additional household income on their lives. 
 
In summary, the dynamics of the household economy have an important bearing on how 
the OAA affects co-resident adolescents. Chapter 7 now examines the other cultural, 
social and economic factors that shape households’ decisions about adolescents’ life-




Exploring the determinants of adolescent life-course circumstances: 




Cash transfers are received into households with a multitude of factors already shaping 
decisions about adolescent schooling, work and marriage. The analytical framework in 
Chapter 2 shows that the more proximate determinants of adolescent life-course 
circumstances can be at the level of the individual, the household, and the community 
and that they shape the nature of the effects that a cash transfer has on adolescents. 
Understanding these factors can help explain why certain effects occur, or not, and for 
whom. This is important as it allows policy makers to design social protection 
programmes that maximise positive outcomes, minimise potential negative effects, and 
are more responsive to the varied needs of the intended beneficiary population.  
 
The OAA has been shown to have various impacts on adolescents’ lives, some of which 
are clearly beneficial, but others which are harmful from an individual and societal 
perspective. The effects vary depending on adolescents’ age and gender, the 
socioeconomic status of the household, the gender and cohabitation status of the 
recipient, and the dynamics of resource sharing within the household. These are 
marginal effects and many adolescents are likely to see no change in their lives from the 
additional income provided by OAA.  
 
The OAA interacts with household decision-making in a complex context and the 
primarily quantitative analysis presented so far tells only part of the story. Many reasons 
may underlie the gendered differences in outcomes, including social and economic 
norms and expectations relating to education, work, and marriage, and how these 
interact. Variation in effects on school choice may be driven by differences in 
availability and quality of education provision or other cultural considerations. Despite 
providing the financial means to continue education, additional income may not make a 
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difference where other social or cultural factors limit educational opportunities and may 
even support faster transitions into adulthood where these preferences or interests 
already exist. 
 
This chapter uses qualitative data complemented by additional quantitative analyses to 
provide insights into the factors that drive decisions about adolescents’ life-course 
circumstances. The analyses provide evidence towards the third research question of the 
thesis which asks how OAA income is factored into households’ gendered preferences 
and decision-making about adolescent life-course options. The next section describes 
the data and methods. This is followed by the findings presented in three parts that 
examine access to school, work, and marriage in turn. The final section integrates the 
findings and concludes. 
 
Data and methods 
Data in this chapter comes from the in-depth interviews (IDI) with complementary 
analysis using CTALS data. Semi-structured IDIs were conducted with elders, parents 
and adolescents from 21 households with a confirmed OAA recipient. Individual 
interviews were conducted with 16 adolescents, 18 parents, and 21 elders.89 Households 
were sampled by randomly selecting an individual adolescent from the survey to 
maintain a degree of representativeness, but within certain limitations.90 A detailed 
account of the sampling approach is provided in Chapter 3. 
 
Including the sampled adolescent, the 21 IDI households contain a total of 43 
adolescents who were either resident or had recently left the household. While only one 
adolescent (at most) was interviewed per household based on the initial sample, parents 
and elders provided insights into other adolescents within the household. Using data 
from the CTALS, Table 26 shows the life-course status of adolescents in the IDI and 
CTALS samples. Mean age of adolescents is similar across the samples. The random 
element of the IDI sampling has some advantage in reflecting the study community and 
 
89 It was intended to interview one elder, one parent or guardian, and one adolescent from each 
household, but not all were available in each case. 
90 Because of the interest in adolescents who left the household, adolescents were selected evenly 
between those who were resident at the time of the survey and those who had recently out-migrated. 
Geographically, the sample was restricted to three of 13 administrative areas covered by the CTALS with 
a balance of Hindu and Muslim communities. Adolescents from households from the richest income 
quintile were excluded due to the low relative value of the OAA to the household. 
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avoiding unintentional bias. As intended, adolescents who out-migrated are over-
represented. However, given the findings in Chapter 5, the interviews would have 
benefited from greater representation of certain groups, especially adolescents who are 
married and adolescents who were known to have transferred from private into public 
school and vice versa. 
 
As described in chapter 3, organisation and interpretation of the data used a hybrid 
thematic analysis (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2006). The starting point for analysis 
was the corpus of coded interview transcripts. The data was coded into the broad life-
course themes of education, work and marriage and several sub-categories of factors 
that influence decisions about adolescents’ life-course options including individual 
characteristics, social status, the household economy, OAA income, values and 
preferences, and external factors. Analysis of the coded corpus involved an iterative 
process of (re)reading and (re)organising the data by identifying common themes and 
anomalies and clustering and mapping the themes, integrating with survey data, and 
writing. The process allowed for new themes and concepts to emerge alongside the 
initial code structure, promoting subjective interpretations of the data. 
 
The first step involved a careful (re)reading of the extracts relating to a life-course 
theme, focusing on all interviews from one household. In this way, it was possible to 
identify coherence and contradictions within as well as between households. The 
process of reading aimed to identify two main ideas: which influencing factors are 
important for the given circumstance of an adolescent and in which way; and how this 
relates to the additional income provided by the OAA. Second, key points of interest 
were summarised for each household and combined with data from the CTALS about 
the ethnicity/caste and per capita income quintile of the household. In addition, IDI data 
about the adolescents was cross-validated with data from the CTALS. In most cases, 
triangulation verified the accuracy of the data. In some cases, it showed that an 
adolescent’s circumstance had changed between the survey and the IDIs. In a few other 
cases the data was contradictory, most notably regarding adolescents who were reported 
in the survey as never having been to school but who may have attended when they 
were younger and dropped out. Any apparent contradictions in the data are discussed 




Table 26 Comparison of adolescent life-course circumstances between IDI sample and CTALS sample 
  
CTALS sample IDI sample  
(co-resident with OAA recipient) 
Full sample Co-resident with 
OAA eligible 
Total Girls Boys 
n % n % n % n % n % 
Total 3437 100.0 1794 52.2 43 100 25 58 18 42 
Mean age (years) 13.1 - 13.2 - 13.3 - 13.2 - 13.5 - 
Attends mainstream school 1976 57.5 1085 60.5 28 65.1 17 68.0 11 61.1 
Public 1341 39 764 42.6 25 58.1 17 68.0 8 44.4 
Private 635 18.5 321 17.9 3 7.0 0 0.0 3 16.7 
Dropped-out 332 9.7 169 9.4 4 9.3 1 4.0 3 16.7 
Never attended 1126 32.8 539 30 11 25.6 7 28.0 4 22.2 
Attends religious school 256 7.5 129 7.2 3 7.0 2 8.0 1 5.6 
n 2975 - 1527 - 33 - 21 - 10 - 
Work participation           
Paid 281 9.5 132 8.6 2 6.1 2 9.5 0 0.0 
Unpaid economic 2062 69.3 1054 69 20 60.6 14 66.7 6 60.0 
Domestic 2495 83.9 1294 84.7 26 78.8 20 95.2 6 60.0 
n 3437 - 1794 - 43 - 25 - 18 - 
Married 241 7 129 7.2 2 4.7 2 8.0 0 0.0 
Out-migrated 461 13.4 266 14.8 12 27.9 4 16.0 8 44.4 
Education 266 7.7 153 8.5 6 14.0 2 8.0 4 22.2 
Employment 106 3.1 64 3.6 4 9.3 0 0.0 4 22.2 
Marriage 57 1.7 35 2.0 2 4.7 2 8.0 0 0.0 




Third, adolescents from each household were organised into groups reflecting their 
circumstance. The analysis of school attendance focuses on adolescents who are in 
public (or low cost religious) school; adolescents who are in private school; and 
adolescents who are out of school. The analysis of work focuses on school-going 
adolescents; adolescents who dropped out of school prematurely to work; and 
adolescents who never went to school or dropped out primarily for non-economic 
reasons. The analysis of marriage is organised into adolescents who are unmarried and 
in school; adolescents who are unmarried and out of school; and adolescents who are 
married.  
 
Fourth, the data were written as a narrative that describes the most important cultural, 
social and economic factors behind the circumstance of the adolescents and how they 
interrelate, the choices and trade-offs that households make, and to what extent the 
OAA was likely to have been factored into decision making. While data from all IDIs 
have been used to inform the analysis, selected extracts are provided where appropriate 
to exemplify the points being made. Quotes were selected to balance diversity across 
the sample with the richness of certain cases. As such, 25 of 52 individual voices from 
15 of 21 households are represented with certain individuals reappearing. While 
adolescent voices are represented through those who were interviewed, parents and 
grandparents provide insights into many of the other co-resident adolescents in the 
sampled households. As in Chapter 6, apart from the names of the respondents, direct 
quotations have not been changed from the original translation. 
 
Quantitative data comes from the CTALS unless otherwise stated. Descriptive statistics 
are presented on the reasons for being out of school, the relationship between school 
attendance and marital status, and expected age at school completion and marriage. 
Details of the specific variables are provided in the text where necessary. 
 
The determinants of access to school: quality, cost, and social norms 
The findings in Chapters 5 and 6 show that the OAA supports adolescents to remain in 
public and private schools through an income effect and, in some cases, supports a shift 
from public to private school by increasing access to credit. For other adolescents, the 
shift to private school occurs in anticipation of the OAA but is unsustainable and they 
drop out or (re)enter public school. Effects vary depending on the gender and age of the 
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adolescent and the socioeconomic status and structure of the household. Certain 
adolescents are unlikely to have benefited from the OAA despite it having a positive 
effect on household income.  
 
The analysis in this section reveals both common and exceptional factors at the level of 
the individual, household, and community or society, that either enhance or constrain 
adolescent access to school, and considers how these factors shape the extent to which 
the OAA supports school attendance or expands school choice. The findings are 
structured according to three broad groups of adolescents defined by their school status. 
First, are adolescents who attend mainstream public school or low cost madrassas. 
Second, are adolescents who have greater school choice and are either in private school 
or a higher cost madrassa. Third, are adolescents who never attended or dropped out of 
school.  
 
Adolescents who attend mainstream public school or low cost madrassas 
CTALS data show that mainstream public schools attract less than two-fifths (39%) of 
adolescents; with a higher proportion of girls (42%) than boys (36%). This drops to just 
13% among the Muslim population. However, nearly 20% of Muslims, representing 7% 
of all adolescents, attend madrassas of different fee levels, many of which are as low or 
lower cost than public schools. 
 
Nearly half of IDI households illustrate where the OAA may have been important in 
supporting continued attendance at a mainstream public school or a low cost religious 
school. Common across these households is the high value placed on education and the 
significant level of personal determination on the part of the adolescent to attend school. 
Both Hindus and Muslims perceive a range of benefits from mainstream education 
including being wise and knowledgeable, reading and writing, running a business, 
finding employment, and improved social mobility. These views were expressed by 
adolescents, parents, and grandparents, despite most of the middle and older generation 
having little or no education themselves. Anju, aged 15, has just completed Class 10 and 
is awaiting the results of her Secondary Education Examination (SEE). She describes 
the importance of education within society. 
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Everyone looks for educated people, everything becomes good if one is 
educated. To read, write, and know something, education is needed. Even 
if you have to search some [news] paper you need to be educated.  
(Interview with Anju, female, 15, Terai/Madhesi) 
 
Anju’s mother is very supportive of her education because Anju has academic ability and 
personal motivation to go to school. 
Renu: She was a child who wanted to study so she would study anyhow; 
but if the child does not want to study then no matter how much money you 
give or beat her, she would not study at all. How to educate the child if she 
does not study? 
Interviewer: Suppose you have less income than you have now, would you 
educate her? 
Renu: Yes, I would educate her in that situation too because she is the 
student who wants to study. 
(Interview with Renu, mother of Anju, female, 15, Terai/Madhesi) 
 
Like Renu, most respondents in poorer households who place a high value on education 
say they would find a way if they had less money. 
 
Muslim households gain various benefits from religious education which include 
fulfilling religious obligations, forgiving the sins of family members, and improving 
marriage prospects. Some Muslim households send their children exclusively to the 
madrassa. Survey data shows that this is the case for 19.7% of Muslim adolescents and 
is similar for girls and boys. Rakiba has five grandchildren including two adolescent 
girls aged 15 and 11. The girls have never been to mainstream school but attend the 
local madrassa. 
Rakiba: …Their father and mother educate them [at the madrassa] with my 
help. This is the age of education. They will be forward when they are 
educated. 
(Interview with Rakiba, grandmother, Muslim) 
 
Attitudes towards education vary within the Muslim community and households may 
value both mainstream and religious education. As discussed in Chapter 4, some 
madrassas teach aspects of the national curriculum but integration into madrassa 
education is limited in practice, especially in Rautahat district. In some Muslim 
households, adolescents simultaneously attend mainstream school and the madrassa. 
Two sisters, aged 15 and 12, go to the local public school during the day, occasionally 
receive (mainstream) private tuition, and attend the madrassa before and after school. 
Their mother died and their father works in Kathmandu, so they are dependent on their 
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grandparents. The OAA is a significant part of the household income and directly 
supports the girls’ education. 
 
In other Muslim households, mainstream education is favoured over religious 
education. This is the view of Ibran, whose ambition is to work in public service. 
Interviewer: Why did you study in government school rather than in 
Madrasa? 
Ibran: Because I wanted to learn Nepali rather than Urdu… I like Nepali. 
And Urdu is not good.  
Interviewer: What is the advantage of reading Nepali? 
Ibran: Because people become Sir ji, Officers and Police when they study 
Nepali. 
(Interview with Ibran, male, 11, Muslim) 
 
As the survey data shows, Ibran’s attendance at public school is unusual for a Muslim 
adolescent. His parents support his mainstream education despite social pressure for 
him to engage in work and pressure from religious advocates to attend the madrassa. 
 
Most Hindu and Muslim IDI households with an adolescent in public or low cost 
religious school fall within the bottom two income quintiles. They face considerable 
financial constraints on the level of investment they can make in education, which 
results in three necessary considerations: who to educate, for how long, and at what 
quality.  
 
First, one adolescent’s education is often prioritised over another. Some households 
prioritise the adolescent who shows greater academic aptitude and self-motivation. This 
is the case with Anju and her 13 year old sister, Gita, who never attended school, 
ostensibly because of lack of interest. In the earlier extract, their mother Renu 
differentiates between the girls in the willingness of the household to invest in their 
education. Some households prioritise boys over girls. Boys’ attendance at mainstream 
school is 8 percentage points higher than for girls (see Chapter 4). However, this does 
not mean an absence of support for girls’ education. Many respondents express their 
determination to educate their girl children and the OAA provides a larger boost to 
girls’ public school attendance compared to boys, especially in poorer households (see 
Chapter 5). Favouritism towards boys’ education is more evident when households have 
the financial means to pursue private school education (discussed in the next section). 
However, data presented in Chapter 6 shows that boys in public school receive 
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approximately 36% more investment in their education than girls. The largest part of 
this difference relates to fees. Girls may have fees waived as part of the state-funded 
scholarship scheme. However, it is likely that boys also receive more private tuition, 
especially at critical grade junctures (Subedi 2018). 
 
In some households, younger adolescents appear to receive greater support for their 
education following the failure to satisfactorily educate older siblings. Two older 
brothers, aged 17 and 20, dropped out of school some years earlier when their parents’ 
ill health led to a loss of income. At the time of the interviews, the household was more 
financially stable, and their 11 year old brother and two younger sisters were all 
attending school. This aligns with evidence from other developing countries including 
India that shows first born children are more likely to receive less schooling and to 
transition into work at a younger age (Kumar 2016). In contrast, other IDI households 
with slightly higher incomes, falling within the third income quintile, have managed to 
keep all children in public school. 
 
The second financially-constrained consideration involves limiting the grade level that 
an adolescent is likely to complete. By law, public education is free up to primary level, 
and should be free up to secondary level for girls and certain marginalised groups; 
however, analysis in Chapter 6 shows this may not be the case in practice. Further 
analysis of CTALS data shows that costs rise with age by a factor of around NRs 1,000 
(US$9) per year.91 Moreover, there are a limited number of schools that offer higher 
levels of education with as few as 9% of public schools in Province 2 providing upper 
secondary (Ministry of Education 2018). Even the most determined students and parents 
from poorer households must limit their ambitions when education becomes too costly.  
Renu: We do not have capacity to educate her further, we are poor people. 
She says that she will study but we want to stop the study. There is one 
member of the family who earns the money and seven or eight people for 
the expenses. Her grandfather receives the money and he gives us little 
from that. 
(Interview with Renu, mother of Anju, female, 15, Terai/Madhesi) 
 
 
91 Total education expenditure in the past year is regressed on age for adolescents who have lived in the 
household for at least 2 years and are currently attending public school: n = 1201, β = 1011.09, S.E. = 
87.68, p < 0.001. 
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Nonetheless, parents may have a long-term view of the level of education they expect 
for their children. Ibran’s mother is determined for him to complete the SLC, also 
known as the matric, at the end of Class 12 and explains the importance of the OAA in 
supporting this aim.  
Sabana: He is good at study. He concentrates on study. I want to educate 
him up to matric. If I can, I will do. If I would get power, then I will educate 
him further after matric, if not, then only up to matric.  
Interviewer: Do you think this is because you have money of pension? 
Sabana: Yes. If Mother won’t live or dies, then how could I get pension? 
That time, if income supports then I will educate him otherwise it will be 
stopped. 
(Interview with Sabana, mother of Ibran, male, 11, Muslim) 
 
At the same time, Sabana expresses her concern about achieving this. Ibran is currently 
in Class 3 and, barring delays, will reach Class 12 by age 20. Mainstream school 
attendance rates among boys decline to just 38% among 17 year olds (see Chapter 4) 
and Ibran’s two older brothers dropped out after Class 5 and 8.  
 
The third consideration that very poor households make related to investment in 
education is limiting their options to poor quality, local public schools. Sunita, aged 13, 
is currently studying in Class 3. Her older siblings dropped out of school after Class 2 
and 4; but Sunita’s mother and grandfather are committed to her education because she 
studies well.  
Sumintra: Sister, I want to send her out for her study but… it needs to take 
room in rent, food to eat and monthly fee to the teacher… Poor people like 
me cannot afford all these… 
Interviewer: In what type of school would you send Sunita if you had to 
take decision? 
Sumintra: In Private school of Gaur looking at things… Sister, everyone 
wants to do that, but we don’t have money… We are loaded with the 
poverty. 
(Interview with Sumintra, mother of Sunita, female, 13, Terai/Madhesi) 
 
Although private school is out of reach for most adolescents in very poor households, 
opportunities to access better quality education are sometimes available. Sunita 
benefited from a government tuition programme that provides catch-up classes to help 
children (re)enrol in mainstream school. She was able to enrol in a public school in 
another VDC where the tuition teacher works, and which is attended by other girls from 
the village.  
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Sumintra: Yes sister, teacher said that “teaching method is not good here 
so I will take her to the school [in Baluwa] and bring her here”. I said if she 
goes with you and you will drop her here, it’s fine. 
(Interview with Sumintra, mother of Sunita, female, 13, Terai/Madhesi) 
 
Religious education also varies in quality and cost. Rakiba, whose 15 and 11 year old 
granddaughters go to the local madrassa, has ambitions for them to go the big madrassa 
in a neighbouring VDC where they are more serious about teaching. However, Rakiba 
explains that the fees are prohibitive at up to NRs 3,000 (US$ 27) per month compared 
to the costs of the local madrassa at NRs 150-250 (US$ 1-2) per month. The desire to 
access private schools or more costly madrassas, even among very poor households, 
reflects the large part they play in the education sector and the marked difference in 
quality between public and private schools across the country.  
 
In most of these poorer households, respondents recognise the role played by the OAA 
in supporting the costs of school attendance. As shown in Chapter 6, approximately 36% 
of OAA recipients spent some of the last payment directly on education and the OAA 
often acts as a kind of intra-household safety net, allowing the smoothing of education 
expenditures over time. Returning to the case of Anju, her mother and grandfather 
confirm that the OAA is added to her father’s earned income and contributes to 
stationery, admission and exam fees, and private tuition. She clearly articulates that the 
OAA is the factor that allows her to access private tuition. 
Anju: There would be problems [without the OAA] but I would study. 
Maybe I could not take the coaching classes because they used to ask me 
money in the beginning of month. But I would study. 
(Interview with Anju, female 15, Terai/Madhesi) 
 
As discussed in Chapter 6, private tuition is critical in supporting adolescents in public 
school to pass exams and to transition to higher grades.  
 
Incomes also tend to be shared in a way that means the OAA expands the total 
household budget. Several IDI respondents recognise that, because the OAA is spent on 
the elder’s medicine or other basic needs, it is easier to support the children’s education.  
Rakiba: OAA money made the life easier for older people. If we would not 
receive it then it would be difficult whether to look at the older person of 
the family or to the children’s education. When older people receive it they 
can spend the money on their medication, buying vegetable and clothes. 
There would be problem if we would not receive it.  
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Interviewer: Even if you do not give them directly it becomes easier for 
them to educate their children because you spend the OAA money on you? 
Rakiba: If we would not receive it won’t be comfortable. Sons would have 
to look after their sick parents and could not educate their children. 
(Interview with Rakiba, grandmother, Muslim) 
 
Without the OAA, education may be compromised because costs cannot be met, time 
sensitive payments may be late, and debt may be incurred. The evidence suggests that 
the OAA plays an important role in supporting continued attendance at school, 
especially where both the parents or guardians and the adolescent have significant 
determination to do so. 
 
Adolescents who attend private school and higher cost madrassas 
In the CTALS, nearly one-fifth of adolescents attend a mainstream private school. Close 
to one-third of households involved in the IDIs illustrate where higher incomes, 
possibly aided by the OAA, have expanded school choice by providing access to higher 
quality private schools. Most of these are moderately poor households in the third or 
fourth income quintile. Like very poor households with an adolescent in public school, 
parents and grandparents are determined to educate their (grand)children and 
adolescents show strong personal determination to go to school.  
 
Most respondents highlight the quality of teaching as the main reason for sending their 
adolescents to private school. Aabu Mahamad has four sons and values both mainstream 
and religious education. His second son, aged 18, completed the SLC at private school 
and has since left. Attab, his youngest son, aged 12, recently shifted from public to 
private school. Fees for the private school are relatively low at NRs 500 (US$4.40) per 
month but Aabu Mahamad sees a substantial difference in the quality of teaching and 
potential for learning. 
Aabu Mahamad: For three or four years he studied in government school 
but could not write name and address correctly, then I sent him to the 
boarding [private school]. What happens there is they pressurize to study. 
They know that we will pay money, so they continuously teach him, but in 
government [school] one day vacation, one day only two periods, and this 
and that. Teachers involve in politics in the village so teaching quality is 
not good… If I pay in boarding, he studied in one year what he had done 
in government school in three years. 




Abishek, aged 10, recently moved from the local public school in Jhunkhunwa to a 
nearby private school. His grandfather believes that he would be unlikely to continue 
his education at the local public school. 
Ajan: No expenses are needed [at government school]. He eats from our 
own home and goes to study, but I don’t think the teaching is good there. 
Teachers sit on one side, students play on the other side. The boys go to 
school after finishing the work here, but he does not study well, he is in bad 
track. He will only study if we keep him in boarding spending the money.  
(Interview with Ajan, grandfather of Abishek, male, 11, Terai/Madhesi) 
 
Abishek’s mother confirms that the decision to send him to private school is about the 
discipline and focus of the teachers. 
Nilam: If the teaching in government school becomes good, people won’t 
send their children to the boarding [private] school…. The main thing is 
children should learn and be good, it does not matter in which school they 
study.  
(Interview with Nilam, mother of Abishek, male, 11, Terai/Madhesi) 
 
On transferring to private school, Abishek had to go back two grades from Class 3 to 
Class 1, reflecting the difference in standards of teaching. Analysis of CTALS data 
shows that adolescents in private school are on average nearly one year younger and 
two classes lower than adolescents in public school.92 
 
Compared to very poor households, moderately poor households are more likely to have 
all adolescents in some form of education. However, choices are still constrained by the 
level of income and decisions must be made about who receives additional investment 
in education, for how long, and at what quality. First, most households have several 
school-age children but may only be able to support one to attend private school.93 This 
is the case for all IDI households, and it is notable that these are all boys. Most 
respondents recognise the value of education for both girls and boys, but where 
additional investment can be made, boys tend to be favoured.  
Archana: Yes, [my daughter is] in government [school]. I am a poor woman 
how much can I afford? I have sent my son to the boarding [private] school. 
(Interview with Archana, mother, Dalit)   
 
 
92 Among adolescents who lived in the household for at least two years and are currently attending a 
mainstream school, a t test of age by school type indicates a difference of -0.74 years (S.E. = 0.104, p = 0.000) 
and a t test of current grade by school type indicates a difference of -1.69 grades (S.E. = 0.137, p = 0.000). 
93 Analysis of CTALS data shows that among households with more than one adolescent of whom at least 
one is in private school, 54% have only one in private school (data not shown). Moreover, adolescents are 
not the only school age children in the household. 
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There is also a tendency to focus on sons when discussing larger ambitions for children, 
reflecting expectations about their future economic role in society. Bikhari’s two oldest 
sons dropped out of school prematurely, but his two daughters, aged 11 and eight, and 
six year old son, are in school. 
Bikhari: Whose parents do not dream to make their son a doctor and send 
him to US by flight, and not to cut the grass? No one wants his son to work 
in the field. Most important thing is money… Two daughters and one son 
are studying, I am thinking that we are residents of Nepal, people will say 
that even their father was illiterate his son is educated.  
(Interview with Bikhari, father, Brahmin/Chhetri)  
 
 
Fewer than half the number of girls attend private school as boys; and the analysis in 
Chapter 5 finds more substantial effects of the OAA on boys’ private school attendance 
compared to girls. Girls may be more likely to benefit from private school education 
only when the household is rich enough to have done so first for boys.94 This is reflected 
in the attempt, albeit unsuccessful, to boost girls’ migration for education in households 
with elder couples who are both eligible for the OAA. Once girls are in private school, 
they receive a much higher level of investment, although approximately 18% less than 
private school-going boys (see Chapter 6). Underlying these differences are gendered 
economic and social norms and expectations relating to social interaction, future 
incomes, and age-at-marriage. These issues will be returned to later in the chapter. 
 
Muslim households that have just one school-age child in private school may be 
financially constrained but may also have preferences (or obligations) for religious 
education. Aabu Mahamad, who supported two sons to attend private school sent his 
other two sons to religious school but for different reasons. His eldest son, aged 21, was 
educated at the madrassa to fulfil the family’s religious obligations. 
Aabu Mahamad: Yes, we discussed in the family that at least one among 
four should learn [at the madrassa]. At least that facility we can have. 
(Interview with Aabu Mahamad, father, Muslim) 
 
His third son, Sahabudin, aged 15, was attending the local public school but recently 
moved to the madrassa. Both Sahabudin and his father agree that this was his own 
choice, preferring to study Urdu and the Quran rather than the mainstream curriculum. 
 
94 Assuming this to be the case, girls who attend private school are less likely to appear in the IDI data 
given that the sample deliberately excluded households in the top per capita income quintile due to the 




Second, as well as limiting the number of adolescents in private school, investment in 
private education may be delayed until a certain point in the grade structure. Some 
adolescents shift into private school at a certain stage because higher level classes are 
not available in the local school or to increase their chances of success at critical 
junctures, such as when working for the SEE or SLC. Jitendra has two sons, aged 17 
and 13, and a 15 year old daughter. The two younger adolescents go to the local public 
school which may be better quality compared to some, as Jitendra explains, everyone’s 
children are educated here. Unusually for his generation, Jitendra completed secondary 
level education and has ambitions for all his children to complete upper secondary level. 
His oldest son, Randhir, moved from the local school to a private school in Gaur where 
he boards. Jitendra’s daughter, Anita, aged 15, is still in public school but has the same 
ambition. 
Interviewer: If it were on you, would you study in government or in other 
school? 
Anita: …I would study in boarding [private], in big school.  
Interviewer: …Why do you want to study in boarding then? 
Anita: Teaching medium is English in boarding, there are talent students 
there. It is taught very much there. 
(Interview with Anita, female, 15, Terai/Madhesi) 
 
Results from Chapter 5 show that the increase in private school attendance associated 
with the OAA in households with an elder woman is larger among older boys. 
Attending private school can mean a large financial commitment. The costs are 
relatively high and increase substantially with age; by approximately NRs 4,000 
(US$35) per year.95 While some households may delay entry into private school until a 
certain grade juncture, private school attendance rates decline considerably with age, 
suggesting that others may use the OAA to remain in private school for longer. The 
balance of cases that fall into each of these scenarios is unclear. However, it is notable 
that three of six adolescents among the IDI sample who are currently in private school, 
shifted to private school during the months between the survey and the IDIs. Movement 
between schools is relatively common and aligns with the earlier findings that 
 
95 Total education expenditure in the past year is regressed on age for adolescents who have lived in the 
household for at least 2 years and are currently attending private school, n = 568, β = 4029.45, S.E. = 




households with an elder man act in anticipation of the OAA to increase, rather than 
sustain, private school attendance. 
  
The third constraint on households with an adolescent in private school is that they 
would prefer their children to attend a better private school if they could afford to.  
Jitendra: If I had better economic situation, I would have sent my children 
for the study to Birgunj or Kathmandu. I would have sent them to the bigger 
college. Since I don’t have that economic status, I send them in the school 
of village.  
(Interview with Jitendra, father, Terai/Madhesi)  
 
This highlights the variety in cost and quality of private schools. Given the low level of 
development in Rautahat relative to the rest of the country, better and more expensive 
schools are almost certainly located outside the district. CTALS data shows that among 
adolescents, mostly boys, who migrated for education, 18% went to Kathmandu and 
26% went abroad, almost all to India. The largest group of education migrants, 36%, 
stayed in Rautahat and a further 21% went to other, mostly neighbouring, districts. The 
effects of the OAA on education migration are perhaps more plausible knowing that 
adolescents do not necessarily have to move far from home. 
 
While most households with an adolescent in private school are only moderately poor, 
respondents recognise that the OAA is important to the elder or the household in general. 
In some cases, an explicit link is made between the OAA and adolescent education. 
Jitendra: Yes, it has been a convenience to me that I do not have to spend 
all money on her medication. Government’s money is spent on my 
mother’s which saves my own earned money that I spend on my children’s 
education. Otherwise I would be backward because I would have to spend 
the money on mother including education and to run the house. But now 
that money is spent on my mother. That’s government’s money. If it is not 
sufficient then only I add in that. And there is no shortage of money to 
spend on children’s education. 
(Interview with Jitendra, father, Terai/Madhesi)  
 
The poorest household to have an adolescent in private school was introduced in 
Chapter 6. Ajay, aged 11, recently moved to a private school in the nearby VDC after 
three years at the local government school. His grandfather directly supports him with 
the OAA by paying the monthly fees. However, the household is economically insecure 
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and the OAA is paid infrequently, so he often relies on loans to pay the fees. Even when 
receiving the OAA, maintaining private school fee payments can be challenging. 
 
Factors that prevent access to (mainstream) school 
Data presented in Chapter 4 shows that 43% of adolescents are not in mainstream 
school. These include adolescents who reportedly never went to school and those who 
dropped out; among adolescents who are not attending school, 77% never attended and 
23% dropped out.96 Notably, never attending mainstream school is an issue largely 
affecting Muslims. Muslim adolescents constitute 38% of the adolescent population but 
make up 82% of never-attenders compared to 21% of drop-outs.  
 
Figure 31 shows mainstream school attendance and drop-out rates by age. While the 
school attendance rate decreases and the drop-out rate increases with age, the proportion 
of adolescents who never attended school stays approximately constant.97 This suggests 
that never attending school is a durable issue that continues throughout adolescence and 
does not generally end with late enrolment. Those who have never been to school are 
unlikely to ever do so. This implies that any difference in attendance rates brought about 
by the OAA relates to prevention of drop-out or transfers, in either direction, between 
public and private schools. Most evidence on UCTs points towards prevention of drop-




96 IDI data suggests that a small number of adolescents who were reported as never-attenders in the 
CTALS had been to school at a very young age but dropped out quickly; never-attenders may be over-
estimated in the survey data. Having dropped out some years before, it may be that in the mind of survey 
respondents they never went to school. 
97 Although the population of adolescents includes those who left home within the past three years, the 
number of adolescents in the sample decreases with age. It is possible that adolescents who left the home 
more than three years ago would increase the rate of never-attenders to some extent. However, among 
adolescents who left the households in the past three years, nearly twice as many did so for education 
than any other reason. The effect, if any, is likely to be small. 
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Figure 31 Mainstream school attendance and drop-out rates by age 
 
Data source: CTALS 2017. n = 3434. Figure shows the linear fitted line and error bars (95% C.I.) using 
robust standard errors clustered at the level of the household. 
 
Table 27 and Table 28 show the primary reason that adolescents never went to school 
and dropped out of school, respectively, as reported by parents or guardians.98 In nearly 
half the cases (49%), parents reported that adolescents who never went to school had a 
lack of interest in going. Most never-attenders are Muslim and there may be a strong 
perception among this community that mainstream schools are culturally inappropriate 
(Hafiz, Prakash, and Rajbhandari 2008). However, a sizable minority of never attenders 
and most drop-outs are non-Muslim; and almost half (48%) of drop-outs did so because 
of lack of interest. For many, the lack of interest may stem from the poor quality of 





98 The CTALS asked adolescents the same question and the average responses are very similar. 
Parent/guardian responses are used here because they include adolescents who were unavailable for 
interview.  
99 Many children start school late, some of whom may have had the chance to form a negative view of 
school. It may also be that responses to the question are coloured by their parents’ current perception of 
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Table 27 Primary reason for adolescents never attending mainstream school 
 
All adolescents Girls Boys 
n % n % n % 
Too expensive 261 23.5 145 23.9 116 23.0 
Needed to help at home 81 7.3 55 9.1 26 5.2 
Lack of interest 541 48.7 282 46.5 259 51.4 
Marriage 3 0.3 3 0.5 0 0.0 
Illness / disability 11 1.0 4 0.7 7 1.4 
Poor quality school 15 1.4 4 0.7 11 2.2 
Too far 17 1.5 13 2.2 4 0.8 
Denied admission 11 1.0 7 1.2 4 0.8 
Other reason† 170 15.3 93 15.4 77 15.3 
Total 1110 100.0 606 100.0 504 100.0 
Data source: CTALS 2017. †Includes one case of ‘don’t know’ for girls. 
 
Table 28 Primary reason for adolescents dropping out of mainstream school 
 
All adolescents Girls Boys 
n % n % n % 
Too expensive 28 8.5 10 5.8 18 11.5 
Needed to help at home 62 18.8 35 20.4 27 17.2 
Lack of interest 158 48.0 71 41.3 87 55.4 
Marriage 24 7.3 23 13.4 1 0.6 
Illness / disability 6 1.8 4 2.3 2 1.3 
Poor grades / failed exams 18 5.5 8 4.7 10 6.4 
Poor quality school 1 0.3 1 0.6 0 0.0 
Too far 9 2.7 7 4.1 2 1.3 
Denied admission 5 1.5 3 1.7 2 1.3 
Other reason† 18 5.5 10 5.8 8 5.1 
Total 329 100.0 172 100.0 157 100.0 
Data source: CTALS 2017. †Includes one case of ‘don’t know’ for girls. 
 
The second most common reason for never attending school is economic. Nearly a 
quarter (24%) of cases reported school to be too expensive, rising to nearly a third 
(31%) when including those who need their child to help at home. The second most 
common reason for dropping out of school is to help at home. This could be for either 
domestic or economic work. The rate is slightly higher for girls for whom domestic 
work is more likely. That this reason is more common among drop-outs is unsurprising 
given the value of labour at home increases with age. For those adolescents engaged in 
economic, especially paid work, the OAA could reduce the need for their income, 
allowing them to stay in school. However, the findings in Chapters 5 and 6 suggest only 
a weak link, if any, between reductions in paid work and increases in school attendance. 
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The direct cost of school is the primary concern for 12% of boys who dropped out, 
possibly because boys are more likely to be considered for private school. For girls, 
marriage is also an important factor, driving school dropout in more than 13% of cases. 
A gendered pattern emerges from the data, whereby boys are more likely to drop out 
because of lack of interest or cost and girls are more likely to drop out to help at home 
or for marriage.  
 
The third most common reason for never attending school is the 15% classified as 
‘other’. Further analysis of the data shows that 91% of these cases are from Muslim 
households. Among these, 44% are currently attending the madrassa and others may 
have done so in the past. In these cases, parents may be expressing their preference for 
religious education, their dissatisfaction with mainstream education, or both. In contrast, 
just 6% of drop-outs did so for ‘other’ reasons and few of these are Muslims, suggesting 
that switching from mainstream to religious education is less common. 
 
The remaining reasons for never attending or dropping out of school include disability, 
poor school quality, failed exams, distance, and being denied admission, collectively 
representing approximately 5% of cases. The IDIs reveal that poor quality of teaching in 
public schools is a significant issue and it is perhaps surprising that this was not more 
prominent in the survey. As suggested, the problem of low school quality may be 
expressed by survey respondents as a lack of interest, especially among those who 
cannot afford better options. This would reflect Nepalis’ low expectations of public 
services, the culture of not speaking out, and possibly fear of exclusion if seen to 
complain (Adhikari et al. 2014; Hagen-Zanker and Mallett 2016). 
 
Almost half of households involved in the IDIs include at least one adolescent who is 
out of school, representing one third of all adolescents from the sample. These 
adolescents either never went to school or dropped out because of a range of financial 
and non-financial barriers to education. Like the survey responses, lack of interest is 
sometimes cited as the reason for either never attending or dropping out of school, with 
little further explanation. Some adolescents may have a learning difficulty. One father 
says of his 15 year old son who never attended school, that he didn’t know how to study 
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and that his mental condition is less. However, none of the adolescents in the survey 
have a reported physical or mental disability.100 
 
Most respondents suggest that the circumstances behind being out of school are 
multifaceted and complex, often involving both push and pull factors. In contrast to the 
survey findings, most common are push factors relating to the school including poor 
quality teaching, corporal punishment, and discrimination or unfair treatment. Survey 
respondents may be more inclined to identify personal reasons when confronted with 
limited options. However, as will be shown, poor school quality underlies many of the 
other factors that drive non-attendance. Bindu, aged 13, went to the local public school 
but was determined to leave after experiencing both poor teaching and violence. 
Bindu: Since the day madam [the teacher] beat me and I got fainted, then I 
didn’t go to school again. Teaching was not good, so I didn’t go. 
Interviewer: Why did madam beat you? 
Bindu: Students were quarrelling, but madam came and beat only to me 
then after I fell down. But she did not care me. Other students had taken 
me to home from the school. I went to the school next day, but the teaching 
was not good, so I didn’t continue school since then. And I started cutting 
grass. 
(Interview with Bindu, female 13, Dalit) 
 
Other girls, such as Chandani, aged 15, testify to dropping out, in part, due to 
harassment by boys. 
Chandani: Even when we used to talk with our brothers, they started to 
gossip that we are having affair with the boy, that’s why all the girls left 
the school.  
Interviewer: Is this also the reason to leave the school? 
Chandani: Yes 
(Interview with Chandani, female, 15, Terai/Madhesi) 
 
The poor quality of teaching and difficult environment in public schools aligns with 
earlier findings from the IDIs. Some households do all they can to shift their children 
into private school or risk them dropping out altogether. Alternatively, private tuition 
can make up for the poor quality teaching in many public schools. However, both 
options are only available to those who can afford it and tuition classes will not 
overcome the problems of harassment and abuse.  
 
 
100 During the interviews, the research assistants were not aware of any adolescents with a disability or 
learning difficulty. However, this does not mean that there were none. 
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Social, economic, and cultural pull factors exert pressure on adolescents to leave school, 
which tends to increase with age. These include concerns about and constraints on girls’ 
social interaction outside the home, cultural and social exclusion of Muslims from 
mainstream education, and increasing economic and social pressure to work and to 
marry. For girls, constraints on female-male public interaction can limit opportunities 
that are available to boys, and may prevent accessing education altogether.101 Lilam, 
aged 12, was in public school at the time of the survey but dropped out shortly after. 
Her grandmother believes this was because she had to help in the house following major 
floods that destroyed homes, crops and assets. However, her mother gives a different 
account. 
Archana: Lilam studied up to third or fourth grade. But the teaching method 
was not good there so Lilam said “Mommy, teachers do not teach in good 
way in the school.” Then I managed tuition classes for her. She is grown 
up now, so she said “My friends are also not going. How can I go alone? 
Her father said her that other friends will go for their education, if you go, 
you will be knowledgeable. You are making excuses of giving example of 
others who do not go.” Then I also thought it’s not good that she goes to 
Jhunkhunwa alone.  
(Interview with Archana, mother of Lilam, female, 12, Dalit)   
 
Private school was considered as an option for Lilam, but her mother emphasises the 
difficulty of adolescent girls interacting with males outside the home. 
Archana: [Her father] asked "Daughter why did you leave the study?" Her 
uncle asked if she would study in boarding [private school] then she 
answered "No, I will study in government school." Her father also talked 
to other girls if they would go to school. You know the situation, it's 
difficult to send the girls alone somewhere, isn’t it? 
(Interview with Archana, mother of Lilam, female, 12, Dalit) 
 
The economic shock from the floods and demand for labour at home may have been the 
immediate trigger for Lilam to leave school in a context where the poor quality teaching 
provided little incentive to stay. At the same time, constraints on female movement limit 
her options even though her family can pay for tutoring and private school. In contrast, 
Lilam’s nine year old brother continues to attend private school. Despite these 
difficulties, her mother is determined for Lilam to go back to school. They hope to buy 
a bicycle so she can commute to another public school that is considered better quality. 
 
 
101 Actual incidents of inappropriate behaviour could be considered as a push factor; however, perceptions 
that it could occur are perhaps a more important pull factor. 
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Some Muslim households may find mainstream schools culturally inappropriate. Based 
on interviews with students and community members from 11 madrassas that were 
registered as providing the mainstream curriculum, Hafiz, Prakash and Rajbhandari 
(2008) suggest that the main reasons for low participation of Muslims in mainstream 
schools are the lack of religious education, a culturally unfriendly environment, and no 
instruction in Urdu. Cultural appropriateness of mainstream education was not a direct 
line of enquiry in this study and may not be readily articulated among the community. 
Rather, as shown earlier, respondents tend to describe education in the madrassa as a 
pull factor away from mainstream education. The data suggests that decisions to attend 
a madrassa rather than mainstream school tend to happen pre-adolescence.  
 
However, some adolescents move from one education system to the other as a result of 
pressure from religious campaigners who come from outside the local community. 
Sajid, 15 years old, from Jhunkhunwa, was attending private school but his uncle, a 
religious teacher, convinced him to go to the madrassa. His mother explains the 
difficulties caused by changing education systems, which eventually led to him 
dropping out.  
Kanija: My sister’s husband enrolled him [in the madrassa] and went out. 
Other Maulavi [religious teacher] of the Madrassa used to beat him. Two 
or four times he came home happily then later he said he won’t go there. 
He ran away from there. My husband beat him with the stick. You know 
the mother loves her child, I said “what will happen when you beat him”, 
and I did not let him beat the boy. Then he went to his maternal 
grandmother’s home, he stayed there for few days then he went to 
Kathmandu with his maternal uncle saying that he won’t study. So, we 
called him [back] from the maternal grandmother’s home. We were 
penalized with two thousand rupees in the school. They asked for two 
thousand in the boarding [private school] again. Paying two thousand 
rupees, we got him re-enrolled in the boarding. Since he was back from 
studying Urdu, he became weak in boarding school too. Teachers used to 
beat him and also asked "you studied very good but why are you so weak 
now?" He left in the boarding too. We tried and beat him two or three days, 
but he did not study.  
(Interview with Kanija, mother of Sajid, male, 15, Muslim) 
 
The data suggests that where there is an existing (or new) preference for religious 
education over mainstream education, additional income is more likely to facilitate the 




Expectations and pressures to work and to marry can also lead adolescents to leave 
school prematurely or to never attend in the first place. The determinants of adolescent 
work and early marriage, and their relationship to school attendance, are explored in the 
following two sections. 
 
The determinants of adolescent work: normality, necessity, and opportunity 
The findings in Chapters 5 and 6 show that the OAA reduces the rate of participation in 
paid work by compensating foregone income. It may also reduce the risk of migrating 
for work for some adolescents while increasing economic migration opportunities for 
others. As with school attendance, findings vary by age and gender of the adolescent 
and the socioeconomic status of the household. At the same time, the results show only 
small and non-significant effects, if any, on unpaid economic and domestic work, despite 
the potential for the OAA to do so through investment or changes to adult labour supply. 
 
Various other factors affect demand for and supply of adolescent labour which in turn 
determine the nature of the effects of the OAA on work. IDI data provides insights into 
the determinants of adolescent work which are presented in three typical scenarios: 
school-going adolescents who may be at risk of dropping out; adolescents who dropped 
out of school prematurely because they had to work; and adolescents who never went to 
school or dropped out primarily for non-economic reasons. Each sub-section explores 
the nature and drivers of adolescent work and considers how the OAA relates to this. 
 
Work among adolescents who attend school 
Data presented in Chapter 4 show that nearly all adolescents, including those in school, 
do some amount of work, whether domestic or economic. However, participation in 
paid work is much lower among school-goers. Similarly, most adolescents from the IDI 
sample engage in some amount of work, including those who attend school, although 
younger adolescents are sometimes said to contribute less because they are still a child. 
 
For most adolescents, work is a part of everyday life which makes an important 
contribution to the household and develops important skills as they transition to 
adulthood (Morrow 2012). Sabrina, aged 15, goes to the madrassa, but also works and 
cooks in the home. Attab, aged 12, goes to private school but sometimes helps his father 
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and older brother to sell vegetables. These work contributions do not appear to 
compromise their education. In some cases, work can even make an important 
contribution to adolescents’ education. Anju, aged 15, was shown in previous extracts to 
be an above average student. She helps in the home and used to contribute to her 
parents’ batayia (crop share) work. Now she provides private tuition to other children 
and uses the money to pay some of her own education costs. Anju’s case is exceptional; 
paid work is predominantly done by out-of-school adolescents.  
 
The analysis in Chapter 5 showed that the effects of the OAA on school attendance 
were generally larger in households with more working age adults. Households with 
fewer adults are generally poorer, but they may also place greater demands on 
adolescent labour which an income transfer is unable to compensate. In some cases, 
respondents recognise that the OAA may prevent adolescents from having to increase 
their participation in work, potentially at the cost of leaving school. These happen to be 
younger adolescents from households in the second poorest per capita income quintile 
and who are all attending public school. Ibran, aged 10, was shown earlier to benefit 
from the OAA for his education. His mother suggests that if his grandmother did not 
receive it, he would have to go out and work.   
Interviewer: When she does not have pension and you need money then 
what would you do? 
Sabana: I will borrow.  
Interviewer: How would you pay it? 
Sabana: When children will work then I will pay. 
(Interview with Sabana, mother of Ibran, male, 10, Muslim) 
 
These cases support the findings from Chapter 5 that the OAA reduces participation in 
paid work, although in contrast to Ibran, the reductions in paid work are larger among 
middle to older adolescents in better-off households. 
 
Adolescents who dropped out of school to work 
In some cases, poverty has forced adolescents out of school and into work. CTALS data 
shows that in all these cases, the adolescents dropped out to start work before the co-
resident elder was eligible for the OAA. Bikesh, aged 15, left school to work when he 
was 12 years old. While his mother says he did not study well, Bikesh felt a strong 
determination to contribute income to the family after his father fell into debt.  
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Sumintra: No, no one [stopped him from going]. When the brothers were 
separated and loans were divided, he said “how much father alone can earn, 
what happens with this earning, let me go out and know some skills”. 
Thinking all these, the boy went out. 
Interviewer: Did you say, “don’t go”? 
Sumintra: Yes, we said not to go, first study and then go. 
Interviewer: What did his grandfather say? 
Sumintra: Grandfather said not to go, his father said not to go, his uncle 
said, “it’s not time to go for you, study now.” He did not listen to us and 
said, “if you do not let me go, I will run away.” Then everyone said not to 
run away but go with everyone’s consent. 
 (Interview with R, mother of Bikesh, male, 15, Terai/Madhesi) 
 
The balance between the contribution of poverty and poor quality schooling in driving 
the transition into work is not always clear. Bikesh may have had little incentive to 
study given the available options. The family was keen for him to continue his studies 
but appeared to be unable to pay for private school. Bikesh’s grandfather believes that if 
they had more money at the time, they would have educated him further at private 
school. Equally, better public schools would provide greater incentive to stay in school, 
in which case the OAA might have a larger effect on reducing participation in work. 
The findings in Chapter 5 show that effects on reducing paid work are larger in richer 
households with fewer working age adults. There may be a necessary level of household 
income above which the OAA can tip the balance from paid employment to school or 
other home-based work. 
 
Some girls are required to work fulltime in the home because of a shortage of other 
female labour in the household. In Nepal, children are sometimes known to move 
between households to address an imbalance in household composition (Libois and 
Somville 2018). Among the IDI cases, two adolescent girls live with their maternal 
grandparents to keep them company. This can be to the girls’ advantage if they have 
better opportunities for education. However, in some cases, household work is 
prioritised over education. Nisha, aged 12, has lived with her maternal grandparents 
since the age of three when her mother died. They value her education and used the 
OAA to support it. However, she dropped out of the local public school after missing 
her exams when her father kept her at his home for an extended period.  
Maya: I did a lot for her, but her father deceived. If she were here, she 
would do something, we would not leave like this. She was the only one 
girl in his family, there are no other young ladies that’s why they made her 
stop her study. 
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Interviewer: You planned to educate her time and again, but her father 
dismissed it? 
Maya: Yes, he dismissed it saying: "My daughter will be like this, she will 
not study. She will live in home.” 
(Interview with Maya, grandmother of Nisha, female, 12, Dalit) 
 
In this case, the OAA was supporting Nisha but other forces were stronger in pulling 
her out of school and into work. 
 
Adolescents who are out of school for reasons other than work 
In several cases, adolescents are not able to go to school for a range of non-economic 
reasons and work becomes the default option. For boys, this can involve migration for 
paid work opportunities. Sajid, aged 15, dropped out of mainstream school at age nine 
to attend the madrassa, but then dropped out of school altogether.  
Shekh Mubarak: His mother said if you don’t do anything here then go to 
Kathmandu to learn something. If you don’t study, then learn some skill 
so that you can earn that can feed you. That’s why he went to work with 
his maternal uncle. 
(Interview with Shekh Mubarak, grandfather of Sajid, male, 15, Muslim) 
 
Sajid: They [said I should go to school] but I said, "I don’t like", so I didn’t 
go. Then they said if you don’t do anything go to learn some skill. And I 
went to my maternal uncle and worked, again I will go there. 
(Interview with Sajid, male, 15, Muslim) 
 
For girls, this may mean working in the home until their marriage can be arranged. 
Chandani left school recently for a range of reasons including poor teaching, difficulty 
in studying, and harassment, with no options outside the local public school. She is now 
engaged in household work until her marriage can be arranged.  
Interviewer: I ask you about your daughter Chandani. What does she do? 
Rita: She cooks food, feed everyone, cleans the house and washes the 
clothes of all.  
Interviewer: What about study? 
Rita: I tried a lot but she did not study, what can I do? 
(Interview with Rita, mother of Chandani, female, 15, Terai/Madhesi) 
 
In such cases, the OAA may prevent adolescents having to engage in more adult work 
outside the home. Bindu, age 13, left school because of poor teaching and after 
experiencing corporal punishment, despite the OAA supporting her school costs. She 
now works in the home and takes the cows grazing but suggests that her grandparents’ 
OAA means she is less likely to engage in paid work.  
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Interviewer: What is the convenience with the money of older pension in 
your life? 
Bindu: I can eat. 
Interviewer: Won’t you get things to eat if there were no older pension? 
Bindu: No, I had to go to earn money. 
Interviewer: Would you have to go to earn wages? 
Bindu: Yes 
(Interview with Bindu, female 13, Dalit) 
 
In other cases, the OAA may help expand employment opportunities for out of school 
adolescents. After leaving school, but while still at her maternal grandparents’ home, 
the OAA paid for Nisha to attend tailoring training. This would have continued if she 
had not gone back to her father’s home. When boys migrate for work the OAA can help 
support the household during initial periods of training when wages are lower. Bikesh, 
who has been working for three years, left for Delhi in India to train as a painter about 
one year ago.  
Sumintra: He is learning skills at this moment, once he becomes skilful, he 
will earn. 
Interviewer: Does he earn too? 
Sumintra: Only little. 
Interviewer: Does he send that money? 
Sumintra: Yes, he does. 
(Interview with Sumintra, mother of Bikesh, male, 15, Terai/Madhesi) 
 
This supports the findings in Chapter 5 that show the OAA is associated with an 
increase in economic migration among older adolescents who co-reside with an elder 
woman, especially in poorer households. It is possible that the OAA covers the shortfall 
in earnings during periods of low paid apprenticeship as well as the initial costs of 
migration such as transport. 
 
The determinants of early marriage: social expectations, economic incentives 
The data presented in Chapter 4 shows that early marriage is a significant problem for 
girls, but also affects boys. Findings from the literature presented in Chapter 2 are 
ambiguous about the effects of UCTs on marital status, which have been found to both 
increase and decrease marriage rates among adolescent girls. The analyses in Chapters 5 
and 6 show that the OAA increases the chances of girls leaving the parental home for 
marriage in certain circumstances, most likely through increased access to credit. The 




The analysis in this section aims to understand the practice and perceptions of marriage 
among the study community, and how the OAA may interact with decisions about 
marriage timing. The first part explores expectations around expected age at school 
completion and marriage among unmarried, school-going adolescents; the second 
examines the status of unmarried adolescents who are out of school; and the last part 
focuses on married adolescents. 
 
Expectations for unmarried, school-going adolescents 
Table 29 shows the expected age at school completion and marriage as reported by 
parents.102 Among unmarried adolescent girls the average ideal age for marriage is 19.2 
years, slightly more than 3 years younger than boys. Among current school goers, 
expected age at marriage is 20.2 years for girls and 23.6 years for boys, compared to an 
expected school completion age of 19.3 years and 22.0 years, respectively. For both 
girls and boys, the transition to marriage is expected to happen soon after completion of 
schooling, but 3 years earlier for girls.  
 
Table 29 Expected age at school completion and expected age at marriage among non-
married adolescents by mainstream school attendance status 
 
Girls Boys 
Mean S.E. n Mean S.E. n 
Expected age at school completion  
Attends school 19.3 0.10 899 22.0 0.11 1069 
Expected age at marriage  
All 19.2 0.08 1502 22.5 0.08 1694 
Attends school 20.2 0.09 879 23.6 0.10 1068 
Previously attended 18.8 0.20 128 21.5 0.19 147 
Never attended 17.7 0.11 495 20.3 0.12 476 
Hindu 19.9 0.08 1011 23.3 0.10 1076 
Muslim 17.8 0.12 491 20.9 0.12 618 
Data source: CTALS 2017. Robust standard errors clustered at the level of the household. 
 
This reflects the circumstance of adolescent girls from at least one third of households 
involved in the IDIs. For girls with the determination and means to be educated, both 
they and their parents are clear that marriage will come after those ambitions have been 
 
102 The relevant survey module was required to be administered to a parent or guardian of the concerned 




achieved. Khushbu, aged 19, was recently married after completing upper secondary. 
Her younger sister Mala, aged 18, is currently in the last year of upper secondary and 
will be married soon after. 
Pramila: Yes, [Mala] is 18 or 19. 
Interviewer: In your caste does daughter get married at the age of 18? 
Pramila: Yes 
Interviewer: Don’t you think that its early? 
Pramila: (Laughs) yes, it’s early. 
Interviewer: If you know that then do you get her married now? 
Pramila: We are not doing right now, we are preparing for that. Next year 
she will be 20 years old. 
(Interview with Pramila, mother of Khushbu, female 19, and Mala, 
female, 18, Terai/Madhesi) 
 
In contrast, all IDI respondents consider the idea of marriage for adolescent boys as a 
more distant concern. In richer and poorer household alike, boys’ marriage will occur 
only after education has been completed, they are engaged in work, and are financially 
independent. For 11 year old Ibran, who has ambitions to complete the SLC and work in 
public service, both he and his mother agree that he will be married only when he 
becomes ‘young’, meaning of-age locally, in his early twenties. 
Interviewer: In the village children are married in early age, what do you 
think about Ibran? 
Sabana: When he will be young or will be of 22 years aged or 23 years 
aged then only. If we get him married in this early age then would it be 
good? 
(Interview with Sabana, mother of Ibran, male, 11, Muslim) 
 
In these circumstances, it is possible that the OAA could help avoid earlier marriage by 
preventing school drop-out during periods of economic insecurity. However, with such 
a strong commitment to later marriage, even if the adolescent were to leave school 
prematurely, marriage would not necessarily immediately follow.  
 
Expectations for unmarried out of school adolescents 
Table 29 shows that being out of school is correlated with 2-3 years lower expected age 
at marriage. For girls, this is 18.8 years among drop-outs and 17.7 years among never 
attenders. Some girls are no longer in school, but their marriage is likely to be several 
years away. Bindu, aged 13, was shown earlier to have recently dropped out of school 
due to poor teaching and corporal punishment. Her mother is considering getting her 
married by the age of 18 but her grandmother thinks her marriage should be even later. 
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Paramsila: Twenty year is the marriageable age, if she gets married earlier, 
she has to bear child earlier and that will make her physically weak.   
Interviewer: Then when do you think she will get married? 
Paramsila: After she reaches 20 years of age, then she will get married. 
Now she herself is a child.  
(Interview with Paramsila, grandmother of Bindu, female, 13, Dalit)  
 
For other girls, leaving school prematurely puts them at greater risk of early marriage. 
Respondents referred to a range of factors that may encourage earlier marriage 
including social pressure from the community, concern for girls’ protection (presumably 
from pre-marital sex or protection of her well-being in general, although neither was 
stated explicitly), poverty, transfer of the burden of care, and release of tension.  
 
Lilam, aged 12, was shown to have left school for multiple reasons. Because of poverty 
and concerns about interaction with men outside the home, she does not have the same 
opportunities as her brother for private education; but her parents may yet help her 
transfer to another public school. In the meantime, there is some disagreement between 
her parents about when she should marry.  
Archana: Her father said, “she is a child now, if I get her married then [the 
husband’s family] will not let her stay here”. Then I said, “if they don’t let 
her stay here, then I cannot keep her here forever”.  
Interviewer: That means you agree with the decision of her father? 
Archana: What to do then? I told [my husband], “you want to keep her in 
a cage, but you know how the society is, if something happens what would 
you do?” Then he suggested me to take care of her [with] good 
responsibility. 
(Interview with Archana, mother of Lilam, female, 12, Dalit) 
 
Archana goes on to say that she and Lilam’s grandmother would get her married sooner 
if it were their decision. However, if Lilam can continue her education, this may provide 
some protection from early marriage. In such cases, additional income that allows girls 
to stay in school may have a secondary effect of delaying marriage. If this occurs 
among the survey sample, the effect is small as the analysis in Chapter 5 finds no 
measurable reduction in marriage or marriage migration rates. 
 
Some parents would prefer their adolescent daughters to be married sooner rather than 
later but are constrained financially. Sunita, aged 13, was able to move to a better 
quality public school by attending state-funded ‘child education’ classes. Her family is 
committed to her education for as long as she is unmarried, but they have been 
Chapter 7 
241 
considering her marriage for the past two years. Her grandfather thinks she should be 
married within the next two or three years but they cannot yet afford to pay the dowry. 
Rambharoshi: From where should we give money, they ask for money. 
Interviewer: How much do they ask for? 
Rambharoshi: Two (hundred thousand rupees) and motorcycle too… first 
grandson will get married and then only she will get married. 
Interviewer: By that time grandson will earn money. 
Rambharoshi: He will earn by that time and also make house. 
(Interview with Rambharoshi, grandfather of Sunita, female, 13, 
Terai/Madhesi) 
 
This case suggests that financial constraints may be reduced following the marriage of 
an older brother. Boys typically stay in the parental home following marriage and most 
likely will have started to earn their own income. Moreover, the household may benefit 
from the incoming dowry and increase in female labour. This may also explain why the 
effect of the OAA on marriage migration is larger in households with fewer working 
age adults. In households with an existing preference for early marriage, adolescent 
girls with older, married, brothers may be more likely to have completed their Gauna 
and moved to the husband’s home without the need for the OAA. 
 
As shown in Chapter 6, some households take loans to meet the financial costs of girls’ 
marriage. Chandani, aged 15, was shown earlier to have dropped out of public school 
for multiple reasons including poverty, harassment, and being unable to study well. If 
she continued at school she may not get married until age 20, but since she has left 
school her marriage is a more pressing concern. Her mother feels that getting her 
married would be a release of tension for the family. Despite not being able to afford 
the costs of school, her parents would take a loan to manage the costs of her marriage. 
Interviewer: You said that you could not manage the money so you left the 
study, how would they manage the dowry? 
Chandani: They have to take loan to give the dowry. 
(Interview with Chandani, female, 15, Terai/Madhesi) 
 
In poor rural communities with a dowry culture, many households will need to take a 
loan to pay for the dowry and the findings from Chapters 5 and 6 suggest that parents or 
guardians use the OAA to access credit for this purpose.  
 
The data in Table 29 confirms that adolescents who never attended school are 
particularly at risk of early marriage. Expected age at marriage for girls who never 
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attended school is 1 year younger than for drop-outs and 2 years younger than for 
school goers. Moreover, analysis in Chapter 4 shows that Muslim adolescents are more 
likely than Hindu adolescents to have never attended school. This correlation is 
reflected in the expected age at marriage for Muslim adolescents which is 
approximately 2 years younger than for Hindus. Sabrina, aged 15, reportedly never went 
to mainstream school but is attending the madrassa part-time. Her grandfather and 
mother are keen to get her married soon but they cannot yet afford the dowry. 
Interviewer: When will you get Sabrina married? 
Apsana: Now… … when there will be money, we will start talking of 
marriage… … when she will be 15 or 16 years old then she will get 
married. Even if marriage will be set, we have to manage money. [Her 
father] has gone to earn money.  
Interviewer: You said 15 or 16 years, she is 15 years old now.  
Apsana: Yes, she is. In our culture at 15 or 16 she can be married but Gauna 
happens at 17, 18, 20 years. If we can manage money within time, then it 
will be done. 
Interviewer: Is Sabrina’s Nikah done or not? 
Apsana: No, it’s not done now…  
Interviewer: You said you will get her married at 15 or 16 and she is 15 
now, why the marriage is delaying then? 
Apsana: It’s delayed because we don’t have money now and boy is not 
found yet.  
Interviewer: Suppose you can manage the money now? 
Apsana: Then boy will be found, and marriage will take place.  
Interviewer: Can marriage take place this year? 
Apsana: Yes. 
(Interview with Apsana, mother of Sabrina, female, 15, Muslim) 
 
This case suggests that dowry payments can be made later, at the time of Gauna, rather 
than at the initial marriage ritual, the Nikah in Urdu. That the major financial costs of 
marriage can occur at the Gauna ceremony explains why the OAA affects migration for 
marriage but not marital status. Families of adolescent girls that have a pre-existing 
preference for earlier marriage and have already made a marriage commitment use the 
OAA to secure loans to pay for the dowry at the time of Gauna, thus hastening the 
formalisation of the marriage.  
 
Table 29 shows that being out of school is also correlated with 2-3 years lower expected 
age at marriage for boys; but still within their early twenties. Like girls, boys who are 
Muslim and who never went to school are most at risk of earlier marriage. Sajid, aged 
15, had dropped out of mainstream school to attend the madrassa but then dropped out 
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of school altogether. While his grandfather thinks he should be married at 17 or 18 
years old, once he can earn his own money, his mother believes it should be later. 
Interviewer: When have you thought to get him married? 
Kanija: Marriage (laughs)… when he will be 20 or 25 years old then we 
will get him married.  
Interviewer: 20 or 25?  
Kanija: 25 years. Till he does not become independent, till he does not 
learn some skill how could we get him married? 
(Interview with Kanija, mother of Sajid, male, 15, Muslim) 
 
There is some variation in expectations about age of marriage, especially between the 
generations. Nonetheless, the data suggests that among parents, there is a normative 
view that boys will get married during their early twenties regardless of their school 
status. The OAA is unlikely to make any difference to the marriage timing of boys. In a 
dowry culture, boys’ families do not face the same economic incentives for earlier 
marriage and there is no evidence of the OAA hastening marriage among boys.  
 
The circumstance of married adolescents 
Focusing on married adolescents reveals further complexities around marriage decisions 
and how they relate to education. Data presented in Chapter 4 shows that 11% of 
adolescent girls are married, rising to 26% among 15-17 year olds; while 3% of 
adolescent boys are married rising to 8% among 15-17 year olds. Table 30 shows the 
school attendance status of married adolescents. Approximately two-thirds of 
adolescents never attended mainstream school and a further one fifth to one quarter had 
dropped out. Marriage rates are by far the highest among Muslim adolescents; and 
approximately 74% of married adolescent girls and 83% of married adolescent boys are 
Muslim (data not shown). There is a notable concentration of early marriage among 
Muslim girls and boys who never attended school.  
 
Table 30 Mainstream school attendance status of married adolescents 
 
Girls Boys 
n % n % 
School attendance status     
Attends school 23 12.3 6 11.11 
Previously attended 46 24.6 11 20.37 
Never attended 118 63.1 37 68.52 
Total 187 100 54 100 




The tradition of early marriage may be more deep-rooted among the Muslim 
community. It may also reflect the more limited opportunities for (mainstream) 
education. In part, this is because some parents and adolescents have a positive 
preference for religious education. However, public schools also offer a poor quality 
and culturally or religiously inappropriate alternative. Being out of school means that 
adolescents are likely to transition into adult roles sooner. 
 
Within the IDI sample, two adolescent girls are married. In both cases, they were 
reported in the survey as never having gone to school. However, their parents suggest 
that they may have attended the first few grades of public school but dropped out some 
years ago. This is the case with 17 year old Jasmin, from a Muslim household, who was 
married when she was 15 years old but only left her parents’ home within the past year. 
She attended both mainstream and public school for a few years, in part, to improve her 
marriageability. 
Interviewer: Do they study in government school and about their own 
religion too? 
Kanija: At the time of marriage, they are asked what kind of education they 
have studied. Have they learned Islam or not? Or are they only studied 
Hindi? They could ask such kind of questions. So, I am sending my 
daughters to learn both. I can also say that my daughters are studied up to 
eight class, or up to six class or up to two class. I can say so. 
Interviewer: Will it be difficult in their marriage if she had not studied Urdu 
or Islam? 
Kanija: It might be difficult or might not be. Many people have said they 
have studied only Hindi, she does not know our Urdu, so she will not value 
us. If she studied more in Islam, then they would say that she does not know 
Hindi at all. Some people also think "she has not studied Urdu so what she 
is educated, we can live our life and go for marriage." Two of my daughters 
are married, they had studied Hindi and Urdu both, so there was no 
difficulty in their marriage. Now I have four daughters left. One is infant 
she does not go to school. And three daughters study. 
(Interview with Kanija, mother of Jasmin, female, 17, Muslim) 
 
Regardless of whether Jasmin attended mainstream school for some time, the overriding 
concern for her future appears to be to secure her marriage.  
 
Adolescents can be married before they leave school. Table 30 shows that 12% of 
married girls and 11% of married boys are attending school, although some may have 
recently left. Sanju, aged 16, was married at age 13 while still at school. Her father 
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suggests that she dropped out of school because of poverty but that he felt compelled to 
get her married to avoid pre-marital sex and to reduce his burden. Like Jasmin, Sanju 
moved to her husband’s household about a year later. 
Ram: I made her leave the study because I am a poor man. I had four 
children and I am the only one earning member in the family… It was not 
because of marriage. I was compelled to do that because of the lack of food 
and water. I had two young daughters. When she was in class five, I got 
her married. Six months later she had her half-yearly examination, she 
appeared for the examination and then I did her Gauna. 
Interviewer: …What compelled you to get her married at the very young 
age? 
Ram: In our culture in rural area, there is no guarantee of young girls. She 
can elope at any time with anyone. In this village only, there are two or 
three examples of this. When the daughters turn young parents have to 
think. That’s why I also thought that I would also be burden free. I got her 
married very well. Her nature is stubborn, so her parents-in-law beat her. 
(Interview with Ram, father of Sanju, female, 16, Dalit) 
 
The practice of Gauna means that married girls continue to live with their parents for up 
to several years before cohabiting (see Chapter 4). CTALS data shows that among girls 
who are reported as married, 29% left their parental home within the past 3 years and 
69% still live in their parental home (data not shown).103 The initial ritual secures the 
marital relationship and may reduce the (perceived) risk of pre-marital relationships. At 
the same time, cohabitation and the onset of childbearing are delayed, and like Sanju 
this allows some married girls to stay in school in the short term. In the longer term, the 
predisposition for earlier marriage limits the length of time available for education. 
Formalising the marriage through the act of Gauna means the end of schooling. CTALS 
data shows that less than 1% of married girls (1 case) who left their parental home are 
still in school. 
 
Whether marriage leads to dropping out of school or vice versa remains uncertain. Both 
conditions may be true simultaneously. Data in Table 28 (p.228) shows that 13% of 
girls who dropped-out of school did so primarily because of marriage. Comparing with 
data in Table 30 (p.243), this suggests that approximately half of married drop-outs did 
so primarily because of marriage, while half dropped out primarily for other reasons 
and were subsequently married. In many cases, several factors including poor quality 
 




schools, poverty, concern about pre-marital relationships, and social pressure, converge 
to influence decisions about school and marriage simultaneously. Underlying these 
decisions are pre-existing notions about the appropriate age to be married. Those with a 
strong preference for earlier marriage are likely to make only limited (or no) investment 
in education. However, the effect on school going adolescents may not be large. Using 
an instrumental variable approach, Jafarey, Mainalo and Montes-Roja (2015) show that 
among married women in Nepal, each additional year in age-at-marriage is associated 
with an additional 0.2-0.5 years of schooling. That the OAA increases school attendance 
for some girls while hastening the formalisation of marriage for others, shows that 
additional income has different effects depending on the existing preferences of 
households as well as other prevailing circumstances.  
 
Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has provided insights into the determinants of, and dynamics surrounding, 
decision-making about adolescent life-course circumstances. The combination of data 
from the IDIs and CTALS has corroborated and provided a more nuanced interpretation 
of the findings regarding the effects of the OAA on school attendance, work and 
marriage. 
 
The analyses suggest that most households value the benefits of education but face a 
different set of constraints depending on their level of income. Poorer households, 
approximately the bottom 40% of the income distribution, limit their ambitions in terms 
of the number of adolescents and other school-age children who attend school, the 
quality of the school, and the number of years spent in education. Typically, in poorer 
households, just one adolescent goes to the local, often poor quality, public school. 
Adolescents who are favoured tend to be those who show the most academic aptitude, 
whether girls or boys. Poorer Muslim households may send adolescents only to the 
madrassa or in some cases to both religious and mainstream school. In poorer 
households, the OAA plays an important part in supporting the costs of education. 
Because the direct costs of public school are low, it is likely that in some cases the OAA 
supports school attendance by increasing expenditure on private tuition. It takes a 
significant level of self-determination and support from the household for adolescents to 
continue to higher grades in the public school system, which is often only possible with 




Slightly better-off households, within the upper 60% of the income distribution, are 
more likely to have all children in school and to have one adolescent attend private 
school because of better quality teaching. Favouritism towards boys becomes more 
pronounced in relation to private school attendance. Households sometimes limit 
expenditure on private school by delaying entry until more critical grades and limiting 
their ambition in terms of the choice of private school. While most adolescents who 
migrate for education go outside the district, around one third of education migrants 
stay closer to home. Some Muslim adolescents attend better quality, and higher cost, 
madrassas in preference to private schooling. However, sending at least one child to the 
madrassa is sometimes an obligation more than an active choice.  
 
The OAA makes an important contribution to better off households and some explicitly 
recognise its role in supporting the costs of private school. Shifts from public into 
private school appear to be common, supporting the findings that the OAA allows 
adolescents to transfer into private school, including away from home; albeit in 
anticipation of eligibility in the case of elder males and couples. At the same time, the 
rapidly increasing costs of private school with age puts pressure on households that are 
already economically insecure, supporting the notion that anticipatory responses are 
unsustainable in the face of an unreliable OAA.  
 
Even in households that receive the OAA, many adolescents drop out of school 
prematurely and some do not attend at all. There are multiple barriers to accessing 
mainstream school including push and pull factors, many of which mean that additional 
income is unlikely to make a difference. The findings reveal a tension between intrinsic 
and external motivations for being out of school. A large proportion of survey responses 
cite lack of interest of the adolescent as the primary reason for never attending or 
dropping out of school. Alongside push and pull factors, Singh and Mukherjee (2018) 
refer to this as opting out and find it to be the most common cause for leaving school 
prematurely in their study on discontinuing education in four countries including India. 
However, most IDI respondents in this study suggest that underlying the lack of interest 
are push factors related to poor school quality, physical punishment, and harassment, 
especially of girls. Pull factors include demand for both economic and domestic labour, 
restrictions on female movement due to concerns about female-male interaction outside 
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the home, and preferences for early marriage. Muslim households also have a positive 
preference (or obligation) for religious education alongside a sense of exclusion from 
mainstream schools. As a result, a large proportion of Muslim adolescents have never 
attended a mainstream school. 
 
The findings point to an interaction between specific incidents that force school dropout 
such as violence, exam failure, or an economic shock; underlying material issues 
including poverty and poor school quality; and social and cultural norms and 
expectations around work, marriage and religion. Poverty may not always be the 
primary reason for dropping out, but it limits opportunities. Additional household 
income can and does help in some cases, but it will not overcome many of the other 
social and cultural forces that drive school dropout and especially those that mean 
adolescents never attend mainstream school.  
 
For most adolescents, some level of work is a normal and important part of everyday 
life. Adolescents who transition into full-time work prematurely may do so because of 
poverty, but this is likely exacerbated by poor quality school options. Supporting the 
findings from Chapter 5, IDI respondents suggest that the OAA prevents some 
adolescents from having to engage in paid work, including those who are already out of 
school. However, some adolescents, especially girls, are required to work full time at 
home where there is a shortage of adult female labour in the household in which 
circumstances the OAA is unlikely to make any difference. There is also evidence to 
suggest that the OAA increases economic migration by compensating the short-term 
opportunity costs. Adolescent boys who migrate for work are shown to undergo a 
period of training when wages are typically low.  
 
For both girls and boys, the transition to marriage is expected to happen soon after 
completion of schooling; but three years earlier for girls. Preferences for later marriage 
and higher levels of education occur strongly together, while being out of school is 
correlated with lower expected age at marriage. Early marriage is strongly correlated 
with being Muslim and never attending school. This may be driven by cultural 
preferences for earlier marriage combined with a lack of appropriate educational 
options. Dropping out of school prematurely for reasons other than marriage does not 
necessarily mean that marriage will follow quickly, but girls who drop out are at greater 
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risk. If the reason for dropping out is primarily economic, the OAA could delay 
marriage by supporting school attendance, but this is not supported by the results in 
Chapter 5. Conversely, the data shows that some parents or guardians prefer early 
marriage for their daughters but are financially constrained, especially when the 
adolescent girl does not have an older brother. There is evidence that these households 
take loans to pay the dowry, which may be facilitated by the OAA in some cases. 
Where there are existing preferences for early marriage, additional income will support 
it rather than mitigate it through a school effect. The traditional practice of Gauna and 
evidence that dowries may be paid at this second stage of the marriage ritual up to 
several years after the initial marriage ceremony, explains why the OAA affects 
marriage migration and not marital status.  
 
This chapter shows that the OAA is only one factor among many that can determine 
adolescents’ life-course outcomes and that often multiple conditions must converge for 
additional income to have an effect. The final chapter collates the main findings in 
relation to the research questions and considers their contribution to the wider literature, 
presents a critical review of the research process including the analytical framework, 









This study aimed to contribute new evidence and analyses on the effects of cash 
transfers on adolescent life-course circumstances in Nepal. Taking the household 
decision-making process as the starting point for the analytical framework, and applying 
integrated mixed methods, the research aimed to provide a deeper understanding of the 
pathways through which cash transfers affect adolescents and to contextualise the role 
of this cash within the numerous social, economic and cultural incentives and 
disincentives for each life-course option.  
 
This chapter summarises the main findings in relation to the research questions and then 
considers their relevance and contribution to the existing literature on the effects of cash 
transfers on children and adolescents. This is followed by a review of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the research approach and methods including their contribution to 
analytical approaches for researching social transfer programmes. The chapter 
concludes by discussing the implications of the findings for policy in Nepal and more 
broadly, and areas for further research.  
 
Summary of the findings in relation to the research questions 
The overarching research question (RQ) of this thesis asks, how does Nepal’s Old Age 
Allowance (OAA) change decision-making about adolescents’ life-course 
circumstances in multi-generational households? Through the analyses, a common 
thread has emerged: additional income provided by the OAA supports households to 
fulfil existing preferences for adolescents, depending on their gender and age, and 
circumstances. Preferences and opportunities are shaped by the socioeconomic status, 
structure, and religion of the household, the type and quality of local schools, the nature 
of local credit markets, how the OAA is implemented in practice, and gendered social 




RQ1: What are the effects of OAA income on adolescents’ education, work, and timing 
of marriage?  
The findings from Chapter 5 showed that many households take advantage of the OAA 
to support adolescent education, albeit not always succesfully, and in some cases to 
prevent adolescents from engaging in paid work. However, other households use the 
OAA to hasten transitions to adulthood by supporting boys’ economic migration and the 
formalisation of girls’ marriage.   
 
While the OAA has a modest positive impact on mainstream school attendance, this 
hides a far more complex picture, with different effects depending on the gender and 
age of the adolescent, the gender of the OAA recipient, and the type of school. The 
OAA unambiguously increases mainstream school attendance for adolescents who co-
reside with an elder woman. However, the OAA is more likely to support younger 
adolescents to remain in public school and older adolescents to transfer from public into 
private school. Boys especially are supported to access private schools that are away 
from home. At the same time, the OAA supports some Muslim boys who co-reside with 
an elder woman to attend religious school.  
 
For adolescents who co-reside with an elder man or couple, the overall effect of the 
OAA on mainstream school attendance is positive but small. However, this masks a 
larger positive effect on public school attendance, concentrated among girls, concurrent 
with a negative effect on private school attendance, concentrated among boys. A similar 
negative effect is seen for girls who co-reside with an eligible couple, especially in 
relation to education migration. It was shown that the negative effects on private 
schooling should be interpreted as an unsustained anticipatory response (discussed 
further under RQ2).  
 
The OAA also reduces the risk of both girls and boys engaging in paid work, especially 
those who co-reside with an elder man. Results were only significant for work within 
the past year and not for hours worked in the past week, which may be due to 
seasonality in work patterns. At the same time, the OAA has no measurable effect on 
unpaid work in the home. While many households want to keep adolescents in school 
and delay them entering the labour market, some use the OAA to accelerate transitions 
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to adulthood. The findings show that in households with an elder woman, the OAA 
supports older boys to migrate for work, while households with an elder man or couple 
use the OAA to hasten the formalisation of marriage of older adolescent girls.  
 
RQ2: What are the pathways through which the OAA affects adolescents’ life-course 
circumstances?  
The findings from Chapter 6 confirmed the existence of the underlying conditions 
assumed to be necessary for the OAA to affect households and individuals. The 
population is poor and (partially) credit constrained, the OAA provides a meaningful 
increase in household income, and most households share resources. At the same time, 
the analysis revealed complexities in the household economy and resource sharing 
practices, and irregularities in OAA implementation, that moderate the nature of the 
OAA’s impact on adolescents’ life-course circumstances. 
 
Evidence presented in Chapters 6 and 7 showed that the OAA primarily affects school 
attendance by allowing households to maintain, and sometimes to increase, expenditure 
on the direct costs of school and, most probably, supplemental private tuition. For some, 
the OAA smooths education expenditure through access to credit to prevent school 
drop-out. For others, the OAA increases access to larger loans to support a shift into 
private school. The findings in Chapter 6 about knowledge and take-up of the OAA and 
pre- and post-treatment differences in income, education expenditures and loans, 
provided evidence that the negative effect on private school attendance should be 
interpreted as an unsustained anticipatory response. 
 
The findings in Chapter 7 suggested that reductions in paid work are not strongly linked 
to increases in school attendance but most likely occur because the OAA allows 
households to compensate foregone income that would have been essential to their basic 
needs. At the same time, potential multiplier effects on household income and evidence 
that migrant work involves initial periods of apprenticeship with lower wages suggest 
that the increase in economic migration among older boys occurs because the OAA 
allows households to invest in better (paying) employment opportunities. 
 
Several strands of evidence suggested that the OAA increases the risk of marriage 
migration because it is used to finance dowry payments and other related expenses, 
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thereby expediting the formalisation of marriage and cohabitation. Qualitative evidence 
from Chapter 7 showed that financial constraints can delay the marriage of girls. 
Moreover, both qualitative and quantitative evidence from Chapter 6 indicated that 
loans play a part in financing the costs of marriage and that the OAA reduces credit 
constraints. In addition, preferences for and incidence of early marriage are shown to be 
more likely for girls who are already out of school and, in many cases, may never have 
been to school. In this context, a school effect on delaying marriage is unlikely to occur.  
 
RQ3: How is OAA income factored into households’ decision-making about adolescent 
life-course options? 
Findings throughout the empirical chapters showed that the OAA is just one factor 
among many that shape households’ decisions about adolescent’s life-course 
circumstance. Understanding the varied socioeconomic circumstances and local 
cultural, social, economic and institutional context explains why households respond in 
very different ways to the income transfer. 
 
At the household level, the findings from Chapters 5 and 7 showed that existing levels 
of income and adult education shape the effects of the OAA on adolescents. While most 
households across the income distribution were shown to value the benefits of 
education, poorer households often limit the number of school age children they send to 
school. The options for adolescents who do attend are more likely to be confined to a 
local public school. In these circumstances, the findings suggested the OAA is likely to 
support those adolescents with a greater aptitude for learning to transition to higher 
grade-levels in public school. However, a minority of poorer households with better 
educated adults are more likely to use the OAA to support adolescents to attend a low 
cost private school.  
 
Although adolescents in poorer households are at greater risk of engaging in paid work, 
the OAA has a larger effect on reducing paid work in better off (but still poor) 
households. Better off households are also more likely to send all school age children to 
school with at least one adolescent attending private school. In these households, the 
OAA is more likely to support adolescents who are a lower priority for educational 
investment than their siblings, especially when the household head is better educated. 
The findings showed that additional income will support girls’ education if boys’ needs 
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have been met first. The increase in the formalisation of girls’ marriage also only occurs 
among better off households, suggesting that credit constraints may be more binding 
among poorer households. 
 
Quantitative analysis from chapter 5 and qualitative evidence from Chapter 7 showed 
that household structure can affect decisions about school attendance and work 
independently of income. Effects on school attendance are concentrated in households 
with more adult labour, which may stem from higher incomes, but also because of 
lower demand for unpaid adolescent work in the home. Conversely, reductions in paid 
work are concentrated in households with less adult labour, which may be because 
adolescents are more likely to be working in the first place. The OAA is unlikely to 
make any difference to either work or education when demand for adolescent labour is 
not linked to the immediate economic needs of the household, such as when there is a 
shortage of adult female labour to undertake household chores. The increase in marriage 
migration is concentrated in households with fewer working-age adults. Qualitative 
evidence suggests that this may be due to the absence of a married older brother, whose 
income would have allowed the household to pay for the younger sisters’ dowry sooner. 
The findings also show that the OAA supports older boys to migrate for work but only 
in households with an elder woman. Migration comes with some risk and a reduction in 
income in the short term. The findings suggest that these households may have been 
more risk averse than households with an elder man prior to receiving the OAA. 
 
Turning to community level factors, the findings in Chapter 7 showed that school 
quality including teaching, discipline practices and the broader environment, plays a 
major part in shaping decisions about schooling, and consequently about work and 
marriage. Households across the income distribution have a strong preference for 
private education. For those who cannot afford private school, the local public school 
often provides a poor quality option. Private tuition is necessary for those who remain in 
public school, especially in higher grades. However, for adolescents who struggle 
academically, experience violence or harassment, or are under pressure to work or 
marry, there is little incentive to remain in school, and additional income is unlikely to 




Religious and social norms, practices and expectations have also been shown to 
determine adolescents’ life-course options. Evidence from Chapter 7 showed that many 
Muslim households have an active preference or obligation for adolescents to attend 
religious school, while simultaneously feeling excluded from mainstream schools 
(Hafiz, Prakash, and Rajbhandari 2008). The findings also showed that social pressures 
to prevent pre-marital relationships both increase the risk of earlier marriage and limit 
access to school even when lack of income is not a barrier. Girls who drop out of school 
prematurely relative to the household’s expectations may be at slightly higher risk of 
early marriage, but inherent preferences for age-at-marriage do not necessarily change. 
At the same time, adolescents most likely to marry early are also the most likely to have 
never attended mainstream school. Collectively, the evidence suggested that social and 
economic pressures for early marriage and the poor quality of, and cultural exclusion 
from, public schools reinforce each other, especially among the Muslim community. 
 
Both the design features of the OAA and how it is implemented in practice affect how 
households make use of the money and how this influences decisions about adolescents’ 
lives. The findings in Chapters 5 and 6 showed that an average transfer value equivalent 
to 9% of median household income is enough to make a meaningful difference to both 
consumption and investment depending on existing levels of income. However, 
evidence from Chapter 6 showed that infrequent and irregular distribution limits 
households’ ability to smooth consumption and to make more strategic expenditures. 
Moreover, low coverage of the OAA resulting from substantial delays in registration 
and receipt of the first transfer both diminishes the overall impact and explains why 
anticipatory responses relating to education investment are not sustained. 
 
Finally, the findings in Chapters 5 and 6 provided evidence that households are 
collective entities with different preferences, bargaining power, and economic 
opportunities. While parents are likely to be present in the majority of households and to 
take a major role in decisions about adolescents’ life-course circumstances, elders are 
also shown to have an important role in some cases. The quantitative results showed 
that the effects of the OAA differ depending on who is eligible for the OAA. The 
pattern of results for adolescents who co-reside with an elder man or couple are broadly 
similar. However, because households with an elder couple receive double OAA 
income they are able to support investment in additional (lower priority) adolescents. 
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Variations in the outcomes according to the gender of the co-resident elder are shown to 
depend on gendered differences in bargaining power and economic opportunity as much 
as on differences in preferences or interests. Households of all elder type increase 
education expenditure and adolescent access to school, the main difference being that 
households with an elder man or couple do so in anticipation of the OAA, reflecting 
gendered differences in access to credit. Differences in bargaining power suggest that 
outcomes in households with an elder woman are more likely to reflect preferences of 
the younger generation, the parents of the adolescents, which may explain why there is 
no increase in early marriage in these households.  
 
Contributions to the literature 
This section reviews the findings in relation to the existing literature. This thesis aimed 
to understand the effects of an unconditional cash transfer (UCT) on adolescent life-
course circumstances in a developing country context. Taking a broad view, the study 
contributes to the literature on household income effects on adolescent development in 
lower income countries. As discussed in Chapter 2, the literature primarily emerged out 
of the rapid growth in cash transfer programmes over the past two decades, initially 
conditional cash transfers (CCT) in Latin America and later, both UCTs and CCTs in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Many of these schemes were donor funded and incorporated 
experimental evaluation components. Other studies have made use of quasi-
experimental methods for causal inference using existing survey or administrative data. 
As such, this study contributes new empirical evidence from the less studied region of 
South Asia and of a universal scheme that was initiated and is funded by the state. 
Moreover, the literature from developing countries has largely been concerned with 
younger children or has tended to inadequately differentiate adolescent age groups 
within the spectrum of childhood. This thesis brings a specific focus to the opportunities 
and constraints of adolescents, which are very different to those of younger children and 
change throughout the transition to adulthood. 
 
The cash transfers literature is dominated by the field of economics, with most studies 
taking a positivist or post-positivist approach to the analysis – an epistemological 
perspective that has certain limitations which were discussed in relation to the analytical 
framework in Chapter 2, and are further reviewed later in this chapter. The literatures of 
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most relevance to this study fall into three sub-groups related to the main outcomes of 
interest. First, studies on the effects of cash transfers on access to school tend to assume 
that increases in attendance or enrolment are due to higher investment in the direct or 
indirect costs of education. Second, studies on cash transfers and child and adolescent 
work tend to employ a utility maximisation model, whereby household decision-makers 
decide children’s time allocation between work, leisure, and education, depending on 
the private returns to each activity. Additional income may reduce or increase 
adolescent work depending on household consumption and investment priorities. Third, 
studies on cash transfers and early marriage tend to assume that households are averse 
to early marriage and will use additional income to support their daughters’ upkeep at 
home or prolong their education. Overall, the findings in this study support the 
propositions of the family investment model whereby household income determines 
levels of investment in child well-being and development (Cooper and Stewart 2013; 
De Walque et al. 2017), but reveal that investment decisions are more diverse than is 
typically recognised in the literature, and are highly contingent on a range of other 
individual, household, cultural, social, and environmental factors. 
 
This study also contributes to the literature on household bargaining. While some 
econometric studies explicitly look at the effects of cash transfers on household 
bargaining, particularly from a gender perspective (see for example Bergolo and Galván 
2018), and other qualitative studies examine the gender dynamics of control of financial 
resources (see for example Gram et al. 2019), these intra-household relational dynamics 
are rarely (explicitly) incorporated into studies on the effects of cash transfers on 
individual household members. The findings in this study support the notion of 
collective models where expenditure and investment decisions are contingent on who 
controls income(s), their preferences, relative bargaining power, and access to economic 
opportunities (Yoong, Rabinovich, and Diepeveen 2012; Doss 2013). However, the 
findings reveal that in the case of inter-generational resource sharing, gendered 
differences in bargaining power and economic opportunity interact with inter-
generational differences in preferences and interests to produce varied outcomes. 
 
The following discussion first addresses the study’s contribution to three empirical gaps 
in understanding adolescent investment decisions that were identified in the literature 
review in Chapter 2. These relate to how additional income generates different 
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educational investment choices within the context of a heterogenous school system; 
how contextual factors mean that the same income transfer can generate both “well-
being” and “investment” responses in relation to adolescent work; and how cash 
transfers expedite early marriage as a “social investment”. The discussion then turns to 
three key areas that are central to understanding the pathways through which UCTs 
affect adolescents’ lives: the role of credit in human capital and social investments; how 
differences in bargaining power and economic opportunity, rather than differences in 
preferences, shape income effects on adolescent outcomes; and the potential for (risky) 
anticipatory responses. 
 
Three empirical gaps 
Broadening understandings of the varied effects of cash transfers on access to school(s) 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the assumption made in the literature on income effects on 
school attendance in developing countries is that households make binary choices 
between children or adolescents being in school or not (see for example the systematic 
reviews from Baird et al. 2014; Bastagli et al. 2016; Bauchet et al. 2018). Focusing on 
the binary question of school access, the effects of the OAA identified in this study are 
consistent with much of this literature, leading to moderate and sometime large 
increases in school attendance. However, far from being a homogenous entity there is 
considerable diversity in education supply in most contexts, including public, private 
and religious schools. For studies on CCTs that specifically promote school attendance, 
the focus on the binary question may be because programme rules tend to limit 
eligibility to children and adolescents in the public-school system. However, the same 
cannot be said for UCTs. A narrow view of school supply precludes any consideration 
of whether additional income facilitates access to different types of school and whether 
it allows individuals to change school type. This study shows increases in public, 
private and religious school attendance (albeit unsuccessful in some cases) and suggests 
that there is movement between public and private schools. This is not just a question 
for policy (discussed in more detail in the next section) but has implications for 
understanding the interactions between additional income, (perceptions of) school 
quality, culture, and school attendance, and the pathways through which UCTs may 




The findings show that (perceived) school quality and cultural or religious 
appropriateness shape decisions about use of additional income for education 
investments. There is some evidence of this in IEG’s (2011a) study on Pakistan’s 
Female Secondary Stipend Programme (FSSP) which finds that the CCT allows co-
resident boys to shift from public to private school at the primary level without 
changing overall enrolment rates. The authors propose that this is feasible given the cost 
of private schools relative to the transfer value, and that private schools are of better 
quality based on better student test scores. In their evaluation of Kenya’s Hunger 
Safety-net Programme (HSNP), Merttens et al. (2013) find slight improvements in 
educational achievement but not in school attendance. Although they also find no 
measurable increase in education expenditure, qualitative data suggests that some 
children of HSNP households are accepted at fee-paying schools because the school 
perceives them as more creditworthy. Notably, among the 20 studies identified in 
Bastagli et al.’s (2016) systematic review that report on overall school attendance, seven 
find no significant effects. Differentiating the analysis by school type would have 
allowed the authors to identify whether the transfer had resulted in shifts from public 
into private schools despite no overall change in attendance. 
 
Understanding the effects of a cash transfer on school choice can also provide insights 
into the pathways to higher-level educational outcomes such as attainment and cognitive 
development. However, while school quality is an important focus of education research 
in developing countries (Masino and Nino-Zarazua 2016), it is typically ignored in the 
cash transfers literature or provided only as a post analysis explanation for results that 
differ by geographic area (see for example IEG 2011a). Berhman, Parker and Todd 
(2008) provide a rare example where school quality is incorporated into the analysis and 
find that Mexico’s CCT, Oportunidades, has larger impacts on grade attainment in 
standard public schools compared to low-cost models for remote areas. The findings 
here show that the low quality of public schools including poor teaching, frequent 
absences, and the use of physical punishment, is central to shaping the effects of the 
OAA on adolescents. This raises an important area for further research, incorporating 
analysis of the effects of cash transfers on school choice into studies on the impacts on 




In addition to preferences over school type, the findings in this study show that 
heterogeneity in educational investment decisions are driven by a number of other 
factors that lead households to strategize about which adolescents to prioritise, at what 
type of school, and for how long. First, the literature on the effects of cash transfers on 
school access says little about the moderating role of other sources of household 
income. This may be because most cash transfers in developing countries are targeted to 
largely poor populations or because income or consumption data is unavailable in the 
survey data. One exception is Galiani and McEwan (2013), who find that the Honduran 
Family Allowances Program, a CCT, has larger effects on school enrolment among the 
poorest 40% of recipients. However, this study has shown that the interaction between 
the OAA, household income, and school choice can be more complex, even within a 
poor population with a relatively flat income distribution. Households with lower levels 
of income are more likely to use the cash transfer to maintain at least one adolescent in 
public school, possibly through increased access to private tuition. Households with 
higher levels of non-transfer income are more likely to use the cash transfer to shift 
adolescents into private school and to meet the needs of “second priority” adolescents.  
 
Second, the literature has paid slightly more attention to the moderating effects of adult 
levels of education. Edmonds (2006) finds that increases in adolescent schooling 
associated with male eligibility for the South African pension are larger when the elder 
is less educated. He concludes that this is because uneducated men are likely to be more 
credit constrained and underinvest more in education. DSD, SASSA and UNICEF 
(2012) find similar results and draw similar conclusions for South Africa’s child support 
grant. This study finds the opposite. The main positive effects on access to school are 
found in households where the elder has some level of education rather than none. This 
may be the result of households’ earlier investments in human capital development. 
Shrestha and Shrestha (2019) show that, in Nepal, better educated adults, especially 
mothers, invest more in their children’s education. The child development literature 
shows that children whose educational development was better supported from a young 
age will perform better at school in later childhood (Kilburn et al. 2017). As a result, 
additional investment in education at this later stage will generate larger returns. This is 
supported by qualitative evidence in this study showing that, within households, parents 




Third, when studies find that cash transfers have a small or no effect on access to 
school, the results are typically explained by the low transfer value, high baseline rates, 
or a lack of compliance in the case of CCTs. This is the case for seven of 20 studies in 
Bastagli et al.’s (2016) systematic review. The findings in this study suggest that these 
explanations are inadequate for understanding why cash transfers do not have larger 
effects on school attendance. In addition to poor quality public schools, several other 
important barriers to school attendance including shortages of adult labour within the 
home, social restrictions on female movement outside the home, harassment at school, 
and pre-existing expectations about age-at-marriage, will likely outweigh financial 
considerations. These issues affect girls to a greater extent than boys as revealed by the 
inequality in access to school. At the same time, the findings suggest that education for 
girls is not un-valued but is undervalued relative to boys. Notably, half the studies on 
cash transfers and access to school cited in Bastagli et al. (2016) do not differentiate 
analysis by gender.  
 
Turning to effect pathways, the evidence in this study broadly concurs with much of the 
literature that increases in school attendance are primarily due to increased expenditure 
on the direct costs of school, whether public, private or religious (see for example 
Edmonds 2006; Miller and Tsoka 2012; Handa, Natali, et al. 2015; Kilburn et al. 2017). 
However, a novel finding of this study is that additional income supports both 
smoothing of education expenditures over time, thus reducing the risk of dropping out, 
and increased investment to facilitate shifts into higher costs schools, depending, in part, 
on existing income and adult education levels. Moreover, most studies consider 
expenditure on education to be related to direct school costs such as fees and uniforms. 
For example, Sabates et al. (2019) use school uniforms as a proxy for education 
expenditures in their study on the effects of a UCT on schooling in Rwanda. However, 
the qualitative findings in this study suggest that the OAA may lead to better retention 
in public schools by allowing households to pay for the costs of private tuition. This is a 
common occurrence across Asia and is even obligatory at some public schools in Nepal 
(Subedi 2018; Ministry of Education 2018). Merttens et al. (2013) find similar 
qualitative evidence of Kenya’s HSNP being used to pay for private tuition and suggest 
that this may explain some of the increase in educational attainment. A higher degree of 
specificity in measuring types of education expenditure can be revealing about the 




Finally, economic theory predicts that cash transfers can also increase school attendance 
by decreasing opportunity costs. Edmonds and Schady’s (2012) study on Ecuador’s 
Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH), a de facto UCT, shows reductions in paid work 
are strongest among baseline school goers, which implies that a lower supply of child 
labour may prevent drop-out. De Carvalho Filho (2012), Handa et al. (2015), and 
Gutierrez et al. (2017), provide evidence of cash transfers that reduce children’s and 
adolescents’ paid work concurrent with increases in school attendance. However, little 
evidence is provided that the two effects are connected; they may occur in different sub-
groups of the population. In many contexts, including among the CTALS population, 
paid work is most common among children and adolescents who are already out of 
school. The findings in this study show that reductions in paid work occur in households 
that see little overall change in mainstream school attendance and qualitative evidence 
confirms that households are averse to adolescent paid labour regardless of school 
status. Reductions in paid work should not be assumed to affect school attendance. 
 
The same UCT can both reduce undesirable adolescent paid work and create economic 
opportunities 
Economic theory on cash transfers and child and adolescent work recognises that 
responses to additional income are ambiguous and depend on the type of work and 
certain contextual factors (Dammert et al. 2018). Porreca and Rosati (2018), Handa et 
al. (2015) and Edmonds and Schady (2012) find that households are averse to children’s 
involvement in paid work outside the home and reduce their participation on receipt of 
additional income, essentially investing in children’s well-being. At the same time, 
another body of literature shows that cash transfers do not disincentivise adult work in 
low-income countries (Mathers and Slater 2014). O’Brien et al. (2013), Canavire-
Bacarreza and Vásquez- Ruiz (2013) and Barrientos and Villa (2015) show that adults 
increase labour supply, and Ardington et al. (2009) show increases in economic 
migration, when cash transfers are used to invest in economic opportunities. The period 
of adolescence staddles these two circumstances. The findings in this study show that 
both “well-being” and “economic opportunity” responses can occur within the same 




The overall pattern of the effects of the OAA on adolescent work aligns with much of 
the existing literature which suggests that UCTs are more likely to affect child and 
adolescent participation in paid work than unpaid work (IEG 2011b; de Hoop and 
Rosati 2014; Bastagli et al. 2016; Dammert et al. 2018). The negative effect of the OAA 
on paid work is large and is comparable to the 41% decline in adolescent paid 
employment associated with Ecuador’s Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH), a de facto 
UCT (Edmonds and Schady 2012). Moreover, the findings in this study support the 
consensus that the main pathway is through compensating foregone income used for 
basic consumption and that this tends to affect the binary status of participation in paid 
work rather reducing hours (Edmonds and Schady 2012).  
 
However, the OAA may be insufficient to afford poorer households the possibility of 
reducing adolescent paid employment, especially where this affects younger 
adolescents. This appears contrary to studies on CCTs reviewed by de Hoop and Rosati 
(2014), that generally find larger impacts on child labour among poorer households, 
which they explain by a combination of lower school attendance and greater credit 
constraints at baseline. Edmonds and Schady (2012) find that reductions in adolescents’ 
paid work resulting from Ecuador’s BDH occurred only among the poorest 25% of the 
target population, equivalent to the poorest 9% of the national population. In contrast, 
that the OAA does not reduce paid work among poorer households may be because the 
sampled area of rural Rautahat has a particularly high rate of poverty relative to national 
and even district populations, the OAA is unconditional on school attendance, and the 
poor quality of many local public schools provide little incentive to remain in education.  
 
Turning to economic migration, the findings show that for some adolescents the OAA 
increases access to better economic opportunities away from home. Evidence on the 
effects of cash transfers on economic migration is thin, especially in relation to 
adolescents, but suggests that the nature and direction of the effects are highly 
dependent on context (Hagen-Zanker and Himmelstine 2013). Behrman, Parker, and 
Todd (2009) examine medium-term migration effects of Mexico’s CCT on adolescents. 
They find that it reduces the risk of migration among older boys (who are no longer 
beneficiaries), which the authors speculate is related to economic migration. This study 
finds that, in limited circumstances where elders are better educated, the OAA may also 
reduce economic migration. However, in contrast, the more robust findings point to an 
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increase in economic migration among older boys. Further evidence suggests that the 
decision to migrate most likely represents a positive opportunity which may even have a 
multiplier effect on household income. This has been shown to occur in several other 
studies, albeit for young adults, because of limited employment opportunities at home 
(Siaplay 2012; Priya Deshingkar, Godfrey Wood, and Béné 2013; Hagen-Zanker and 
Himmelstine 2013).  
 
These divergent findings raise questions about the particular circumstances under which 
the “well-being” response and the “economic opportunity” response occur, which the 
literature does not yet sufficiently address. In this study, decreases in paid work occur 
among both younger and older girls and boys, although effects are larger among older 
adolescents, while increases in economic migration occur only among older boys. This 
suggests that factors other than age are at play. Moreover, in both cases, effects appear 
larger where there are fewer adults in the household. The clearest distinction between 
the two effects is the gender of the recipient. Thus, the responses may relate more to 
intergenerational differences in priorities, whereby (male) elders’ interests are to have 
adolescents in the home, while parental interests are to send adolescents out to work. 
The issue of household bargaining is discussed in more detail shortly. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that more research is required to understand in what circumstances income effects 
tip the balance between investments in adolescent “well-being” by preventing their 
engagement in paid work, and investments in “opportunity” by supporting access to the 
labour market. 
 
UCTs can expedite early marriage in a dowry culture, especially where schools offer a 
poor quality or culturally inappropriate alternative 
This study appears to be the first to examine the effects of a UCT on early marriage in a 
dowry context. Most existing studies on the effects of social transfers on age-at-
marriage are for CCTs conditional on school attendance.104 CCTs provide cash income 
to help households overcome the direct costs of school, while the condition aims to 
change (short-term) behaviours by decreasing the opportunity costs of school. In 
societies where girls’ education and marriage are largely mutually exclusive, CCTs can 
 
104 Some marriage disincentive schemes pay a lumpsum incentive on reaching a certain age unmarried. 
These differ from most CCTs in that they do not provide a regular and predictable income. 
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be expected to reduce marriage rates by increasing the number of years spent in school, 
although there is some evidence that they may not always be effective, especially in a 
dowry culture (Amin et al. 2017a).  
 
UCTs, on the other hand, have only an income effect, and do not change preferences or 
incentives through compulsion. Lee-Rife et al. (2012), Handa et al. (2015) , Bastagli et 
al. (2016), Kalamar et al. (2016), and Dake et al. (2018)  propose two main pathways 
through which a UCT may affect marriage, either through a school effect or by allowing 
poor households to support the upkeep of their daughters for longer. In both cases, the 
expected outcome is a delay in marriage. However, the findings in this study show that 
the OAA allows some households to fulfil their existing preferences for earlier 
marriage, most likely by increasing access to credit to pay for the costs of dowry and 
other expenses. Moreover, effects occur only among slightly better-off households, 
suggesting that poorer households may face more binding credit constraints. This aligns 
with the findings of Bajracharya and Amin (2012) who use a panel data-set from Nepal 
to show that girls who lived in poorer households when they were 5-9 years old are 
more likely than those from richer households to have left the household for marriage 
when they reached 13-17 years old. However, girls at the highest risk of early marriage 
are in the second poorest per capita consumption quintile (nationally), and not the 
poorest.  
 
Evidence of the practices associated with marriage align with other studies that show 
societies with a traditional dowry culture tend to value earlier marriage for both social 
and economic reasons (Anderson 2007; Ghimire and Samuels 2014). The findings also 
suggest that, although girls who drop out of school prematurely relative to the 
expectations of the household are at heightened risk of early marriage, inherent 
preferences for age-at-marriage do not change. At the same time, those at most risk of 
early marriage, largely from the Muslim community, are also most likely to have never 
attended school. Thus, in contexts where early marriage is common, and especially 
where public schools are of poor quality or are considered culturally inappropriate, a 





Collectively, the findings support the existence of a social investment pathway whereby 
a UCT can facilitate marriage by covering the associated costs when preferences for 
earlier marriage already exist.105 Perhaps because of the limited empirical evidence, or a 
bias towards what works, the theoretical possibility of a social investment effect is 
largely ignored in the research literature cited above, and in policy reports (Thompson 
2012; Barrientos et al. 2013; Verma 2018). The findings in this study should prompt 
recognition that UCTs can, and indeed should be expected to, increase the risk of early 
marriage in contexts with a dowry culture.  
 
Three factors that moderate cash transfer effect pathways 
Credit markets can play an important role in mediating the effect of cash transfers on 
investment in human capital and marriage 
The findings in this study show that gendered access to credit plays an important role in 
determining the nature of the effects of additional income on adolescent schooling and 
marriage. However, existing studies on human capital or major social investments such 
as marriage pay very little attention to the role of credit, beyond the underlying 
assumption that credit constraints prevent optimal allocation of resources.  
 
The literature on cash transfers and economic productivity shows that the impacts on 
loans is mixed, at least in part, because transfer income could be used either to repay 
existing loans or to access new loans. Both the systematic review by Bastagli et al. 
(2016) and the more recent multi-country study by Daidone at al. (2019) reveal cash 
transfer programmes that result in increased access to credit or loans, reflecting a more 
risk-seeking population, and programmes that result in decreased access to credit, 
reflecting a more risk-averse population. The findings in this study suggest that the 
CTALS population is, on average, more risk-seeking but also that there is heterogeneity 
in credit-related responses to the OAA within the population depending on existing 
levels of income and gender of the recipient. 
 
 
105 While there are multiple facets to a marital union, it can be viewed as an investment from the 
perspective of the girls’ family given the benefits of securing her future, maintaining social esteem, 
creating economic alliances with another (potentially wealthier) family, and avoiding the risk of the girl 
being unmarriageable in future (Ghimire and Samuels 2014). 
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While it is recognised that cash transfers can help both smooth education expenditures 
and increase investment in education (Fisher et al. 2017) there is very limited discussion 
in the literature of the links between cash transfers, credit and educational investment. 
Some studies point to credit constraints as the underlying reason that cash transfers 
result in increases in school attendance or enrolment, but provide few insights into how 
this works in practice (see for example Edmonds 2006). A number of qualitative studies 
point to the role of cash transfers in increasing creditworthiness among beneficiaries 
due to their ability to repay more reliably, and to support households to access small, 
short-term loans for smoothing expenditures over time, including for education (DSD, 
SASSA, and UNICEF 2010; Merttens et al. 2013; Uprety 2010). The qualitative 
findings in this study reveal similar examples of use of the OAA for smoothing 
education expenditures over time, and for accessing loans to increase investment 
through access to private schools. Moreover, the quantitative findings suggest that the 
OAA increases access to larger loans for investment in better quality education, 
including to access schools away from home, and to fund the costs of marriage. While 
the data on loans is not limited to loans for education and marriage, the differences in 
loan value associated with the OAA align with those for private school attendance. 
Merttens et al. (2013) also find that the HSNP leads to an increased propensity to 
borrow but there is no concurrent increase in education expenditures.  
 
Finally, the question of gender is largely overlooked in the literature on the effects of 
UCTs on access to credit, perhaps due to availability of only household level indicators. 
However,  the findings in this study support claims in studies from Nepal and elsewhere 
that access to credit is gendered (Adhikari et al. 2014; Doss et al. 2019), with 
implications for the timing of responses to the OAA, discussed in the final sub-section. 
Overall, the findings suggest that the nature of local credit markets have important 
implications for the ways in which cash transfers impact on households and individuals 
including on adolescent education and marriage.  
 
Variation in outcomes according to the gender of the recipient may stem from 
differences in bargaining power and economic opportunity as much as from differences 
in preferences 
There are three main strands of literature that deal with intra-household bargaining: 
studies that explicitly test unitary and collective models, studies that implicitly 
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incorporate household bargaining into analysis of the determinants of resource 
allocation within the household, and experiments that examine process of decision-
making (Doss 2013). This study is most closely aligned with the second approach while 
incorporating a more explicit recognition and analysis of the role of household 
bargaining in shaping outcomes that are determined by the OAA. 
 
Overall, differences in the effects of the OAA on adolescents according to the gender of 
the eligible elder support the consensus in much of the literature that the household is a 
collective, rather than a unitary, entity (Alderman et al. 1995; Yoong, Rabinovich, and 
Diepeveen 2012). The findings also align with existing evidence from UCTs including 
Duflo (2003), Bertrand et al. (2003), Edmonds (2006), Yanez-Pagans (2008), and 
Juaraz (2010) that find differential effects on individual household members according 
to the gender of the recipient or eligible household member. However, no consistent 
pattern is identified, even among several studies that look at the same UCT, South 
Africa’s Old Age Pension (Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Miller 2003; Duflo 2003; 
Edmonds 2006). This suggests that how the gender of the recipient affects outcomes is 
context specific and may also depend on the nature of the outcome of interest.106 
 
Understanding why outcomes differ by gender of the recipient requires examination of 
three dimensions of intra-household decision making: differences in preferences and 
interests, differences in bargaining power and influence, and differences in economic 
opportunity (Yoong, Rabinovich, and Diepeveen 2012). Cash transfers, especially 
CCTs, are often given to women on the basis that they are more likely to invest in the 
well-being of the children. Agarwal (1997) argues that women in developing countries 
are just as likely to invest more in children, especially boys, due to their own self-
interest, as they will be more reliant on them in future. However, the findings from this 
study do not necessarily support gendered differences in preferences or interests. While 
boys are prioritised over girls for investment in education, this is the case for both elder 
men and elder women, the main difference being one of timing related to differences in 
economic opportunity, discussed shortly. The lack of any fundamental difference in 
preferences for education aligns with the findings of Baird et al. (2014), whose meta-
 
106 The studies on South Africa’s pension examine its effects on very different outcomes including young 
child nutrition, adolescent education, and adult labour supply. 
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analysis of the effects of cash transfers on school enrolment shows that effect sizes do 
not substantially differ according to the gender of the recipient.  
 
Adato et al. (2000), Bertrand et al. (2003), and Bergolo and Galvan (Bergolo and 
Galván 2018) provide evidence of gendered differences in bargaining power including 
that receipt of cash transfers by women can increase their bargaining power within the 
household. This study did not set out to see whether the OAA changes bargaining power 
within the household, but rather to understand how differences in bargaining power may 
affect outcomes. The findings show that uneducated elder women who are not the 
household head are most likely to have only very weak bargaining power within the 
household and little influence over decisions about adolescents’ lives. This suggests that 
at least some of the variation in outcomes according to the gender of the recipient 
reflects generational differences in preferences. This may explain why there are 
increases in adolescent marriage migration in households with an elder man but not an 
elder woman. Marriage practices and expectations are changing in Nepal, with younger 
generations marrying later and sometimes for personal reasons rather than because of 
family obligations (Ghimire and Samuels 2014). While both men and women in the 
older generation may have a stronger preference for earlier marriage than the younger 
generation, elder men with the means to contribute financially are more likely than elder 
women to influence the decision. 
 
Differences in outcomes according to the gender of the eligible elder can also depend on 
differences in economic opportunity. In his study on the effects of South Africa’s 
pension on co-resident adolescents’ schooling and work, Edmonds (2006) suggests that 
effects are only found for elder men because they are likely to be more credit 
constrained than women and thus underinvest in their grandchildren prior to becoming 
eligible. The findings in this study suggest that the opposite is true in Nepal. Men are 
less credit constrained than women (Uprety 2010) and are therefore able to leverage the 
OAA to access credit in anticipation of eligibility. In summary, the findings suggest that 
variation in outcomes according to the gender of the recipient may stem as much from 
differences in bargaining power and economic opportunity as from inherent differences 
in the preferences or interests of elders.   
 
Anticipatory responses to schemes for which eligibility is inevitable can occur 
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Finally, a limited strand of the methodological literature on causal inference and the 
empirical literature on the effects of cash transfer programmes recognises that 
anticipatory responses can occur when eligibility for benefits is known in advance or is 
inevitable, such as the age-based criteria of pensions. This represents an issue both for 
estimating impacts and for policy. Lee and Lemieux (2010, 346) point out that 
“[optimizing] behavior in anticipation of a sharp regime change may either accentuate 
or mute observed effects.” For example, schemes that provide benefits for a specific 
purpose, such as health insurance, may lead to a delay in expensive medical treatment, 
knowing that the costs will be covered soon. This would potentially accentuate the 
impact of the scheme but may be risky from a health perspective. In contrast, a UCT is 
not tied to a specific purpose and it seems likely that any anticipatory response would be 
to increase expenditure or investment and thus reduce discontinuities at the eligibility 
threshold. 
 
Some social transfer schemes in developing countries incorporated an experimental 
design into their structure for evaluation purposes either at a pilot stage or for a limited 
period during initial roll-out. Studies of these schemes suggest that measures were taken 
to minimise knowledge of future eligibility among control group households (Schady 
and Araujo 2008; Gertler, Martinez, and Rubio-Codina 2012; Handa et al. 2014). In 
most cases, anticipatory responses were not considered a major concern. However, in 
their study on the impact of Malawi’s SCTS on food security, Miller et al. (2011) note 
that households in the control group were notified two months after the start of the 
scheme that they would receive transfers in one year. Assessment of data on borrowing 
suggests that anticipation, although not widespread, may have moderately attenuated 
results. This suggests that anticipatory responses can occur even in the context of a new 
scheme where knowledge and confidence among current and future beneficiaries is 
likely to be low. 
 
Schemes such as the OAA for which eligibility is inevitable are also susceptible to 
anticipatory responses. In his study on the effects of South Africa’s pension on co-
resident adolescents’ schooling and work, Edmonds (2006) recognises that households 
may delay withdrawing adolescents from school knowing that income will increase in 
the near future. He concludes that the effects on schooling are found in households with 
elder men but not women because elder men are more likely to be liquidity constrained 
Chapter 8 
271 
due to higher mortality risk and gendered differences in access to credit and in 
behaviour. Although not stated, the implication is that anticipatory responses to the 
pension may occur in households with elder women. One study on the effects of 
Mexico’s pension on elder health specifically tests for anticipatory responses. Using a 
difference-in-difference approach Galiani, Gertler and Bando (2016) test for changes in 
household consumption and paid labour participation of co-resident younger adults 
prior to eligibility for the pension and conclude that no substantial anticipatory effects 
occur. 
 
For an anticipatory effect to occur, a household should have access to cash (liquidity) or 
credit prior to eligibility (Galiani, Gertler, and Bando 2016). Beyond this, Lee and 
Lemieux (2010, 346) suggest that it is difficult to take a generalised approach to 
analysing anticipatory effects because “…it seems that how one models expectations, 
information, and behavior in anticipation of sharp changes in regimes will be highly 
context-dependent.” The findings in this study provide rare empirical evidence that 
anticipatory effects occur in practice, and why. Interpretation of the negative effects on 
private schooling as an unsustained anticipatory response depends on a combination of 
factors including strong preferences for higher cost private schools, widespread prior 
knowledge of the OAA, the gendered nature of local credit markets, and the systematic 
unreliability of OAA implementation. This not only diminishes expected results but 
reverses them because the investments in private school are not sustained due to delays 
in registration and first receipt of the OAA.  
 
Lessons from the research approach and methods 
This section critically reviews the research approach and methods to allow further 
assessment of the strength and credibility of the findings and to provide lessons for 
future research. The section starts with an evaluation of the approach taken in the 
analytical framework, followed by discussion of the issues arising from integrating dual 
methods, and then issues specific to the quantitative and qualitative methods and data in 
turn. 
 
The analytical framework 
This study has demonstrated that an analytical framework that draws on the tenets of 
critical realism and centres on the process of decision-making about the outcomes of 
Chapter 8 
272 
interest provides for richer and more nuanced findings than is the case in most 
econometric studies that draw on a (post)positivist perspective. The critical realist 
perspective meant that attention was paid to causal processes, the role of values and 
beliefs, and diversity within the study community. This approach led to findings that 
show, while important in some cases, a cash transfer is just one consideration among 
many when decisions are made about adolescents’ life-course circumstances. Among 
other things, the more inductive analysis revealed the importance of school quality and 
related social issues, how households prioritise educational investment, and the 
interaction between financial constraints and marriage practices, in understanding the 
casual processes linking additional income to adolescent outcomes. Importantly, the 
findings highlight the many circumstances in which adolescents are unlikely to be 
affected by the cash transfer, with important implications for policy choices and 
programme design (discussed in the following section). 
 
The analytical framework built on existing evidence and theories but is not prescriptive, 
in that it does not assume any particular model of household bargaining or pathway 
through which effects occur. Rather, it set out the important areas of inquiry necessary 
to more fully understand the impacts of the cash transfer in people’s lives. Focusing on 
decision-making also required consideration of all the potential alternatives, how they 
interact, and who is involved in the decision-making process. In this study, the interest 
was in adolescent transitions to adulthood. The findings show that analysing the 
common (and often competing) set of options together has mutually beneficial 
explanatory value. A small number of other studies have taken a similar approach in this 
regard (Behrman, Parker, and Todd 2008; Bajracharya and Amin 2012) although 
possibly none that focus on UCTs specifically. It should be noted that the framework 
was developed to study second order effects and may require adaptation for analysis of 
longer term, more cumulative outcomes that result from multiple decisions over time, 
such as cognitive and physical development.  
 
Finally, the framework also recognised that while there may be a primary household 
decision-maker with regards to major expenditures and life-course options, multiple 
household members can be involved. Importantly, this includes the adolescent, and the 
findings show that gaining their perspectives was vital to understand why a cash transfer 





The approach taken in this study necessarily placed greater demands on data and 
analytical requirements, which may explain, in part, why limited attention is paid to 
these issues in the existing literature. Nevertheless, there is a burgeoning literature that 
demonstrates the feasibility of integrated mixed-methods and examples, beyond this 
study, of short-form survey modules for collecting economic data of satisfactory quality 
to allow for analysis of heterogeneity (see Chapter 3). Accounting for more complexity 
also creates challenges in organising and integrating a larger quantity of data with some 
necessary trade-offs between breadth and depth. The alternative, however, is that failing 
to account for the complexity in people’s lives can lead to blunt or erroneous 
conclusions. 
 
Application of integrated mixed-methods increased the robustness and credibility of 
both the quantitative and qualitative findings. The two methods together demonstrated 
internal consistency of the findings and provided for more accurate and nuanced 
interpretation of the results, which gives more confidence in the findings. At the same 
time, several opportunities were lost due to challenges in the sequencing and timing of 
each stage of the research process. In particular, the interruption to the survey caused by 
severe flooding meant that the quantitative analysis was not as advanced as intended by 
the time qualitative data collection took place. This had implications for the qualitative 
sampling (discussed shortly) and construction of the topic guides because not all the key 
quantitative findings were apparent before the IDIs took place. For example, it would 
have been beneficial to explore certain issues in more depth such as the use of loans and 
to interview non-eligible elders who may have been anticipating the OAA. In addition, 
it was not possible for the researchers to return to the study population to gain 
respondent and other local perspectives on interpretation of the integrated findings. 
 
Quantitative methods and data 
This study has demonstrated that surveys can be designed specifically for application of 
discontinuity approaches to casual inference. Most regression discontinuity and related 
approaches make use of secondary data, typically requiring large data sets. Studies 
using this approach have been innovative in exploiting existing data to examine income 
effects on a whole range of issues. However, analysis is limited to outcomes for which 
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variables are available in any given dataset. The CTALS has shown that this limitation 
can be overcome by collecting primary survey data on the policy issue of interest 
wherever social pension schemes exist. This may be useful to test potential outcomes 
and assumptions in advance of introducing a new social transfer scheme. Two major 
challenges were encountered during the research with implications for the estimation 
approach. First, the OAA take-up rate was overestimated which had significant 
repercussions for sample size and, consequently, time and cost. Second, the implications 
of the Widows and Single Women’s Allowance (WSWA) only became apparent after 
data collection, highlighting the need to carefully consider all other possible benefit 
changes at the age threshold for eligibility prior to data collection. These issues could 
potentially have been anticipated or investigated in more depth during the pre-survey 
reconnaissance of the research site. 
 
When researching income effects or evaluating cash transfer schemes it is important to 
consider the whole population of individuals that may be impacted. As shown in this 
and other studies, adolescents can leave the home for a range of reasons, most 
commonly, education, marriage and work. However, most research on the second order 
effects of cash transfers on children and adolescents either overlook these migration 
outcomes or may not have data available on those who left the home. In the CTALS, 
including recent out-migrants in the household roster ensured a more accurate picture of 
the true effects of the cash transfer. This has implications for how a household is 
defined and who is enumerated in surveys. 
 
Very few studies on the effects of UCTs on adolescents differentiate analysis by the 
economic status of the household. However, short-form household economic well-being 
modules can provide sufficiently robust data for this purpose. The CTALS used short-
form modules for collection of data on household income, consumption and assets. 
Analysis provided in Chapter 3 shows a high degree of correlation between the three 
composite variables. While the data are not equivalent to other national income and 
consumption data, they provide an approximate benchmark for comparison and allow 
for differential analysis within the study sample. At the same time, the analysis revealed 
some shortcomings in the data related to loans. The findings in Chapter 6 suggested that 
smaller informal loans may be underrepresented in the survey data. This may be 
because respondents considered small scale, short-term borrowing was unimportant or 
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were not aware of all loans taken by other household members. Moreover, by design, 
the loan variable was limited to loans taken in the past year. However, data on longer 
term debt may have been more appropriate to analyse and interpret the findings related 
to anticipatory effects and education. 
 
Two areas of data collection did not work as intended. Many household surveys collect 
data on the relation between each household member and the household head. This 
allows for very limited analysis of relations within the household, such as the effect of 
(grand)parental characteristics on adolescent outcomes. To overcome this, the CTALS 
attempted to collect data on the relationship between each adolescent and all other 
members of the household. However, collection of detailed data on intra-household 
relationships was challenging. Despite training and regular review of the procedures 
during data collection, reverse relationships were often recorded (e.g. daughter rather 
than mother) and the data cleaning process was unable to sufficiently rectify all cases. 
As a result, it was not possible to incorporate a more nuanced analysis of 
(grand)parental characteristics into the analysis. It was also intended to analyse school 
attendance within the reference period of the last week as well as the past year. 
However, a combination of technical difficulties and confusion between local terms for 
(school) holiday and strike or enforced closure resulted in a large number of cases with 
missing data. 
 
Qualitative methods and data 
Guided by the analytical framework, the structure of the IDI topic guides aimed to 
explore aspects of adolescents’ lives and life-course circumstances before focusing on 
the role of the household economy and the OAA. This had two major advantages that 
are apparent in the data. First, conversations generated a breadth and depth of data for 
understanding the determinants of adolescent outcomes, within which the role of the 
OAA could be situated. Second, this also meant that links between the household’s 
economic circumstances, including the OAA, and the outcomes of interest could emerge 
spontaneously, providing greater credibility to aspects of the data. For example, this was 
the case with references to the relationship between the OAA, credit, and adolescent 




The randomised approach to IDI sampling had both advantages and disadvantages. On 
the positive side, random selection of adolescents (within certain bounds) ensured some 
degree of representativeness across the survey population, avoiding unconscious 
selection bias. However, considering the major quantitative findings, analysis of the IDI 
sample suggests that a greater degree of purposive sampling could have been useful.  
For example, cases of adolescents who had shifted from public to private school, or vice 
versa, and married girls may have been proportionally represented but were very few in 
number. More purposive sampling was not done, in part, because of issues related to 
sequencing of the research process, discussed earlier.  
 
The qualitative research process was limited by two major practical issues. First, the 
translator was unable to participate in data collection (interviews) as originally planned. 
This would have had two major benefits. Although de-briefing with the RAs occurred 
daily, having a skilled translator participating in the process would have allowed the 
Principal Investigator (PI) to have more detailed insights into the content of the 
interviews to shape the approach in future interviews. In addition, the translator would 
have had a stronger foundation prior to translating the transcripts. Second, the PI was 
unable to remain in Nepal for the coding process. While a limited double-coding was 
adopted remotely, doing this collaboratively in person could have generated a higher 
degree of co-construction of meaning from the corpus. 
 
Implications for policy and further research 
The findings in this study have implications for the design of cash transfers for 
adolescents and, more broadly, for the complement of policy approaches that might be 
most effective at promoting growth and development throughout adolescence and 
improving life-course transitions. 
 
Access to quality education is central to successful transitions to adulthood and is a 
strong determinant of many developmental outcomes later in life (Banati and Lansford 
2018). The findings in this study show that there are financial barriers to education that 
increase throughout adolescence, and that a UCT can support some households to 
overcome these. However, many adolescents face other, often multiple, cultural and 
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social constraints to education for which a modest amount of additional income will 
make little difference.   
 
One of the main non-financial barriers to accessing education is the low quality of 
public schools. The findings highlight issues related to teacher absenteeism, teaching 
standards, discipline practices, and the social environment. Muslims also experience 
cultural exclusion from mainstream schools (Hafiz, Prakash, and Rajbhandari 2008). 
Poorer households have little incentive to support adolescents who struggle 
academically to remain in school. Likewise, adolescents have little incentive to stay in 
school when they experience violence or other social challenges. Households choose to 
allocate additional money towards education that achieves the best available results. 
Those that can afford to, shift adolescents into private school or pay for private tuition. 
Research shows that in Nepal, private schools substantially outperform public schools 
in examination success (A. Thapa 2015). However, Tooley and Dixon (2007) suggest 
there is little empirical evidence on low-fee private school quality globally. This points 
to the need for further research to better understand the interactions between household 
income, school choice and the use of tutoring, and educational attainment.  
 
Nevertheless, in this context, questions must be asked about the efficacy of cash 
transfers as an intervention to support access to school. Without (drastically) improving 
the quality and inclusiveness of mainstream public schools, cash transfers will have 
only limited effects on attendance. Moreover, additional income that is primarily 
directed by households towards the private sector will do little to support the public 
education system, even if this improves public school outcomes through the use of 
private tutoring. This suggests that improving the quality of public schools should be a 
priority for public policy. At the same time, cash transfers, even when conditional on 
school attendance, may be diverted towards private education of higher priority 
adolescents, typically boys rather than girls. Thus, removing school fees at secondary 
and upper secondary levels would be an important step prior to considering direct 
income support for adolescent education and would likely be more efficient.  
 
The findings also show that in the study area, most adolescents who are out of 
mainstream school have either never been to school or dropped out very early. 
Moreover, households are shown to prioritise educational investment in adolescents 
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with greater academic aptitude. This suggests the need for greater investment in non-
formal education to support (re-)enrolment into mainstream school, which could be 
linked to income support to incentivise attendance (see below). However, in the longer 
term, one of the most effective approaches to improving adolescent education outcomes 
would be early intervention to ensure a sound basis for learning throughout adolescence 
(Kilburn et al. 2017). This suggests a prioritisation of policy resources towards 
improving quality and access to early years and primary education. Without this, 
outcomes during adolescence will continue to be poor. Enrolment rates among primary 
age children are much higher because primary education is free, is moving towards 
being compulsory, and opportunity costs are lower (Ministry of Education, UNICEF, 
and UNESCO 2016). However, outcomes are poor and certain groups, such as Muslims, 
are still likely to be excluded. This suggests the need for further research on the barriers 
to achievement in early and primary years education and the extent to which economic 
support, for example through an enhanced child grant in Nepal, would impact on 
attendance and attainment.  
 
At the same time, recognising the current state of the education fabric of the country, 
cash transfers targeted to adolescents could be a useful part of the policy mix. In Nepal 
a scholarship scheme already exists but is known to be poorly implemented and largely 
ineffectual due, in part, to the very small scholarship value (Educational Resource and 
Development Centre 2011; Datt and Uhe 2019).107 However, the findings in this study 
show that even when additional income is not intended for adolescents it tends to 
become part of the overall household budget and has measurable effects on school 
attendance. It is important to note, the research site for this study was chosen because it 
has very low levels of economic and human development. School standards, levels of 
poverty, and other factors will vary across the country. Thus, the optimal balance in the 
policy mix and allocation of resources towards raising school standards and direct 
income support to households may vary. Nevertheless, a well designed and 
implemented cash transfer for the purpose of improving adolescent educational 
outcomes would likely have greater impact than both the OAA and current scholarship 
scheme. 
 
107 CTALS data shows that the mean value of scholarships received by adolescents in this study is 0.2% 




The findings point to various design features of a cash transfer for adolescent education 
that would maximise positive outcomes while guarding against socially negative 
consequences. First, a wide and inclusive view should be taken of the types of education 
that can be accessed. To encourage out-of-school adolescents (back) into school, a clear 
case can be made to include catch-up classes, madrassas that have integrated the 
mainstream curriculum, and other state-sanctioned non-formal education schemes 
(Ministry of Education, UNICEF, and UNESCO 2016). Whether fee charging unaided 
schools should be included is less clear but may be necessary where local public schools 
do not have adequate capacity or do not (yet) meet minimum quality standards. Second, 
this inclusive view of education implies that, in contrast to the current scholarship 
scheme, programme delivery should be de-coupled from the public school system. This 
would also allow educational institutions to play a more supportive role in monitoring 
and grievance systems.  
 
Third, the potential for certain socially undesirable effects of a UCT implies that 
mitigating measures are necessary. While strict, punitive conditions can be counter-
productive, application of sensitively applied ‘soft’ conditions of school attendance 
could be used as an entry point to overcome other barriers to education (UNICEF 2016). 
Thus, adolescents who do not attend an appropriate form of education for a specified 
period should not be cut-off from the programme. Instead, the transfer can help 
adolescents link to other forms of support such as alternative forms of education and 
schemes to discourage early transitions into marriage and work. However, as in most 
low-income countries, administrative capacity in Nepal is low and may be unable, in the 
short to medium term, to provide effective systems for monitoring and responding to 
adolescents’ needs. As such, there is some evidence that combining a UCT with 
messaging that promotes socially positive choices can be beneficial (Heinrich and 
Knowles 2018). 
 
Fourth, the value of the transfer must be sufficient to cover the grade-specific direct 
costs of school including fees where these are in place, possibly set to a maximum level 
for private school fees, and other out-of-pocket expenses. In addition, to further 
incentivise attendance and to see improvements in attainment, the transfer should also 
cover the costs of additional educational support such as catch-up education, private 
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tuition, especially for periods prior to critical grade-junctures, and for children with 
additional needs such as those with disabilities.  
 
Fifth, the findings show that education investment within households can be inequitable. 
This suggests that education transfers should be provided to all school-age children 
within the household. Whether this covers primary age children remains a question 
requiring further research as to whether this would improve outcomes. As in most low 
income countries, poverty targeting in Nepal is fraught with difficulty and is likely to be 
counter-productive (Mathers 2017; Kidd, Gelders, and Bailey-Athias 2017; Brown, 
Ravallion, and van de Walle 2018). Geographic targeting may offer a feasible 
alternative when resources are scarce. Sixth, lessons from the OAA in this study and 
evidence from other research in Nepal (Educational Resource and Development Centre 
2011; Drucza 2015; Hagen-Zanker and Mallett 2016) show that improvements to social 
protection management and delivery systems are required to ensure regular and timely 
transfers that reach the right people. The findings show that this is especially important 
in relation to time-sensitive payments such as school fees to prevent drop-out and avoid 
unnecessary and unsustainable debt. 
 
Improvements in school quality and appropriately designed economic support for 
adolescent education are likely to have positive effects on delaying marriage and work. 
However, the findings suggest that those most likely to be in work or to marry early are 
the hardest to support (back) into school and other targeted interventions may be 
necessary. Existing evidence on what works to delay marriage is thin but points most 
convincingly to payment of school fees or cash transfers conditional on school 
attendance (Kalamar, Lee-Rife, and Hindin 2016). Life-skills and parental education 
may also have a role although their effectiveness is variable (ibid.). This points to the 
need for more robust evidence on which approaches, beyond CCTs, are most effective 
at delaying marriage, ensuring that analyses can disentangle effect pathways for multi-
component interventions.  
 
There is more consensus on what works to reduce child and adolescent labour, which 
includes decent work for adults and legal standards and regulation in addition to social 
protection and quality education (UNICEF 2014; ILO 2017a). Social protection 
measures include not just education-related transfers, but those that help reduce risk 
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such as asset building programmes and health insurance (Dammert et al. 2018). 
However, the findings from this study show that adolescent work is most intransigent 
among the poorest, and other evidence suggests that children from the poorest 
households, and those whose father has died or who are living away from both 
biological parents are most likely to be engaged in hazardous forms of work (Kamei 
2018). Further research focused on at-risk groups would be helpful to understand which 
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Appendix 1: Cash Transfers and Adolescent Life-course Survey (CTALS) questionnaire 







  Cash transfers and adolescent life-course survey (CTALS) 
*Refer to survey questionnaire response 
options at end 
  
Household eligibility      
A06 
Confirm there is at least one household member between age 65 and 74 years (or 55 and 
64 years if Dalit) 
      If No, check again, is there anyone of that age who normally lives here but is 
temporarily away? 
      If No is confirmed, terminate interview. 
A current member of the household typically sleeps 
under the same roof (or an adjacent roof within the 
same plot) on a regular basis and does so for at least 6 








Confirm there is at least one household member between age 10 and 17 years.  
      If No, check again, is there anyone of that age who normally lives here but is 
temporarily away? 
      If No, check, is there anyone of that age who used to live here but moved away 
within the past 3 years? 
      If No is confirmed, terminate interview. 
A current member of the household typically sleeps 
under the same roof (or an adjacent roof within the 
same plot) on a regular basis and does so for at least 6 
months of the year. 






  A. Basic interview information      
A05 Select enumerator name  Select one enumerator   
A01 Select VDC name  Select one vdc_list   
A02 Select Ward number  Select one ward   
A03 Enter Tole name  Enter text    
A04 Enter household I.D. 
Write the 2 digit household I.D. number on the 




    
      
  Household questionnaire 
To be administered to the household head or the 
household member who is most knowledgeable about 
household membership, assets, livelihoods and income 




Hello. You are being invited to take part in a research study. This study is part of a research project being conducted in Rautahat by a student 
at the London School of Economics in the United Kingdom who is working with NEPAN. The study wants to understand about the lives of 
adolescents in Nepal, including about their education, work and living arrangements; and how these are affected by the circumstances of 
your household. You will not be provided with any incentive to take part in the research and there will be no direct benefit to you. However, 
your participation will help us to learn more about what can benefit the lives of young people in Nepal. The findings of the research will be 
published in the student’s thesis and a copy will be provided to relevant government Ministries and your local government office. The 
questions usually take up to 1 hour. Your name and all of the individual answers you give will be confidential. You don't have to take part in 
the survey, but we hope you will agree to answer the questions since your views are important. If I ask you any question you don't want to 
answer, just let me know and I will go on to the next question. You can also stop the interview at any time. Do you understand the statement 
and agree to be interviewed? 
Select one yes_no_only 
If no, go to 
end, A14 
  B. Household characteristics and members 
  Basic household information      
B01a What is your name? Write respondent's name Enter text    
B02 Are you the household head?   Select one yes_no_only   
B03 What is the main language of the household?  Select one language   
B03a Specify other language: If unsure type 'don't know' Enter text  
If language 
= 4 
B04 What is the name of caste of the household?   Select one caste   
B04a Specify other caste: If unsure type 'don't know' Enter text  
If caste = 
704 
B05 What is the religion of the household?  Select one religion  
B05a Specify other religion: If unsure type 'don't know' Enter text   
If religion = 
6 
  Household roster      
B06 
How many people live in this household including you and those who have left within 
the last 3 years? 
Enter current household members first - a current 
member of the household typically sleeps under the 
same roof (or an adjacent roof within the same plot) on 
a regular basis and does so for at least 6 months of the 
year. After entering all current members, probe: is 
there anyone else who lives here who you may have 
missed such as young children, non-family members, or 
those who are temporarily absent? Enter previous 
household members second:  include anyone who was 




    
  Repeat for all household members         
  
Important: enter the name of the *household head* first and the name of the 
*respondent* second. 
  Read only     
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B07 Line no.   Calculate     
B08 Enter the name of household member: 
Enter current household members first. 
After entering all current members, probe: is there 
anyone else who lives here who you may have missed 
such as young children, non-family members, or those 
who are temporarily absent? 
Enter previous  household members second -  include 
anyone who was previously a household member but 
left within the last 3 years. 
Enter text     
B09 How old is [NAME]? 
Double check the age of anyone within 2 years of 
adolescent and older person age eligibility. Enter '0' for 
new-borns less than 1 year. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
B10 What is the sex of [NAME]?   Select one sex   
B11 What is the residence status of [NAME]? 
Confirm the residence status of the household member. 
- A current member of the household typically sleeps 
under the same roof (or an adjacent roof within the 
same plot) on a regular basis and does so for at least 6 
months of the year.  
- A previous household members includes anyone who 





B11a Will [NAME] be available for interview? 
Confirm whether the adolescent will be available for 
interview either now or at a later time. If available 
later, select ‘available’ and make arrangements to 
return to the household. 
Select one availability 
If B09 = 10-
17 and B11 
= 1 
B12 How many years has [NAME] lived in the household? 
Enter '0' if less than 1 year.  If resident for whole life, 
entry should match age. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
B13 How many years ago did [NAME] leave the household? Enter '0' if less than 1 year ago. 
Enter whole 
number 
  If B11 = 2 
  
Write down the name, age and interview eligibility of the household member on the 
roster sheet. 
  Read only     
  Household member characteristics      
  
Answer the following questions on marriage, citizenship, education and migration for 
each household member. 
- Marriage questions will not appear for under 10s. 
- Education questions will not appear for under 3s. 
- Migration questions will not appear for current/usual residents. 
  Read only     
  Repeat for all household members         
B17 What is [NAME]'s marital status?   Select one marriage If B09 > 9 
B19 What is the highest grade of education completed by [NAME]?   Select one education If B09 >3 
B20 Where does [NAME] currently live?   Select one destination If B11 = 2 
B20a Select district name:   Select one district If B20 = 1 
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B20b Select country:   Select one country If B20 = 2 
B20c Specify other country:   Enter text   
If B20b = 
14 
B21 What was the main reason for [NAME] leaving the household in the first place?   Select one 
migration_ 
reason 
If B11 = 2 
B21c Specify other reason:   Enter text   If B21 = 9 
B22 Does [NAME] have a physical or mental disability?   Select one disability   
      
  C. Household assets and services         
  I am now going to ask you a few questions about your household assets.  Read only    




C09a Specify other occupancy status:  Enter text  If C09 = 5 
C01 How many rooms in this household are used for sleeping? 




   
C11 Does any member of this household own any land that can be used for agriculture?  
If yes, enter the total area of agricultural land in bigha, 
katha and dhur. If no, put '0' for all. 
Read only    
C11a Bigha Put '0' if none. 
Enter whole 
number 
   
C11b Katha Put '0' if none. 
Enter whole 
number 
   
C11c Dhur Put '0' if none. 
Enter whole 
number 
   
C11d Reconfirm total land area.  Acknowledge    
  Does your household own any of the following?  Read only    
C22a Bicycles?  Select one yes_no_dk   
C22b If yes, how many bicycles?  
Enter whole 
number 
 If C22a = 1 
C23a Cars, trucks or motorcycles?  Select one yes_no_dk   
C23b If yes, how many cars, trucks or motorcycles?  
Enter whole 
number 
 C23a = 1 
C24a Mobile phones?  Select one yes_no_dk   
C24b If yes, how many mobile phones?  
Enter whole 
number 
 C24a = 1 
C25a Generators / invertors?  Select one yes_no_dk   
C25b If yes, how many generators / invertors?  
Enter whole 
number 
 C25a = 1 
C26a Electric fans?  Select one yes_no_dk   
C26b If yes, how many electric fans?  
Enter whole 
number 
 C26a = 1 
C27a Fridges?  Select one yes_no_dk   
C27b If yes, how many fridges?  
Enter whole 
number 
 C27a = 1 
C28a Umbrellas?  Select one yes_no_dk   
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C28b If yes, how many umbrellas?  
Enter whole 
number 
 C28a = 1 
C29a Televisions?  Select one yes_no_dk   
C29b If yes, how many televisions?  
Enter whole 
number 
 C29a = 1 
C30a Radios?  Select one yes_no_dk   
C30b If yes, how many radios?  
Enter whole 
number 
 C30a = 1 
C31a Small livestock (e.g. chickens, ducks)?  Select one yes_no_dk   
C31b If yes, how many small livestock?  
Enter whole 
number 
 C31a = 1 
C32a Medium livestock (e.g. sheep, goats and pigs)?  Select one yes_no_dk   
C32b If yes, how many medium livestock?  
Enter whole 
number 
 C32a = 1 
C33a Large livestock (e.g. horses, buffaloes, cows)?  Select one yes_no_dk   
C33b If yes, how many large livestock?  
Enter whole 
number 
 C33a = 1 
C34a Hand tools (e.g. for cultivation or wood work)?  Select one yes_no_dk   
C34b If yes, how many hand tools?  
Enter whole 
number 
 C34a = 1 
C35a Animal powered tools (e.g. plough, cart)?  Select one yes_no_dk   
C35b If yes, how many animal powered tools?  
Enter whole 
number 
 C35a = 1 
C36a Petrol-powered tools or machines (e.g. tractor or harvester)?  Select one yes_no_dk   
C36b If yes, how many petrol-powered tools?  
Enter whole 
number 
 C36a = 1 
C14 
Does any member of this household have a bank account/cooperative/other savings 
account? 
 Select one yes_no   
  How long does it take you to reach the following services from your household?   Read only    
C15 Government Primary School:  Select one travel_time   
C16 Private Primary School:  Select one travel_time   
C17 Government Lower Secondary School:  Select one travel_time   
C18 Private Lower Secondary School:  Select one travel_time   
C19 Government Upper Secondary School:  Select one travel_time   
C20 Private Upper Secondary School:  Select one travel_time   
C21 VDC or Ward Office:   Select one travel_time   
  
  
    
  D. Livelihoods, income, debt and expenditure 
  
I am now going to ask you a few questions about your livelihoods, income and 
household expenditure. 
  Read only     




I now want to ask you about the three main sources of income for your household in the 
past 12 months, starting with the largest income. 
 Read only    
D01 
Which of the following activities contributed the largest amount of income to your 
household in the past 12 months? 
 Select one livelihood   
D01a Specify other livelihood:  Enter text  If D01 = 8 
D01b For how many months did your household have this income in the past 12 months? Enter number of months. 
Enter whole 
number 
 If D01 < 9 
D01c 
For the months that your household had this income, what was the average amount of 
income per month from this activity? 
You may need to help the respondent estimate the 
average monthly amount. 
Enter whole 
number 
 If D01 < 9 
D02 
Which of the following activities contributed the second largest amount of income to 
your household in the past 12 months? 
 Select one livelihood   
D02a Specify other livelihood:  Enter text  If D02 = 8 
D02b For how many months did your household have this income in the past 12 months? Enter number of months. 
Enter whole 
number 
 If D02 < 9 
D02c 
For the months that your household had this income, what was the average amount of 
income per month from this activity? 
You may need to help the respondent estimate the 
average monthly amount. 
Enter whole 
number 
 If D02 < 9 
D03 
Which of the following activities contributed the third largest amount of income to your 
household in the past 12 months? 
 Select one livelihood   
D03a Specify other livelihood:  Enter text  If D02 = 8 
D03b For how many months did your household have this income in the past 12 months? Enter number of months. 
Enter whole 
number 
 If D02 < 9 
D03c 
For the months that your household had this income, what was the average amount of 
income per month from this activity? 
You may need to help the respondent estimate the 
average monthly amount. 
Enter whole 
number 
 If D02 < 9 
D04 Second livelihood cannot be the same as main livelihood. Check previous responses  Acknowledge  
D02 = D01 
and D02 < 7 
D05 
Third livelihood cannot be the same as main or second livelihood. Check previous 
responses. 
 Acknowledge  
D01 = D03 
or D02 = 
D03 and 
D03 < 7 




D10b Enter line no. of household member who controls income: Refer to the household roster. 
Enter whole 
number 
  D10a = 2 
  Remittances and gifts      
D11 
Has the household received any remittances from migrant family members in the past 
12 months? 
If so, enter the total remittances received in the past 12 





and D03 != 
7 
D12 
Has the household received any gifts in cash or in-kind from other family members, 
friends or neighbours in the past 12 months? 




   
  Reconfirm total values of remittances and gifts.   Acknowledge     
  Government transfers         
  
I would now like you to tell me about cash and in-kind benefits received from different 
government and non-governmental programmes in the past 12 months for each member 
of the household. 
Use the criteria for each scheme to help estimate the 
amount. Note that any given individual is eligible for 
only one of the following schemes: public sector 
pension, old age allowance, single woman/widows 
Read only     
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allowance, child grant and disability allowance. If more 
than one is claimed, double check the information with 
the respondent. 
D13  
Has [NAME] received any benefits from the Public Sector Pension in the past 12 
months? 
  Select one yes_no If B09 > 55 
D13a 
Enter [NAME]'s total benefit from the Public Sector Pension in the past 12 months in 
rupees: 
Ex-government employees only. Help the respondent 
narrow down the estimate. If necessary, consider 
average income per month and calculate annual total. 
Put '0' if no income. 
Enter whole 
number 
  If D13 = 1 
D14  Has [NAME] received any benefits from the Old Age Allowance in the past 12 months?   Select one yes_no If B09 > 55 
D14a 
Enter [NAME]'s total benefits from the Old Age Allowance in the past 12 months in 
rupees: 
All castes, 70 years and above: Rs.2,000/month, 
Rs.8,000/4 months or Rs.24,000/year. Dalit 60-69 
years: Rs.1,000/month, Rs.4,000/4 months or 
Rs.12,000/year (from age 70, entitlement should revert 
to regular allowance).Put '0' if none. If Public Sector 
Pension is received by household member they should 
not be eligible for the Old Age Allowance. 
Enter whole 
number 
  If D14 = 1 
D15  
Has [NAME] received any benefits from the Single Women/Widows Allowance in the 
past 12 months? 
  Select one yes_no 
B10 = 1 and 
B17 > 3 and 
B09 > 55 or 
B17 = 6 
D15a 
Enter [NAME]'s total benefits from the Single Women/Widows Allowance in the past 
12 months in rupees: 
Female widows from any age up to 69 years: 
Rs.1,000/month, Rs.4,000/4 months or Rs.12,000/year. 
Unmarried females, 60-69 years: Rs.1,000/month, 
Rs.4,000/4 months or Rs.12,000/year. Put '0' if none. 
Note, actual amount received may differ from expected 
amounts due to timing of entry into programme, 
irregular payments and insufficient funds. 
Enter whole 
number 
  D15 = 1 
D16  Has [NAME] received any benefits from the Disability Grant in the past 12 months?   Select one yes_no B22 > 1 
D16a 
Enter [NAME]'s total benefits from the Disability Grant in the past 12 months in 
rupees:  
Full disability: Rs.2,000/month, Rs.8,000/4 months or 
Rs.24,000/year. Partial disability: Rs.600/month, 
Rs.2,400/4 months, Rs.7,200/year. Put '0' if none. 
Note, actual amount received may differ from expected 
amounts due to timing of entry into programme, 
irregular payments and insufficient funds. 
Enter whole 
number 
  D16 = 1 
D17  Has [NAME] received any benefits from the Child Grant in the past 12 months?   Select one yes_no 
B09 < 6 and 
B04 > 199 
and B04 < 
299 
D17a Enter [NAME]'s total benefits from the Child Grant in the past 12 months in rupees: 
Dalit under-fives: Rs.400/month, Rs.1,600/4 months or 
Rs.4,800/year. Put '0' if none. Note, actual amount 
received may differ from expected amounts due to 




  D17 = 1 
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D18  Has [NAME] received any benefits from Education Scholarships in the past 12 months?   Select one yes_no 
B09 < 20 
and B09 > 3  
D18a 
Enter [NAME]'s total benefits from Education Scholarships in the past 12 months in 
rupees: 




  D18 = 1 
D19 
Has [NAME] received any benefits from any Other Government Schemes in the past 12 
months? 
  Select one yes_no   
D19a 
Enter [NAME]'s total benefits from Other Government Schemes in the past 12 months 
in rupees: 
If there is more than one 'other' government scheme, 
combine the total transfer income. Put '0' if none. 
Enter whole 
number 
  D19 = 1 
D19b Specify the other government scheme(s):   Enter text   D19a > 0 
D20  
Has [NAME] received any benefits from any Non-Governmental Schemes in the past 
12 months? 
  Select one yes_no   
D20a 
Enter [NAME]'s total benefits from Non-Governmental Schemes in the past 12 months 
in rupees: 
If there is more than one non-governmental scheme, 
combine the total transfer income. Put '0' if none. 
Enter whole 
number 
  D20- = 1 




D21a Enter line no. of household member who controls income: Refer to the household roster. 
Enter whole 
number 
  D21 = 2 
  Loans and debt      
D22 
Have you or any household members applied for credit from a bank, cooperative, 
savings association and microfinance institution in the past 12 months? 
 Select one loan_status   
D22a Why?  Select one 
no_ 
loanReason 
D22 = 2 or 
3 
D22b Specify other reason:  Enter text  D22a = 6 
D23 What was the primary reason for the loan?  Select one loan_reason   
D23a Specify other reason:  Enter text  D23 = 8 
D24 Who was the primary borrower of the loan? 




   
D25 How much was the loan in total? Enter amount in rupees 
Enter whole 
number 
   
D25a Reconfirm loan value.  Acknowledge    
D26 
Have you or any household member requested/applied for credit from an informal 
money lender in the past 12 months? 
(relatives/friends, landlord/employer, local business 
/shopkeeper) 
Select one loan_status   
D236
a 
Why?  Select one 
no_ 
loanReason 
D26 = 2 or 
3 
D26b Specify other reason:  Enter text  D26a = 6 
D27  What was the primary reason for the loan?  Select one loan_reason   
D27a Specify other reason:  Enter text  D27 = 8 
D29 Who was the primary borrower of the loan? 




   
D30 How much was the loan in total? Enter amount in rupees 
Enter whole 
number 
   
D30 Reconfirm loan value.   Acknowledge     
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  Consumption / expenditure      
  I am now going to ask you about how much your household spends on certain items:  Read only    
  Expenditures per month:  Read only    
D13a How much does your household spend on GHEE AND OIL per month? Enter amount in rupees. Put '0' if nothing. 
Enter whole 
number 
   
D31b How much does your household spend on CITRUS FRUIT per month? 
Enter amount in rupees. Put '0' if nothing. 
Oranges, Lemon, Lime, Sweet orange, Pummelo, etc. 
Enter whole 
number 
   
D31c How much does your household spend on FISH AND MEAT per month? Enter amount in rupees. Put '0' if nothing. 
Enter whole 
number 
   
D31d How much does your household spend on CUMIN per month? Enter amount in rupees. Put '0' if nothing. 
Enter whole 
number 
   
D31e How much does your household spend on NEWSPAPERS AND BOOKS per month? Enter amount in rupees. Put '0' if nothing. 
Enter whole 
number 
   
D31f How much does your household spend on MEALS OUT per month?  Enter amount in rupees. Put '0' if nothing. 
Enter whole 
number 
   
D31g How much does your household spend on PERSONAL CARE per month? 
Enter amount in rupees. Put '0' if nothing.Toothpaste, 
tooth powder, toothbrush, etc.; other personal care 
items (shampoo, combs, cosmetics, etc.); dry cleaning 
and washing expenses; personal services (haircuts, 
shaving, shoeshine, etc.) 
Enter whole 
number 
   
  Expenditures per year:  Read only    
D31h  How much does your household spend on CLOTHING per year? 
Enter amount in rupees. Put '0' if nothing. 
Clothes include ready-made clothing and apparel; 
cloth, wool, yarn, and thread for making clothes and 
sweaters; footwear (shoes, slippers, sandals, etc.) 
Enter whole 
number 
   
D31i 
How much does your household spend on other people’s MARRIAGES AND BIRTHS 
per year? 
Enter amount in rupees. Put '0' if nothing. 
Enter whole 
number 
   
D31j How much does your household spend on GIFTS AND DONATIONS per year? Enter amount in rupees. Put '0' if nothing. 
Enter whole 
number 
   
D31h  Reconfirm expenditure values.   Acknowledge     
  
Resource pooling      
D32 
Apart from sharing the building itself, do members of your household typically pool 
resources, i.e. contribute their labour or income to the household and / or share common 
food and assets?  
Ask which statement best describes the situation of the 
household. 
Select one pooling   
      
  Household questionnaire closing section         
A08 Who is the respondent for the next section? 
You will stay with the same respondent if they are also 
the parent or guardian of the next adolescent in the 
household roster. 




Read out: Thank you for your time and for participating in this survey. We are now 
going to interview other members of your household. Before we do, do you have any 
questions? 
We will be coming back to interview some households again in a few months. If your 
household is selected, are you willing to be interviewed again? 
 Select one yes_no_only A08 = 2 
A08b 
Read out: We will be coming back to interview some households again in a few months. 
If your household is selected, are you willing to be interviewed again? 
 Select one yes_no_only A08 = 1 
A09 
Can you provide a mobile phone number where we can reach you in case we return 
here? 
 Select one phone 
A08 = 1 or 
A08a = 1 
A09a Name of phone owner:  Enter text  A09 = 2 
A09b Phone number: If possible, check the number by ringing once. Enter text  A09 < 3 








A13 Any other comments or observations? 
Did other people interrupt or try to participate in the 
interview? Was anyone present who may have affected 
the respondent (e.g. official, local leader, foreigner)? 
Any other reason that interview quality may be 
affected? 
Enter text     
      
  E. Parent/guardian of adolescent questionnaire B09 = 10-17 
  
To be administered to the parent of the adolescent where ever possible. An alternative 
respondent can be found if the parent is unavailable or unable to answer questions. 
  Read only     
  Repeat for all adolescents         
  Informed consent         
  Subject of interview, household member No:[], [NAME], [AGE] years.   Read only     
E01 Who is the respondent for the next section?   Select one respondent   
E02 Enter the line number of the respondent: 




  If E01 = 2 
E03 (Read out for the new respondent) See text in B01   Select one yes_no_only If E01 = 2 
E04 
After this interview, we also wish to ask some questions directly to [NAME] about their 
education, work and family life. To maintain confidentiality, we prefer to interview 
them without other people present, however you can be present if you prefer. If they 
agree to be interviewed, are you happy for us to interview them? 





  Enter the relationship of [NAME] to all other household members.   Read only     
  Repeat for all household members         
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B16 Select relation of [NAME] to [NAME]   Select one relation   






Has [NAME] spent 2 continuous months or more living away from home in the past 3 
years? 
  Select one yes_no   
E05d What was the primary reason for [NAME]'s absence at that time?   Select one 
migration_ 
reason 
E05d = 1 
E05f Specify other reason:   Enter text   E05e = 9 
E05g Where was [NAME] living during this period away?   Select one 
migration_ 
living 
E05d = 1 
  Migration       B11 = 2 
E06  
[NAME] is recorded as having left home. With whom / in which type of 
accommodation is [NAME] living now? 




E06a Specify other living arrangement:   Enter text   E06 = 6 
  Education         
  Now I would like to ask you further details about [NAME]'s education.   Read only     
E07 
Has [NAME] spent any time in school in the current year (2074/75) or in any previous 
years? 
  Select one enrolment   
E08  What was the primary reason for [NAME] never going to school?   Select one 
noschool_ 
reason 
E07 = 3 
E08a What type of school did [NAME] attend in the past?   Select one school_type   
E9 At what grade did [NAME] drop out of school?   Select one education   
E10 At what age did [NAME] drop out of school?   
Enter whole 
number 
    




E12 Is [NAME] enrolled in any other form of full or part time education?   Select one yes_no   




E14 Is [NAME] attending this institution full time or part time?   Select one full_part   
E15 At what age do you expect [NAME] to finish their full or part-time education?    
Enter whole 
number 
    
E16 What type of school is [NAME] attending?   Select one school_type   
E17 What grade level is [NAME] currently at?    Select one education   
E18 
What grade level do you expect [NAME] to complete before leaving full time 
education?  
  Select one education   
E19 At what age do you expect [NAME] to be before leaving full time education?    
Enter whole 
number 
    
E20 Who in your household normally makes major decisions about [NAME]’s education? 




    




Has anyone in this household spent any money on [NAME]’s education in the past 12 
months? 
  Select one yes_no   
  
How much has the household spent on education for [NAME] in the past 12 months for 
each of the following costs? 
  Read only     
E20a Tuition fees (including school / private tuition) Enter amount in rupees. Put '0' if nothing. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
E20b Other fees (exam admission, events etc.) Enter amount in rupees. Put '0' if nothing. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
E20c Uniform Enter amount in rupees. Put '0' if nothing. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
E20d Text book / supplies Enter amount in rupees. Put '0' if nothing. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
E20e Transportation Enter amount in rupees. Put '0' if nothing. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
E20f Others (snacks etc.) Enter amount in rupees. Put '0' if nothing. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
E20g 
Has any non-household member spent money on [NAME]'s education in the past 12 
months? 
  Select one yes_no   
E21a 
Read out: The total education expenditure for [NAME] in the past 12 months is 
Rs.[VALUE]. Does that sound correct? If not, go back and revise the expenditure 
estimates. 
If the total is not verified as correct, probe: Is it too 
high or too low? Revise previous responses as required. 
Acknowledge   E20 = 1 
  





E22 Did [NAME] attend school (or other educational institution) last week? 
If it is currently term time, refer to the last 7 days. If it 
is currently school holidays, refer to the last week of 
term. 
Select one attendance 
E07 = 1 or 
E12 = 1 
E23 
Did [NAME] miss any days of school (other educational institution) in the last week (of 
term)? 
If it is currently term time, refer to the last 7 days. If it 
is currently school holidays, refer to the last week of 
term. 
Enter number of days. Put '0' if none. 
Enter whole 
number 
  E22 < 3 
E24 What was the main reason for non-attendance?   Select one 
absence_ 
reason 
E22 = 3 or 
E23 > 0 
E25 
Thinking about [NAME]’s homework and study time outside of school hours during the 
past week (of term), which of the following is true? 
If it is currently term time, refer to the last 7 days. If it 
is currently school holidays, refer to the last week of 
term. 
Select one study_time 
E07 = 1 or 
E12 = 1 
E26 
What was the main reason for [NAME] not having enough time to study in the last 
week (of term)? 
  Select one 
Absence_ 
reason 
E25 = 2-4 
E27 
How many days in the last week (of term) was [NAME] able to spend at least some 
time studying at home/outside school hours? 
If it is currently term time, refer to the last 7 days. If it 
is currently school holidays, refer to the last week of 
term.   
Enter number of days. Put '0' if none. 
Enter whole 
number 
  E25 < 4 
E28 
How much time in total in the last week (of term) did [NAME] spend studying at 
home/outside school hours? 
If it is currently term time, refer to the last 7 days. If it 
is currently school holidays, refer to the last week of 
term.   
Enter total number of hours. Put '0' if none. 
Enter whole 
number 




Now I would like to ask you how much time in the past week [NAME] has spent doing 
various work and domestic activities. For each activity I would like to know the number 
of days and the total number of hours. 
  Read only     
E29a How many days in the past week has [NAME] spent doing **paid agricultural** work? Working for wage or payment in kind 
Enter whole 
number 
    
E29b 





  E29a > 0 
E29c Has [NAME] spent any time doing **paid agricultural** work in the past 12 months?   Select one yes_no E29a = 0 
E30a 
How many days in the past week has [NAME] spent doing **paid non-agricultural** 
work? 
Working for wage or payment in kind 
Enter whole 
number 
    
E30b 





  E30a > 0 
E30c 
Has [NAME] spent any time doing **paid-non agricultural** work in the past 12 
months? 
  Select one yes_no E30a = 0 
E31a 
How many days in the past week has [NAME] spent doing **self-employed / family 
business** work? 
Non-agricultural family/own business 
Enter whole 
number 
    
E31b 
How many hours in total in the past week has [NAME] spent doing **self-employed / 




  E31a > 0 
E31c 
Has [NAME] spent any time doing **self-employed / family business** work in the 
past 12 months? 
  Select one yes_no E31a = 0 
E32a 
How many days in the past week has [NAME] spent doing **home agricultural** 
work? 
Including any cultivation and tending livestock. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
E32b 
How many hours in total in the past week has [NAME] spent doing **home 
agricultural** work? 
Including any cultivation and tending livestock. 
Enter whole 
number 
  E32a > 0 
E32c Has [NAME] spent any time doing **home agricultural** work in the past 12 months? Including any cultivation and tending livestock. Select one yes_no E32a = 0 
E33a 
How many days in the past week has [NAME] spent doing **milling and food 




    
E33b 
How many hours in total in the past week has [NAME] spent doing **milling and food 




  E33a > 0 
E33c 
Has [NAME] spent any time doing **milling and food processing** in the past 12 
months? 
  Select one yes_no E33a = 0 
E34a 
How many days in the past week has [NAME] spent doing **handicrafts and 




    
E34b 
How many hours in total in the past week has [NAME] spent doing **handicrafts and 




  E34a > 0 
E34c Has [NAME] spent any time doing **handicrafts and tailoring** in the past 12 months?   Select one yes_no E34a = 0 
E35a 
How many days in the past week has [NAME] spent doing **construction and major 




    
E35b 
How many hours in total in the past week has [NAME] spent doing **construction and 








Has [NAME] spent any time doing **construction and major repairs** in the past 12 
months? 
  Select one yes_no E35a = 0 
E36a 





    
E36b 





  E36a > 0 
E36c Has [NAME] spent any time fetching **water and firewood/fuel**?   Select one yes_no E36a = 0 
E37a 





    
E37b 





  E37a > 0 
E37c 
Has [NAME] spent any time doing **any other economic activities** in the past 12 
months? 
  Select one yes_no E37a = 0 
E38 
Read out: The total time spent by [NAME] doing economic activity in the past week is: 
[HOURS]. This is [HOURS] per day on average. Does this sound correct?  
If not, go back and revise the individual estimates. 
  Acknowledge     
  
Now I would like to ask you how much time in the past week [NAME] has spent doing 
various domestic and care activities. For each activity I would like to know the number 
of days and the total number of hours. 
  Read only     
E39a How many days in the past week has [NAME] spent **cooking and serving food**?   
Enter whole 
number 
    
E39b 





  E39a > 0 
E40a 





    
E40b 





  E40a > 0 
E41a 





    
E41b 





  E41a > 0 
E42a How many days in the past week has [NAME] spent **shopping for the household**?   
Enter whole 
number 
    
E42b 





  E42a > 0 
E43a 





    
E43b 
How many hours in total in the past week has [NAME] spent **caring for elderly, sick 




  E43a > 0 
E44a How many days in the past week has [NAME] spent doing **child care**?   
Enter whole 
number 
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E44b How many hours in total in the past week has [NAME] spent doing **child care**?   
Enter whole 
number 
  E44a > 0 
E45a 





    
E45b 





  E45a > 0 
E46a 
Read out: The total time spent by [NAME] doing domestic and care work in the past 
week is: HOURS. This is HOURS per day on average. Does this sound correct?  
If not, go back and revise the individual estimates. 
  Acknowledge     
E47a 
*Read out:* The total time spent by [NAME] doing economic and domestic and care 
work in the past week is: [HOURS]. This is [HOURS] per day on average. Does this 
sound correct? *If not, go back and revise the individual estimates.* 
  Acknowledge     
  Marriage         
  When was [NAME]’s marriage ceremony? Enter Nepali calendar date. Read only     
E48a Select year   Select one year   
E48b Select month   Select one month   
E48c Select day   Select one day   
E51 How old is [NAME]’s husband/wife?   
Enter whole 
number 
    
E52 What is the ideal age you would like [NAME] to get married?    
Enter whole 
number 
  B17 = 0 
E53 
Who in your household will be (was) primarily responsible for decisions about 
[NAME]'s marriage? 
Refer to household roster and enter line number of 
household member. Enter '0' if no one 
Enter whole 
number 
    




E55 Do you expect to (did you) pay/receive a dowry for [NAME]’s marriage?   Select one yes_no   
E55b How much dowry do you expect to (did you) pay/receive? Enter amount in rupees 
Enter whole 
number 
  E54 = 1 
  Closing section         
E56 Who is the respondent for the next section? 
You will stay with the same respondent if they are also 
the parent or guardian of the next adolescent in the 
household roster. 
Select one respondent   
  
Thank you for your time and for participating in this survey. We are now going to 
interview other members of your household. Before we do, do you have any questions? 
  Read only   E56 > 1 








E60 Any other comments or observations? 
Did other people interrupt or try to participate in the 
interview? Was anyone present who may have affected 
the respondent (e.g. official, local leader, foreigner)? 
Any other reason that interview quality may be 
affected? 
Enter text     
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  F. Adolescent questionnaire         
  
Check household roster. Reconfirm availability of adolescent for interview. If an 
‘unavailable’ adolescent can be interviewed at a later time change the status to 
‘available’ (Section B). 
  Read only     
  Repeat for all adolescents (current household members)       
  Informed consent         
  Subject of interview, household member LINE NO.[]: [NAME], [AGE] years.   Read only     
F03 (Read out for the new respondent) See text in B01   Select one yes_no_only 
If no, go to 
next 
adolescent 
or Section G 
  Migration         
F05d 
Have you spent 2 continuous months or more living away from home in the past 3 
years? 
  Select one yes_no   
F05e What was the primary reason for your absence at that time?   Select one 
migration_ 
reason 
F05d = 1 
F05f Specify other reason:   Enter text   F05e = 9 
F05g Where were you living during this period away?   Select one 
migration_ 
living 
F05d = 1 
  Education         
  Now I would like to ask you about your education.   Read only     
F07 
Have you spent any time in school in the current year (2074/75) or in any previous 
years? 
  Select one enrolment   
  
[NAME]'s highest grade completed was previously stated as: [GRADE]. Reconfirm the 
response and change the earlier response if necessary (Section B). 
  Read only   
F07 < 3 and 
B19 = 0 
F08a What was the primary reason that you never went to school?   Select one 
noschool_ 
reason 
F07 = 3 
F08b What type of school did you attend in the past?   Select one school_type   
F09 At what grade did you drop out of school?   Select one education   
F10 At what age did you drop out of school?   
Enter whole 
number 
    




F12 Are you enrolled in any other form of full or part time education?   Select one yes_no   
F13 What type of educational institution are you attending?    Select one 
other_ 
education 
F12 = 1 
F14 Are you attending this institution full time or part time?   Select one full_part   
F15 At what age do you expect to finish their full or part-time education?    
Enter whole 
number 
    
F16 What type of school are you attending?   Select one school_type   
F17 What grade level are you currently at?    Select one education   
F18 What grade level do you expect to complete before leaving full time education?    Select one education   
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F19 What age do you expect to be before leaving full time education?    
Enter whole 
number 
    
F20 Who in your household normally makes major decisions about your education? 




    
F21 Do you have a say in decisions about your own education?   Select one edu_decision   
  Time allocation         
F22 Did you attend school (or other educational institution) last week? 
If it is currently term time, refer to the last 7 days. If it 
is currently school holidays, refer to the last week of 
term. 
Select one attendance 
F07 = 1 or 
F12 = 1 
F23 
Did you miss any days of school (other educational institution) in the last week (of 
term)? 
If it is currently term time, refer to the last 7 days. If it 
is currently school holidays, refer to the last week of 
term.Enter number of days. Put '0' if none. 
Enter whole 
number 
  F22 < 3 
F24 What was the main reason for non-attendance?   Select one 
absence_ 
reason 
F22 = 3 or 
F23 > 0 
F25 
Thinking about your homework and study time outside of school hours during the last 
week (of term), which of the following is true? 
If it is currently term time, refer to the last 7 days. If it 
is currently school holidays, refer to the last week of 
term. 
Select one study_time 
F07 = 1 or 
F12 = 1 
F26 
What was the main reason for not having enough time to study in the last week (of 
term)? 
  Select one 
absence_ 
reason 
F25 = 2-4 
F27 
How many days in the last week (of term) were you able to spend at least some time 
studying at home/outside school hours? 
If it is currently term time, refer to the last 7 days. If it 
is currently school holidays, refer to the last week of 
term.   
Enter number of days. Put '0' if none. 
Enter whole 
number 
  F25 < 4 
F28 
How much time in total in the last week (of term) did you spend studying at 
home/outside school hours? 
If it is currently term time, refer to the last 7 days. If it 
is currently school holidays, refer to the last week of 
term.   
Enter total number of hours. Put '0' if none. 
Enter whole 
number 
  F27 > 0 
  
Now I would like to ask you how much time in the past week you have spent doing 
various work and domestic activities. For each activity I would like to know the number 
of days and the total number of hours. 
  Read only     
F29a How many days in the past week have you spent doing **paid agricultural** work? Working for wage or payment in kind 
Enter whole 
number 
    
F29b 





  F29a > 0 
F29c Have you spent any time doing **paid agricultural** work in the past 12 months?   Select one yes_no F29a = 0 
F30a 
How many days in the past week have you spent doing **paid non-agricultural** 
work? 
Working for wage or payment in kind 
Enter whole 
number 
    
F30b 





  F30a > 0 
F30c Have you spent any time doing **paid-non agricultural** work in the past 12 months?   Select one yes_no F30a = 0 
F31a 
How many days in the past week have you spent doing non-agricultural **self-
employed / family business** work? 
Non-agricultural family/own business 
Enter whole 
number 
    
F31b 
How many hours in total in the past week have you spent doing **self-employed / 
family business** work? 
Non-agricultural family/own business 
Enter whole 
number 




Have you spent any time doing **self-employed / family business** work in the past 12 
months? 
Non-agricultural family/own business Select one yes_no F31a = 0 
F32a How many days in the past week have you spent doing **home agricultural** work? Including any cultivation and tending livestock 
Enter whole 
number 
    
F32b 
How many hours in total in the past week have you spent doing **home agricultural** 
work? 
Including any cultivation and tending livestock 
Enter whole 
number 
  F32a > 0 
F32c Have you spent any time doing **home agricultural** work in the past 12 months? Including any cultivation and tending livestock Select one yes_no F32a = 0 
F33a 
How many days in the past week have you spent doing **milling and food 




    
F33b 
How many hours in total in the past week have you spent doing **milling and food 




  F33a > 0 
F33c Have you spent any time doing **milling and food processing** in the past 12 months?   Select one yes_no F33a = 0 
F34a 





    
F34b 
How many hours in total in the past week have you spent doing **handicrafts and 




  F34a > 0 
F34c Have you spent any time doing **handicrafts and tailoring** in the past 12 months?   Select one yes_no F34a = 0 
F35a 
How many days in the past week have you spent doing **construction and major 




    
F35b 
How many hours in total in the past week have you spent doing **construction and 




  F35a > 0 
F35c 
Have you spent any time doing **construction and major repairs** in the past 12 
months? 
  Select one yes_no F35a = 0 
F36a How many days in the past week have you spent fetching **water and firewood/fuel**?   
Enter whole 
number 
    
F36b 





  F36a > 0 
F36c Have you spent any time fetching **water and firewood/fuel**?   Select one yes_no F36a = 0 
F37a 





    
F37b 





  F37a > 0 
F37c 
Have you spent any time doing **any other economic activities** in the past 12 
months? 
  Select one yes_no F37a = 0 
F38 
Read out: The total time spent doing economic activity in the past week is: [HOURS]. 
This is [HOURS] per day on average. Does this sound correct?  
If not, go back and revise the individual estimates. 
  Acknowledge     
  
Now I would like to ask you how much time in the past week you have spent doing 
various domestic and care activities. For each activity I would like to know the number 
of days and the total number of hours. 
  Read only     
F39a How many days in the past week have you spent **cooking and serving food**?   
Enter whole 
number 









  F39a > 0 
F40a How many days in the past week have you spent **cleaning and tidying the house**?   
Enter whole 
number 
    
F40b 





  F40a > 0 
F41a How many days in the past week have you spent doing **minor household repairs**?   
Enter whole 
number 
    
F41b 





  F41a > 0 
F42a How many days in the past week have you spent **shopping for the household**?   
Enter whole 
number 
    
F42b 





  F42a > 0 
F43a 





    
F43b 





  F43a > 0 
F44a How many days in the past week have you spent doing **child care**?   
Enter whole 
number 
    
F44b How many hours in total in the past week have you spent doing **child care**?   
Enter whole 
number 
  F44a > 0 
F45a 





    
F45b 





  F45a > 0 
F46 
Read out: The total time spent doing domestic and care work in the past week is: 
[HOURS]. This is [HOURS] per day on average. Does this sound correct?  
If not, go back and revise the individual estimates. 
  Acknowledge     
F47 
Read out: The total time spent doing economic and domestic and care work in the past 
week is: [HOURS]. This is [HOURS] per day on average. Does this sound correct?  
If not, go back and revise the individual estimates. 
  Acknowledge     
  Marriage         
  When was your marriage ceremony? Enter Nepali calendar date. Read only     
F48a Select year   Select one year   
F48b Select month   Select one month   
F48c Select day   Select one day   
F51 How old is your husband/wife?   
Enter whole 
number 
    
F52 What is the ideal age you would like to get married?    
Enter whole 
number 
  B17 = 7 
F53 
Who in your household will be (was) primarily responsible for decisions about your 
marriage? 
Refer to household roster and enter line number of 
household member. Enter '0' if no one 
Enter whole 
number 
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  Closing section         
  
Thank you for your time and for participating in this survey. We are now going to 
interview other members of your household. Before we do, do you have any questions? 
  Read only     








F60 Any other comments or observations? 
Did other people interrupt or try to participate in the 
interview? Was anyone present who may have affected 
the respondent (e.g. official, local leader, foreigner)? 
Any other reason that interview quality may be 
affected? 
Enter text     
   
    
  G. Older person questionnaire         
  
To be administered to the older person where ever possible. An alternative respondent 
can be found if the older person is unavailable or unable to answer questions. 
  Read only     
  Repeat for all older persons         
  Subject of interview, household member LINE NO.[]: [NAME], [AGE] years.   Read only     
  Informed consent         
G01 Is the subject of the interview the respondent?   Select one yes_no_only   
G01a Enter the line number of the respondent: 




  G01 = 2 
G02  Has the respondent been interviewed for an earlier module?   Select one yes_no_only   
G03 (Read out for the new respondent) See text in B01   Select one yes_no_only 
G02 = 2 
If no, repeat 
for next 
older person 
or go to end. 
  Repeat for all adolescents       B09 = 10-17 
  Role in adolescents' life         
G04 
I am now going to ask you a few questions about [NAME]. Considering [NAME]'s 
education, marriage, work and other important things, would you say that you have a 
role in major decisions about their life? 





In the past one **month**, have you spent any of your own money on [NAME] for the 
following items? 
  Read only     
G05a Meals, at home or outside Enter the amount in rupees or put '0' if none. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
G05b Snacks, sweets and drinks Enter the amount in rupees or put '0' if none. 
Enter whole 
number 
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G05c Health care and medicine Enter the amount in rupees or put '0' if none. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
G05d Clothes Enter the amount in rupees or put '0' if none. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
G05e Other personal items (e.g. jewellery, cosmetics, electronics) Enter the amount in rupees or put '0' if none. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
  
In the past one **year**, have you spent any of your own money on [NAME] for the 
following items? 
  Read only     
G06a School fees (including entrance, exam and tuition) Enter the amount in rupees or put '0' if none. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
G06b Other school items (e.g. books, uniform, stationery, transport) Enter the amount in rupees or put '0' if none. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
G06c Job seeking (e.g. transport, accommodation) Enter the amount in rupees or put '0' if none. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
G06d Marriage and related costs (e.g. ceremonies, dowry, clothes) Enter the amount in rupees or put '0' if none. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
G06e  Any other major expenditure items Enter the amount in rupees or put '0' if none. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
G06f Specify other major expenditure item(s)   Enter text   G06e > 0 
  Old Age Allowance         
G07 Have you heard about the government Old Age Allowance?   Select one yes_no_only   
G08 To your knowledge, at what age are you eligible for the Old Age Allowance? 
Actual eligibility is different for Dalits and non-Dalits. 
If necessary, specify for the caste of the household. Put 
'0' if not known 
Enter whole 
number 
    
G09 Do you know how much the benefit level is for the Old age Allowance?  
If the answer is monthly, convert to a 4-monthly 
amount. Put '0' if not known. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
G10 Have you applied/registered for the Old Age Allowance?   Select one yes_no_only   
G11  Why not?   Select one not_applied G10 = 2 
G11a  Specify other reason:   Enter text   G11 = 7 
  When did you apply/register for the Old Age Allowance?   Read only     
G12a Select year   Select one year   
G12b Select month   Select one month   
G13 Have you ever received any Old Age Allowance payments since registering?   Select one yes_no_only   
G14  Why have you not received any Old Age Allowance payments?   Select one not_received G13 = 2 
G14a Specify reason for not receiving Old Age Allowance:   Enter text   G14 = 8 
G15 
How long after applying/registering did you receive the first Old Age Allowance 
payment? 




G16  Do you know how often you should receive the Old Age Allowance?   Select one frequency   
G16a Specify other frequency:   Enter text   G16 = 6 
G17 
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G18 How much did you receive for the last payment?  Enter amount in rupees. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
G19 How much have you received in total in the past 12 months?  Enter amount in rupees. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
G20 Who generally collects the payment?   Select one collection   
G20a Enter line no. of household member: 




  G20 = 2 
G20b Specify other person:   Enter text   G20 = 4 
G20c Where do you (or other person) usually collect the Old Age Allowance payment?   Select one pay_location   
G21 How long does it take you (or other person) to collect the payment and return home?   Select one travel_time   
G22 How much does it cost you to pick up the payment each time (e.g. for transport costs)? Enter amount in rupees. Put '0' if nothing. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
G23  In general, are you alone able to decide how to spend the Old Age Allowance?   Select one yes_no   
G23a Who else in the household usually decides how to use the money? 




  G23 = 2 
  
Considering the last payment you received, how much did you spend on the following 
items/uses? 
  Read only     
G24a Own food items Enter amount in rupees. Put '0' if nothing. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
G24b Food items for household Enter amount in rupees. Put '0' if nothing. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
G24c Own health care Enter amount in rupees. Put '0' if nothing. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
G24d Health care for other household members Enter amount in rupees. Put '0' if nothing. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
G24e Own clothes Enter amount in rupees. Put '0' if nothing. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
G24f Clothes for other household members Enter amount in rupees. Put '0' if nothing. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
G24g Own other personal items Enter amount in rupees. Put '0' if nothing. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
G24h Other personal for other household members Enter amount in rupees. Put '0' if nothing. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
G24i Children’s education Enter amount in rupees. Put '0' if nothing. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
G24j Investment / productive activities Enter amount in rupees. Put '0' if nothing. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
G24k Savings account / cooperative Enter amount in rupees. Put '0' if nothing. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
G24l Loan repayment Enter amount in rupees. Put '0' if nothing. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
G24m Wedding costs Enter amount in rupees. Put '0' if nothing. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
G24n Other social or religious events / ceremonies Enter amount in rupees. Put '0' if nothing. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
G24o Other Enter amount in rupees. Put '0' if nothing. 
Enter whole 
number 
    
G26 
The total amount of the last Old Age Allowance payment used is Rs. [VALUE]. The 
total amount received was Rs. [VALUE]. Total used should not be more than total 
  Acknowledge   G13 = 1 
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received. Any balance amount should be kept as cash. Check and adjust the amounts if 
necessary. 
G27 
In the past 12 months, have you accessed a loan of any sort using the Old Age 
Allowance as collateral? 
  Select one yes_no G13 = 1 
  Closing section     
  
Thank you for your time and for participating in this survey. Do you have any 
questions? 
  Read only     








G32 Any other comments or observations? 
Did other people interrupt or try to participate in the 
interview? Was anyone present who may have affected 
the respondent (e.g. official, local leader, foreigner)? 
Any other reason that interview quality may be 
affected? 
Enter text     
      
A14 Household refused to cooperate.   Acknowledge     







Response group and 
option 
 vdc 
01 Akolawa  
02 Auraiya  
03 Badharwa  
04 Bairiya  
05 Banjaraha  
06 Basantapatti  
07 Basatpur  
08 Bhalohiya(Pipra) 
09 Bhediyahi  
10 Brahmapuri  
11 Dumriya(Paroha) 
12 Fatuha Maheshpur 
13 Gangapipara  
14 Hajminiya  
15 Jatahara  
16 Jethrahiya  
17 Jhunkhunwa  
18 Jowaha(Jokaha)  
19 Laxmipur (Do.) 
20 Lokaha  
21 Mathiya  
22 Matsari  
23 Mudwalawa  
24 Narkatiya Guthi 
25 Pacharukhi 
26 Rajdevi 
27 Rajpur Farhadawa 
28 Rajpur Tulsi  














01 Ambika Chaudhary 
02 Anita Dev 
03 Basant Mallik 
04 Dinesh Chaudhary 
05 Jayanti Kumari Sah 
06 Lata Gajurel 
07 Pramila Sharma 
08 Pratipata Sharma 
09 Mahesh Dev 
10 Sirjana Chaudhary 











98 (don't know) 





04 Other language 
 caste 
100 Chhetri 
101 Brahman (Hill) 
102 Thakuri 
103 Sanyasi 


































































































704 Other caste 
 religion 
01 Hindu 


















Available for interview 
(either now or later) 











































55 Other relative 
60 Not-related 
98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 marriage 
01 Married, single 





07 Never married 
98 (don't know) 







06 Other nationality 
98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 education 
00 No education 
01 Preschool/kindergarten 
02 Class 1 
03 Class 2 
04 Class 3 
05 Class 4 
06 Class 5 
07 Class 6 
08 Class 7 
09 Class 8 
10 Class 9 
11 Class 10 
12 SLC 
13 Intermediate / +2 level 
14 Bachelor 
15 Master or higher 
98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 destination 
01 Another part of Nepal 
02 Another country 
98 (don't know) 













































































98 (don't know) 












11 Saudi Arabia 
12 South Korea 
13 United Kingdom 
14 Other country 
98 (don't know) 




03 Looking for work 
04 
Visiting family / friends / 
holiday 
05 Follow family 
06 Family disagreement 
07 Marriage 
08 Natural disaster 
09 Other reason 
98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 disability 
01 None 
02 Physical disability 
03 Mental disability 
98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 floor 
11 (Natural) Earth 
12 (Natural) Sand 
13 (Natural) Dung 





(Rudimentary) Palm / 
Bamboo 
23 Other rudimentary floor 
31 
(Finished) Parquet or 
Polished Wood 
32 
(Finished) Vinyl or 
Asphalt Strips 
33 (Finished) Ceramic Tiles 
34 (Finished) Cement 
35 (Finished) Carpet 
36 (Finished) Linoleum 
37 Other finished floor 
 roof 
11 (Natural) Roofing 
12 (Natural) Thatch 
13 (Natural) Palm Leaf 
14 (Natural) Sod 
15 Other natural roof 




23 Other rudimentary roof 
31 (Finished) Metal / Tin 
32 (Finished) Wood 
33 
(Finished) Calamine / 
Cement Fibre 
34 (Finished) Ceramic Tiles 




37 Other finished roof 
 wall 
11 (Natural) No Walls 
12 
(Natural) Cane / Palm / 
Trunks 
13 (Natural) Dirt 







(Rudimentary) Stone with 
mud 
23 (Rudimentary) Plywood 




26 Other rudimentary wall 
31 (Finished) Cement 
32 
(Finished) Stone with 
lime / Cement 
33 (Finished) Bricks 
34 (Finished) Cement Blocks 
35 
(Finished) Wood Planks / 
Shingles 




Liquefied Petroleum Gas 
(Lpg) 
13 Natural Gas 
14 Biogas 
15 Kerosene 
21 Coal / Lignite 
22 Charcoal 
23 Wood 
24 Straw / Shrubs / Grass 





No food cooked in 
household 
41 Other fuel 
98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 cooking 
01 
In a separate room used as 
kitchen 
02 Elsewhere in the house 
03 In a separate building 
04 Outdoors 
05 Other place 
98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 house_ownership 
01 Own, with land deeds 
02 Own, without land deeds 
03 Rented 
04 Squatting 
05 Other occupancy status 
98 (don't know) 





02 Own business 
03 Trading or selling goods 
04 Work for private sector 
05 Public/government sector 
06 Paid housework 
07 Remittances 
08 Other, specify 
09 None 
98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 income_control 
01 Person who earned it 
02 
A particular household 
member (specify) 
04 Joint household decision 
05 It depends what for 
98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 transfer_control 
01 The recipient 
02 
A particular household 
member (specify) 
04 Joint household decision 
05 It depends what for 
98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 loan_status 
01 Yes, received it 
02 Yes, but was rejected 
03 No 
98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 no_loanReason 
01 Did not need it 
02 Did not have collateral 
03 Facility not available 
04 I don’t know how to do it 
05 Because of my caste 
06 Other reason 
98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 loan_reason 
01 






To meet expenditure on 
marriage, birth, death 
04 
To purchase agricultural 
inputs (seeds, fertilizers 
etc.) 
05 To buy domestic animals 
06 
To purchase household 
durables 
07 To buy land 
08 Other reason 
98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 pooling 
01 
Yes, all members 




No, only some members 




No, all adult members of 
the household live 
economically 
independently 
98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 separate 
01 
Together with main 
household 
02 
Separately from main 
household 
98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 statement 
01 Household module review 





02 Alternative phone number 
03 No phone number 
 respondent_response 
01 
Fully interested and 
attentive during entire 
interview 
02 
Interested during most of 
interview 
03 Interested only partially 
04 
Not interested and 
difficult to get sensible 
answers 
 response_veracity 
01 Very confident 
02 
Doubts with some 
responses 
03 




Agrees for adolescent to 
be interviewed in private  
02 
Agrees for adolescent to 
be interviewed in their 
presence 
03 
Does not agree for 
adolescent to be 
interviewed but agrees for 
self to be interviewed 
 enrollment 
01 Enrolled, current year 
02 Previously enrolled  
03 Never went to school 
98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 migration_living 
01 With relatives 
02 With friends of the family 
03 
Husband or partner’s 
household 
04 
Own or shared private 
accommodation 
05 School boarding 
06 Other living arrangement 
98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 noschool_reason 
01 Too expensive 
02 Too far 
03 Poor quality school 
04 Illness / disability 
05 Needed to help at home 
06 Denied admission 
07 
Poor grades / failed 
exams 
08 Lack of interest 
09 To get married 
10 Other reason 
98 (don't know) 




04 Other type 
98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 other_education 
01 Religious school 
02 Apprenticeship 
03 Vocational training centre 
04 Other type 
98 (don't know) 




98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 edu_decision 
01 
Always involved in the 
discussion and decisions 
making 
02 
Sometimes involved in 





Sometimes involved in 
the discussion but not the 
final decision 
04 Not involved at all 
98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 travel_time 
01 Less than 1 hour 
02 1-2 hours 
03 3-4 hours 
04 One day 
05 Two days 
06 More than 2 days 
98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 attendance 
01 Yes, last week 
02 Yes, last week of term 
03 No 
98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 absence_reason 
01 At home but sick 
02 
At home but experiencing 
menstruation 
03 
At home but working for 
pay 
04 
Working for the family 
farm/business 
05 
Doing household work 
(chores) or child care 
06 Family crisis 
07 Lack of interest 
08 




Away from home for 
other education 
11 
Away from home for 
employment 
12 
Away from home to look 
for work 
13 
Visiting family / friends / 
holiday 
14 Other reason 
98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 study_time 
01 
They had enough time to 
study 
02 
They didn’t have quite 
enough time to study as 
much as they wanted 
03 
They hardly had any time 
to study 
04 
They didn’t have any time 
to study 
98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 marital_decision 
01 
Fully involved in the 
discussion and decisions 
making 
02 
Somewhat involved in the 
discussion and decisions 
03 
Somewhat involved in the 
discussion but not the 
final decision 
04 Not involved at all 
05 No discussion 
98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 exp_items 
01 Food for meals 
02 Snacks / drinks 
03 Health care 
04 Clothes 
05 School / educational items 
06 School fees 
07 Other personal items 
98 (don't know) 














98 (don't know) 














98 (don't know) 


































98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 oldado_decision 
01 
Yes, I make most major 
decisions 
02 
Yes, I have a significant 
say 
03 Yes, I have some say 
04 No, I have very little say 
05 No, I don’t have any say 
98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 not_applied 
01 Not old enough 
02 Not eligible 
03 
Do not have right 
documents 
04 Transport cost is too high 
05 
VDC/Ward office is too 
far (not enough time) 
06 Do not need the money 
07 Other reason 
98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 first_payment 
01 Straight away 
02 1-3 months later 
03 4-6 months later 
04 7-12 months later 
05 More than one year 
06 Still not receiving it 
98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 not_received 
01 
I was told I am not 
eligible 
02 
Did not have right 
documents 
03 
I didn’t complete the 
registration 
04 
I didn’t have time to 
collect it 
05 
The VDC/Ward office is 
too far 
06 I’m too poor 
07 
I don’t know the right 
people 
08 Other reason 
98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 frequency 
01 Monthly 
02 Every three months 
03 Every four months 
04 Every six months 
05 Yearly 
06 Other frequency 
98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 pay_location 
01 VDC/Ward office 
02 
In my village (not 
VDC/Ward office) 
03 Bank 
04 Other place 
98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 collection 
01 Self 
02 Other household member 
03 Friend or neighbour 
04 Other person 
98 (don't know) 
99 (refused to answer) 
 respondent 
01 Same respondent 
02 New respondent 
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Appendix 2: Terms of reference - Survey team co-supervisor 
 
Background 
A PhD candidate from the London School of Economics is undertaking a household 
survey in Nepal as part of the primary data collection for a thesis entitles ‘Poverty, cash 
transfers and adolescents’ lives: understanding the unintended consequences of Nepal’s 
social pension’. The survey will interview multiple members of up to 1,500 households 
in a sub-region of Rautahat district in the central Terai. The survey aims to understand 
the links between additional cash entering a multi-generational household and the 
choices that parents and other household members make in relation to the life-course 
circumstances of adolescents, specifically in relation to their circumstances and 
transitions between education, work, marriage and migration.  
 
General responsibilities 
The consultant Co-supervisor is responsible for supporting the Principle Investigator in 
planning and executing the survey including preparatory work such as planning 
logistics, translation and training; gaining access to selected communities and managing 
the sampling process; and oversight of the survey team in the field and delivery of the 




• Support the PI for survey planning and identification of opportunities and risks 
• Translate the survey questionnaire into Nepali 
• Participate in a pre-survey trip to the field site with the PI to meet relevant district 
and local officials to ensure access to communities and to identify accommodation 
and transport options. 
• Participate in the survey team training with specific responsibility for translation 
(English-Nepali), reviewing survey tools, ensuring enumerators understand and 
deliver the questionnaire to a high standard, planning and participating in the pilot in 
a nearby local community, and support to logistics planning. 
Survey: 
• Negotiate access to communities with appropriate officials at district and VDC level 
as well as informal local leaders. 
• Support sampling and planning daily work schedule for the team. 
• Ensure quality of enumeration among the team members through regular 
supervision, spot checks of live interviews, and review meetings. 
• Identify appropriate and cost effective local transport options for the survey team to 
reach selected VDCs. 
• Identify appropriate local accommodation for the whole team in Gaur and other 




• Assess any potential risks to the project and the health and safety of the team and 
help maintain team morale. 
Post-survey: 
• Participate in a post-survey debriefing (half day) which may be held in Gaur or 
Kathmandu. 
Timetable 
• Pre-survey planning (ad-hoc meetings with PI) and questionnaire translation: as 
required between, 26 June - 16 July 
• Pre-survey trip: 5-8 July 
• Survey team training: 17-21 July 
• Survey: 24 July - 3 September 
Working conditions 
• The work will take place in Kathmandu and Rautahat district.  
• Meetings in Kathmandu will take place in any reasonable central location.  
• The Co-supervisor is responsible for organising their own accommodation and 
subsistence while in the field for which a fixed per diem will be provided. Local 
accommodation may require use of informal lodgings in remote communities. 
• The Co-supervisor is expected to remain in the field location for the majority of the 
duration of the survey, barring any personal emergency circumstances. 
• Transportation from Kathmandu to and at the field site will use standard local 
methods including bus, motorbike and other means where necessary.  
Consultant fees 
• Daily rate: The consultant will be paid NRs. 2,500 per day for work undertaken. A 
working day is equivalent to minimum 8 hours for contributory work in Kathmandu 
(e.g. translation, meetings, training etc.). Working hours in the field may on 
occasion be up to 12 hours including travel time in any given day. Working days 
include travel days from/to Kathmandu. 
• Bonus: A 5% bonus will be paid if certain quality standards are met (outlined 
below). For every half step increase from the expected overall teamwork rate of 4 
questionnaires per person per day on average, an additional 5% bonus will be 
provided, as long as quality standards are also met. 
Other benefits and conditions 
• Per diem: NRs. 1,500 will be paid to cover all accommodation and subsistence costs 
while in the field. 
• Transport costs: transport costs will be paid separately on an actual basis. 
• Communication: Up to NRs. 1000 will be provided for mobile phone credit during 
the field work. 
• Clothing and equipment: A minimum of a rain coat will be provided for local 
weather conditions. Other necessary clothing may be discussed and agreed. The Co-
supervisor will have temporary use of a Samsung tablet for the duration of the 
training and field work. 




Minimum work quality standards 
• The survey team completes a minimum of 4 questionnaires on average per day, 
depending on local realities. 
• The survey team overall maintains a maximum of 5% missing responses on a per 
question basis for all interviews. 
• The Co-supervisor and all survey team members maintain basic interview principles 
of consistency, confidentiality and respect to others. 





Appendix 3: Terms of Reference – Enumerator 
 
Background 
A PhD candidate from the London School of Economics is undertaking a household 
survey in Nepal as part of the primary data collection for a thesis entitles ‘Poverty, cash 
transfers and adolescents’ lives: understanding the unintended consequences of Nepal’s 
social pension’. The survey will interview multiple members of up to 1,500 households 
in a sub-region of Rautahat district in the central Terai. The survey aims to understand 
the links between additional cash entering a multi-generational household and the 
choices that parents and other household members make in relation to the life-course 
circumstances of adolescents, specifically in relation to their circumstances and 
transitions between education, work, marriage and migration.  
 
General responsibilities 
As a member of the survey team, the Enumerator is responsible for actively 
participating in the survey team training programme, contributing to survey planning 
and logistics, acquiring access to local communities, ensuring accurate sampling, 
identifying, engaging and interviewing sampled households to a high standard, and 
participating in survey review meetings.  
 
Specific tasks 
Pre-survey: Participate in the survey team training with specific responsibility for 
understanding and delivering the questionnaire to a high standard in both Nepali (from 
written) and Bhojpuri (live translation); participating in the pilot in a nearby local 
community; providing feedback on the survey tool content and translation; and 
contributing to planning and logistics as required. 
Survey: 
• Support the co-supervisor to negotiate access to communities with appropriate 
officials at VDC level as well as informal local leaders where necessary. 
• Participate in planning daily work schedule for the team and debriefing. 
• Ensuring households meet the criteria for selection, deliver questionnaires to 
selected households in line with good enumeration principles. 
• Be an active member of the survey team and contribute other tasks as required. 
Post-survey: Participate in a post-survey debriefing (half day) which may be held in 
Gaur or Kathmandu. 
 
Timetable 
• Survey team training: 17-21 July 
• Survey: 24 July - 5 September (may finished sooner depending on pace of work). 
Working conditions 
• The work will take place in Kathmandu and Rautahat district.  
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• Enumerators are responsible for organising their own accommodation and 
subsistence while in the field for which a fixed per diem will be provided. Local 
accommodation may require use of informal lodgings in remote communities. 
• Enumerators are expected to remain in the field location for the duration of the 
survey, barring any personal emergency circumstances. 
• Transportation from Kathmandu to and at the field site will use standard local 
methods including bus, motorbike and other means where necessary.  
Fees 
• Daily rate: The enumerator will be paid NRs. 1,500 per day for work undertaken. A 
working day is equivalent to minimum 7 hours for contributory work in Kathmandu 
(e.g. translation, meetings, training etc.). Working hours in the field may be up to 12 
hours including travel time in any given day. Working days include travel days 
from/to Kathmandu. 
• Bonus: A 5% bonus will be paid if certain quality standards are met (outlined 
below). In addition, for every half step increase from the expected overall teamwork 
rate of 4 questionnaires per person per day on average an additional 5% bonus will 
be provided as long as quality standards are also met. 
Other benefits and conditions 
• Per diem: NRs. 1,500 per day will be paid to cover all accommodation and 
subsistence costs while in the field location. 
• Transport costs: transport costs from Kathmandu to Rautahat and while in the field 
site will be paid separately on an actual basis. 
• Communication: Up to NRs. 1,000 will be provided for mobile phone credit during 
the field work. 
• Clothing and equipment: A minimum of a raincoat will be provided for local 
weather conditions. Other necessary clothing may be discussed and agreed. The 
Enumerator will have temporary use of a Samsung tablet for the duration of the 
training and field work. 
• Insurance: Accident and injury insurance will be provided from Himalayan General 
Insurance. 
Minimum work quality standards 
• Minimum of 4 questionnaires on average per day, depending on local realities. 
• Maintain a maximum of 5% missing responses on a per question basis for all 
interviews. 
• Maintain basic interview principles of consistency, confidentiality and respect to 
others. 




Appendix 4: Economic welfare variables from the CTALS 
 
Asset wealth index 
Following Morris et al. (2000), household asset score was derived by assigning to each 
item in the list of assets (g) a weight equal to the reciprocal of the proportion of the 
study households who owned one or more of that item (wg), then multiplying that 
weight by the number of units of asset g owned by the household (fg), and summing the 
product over all possible assets. Thus, for household j, 
 





Assets used: cycle, motor vehicle, mobile phone, generator/invertor, electric fan, fridge, 
umbrella, TV, radio, small livestock, medium livestock, large livestock, hand tools, 
animal tools, power tools; (based on Morris et al. and tailored to Nepal context by SLRC). 
 
Asset wealth score has no missing values. 3 extreme values were generated due to 
households having a very large number of chickens (chicken farms). These were 
confirmed as correct at the time of enumeration. 
 
 
Given the three extreme values, transformation is necessary. Histograms of the 
trimmed, windsorised and log transformations all look reasonable. Trimmed and 
windsorised versions both result in a reduction in the mean by almost 50% and an even 
greater reduction in the variance.  
99%      125.384       41744.73       Kurtosis        1719.13
95%     76.92033       12065.98       Skewness       40.58142
90%     60.04881        2169.63       Variance       936682.5
75%     38.82665       246.9318
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      967.8236
50%     22.95911                      Mean           57.75881
25%     13.95989              0       Sum of Wgt.       2,018
10%     8.742266              0       Obs               2,018
 5%     6.216302              0
 1%     2.247219              0
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                  Asset wealth score (c07)
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Untransformed    Trimmed 
 
 





As there is no apparent problem at the bottom end of the distribution a further option is 
to top-code the data. In this approach, the top three (extreme) values are capped at the 
next highest value. This removes the potential problem of erroneous results due to 
extreme values in both untransformed and log versions and better maintains the 
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Asset wealth score (trimmed)
  awscor_trm        1,981    29.10655     21.3376   2.247219    125.384
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Asset wealth score (log)
  awscor_win        2,018    29.83447    23.33246   2.247219    125.384
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
   awscor_ln        2,018    3.180984    .7792372          0   10.63935
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
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Total household income 
The CTALS asked about income from the three main livelihoods (those which provide 
the most income) and separately about remittances, (informal) gifts and (formal) 
transfers. Total household income in past 12 months is generated by summing estimated 
income from these sources. Livelihood income estimates were obtained in three stages: 
first asking what is the main, second and third livelihood type (in terms of contribution 
to annual income), how many months a year income is received from that livelihood 
type, and what is the average monthly income in the past year. Remittance and gift 
income was obtain by asking the total value for the past year; likewise for transfer 
income, but across a range of known government schemes with the option to include 
other (unanticipated) transfers. 
 
Missing values 
Total household income has 7 missing values due to missing values in first livelihood 
value (lh1val), third livelihood value (lh3val) and remittance (remit). These needed to 
be imputed before generating total income. The general approach taken to imputing 
missing values is to regress the annual value (no. of months * monthly income) for each 
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Asset wealth score (top-coded, log)
   awscor_tc        2,018     30.3854    26.56299          0   246.9318
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
 awscor_tcln        2,018    3.175444    .7473142          0   5.513154
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
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variables that may plausible have some predictive power (i.e. the nature of the 
association is irrelevant). 
 
Across the four livelihood sources (main, second, third and remittances), the livelihood 
types with missing values include remittances (3), private sector (1), agriculture (1) and 
paid domestic work (2). The missing cases all resulted from identification of extreme 
(high) values and are therefore known to be non-zero. 
• As livelihood types are, in a few cases, repeated across main, second and third 
livelihoods and remittances, step 1 was to create a new variable for each of the 
livelihood types that sums any repeated instances. The income variables by type all 
have a distinct right skew so the log transformation is applied. 
• Step 2 was to select and prepare the predictor variables. These include household 
roster, household size, number of bedrooms, log of asset wealth score, gift income, 
all expenditure items; and dummy variables for savings account status, formal loan 
status, informal loan status, education level of household head, caste, livelihood 
types 1-3. 
• Step 3 was to run the regression, examine the model fit and identify any non-
significant predictors. The regression was then run again excluding non-significant 
predictors. In all cases, there was a very marginal reduction in R2 but the F statistic 
increased significantly (more or less doubled) suggesting an improved model fit. 
• Step 4 was to check the correlation between the original and predicted values and to 
verify if the predicted values for missing cases are plausible. The lowest correlation 
was 0.58 for the untransformed agriculture variable, with other correlations between 
0.65 and 0.74. The actual values seemed acceptable in all cases except for 
agriculture where the predicted value implied 16 months of income in 1 year at the 
reported monthly value. As such, the imputed value for this case was based on the 
reported monthly value times 12 months (75% of than the imputed value). 
• Step 5 was to replace the missing values in the original variables for annual income 
value by livelihood contribution (main, second and third livelihood and 
remittances). It is possible that the values by livelihood type consisted of more than 
one reported livelihood (e.g. main and second livelihood could both be agriculture). 
However, none of the missing cases were of this nature. As annual income was 
generated from the number of months contribution times the monthly value, the 
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original missing data was also imputed by dividing the imputed annual value by the 
reported number of months or monthly income as appropriate. 
 
A final step was required to make the order of the livelihood contributions consistent. 
The survey question was posed in a way to obtain the main contributing livelihood first 
(in terms of annual income value), followed by the second and third. However, the 
reported values did not always respect this order. In addition, remittance income was an 
option among livelihood types and was also asked separately for households that did not 
report remittance income as a livelihood. As such, the three main livelihood sources 
(their type, monthly contribution and annual value) and annual remittance income have 
been consolidated into four livelihood sources and reordered (where necessary) to 
ensure consistency in the order of overall income contribution. 
 
Examining total household income 
As mentioned above, total household income in the past 12 months is generated by 
summing estimated income from the main livelihood sources (including remittances), 
(informal) gifts and (formal) transfers. 
 
 
Total household income has a distinct right skew as expected but is less extreme than 
for asset wealth. Trimmed and windsorized versions have a less pronounced right skew; 
they do not drastically change the mean but have some effect on reducing the variance. 
The log transformation results in a normal distribution. In this case it may be 
appropriate to use the untransformed version of household income when used as a 
predictor, but log transformation will be necessary if used as an independent variable. 
99%      1032000        3324000       Kurtosis       39.44844
95%       607900        2313000       Skewness       4.067782
90%       466000        1866800       Variance       4.21e+10
75%       328500        1866000
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      205208.4
50%       216000                      Mean           264917.7
25%       142000          16000       Sum of Wgt.       2,018
10%        94470          14700       Obs               2,018
 5%        71000          13998
 1%        41000           9300
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
      Total household income in last 12 months in NRs.
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Untransformed    Trimmed 
  




(Partial) Household consumption/expenditure 
Following Hagen-Zanker et al. (2015), rather than employ a full household consumption 
module, ten consumption items were selected from the NLSS III consumption module 
based on those that best predicted total household consumption using linear regression. 
Selected items include: oil/ghee, citrus fruit, meat/fish, newspapers/books, meals out, 
personal care, clothes, other people’s marriages/births, and gifts. Average consumption 
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Total household income in last 12 months (log)
   totinc_ln        2,018    12.27166    .6589924    9.13777   15.01668
  totinc_win        2,018    261019.8    176888.4      41000    1032000
  totinc_trm        1,979    255340.6    159370.5      41000    1032000
      totinc        2,018    264917.7    205208.4       9300    3324000
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
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Partial household consumption per year was generated by summing individual items 
and adjusting to the relevant time period where required. 50 missing values are 
generated. These will need to be imputed for individual items. 
 
Missing values 
The process for imputing values follows, more or less, that for household income. 
However, one major difference is that for four variables (citrus fruit, fish/meat, 
newspapers, meals out) it is not known whether missing values are zero or positive. In 
this case an initial step was taken whereby each consumption item with missing values 
was transformed into a binary variable and values were imputed using logistic 
regression. Missing values were then categorised as either zero (0) or positive (1). The 
remaining positive missing values were then imputed using the same approach as for 
household income. 
 
All consumption items have a right skew and there are no extreme values. Missing 
values are found in citrus fruit (11), fish/meat (2), newspapers (28), meals out (3), 
clothes (1), other marriages (10), and gifts (2).  
 
Examination of correlation coefficients between actual and predicted values shows that 
the predictions are relatively good with the possible exception of ‘meals out’ and ‘gifts’. 
Specific predicted values for the missing cases are all plausible. 
 
Variable 





Citrus fruit 0.57 0.21 0.61 
Fish/meat 0.68 0.53 - 
Newspaper 0.68 0.60 - 
Meals out 0.51 0.39 0.39 
Clothes 0.58 0.64 - 
Marriages 0.51 0.34 0.41 









Partial household consumption has a slight right skew, as expected, with no extreme 
values. The log transformation results in a normal distribution. It should be unnecessary 
to transform household consumption when used as a predictor but necessary to use the 
log transformation as an independent variable. 
 




Correlations between economic variables 
Untransformed variables. The correlation coefficient for household consumption and 
income is 0.391. It is much higher for per capita consumption and income at 0.629.  
Correlations are very low with asset wealth in all configurations, likely due to three very 
extreme values in asset wealth score. 
99%       172200         301400       Kurtosis       8.501631
95%       118420         243400       Skewness       1.705805
90%       100980         241120       Variance       9.59e+08
75%        76000         233600
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      30967.68
50%        56550                      Mean           62343.91
25%        41440          12060       Sum of Wgt.       2,018
10%        30280          10240       Obs               2,018
 5%        25500           9920
 1%        16550           9790
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                            (d31)
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Partial household consumption in past year (log)
    expyr_ln        2,018    10.92975    .4738476   9.189116   12.61619
                                                                       





Windsorized for asset wealth only. Using the windsorized version of asset wealth 
improves the correlation coefficient significantly for household consumption (0.393) 
and income (0.345) and for per capita consumption (0.528) and income (0.485).  
  
 
All variables log transformed. Using the log transformation for all variables results in a 
stronger correlation for household consumption with both income and asset wealth; it 
remains similar for household income and asset wealth. All correlations are lower for 





      awscor     0.0316   0.0099   1.0000
      totinc     0.3908   1.0000
       expyr     1.0000
                                         
                  expyr   totinc   awscor
    pcawscor     0.0348   0.0113   1.0000
       pcinc     0.6291   1.0000
     pcexpyr     1.0000
                                         
                pcexpyr    pcinc pcawscor
   awscor_tc     0.3928   0.3453   1.0000
      totinc     0.3908   1.0000
       expyr     1.0000
                                         
                  expyr   totinc awscor~c
pcawscor_win     0.5279   0.4845   1.0000
       pcinc     0.6291   1.0000
     pcexpyr     1.0000
                                         
                pcexpyr    pcinc pcawsc~n
 awscor_tcln     0.4451   0.3456   1.0000
   totinc_ln     0.4474   1.0000
    expyr_ln     1.0000
                                         
               expyr_ln totin~ln awsc~cln
pcawscor_t~n     0.4457   0.3975   1.0000
    pcinc_ln     0.5301   1.0000
  pcexpyr_ln     1.0000
                                         
               pcexpy~n pcinc_ln pcaws~ln
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Appendix 5: In-depth Interview (IDI) Topic guides 
 
Topic guide 1: OAA Recipient 
Start with the OAA in general then focus on spending priorities and control; shift to role 
in adolescent’s life, then link back to the OAA 
Opening 
What do you think about the OAA and why? 
- How long, how often, how much do you receive? 
- How well is it implemented? Why? 
- How and how much does it affect your life? Why? Why not? 
Use and control of OAA 
In which ways do you spend the OAA and why?  
- What are your spending priorities? Why? 
- Do spending priorities change? When, how and why? 
- If you didn’t receive the OAA how would you meet these needs? 
Who in the household has a say over how the OAA is used? 
- How much control do they have? Why? 
- Do spending priorities differ within the household? How and why? Is there 
disagreement? 
- If you had full control how would you spend the OAA differently? 
- Has receiving the OAA changed your status within the household? How? 
Role in adolescent’s life 
Introduce timeline. Summarise and ask opinion about past and (potential) future events. 
- Education level, type/amount of work, marriage timing, migration risks and 
opportunities 
Do you have a say in important decisions about [NAME]’s life circumstances?  
- How much, why, why not? 
- Has this changed over recent years? 
- Are there differences of opinion between household members?  
Do you sometimes spend the OAA on [NAME] directly?  
- In which ways? Why, why not?  
- How significant is this contribution? Why? 
- Does it give you more say over their lives? In which ways? Why, why not? 
Does the OAA contribution to general household needs make a difference to [NAME]?  




Topic guide 2: Parent / Guardian 
Start with the adolescent’s life, move to decision making and influencing factors, then 
focus on economic considerations and the role of the OAA.  
Establishing adolescent’s life-course 
Introduce timeline. Summarise and ask opinion about past and (potential) future events. 
- Education level, type/amount of work, marriage timing, migration risks and 
opportunities 
Decision making about adolescent’s life 
Who makes most major decisions about [NAME]’s life? (Staying in/dropping out of 
school, getting married, migrating etc.) 
- Focus first on the current situation or recent changes 
- How much say do different household members have? Why?  
- Were there differences of opinion between household members? Whose opinion 
prevailed? Why? 
How was the decision made to change/stay with the current situation? 
- What factors - economic, cultural, social, environmental - influenced the decision?  
- What advantages and disadvantages were discussed?  
- Was there one particular thing that led to the (timing of the) decision? 
Would you do things differently if you could?  
- How would you do things differently? 
- What factors - economic, cultural, social, environmental - would need to be 
different? 
Role of the OAA 
How important were economic considerations in the decision(s)? 
- If you had more or less income would you have made a difference decision?  
- Why, why not? 
Did the extra income from the OAA play any part in the decision?  
- Why, why not?  
- Was there any direct contribution to the costs? Was it significant?  
- Did the OAA contribution to the household in general make any difference to 
[NAME]’s circumstance?  
- If the OAA was not there what difference would it make, if any? Is use of the OAA 
contested within the household? In what circumstances? 
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Topic guide 3: Adolescent 
Start with the adolescent’s life, move to decision making and influencing factors, then 
focus on economic considerations and the role of the OAA.  
Establishing adolescent’s life-course 
Introduce timeline. Summarise and ask opinion about past and (potential) future events. 
- Education level, type/amount of work, marriage timing, migration risks and 
opportunities 
Decision making about adolescent’s life 
Who makes most major decisions about your life? (Staying in/dropping out of school, 
getting married, migrating)? 
- Focus first on the current situation and recent changes 
- How much say do different household members – including you - have? Why?  
- Were there differences of opinion between household members? Who “won”? 
Why? 
How was the decision made to change/stay with the current situation? 
- What factors (economic, cultural, social, environmental) influenced the decision?  
- What advantages and disadvantages were discussed?  
- Was there one particular thing that led to the (timing of the) decision? 
How did you feel about the decision?  
- Would you do things differently if you could? How 
- What factors - economic, cultural, social, environmental - would need to be 
different? 
Role of the OAA 
Are you aware of the OAA? Can you explain what it is/how it works?  
Do you think that the extra income from the OAA played any part in the decisions about 
your life?  
- Why, why not?  
- Was there any direct contribution to the costs? Was it significant?  
- Does the OAA make any difference to your life in any other ways?  








Any reference to expenditure of OAA income including decisions not 
to spend OAA income. If the reference to OAA expenditure is also in 
direct reference to a change or decision in adolescent’s life-course 
circumstance, then use the ‘life-course circumstance’ code instead. 
This will usually be in relation to education expenditure. 
Basic needs OAA expenditure on basic needs for living including food, clothes, 
medicine etc. 
Education Expenditure of the OAA on any kind of education (school, madrassa, 
training etc.). Only use this tag if the reference to education expenditure is 
not in direct reference to a change in the adolescent’s education 
circumstance. Otherwise use the ‘life-course circumstance’ education 
code. 
Investment OAA expenditure for investment in a business, work, or domestic assets 
such as house building. Also include references to saving the OAA. 
Wedding, / 
social 
Use of the OAA towards weddings or other social activities. It could be 
gifts, dowry or any other related expenditure. 
Unspecified / 
other 
Any other kind of OAA expenditure that is not in the categories above 





Any reference to the current, past of future circumstance of the 
adolescent. It does not have to be a change (starting or stopping an 
activity) but could be describing a current or on-going situation. 
Education Education could be school (government or private), madrassa or training. 
Work Work could be domestic work (chores, care work), family business, 
farming, or paid work. 
Marriage Any reference to past or future marriage. 
Life ‘in general’ Any reference to the adolescent’s life in general that is not specifically 




All the above (education, work, marriage) could also be related to 




The following sub-categories are about the decision-making process 
related to OAA expenditure and / or adolescent life-course 
circumstances. They nearly always be combined with the higher 




Reference to any factor that influences - enables or constrains - decisions 
about OAA expenditure or life-course circumstance. 
Individual 
characteristic 
Age, gender, health / disability status, relation within HH (e.g. youngest, 
in-law), personal interest/indifference (e.g. in education) 
Social status Caste, education level of adult household members 
Household 
economy 
Income (or lack of income), assets / land, type of livelihood 
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OAA policy / 
implementation 
In the case of OAA expenditure, this could relate to the policy or 
implementation (e.g. frequency of transfers, amount received etc.); in the 




The social or environmental context in the community, the lack of good 
schools, the floods or other climate issues  
Default This is for life-course decisions only - respondents often say they do 
something because that is just ‘what they should do’ (e.g. I’m not in 
school so therefore I do the chores). In some way it represents social 
expectations. 
Agency Reference to an individual’s agency / exercise of control (who makes 
the decision) over OAA expenditure or a life-course decision.  
Elder Usually the OAA recipient or their husband / wife 
Adolescent The adolescent themselves 
Parent The parents or guardian of the adolescent 
Joint If the reference is clearly to a joint family decision or with general 
agreement of the household. 
Other Any other person who does not fit the categories above. 
Trade-off Reference to an explicit trade-off between types of OAA expenditure 
or adolescent life-course decisions. 
Purpose The trade-off may be between the purpose of the OAA expenditure (e.g. 
cannot invest because we spend on food) or the purpose of the life-course 
option (e.g. she cannot go to school because she must work) 
Beneficiary The trade-off may be between the person who benefits from OAA 
expenditure (e.g. spend on grandson rather than granddaughter) or the 
person who is prioritised for a life-course option (e.g. we can only send 








This sub-category includes any reference to household strategies for 
economic security and how these relate to the OAA.  
Pools income A reference to the household pooling or sharing income especially the 
OAA (e.g. the OAA helps manage the household, if we didn’t have it we 
would use other income). 
Doesn’t pool 
income 
A reference to the household not pooling or sharing their income. (e.g. I 
only use the OAA for myself, my son doesn’t help me). 
Asset protection A reference to the OAA helping to protect assets, e.g. preventing the sale 
of grain or livestock (e.g. if I didn’t have the OAA we would still manage, 
but I would have to sell the cow). 
Loan access A reference to the OAA facilitating access to a loan (e.g. we took a loan 
to pay for food and we’ll pay it back when the OAA comes). 
Work effort A reference to the OAA reducing the amount of work the elder (recipient) 
has to do. It may be in the form of a counter-factual (a ‘what-if’) e.g., if I 
didn’t receive the OAA I would have to go out and sell milk. 
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OAA policy / 
implementation 
Sometimes the respondent may talk about problems with the OAA 
but not in relation to expenditure or life-course circumstance. In this 
case, use the following codes. If the reference is in relation to 
expenditure or life-course circumstance, use the ‘influencing factor – 
OAA policy/implementation’ code (e.g. we cannot use the OAA for her 
education because we don’t know when it will come next) 
Frequency A reference to the frequency (or infrequency / delays) of the payments 
Amount A reference to the amount received. 
Corruption A reference to corruption by local officials. 
Lack of 
knowledge 









Reference to a strategic 
change in education 
circumstance of 
adolescent 
Can be a positive or negative 
experience and include 
dropping out, changing 
institution or a deliberate 
decision to continue the 
current path; may be in the 











Reference to the time 
adolescent spends 
doing homework / 
study 
Can be a positive or negative 
experience; represent a 
continuous state or a change; 
refer to a trade-off with work 






Work strategic Reference to a strategic 
change in work 
circumstance of the 
adolescent 
Can be a positive or negative 
experience; and include 
continuing, starting or ending 
economic or domestic work; 
may be in the past few years 









Work time-use Reference to the time 
adolescent spends 
working 
Can be a positive or negative 
experience; represent a 
continuous state or a change; 
may refer to a trade-off with 
other activities; may be in the 









Reference to a decision 
for adolescent to 
migrate 
Can be a positive or negative 
experience; a temporary or 
permanent move; may be for 
education, work or other 
















Reference to a decision 
for adolescent to marry  
Can be a positive or negative 
experience; may be in the past 









Reference to a social or 
cultural factor that 
influenced a strategic 
or short-term decision 
about adolescent’s life 
Can be a weak, moderate or 
strong influence and relate to 
age preference, safety / 






Reference to a 
environmental factor 
that influenced a 
strategic or short-term 
decision about 
adolescent’s life 
Can be a weak, moderate or 
strong influence and relate to 
change in circumstance driven 
by climate, natural disaster 
etc.   
Influence 
economic 
Reference to a cultural 
factor that influenced a 
strategic or short-term 
decision about 
adolescent’s life 
Can be a weak, moderate or 
strong influence and relate to 
chronic poverty, loss of 
income, new livelihood or 
income source etc. 
Influence OAA Reference to the OAA 
as an influence (or not) 
on strategic or short-
term decision about 
adolescent’s life 
Can be a direct or indirect 
influence; may be prompted 
or unprompted; if no influence 










Reference to parental 
involvement in a 
strategic or short-term 
decision about 
adolescent’s life 
May be none, partial or total 





Reference to the OAA 
recipient’s 
involvement in a 
strategic or short-term 
decision about 
adolescent’s life 
May be none, partial or total 
decision making power 
Decision 
adolescent 
Reference to the 
adolescent’s 
involvement in a 
strategic or short-term 
decision about 
adolescent’s life 
May be none, partial or total 
decision making power 
Decision other Reference to another 
person’s involvement 
in a strategic or short-
term decision about 
adolescent’s life 
May be none, partial or total 
decision making power 
OAA experience and spending 
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OAA adequacy Reference to the 
(in)adequacy of the 




Reference to the 





Reference to control of 
the OAA being 





Reference to control of 
the OAA being 





Reference to spending 
of the OAA on the 




Reference to spending 





Reference to spending 







Appendix 7: LSE Research Ethics Review Form 
 
This form should be completed for every research project that involves human 
participants or the use of information relating to directly identifiable individuals.  
 
PART I – CHECKLIST 
The Checklist is designed to identify the nature of any ethical issues raised by the research.  
This checklist must be completed before potential participants are approached to take part in any 
research. 
1. Name of Researcher: Nicholas Mathers 
 
Status (mark with an 














Department Social Policy 
2. Student Details if applicable 











3. Title of the proposal and brief abstract 
Poverty, cash transfers and adolescents’ lives: exploring the unintended consequences 
of Nepal’s social pension. The research aims to understand the extent to which a non-
conditional state cash transfer, in the form of Nepal’s social pension, affects the status and 
quality of adolescent life-course circumstances and how and why these changes occur. The 
case study will be conducted in one District of the Central Terai region of Nepal and will take a 
mixed-methods approach involving primary research for both quantitative and qualitative 
components. Specifically, data collection will involve (i) a survey of 1200 multi-generational 
households where adolescents (10-17 years) and older people (65-75 years) cohabit and (ii) 42 
in-depth interviews with parents and adolescents from households selected from the survey. 
 
4.  Funding 
Is it proposed that the research will be funded?  Yes If so by whom? UNICEF Nepal       
 Please mark an X in the appropriate right-hand column/box Yes No 
Not 
certain 
5. Research that may need to be reviewed by an external Ethics Committee  
i 
Will the study require Health Research Authority approval? (See 
Note 1) 
 X  
ii 
Does the study involve participants lacking capacity to give 
informed consent? (See Note 2) 




Is there any other reason why the study may need to be reviewed 
by another external Ethics Committee? 
  X 
 
If you have answered Yes to any of the questions in section 5, go to Part II, C (there is 





PART II: Self certification and/or next steps 
 
A  If, after careful consideration, you have answered No to all the questions (whether you are a 
member of the academic staff or a student), you do not need to complete the questionnaire in Part 
III, unless you are subject to some external requirement that requires you to seek formal approval 
from the School's Research Ethics Committee. You should tick Box A in the Self-Certification 
Section below, sign as appropriate and submit the form to your Head of Department, Research 
Centre Director, or their administrations as appropriate. Occasional audits of such forms may be 
undertaken by the School.  
 
B  If you have answered Yes or Not certain to any of the questions in sections 6-13 of the checklist 
you will need to consider more fully how you plan to deal with the ethical issues raised by your 
research. Answering the relevant questions in the Questionnaire in Part III below may assist you. 
Alternatively, your own department or institute may have alternative forms or procedures to assist 
you. If having done so you are wholly assured that adequate safeguards in relation to the ethical 
issues raised can and will be put in place, you may tick Box B in the Self-certification Section 
below, sign as appropriate and submit the form to your Head of Department, Research Centre 
Director, or their administrations as appropriate. Occasional audits of such forms may be 
undertaken by the School. 
 
C  If you have answered Yes in section 5 that your research will be subject to an external ethics 
committee, please tick Box C below and send the completed Checklist (questions 1-5) to 
research.ethics@lse.ac.uk. You should submit your research for ethics approval to the appropriate 
body. Once approval is granted please send a copy of the letter of approval to 
research.ethics@lse.ac.uk. 
 
Students who self-certify their research proposals should do so in consultation with their 
supervisors.   
 
If you are unable to self-certify your proposed research you should in any event complete the 
questionnaire in Part III below and complete the Refer to Research Ethics Committee Section 
at the end of the form. 
 
SELF-CERTIFICATION 
Select A, B or C (delete as appropriate): 
 
I have read and understood the LSE Research Ethics Policy and the questions contained in the 
Checklist above and confirm:   
 
C   that the research will be subject to an external ethics review 





Undergraduate/Taught Postgraduate Student/PhD Student 
Summary of any ethical issues identified and safeguards to be taken (expand box as 
necessary): 
1. Survey and IDI participants will include children under the age of 18, specifically those 
aged between 10 and 17 years. Informed consent will be gained from the young person and 
their parent/guardian and additional safeguarding protocols will be followed including; (i) 
references taken for all interviewers; (ii) training of interviewers on research ethics and good 
practice for interviewing children; (iii) ensuring no contact between interviewer and interviewee 
in concealed/private location. 
2. It may be difficult to ensure informed consent is given freely where there is significant 
power imbalance between interviewers and participants due to the caste system in Nepal and 
the real and perceived wealth/power of the Candidate. The Candidate will discuss the 
importance of this issue with the survey team and RAs during training and ensure that 
everything is done to follow protocols for gaining informed consent including reading of 
statements about the research, notification of rights not to participate and to decline to answer 
particular questions, and anonymity and confidentiality. 
3. While none of the topics are considered by the Candidate to be personally sensitive 
enough to cause distress or harm to the participant, the research aims to identify (i) girls who 
have married under the legal age of 18 years, and (ii) boys and girls who are potentially 
engaged in illegal types of employment (involving long hours or hazardous occupations). This 
will require participants to report illegal activity. All protocols related to informed consent will be 
applied throughout the research process and participants will be clearly informed about their 
right to terminate the interview or decline to answer any of the questions. 
 
I hereby confirm that I have undertaken training in research ethics in the course of my studies 
and/or that I have consulted and been advised by my supervisor or other expert with regard the 













By signing here the supervisor confirms that the student has been advised in relation to any 
ethical issues raised by her/his research; these have to the best of the supervisor's 
understanding been adequately addressed in the research design; and the student has been 
made aware of her/his responsibilities for the ethical conduct of her/his research. 




Part III – QUESTIONNAIRE 
The questionnaire enables you to explain how the ethical issues relating to your research will 
be addressed. If you are intending to submit your proposal to the Research Ethics Committee it 
needs to be completed in full. 
1. Research aims  
Poverty, cash transfers and adolescents’ lives: exploring the unintended consequences 
of Nepal’s social pension. The research aims to understand the extent to which a non-
conditional state cash transfer, in the form of Nepal’s social pension, affects the status and 
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quality of adolescent life-course circumstances and how and why these changes occur. The 
research asks three specific questions: 
• What are the spending patterns of pension income, who controls spending decisions, and 
how do these vary? 
• What are the effects of pension income on adolescents’ schooling, work, marriage timing 
and migration and how does this vary? 
• How is pension income factored in to household decision making about adolescents’ life-
course options and time use allocation? 
 
The case study will be conducted in rural areas of one district of the Central Terai region of 
Nepal and will take a mixed-methods approach involving primary research for both quantitative 
and qualitative components. Specifically, data collection will involve (i) a survey of 1200 multi-
generational households where adolescents (10-17 years) and older people (65-74 years) 
cohabit and (ii) 46 in-depth interviews (IDI) with parents and adolescents from 32 households 
selected form the survey. 
 
Survey interviews will ask questions about pension income, control and spending patterns; 
individual household member socioeconomic characteristics; livelihoods, expenditure, transfer 
income and debt; adolescents education, work, migration and marital status and daily time-use 
allocation. IDIs will enquire about spending patterns, control of income and intra-household 
decision-making processes about use of income, adolescent life-course options and time-use 
allocation. 
 
All interviews (survey and IDI) will be conducted with adults and children aged 10-17 years at 
the homes of the research participants. The household survey will be conducted by eight 
Nepali enumerators and one co-supervisor who will be employed by the Candidate. The IDIs 
will be conducted by two Nepali Research Assistants who will be employed by the Candidate. 
The Candidate will provide training to the data collection team and provide daily supervision 
throughout the data collection process including attending every interview that takes place 
(briefly for survey, in full for IDIs). 
2. Informed consent  
i Will potential participants be asked to give informed consent in writing and will they be 
asked to confirm that they have received and read the information about the study? If not, 
why not?  
Please attach a draft information sheet and/or consent form if this has been prepared 
Informed consent will be requested by the interviewer by reading out a written statement 
and marking the participants response on the questionnaire (See Appendix A and C of the 
full proposal, attached). Verbal consent is standard practice for other household surveys in 
developing countries (including MICS and DHS) where illiteracy rates are high. In addition 
to participant consent, parental/guardian consent will be obtained for all interviews with 
anyone aged under 18. At the time of the survey all participants will be asked if they are 
willing to participate in the IDIs.   
ii How has the study been discussed or are there plans to discuss the study with those likely 
to be involved, including potential participants or those who may represent their views?  
The study has been discussed with representatives of UNICEF Nepal who have some 
claim on representation of the interests of potential participants. There are plans to formally 
present the study to organisations that work with the communities from which the 
participants will be drawn. These organisations include UNICEF NEPAL (presentation 
date, 28/04/15), Ministry of Local Governance, and the local level government 
administrative offices (VDCs). All survey participants will be asked at the time of the survey 
if they are willing to participate in the IDIs. 
iii Has information (written and oral) about the study been prepared in an appropriate form 
and language for potential participants? At what point in the study will this information be 




Information about the study will be given to all potential survey and IDI participants on first 
contact and prior to commencing the interview (See Appendix A and C of the full proposal, 
attached). Information has only been prepared in English at this stage but will be translated 
in to Nepali and other relevant local languages depending on which district is chosen. 
iv How will potential participants be informed of whether there will be adverse consequences 
of a decision not to participate? Or of a decision to withdraw during the course of the 
study?  
There will be no adverse consequences of not participating. Participants will be informed 
as part of the informed consent stated under questions i and iii above. 
v What provision has been made to respond to queries and problems raised by participants 
during the course of the study?  
Between each survey module and topic guide section, participants will be asked if they 
have any questions and if they are happy to continue. At the end of the interview 
participants will be provided contact details of the Candidate, the Nepali co-supervisor and 
a contact at the local government office in case of any later queries or concerns. 
3. Research design and methodology 
i 
Where relevant, how does the research methodology justify the use of deception?  
N/a 
ii If the proposed research involves the deception of persons in vulnerable groups, can the 
information sought be obtained by other means?  
N/a 
iii 
How will data be collected and analysed during the project?  
Data will be collected through face to face interviews as part of a household survey and 
IDIs. Survey data will be analysed using statistical software (STATA) and qualitative 
interviews will be analysed using NVIVO. 
 
iv How have the ethical and legal dimensions of the process of collecting, analyzing and 
storing the data been addressed?  
Responses to household survey interviews will be noted on the pre-prepared survey 
questionnaire. IDI’s will be recorded as a written transcript and as digital audio files. 
Questionnaires, transcripts and audio files will be anonymised through a unique ID and 
stored securely by the Candidate. Access will be limited to specific personnel (Co-
Supervisor, Data Entry Officers, RAs) and at specific limited times only. Data will be 
entered in to electronic software (SAS, NVIVO) by the Data Entry Officers and the 
Candidate. All electronic copies of the data (one original, two back-up) will be stored 
securely (password protected) and accessible only to the Candidate. 
v What concerns have been taken into account with regard to the preparation and design of 
the research project? If agencies, communities or individuals are to be directly affected by 
the research (e.g. participants, service users, vulnerable communities or relations), what 
means have you devised to ensure that any harm or distress is minimized and/or that the 
research is sensitive to the particular needs and perspectives of those so affected?  
None beyond those stated above. 
vi 
Have you been able to devise a timetable of research?  
Yes 
4. Ethical questions arising from the provision of incentives  
i 
Are any incentives being offered to participants?  
No 
5. Research participants  
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i Who do you identify as the participants in the project? Are other people who are not 
participants likely to be directly impacted by the project?  
The full survey population includes adolescents aged 10-17 years who were living in the 
same household two years prior to the survey as at least one older person aged 65 to 74 
years, their parent(s) and any pension recipients in the household, in one district of the 
Central Terai region of Nepal. No non-participants are expected to be directly impacted by 
the project. 
ii 
What are the specific risks to research participants or third parties?  
• Informed consent may not be provided freely due to power imbalance between 
researcher/interviewers and research participants, particularly in the context of the 
Caste system. 
• The research will ask participants questions about illegal activities including child 
marriage (below the age of 18) and child and hazardous labour (involving excessive 
hours relative to age, and harmful occupations). While these activities are illegal in 
Nepali law, they are still commonly practiced and questions about these activities form 
a part of the government and UN-led national household surveys including DHS, MICS, 
LMSS and LFS. It is not anticipated that these questions will cause undue stress or 
harm. 
iii If the research involves pain, stress, physical or emotional risk, please detail the steps 
taken to minimize such effects. 
N/a 
6. Confidentiality 
i What arrangements have been made to preserve confidentiality for the participants or 
those potentially affected, and compliance with data protection law?  
See 3.iv above 
7. Dissemination  
i Will the results of the study be offered to those participants or other affected parties who 
wish to receive them? If so, what steps have been taken to minimize any discomfort or 
misrepresentation that may result at the dissemination stage. 
A written summary of the findings in Nepali will be provided to each of the VDC offices 
where the data collection takes place. Research participants will be informed at the time 
of the interview that this information will be available after a certain date. 
8. Risk to researchers  
i 
Are there any risks to researchers? If so, please provide details. 
Minor risks related to road travel to the research site. Risk mitigation has been covered in 
the Field Work Risk Assessment form and will include use of reputable transport hire, 
seatbelts, and emergency contact procedures. Also, field work will take place during the 
dry season when road conditions are safest. 
 
 
REFER TO RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE 
 
Approval is required by the Research Ethics Committee on one or more of the following 
grounds (please mark with an 'X' in the appropriate place in the right-hand column):  
a
. 
Significant ethical issues are raised by the research, including research characterised by 
one or more of the following features:  
 
 
(i) Research involving deception of participants, or which is conducted without their full 
and informed consent at the time the study is carried out or when the data is gathered, or 








(ii) Research involving more than minimal risk of harm to participants, such as:  
o research involving vulnerable 
groups………………………………………………………………  
o research involving personally intrusive or ethically sensitive 
topics…………………………….  
o research involving groups where permission of a gatekeeper is normally required 
for initial access to 
members…………………………………………………………………………………..  
o research which would induce unacceptable psychological stress, anxiety or 















External obligations (for instance, funder requirements, data access requirements) 




Research undertaken by a student or member of staff who has not received appropriate 
training or has insufficient experience in research ethics and has been unable to access 

















Appendix 10: Additional data tables 
Table 9a Descriptive statistics for adolescents in OAA eligible and non-eligible households, without widows and single women (WSW) 
 
Elders within +/- 5 years 
of OAA eligibility 
(1) 
Elder within -5 years of 
OAA eligibility 
(2) 
Elder within +5 years of 
OAA eligibility 
(3) 
Difference in means  
((3) – (2)) 
(4) 
 Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean diff. S.E. 
Adolescents, 10-17 years   
n 2424  1190  1234  2424  
Age 13.127 0.047 13.109 0.068 13.145 0.064 0.036 0.093 
Female 0.495 0.010 0.502 0.015 0.489 0.014 -0.013 0.020 
Attends mainstream school 0.567 0.010 0.525 0.014 0.607 0.014 ***0.082 0.020 
Public school 0.391 0.010 0.340 0.014 0.439 0.014 ***0.099 0.020 
Private school 0.176 0.008 0.185 0.011 0.168 0.011 -0.017 0.015 
Migrated for education 0.081 0.006 0.069 0.007 0.092 0.008 **0.023 0.011 
Attends religious school 0.078 0.005 0.085 0.008 0.071 0.007 -0.014 0.011 
n 2091  1048  1043    
Domestic work (last week) 0.832 0.008 0.823 0.012 0.840 0.011 0.016 0.016 
Unpaid economic work (last year) 0.701 0.010 0.709 0.014 0.692 0.014 -0.017 0.020 
Paid work (last year) 0.100 0.007 0.110 0.010 0.091 0.009 -0.019 0.013 
n 2424  1190  1234  2424  
Migrated for work 0.029 0.003 0.024 0.004 0.033 0.005 0.009 0.007 
Married 0.073 0.005 0.074 0.008 0.073 0.007 -0.001 0.011 
Migrated for marriage 0.016 0.003 0.013 0.003 0.019 0.004 0.007 0.005 
Girls, 10-17 years   
n 1200  597  603  1200  
Age 13.126 0.065 13.144 0.094 13.108 0.090 -0.036 0.130 
Attends mainstream school 0.530 0.014 0.477 0.020 0.582 0.020 ***0.105 0.029 
Public school 0.418 0.014 0.372 0.020 0.464 0.020 ***0.092 0.028 
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Table 9a continued         
Private school 0.112 0.009 0.106 0.013 0.118 0.013 0.012 0.018 
Migrated for education 0.052 0.006 0.047 0.009 0.056 0.009 0.009 0.013 
Attends religious school 0.078 0.008 0.084 0.011 0.073 0.011 -0.011 0.016 
n 1084  546  538  1084  
Domestic work (last week) 0.921 0.008 0.923 0.011 0.918 0.012 -0.005 0.016 
Unpaid economic work (last year) 0.755 0.013 0.755 0.018 0.755 0.019 0.000 0.026 
Paid work (last year) 0.084 0.008 0.097 0.013 0.071 0.011 -0.026 0.017 
n 1200  597  603  1200  
Migrated for work - - - - - -   
Married 0.113 0.009 0.111 0.013 0.114 0.013 0.004 0.018 
Migrated for marriage 0.032 0.005 0.025 0.006 0.038 0.008 0.013 0.010 
Boys, 10-17 years   
n 1224  593  631  1224  
Age 13.129 0.067 13.074 0.097 13.181 0.092 0.106 0.134 
Attends mainstream school 0.603 0.014 0.573 0.020 0.631 0.019 **0.057 0.028 
Public school 0.364 0.014 0.309 0.019 0.415 0.020 ***0.107 0.027 
Private school 0.239 0.012 0.265 0.018 0.216 0.016 **-0.049 0.024 
Migrated for education 0.109 0.009 0.091 0.012 0.127 0.013 **0.036 0.018 
Attends religious school 0.078 0.008 0.086 0.012 0.070 0.010 -0.016 0.015 
n 1007  502  505  1007  
Domestic work (last week) 0.736 0.014 0.715 0.020 0.756 0.019 0.041 0.028 
Unpaid economic work (last year) 0.643 0.015 0.659 0.021 0.626 0.022 -0.034 0.030 
Paid work (last year) 0.118 0.010 0.124 0.015 0.113 0.014 -0.011 0.020 
n 1224  593  631  1224  
Migrated for work 0.057 0.007 0.049 0.009 0.057 0.007 0.016 0.013 
Married 0.035 0.005 0.037 0.008 0.033 0.007 -0.004 0.011 
Migrated for marriage - - - - - - - - 
Data source: CTALS 2017. Robust standard errors are used in columns (1), (2) and (3), clustered at the level of household. Column (4) indicates the statistical 
significance of a two-tailed t-test where * = 90%, ** = 95%, *** = 99%. 
Appendices 
358 







OAA eligible in HH 
(OE) 
(2) 
OAA eligible is female 
(OEF) 
(3) 
OAA eligible female 
and male (OEFM) 
(4) 
Mean S.E. β1 S.E. β2 S.E. β3 S.E. 
Elder receives OAA income 0.349 0.012 ***0.570 0.028 **0.094 0.039 ***0.238 0.056 
Household attributes          
Household size†† 9.899 0.152 -0.549 0.419 0.623 0.553 -1.081 0.976 
No. of adolescent girls 1.104 0.027 0.014 0.086 -0.023 0.120 -0.138 0.167 
No. of adolescent boys 1.129 0.032 0.053 0.080 -0.115 0.128 0.084 0.170 
Household head has education 0.215 0.011 **-0.069 0.031 ***0.121 0.046 -0.089 0.062 
Ethnicity and caste         
Brahmin / Chhetri 0.041 0.005 -0.013 0.013 0.005 0.021 -0.024 0.026 
Dalit 0.125 0.008 ***0.328 0.012 ***-0.066 0.015 ***0.124 0.024 
Muslim 0.376 0.012 ***-0.174 0.035 0.053 0.050 **-0.200 0.071 
Terai/Madhesi  0.441 0.013 ***-0.144 0.035 0.014 0.051 0.108 0.071 
Janajati / other 0.017 0.003 0.003 0.009 -0.006 0.013 -0.008 0.014 
Location          
VDC         
Akolawa 0.110 0.008 -0.030 0.024 0.022 0.036 **-0.095 0.046 
Bairiya 0.061 0.007 -0.013 0.020 -0.030 0.027 **-0.064 0.032 
Basatpur 0.042 0.005 0.007 0.015 -0.021 0.021 0.024 0.032 
Brahmapuri 0.065 0.006 ***0.047 0.017 -0.017 0.023 0.031 0.033 
Fatuha Maheshpur 0.056 0.006 -0.001 0.019 0.019 0.028 -0.043 0.033 
Jhunkhunwa 0.097 0.007 **0.057 0.023 0.001 0.031 0.012 0.046 
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Table 11a continued          
Laxmipur Belbichwa 0.057 0.006 0.019 0.017 -0.003 0.027 0.056 0.043 
Mudwalawa 0.068 0.006 0.003 0.018 0.014 0.026 -0.008 0.034 
Pipra Bagwanpur 0.077 0.007 -0.029 0.021 -0.001 0.027 0.034 0.042 
Rajdevi 0.074 0.006 0.015 0.019 **0.045 0.023 -0.007 0.037 
Rajpur Farhadwa 0.148 0.009 ***-0.085 0.027 0.049 0.039 -0.031 0.064 
Rajpur Tusli 0.066 0.006 -0.001 0.019 -0.025 0.026 0.031 0.033 
Saruatha 0.078 0.006 0.011 0.020 **-0.053 0.027 0.058 0.042 
Adolescent attributes         
Age 13.131 0.035 **0.240 0.107 -0.124 0.145 0.272 0.217 
Female 0.491 0.008 -0.003 0.025 -0.003 0.034 -0.013 0.051 
Data source: CTALS 2017. † Including households with widows and single women, n=3437. Robust standard errors are used throughout, clustered at the 
level of household. Statistical significance is indicated by * = 90%, ** = 95%, *** = 99%. All regressions include a third order polynomial of the age of 
the oldest elder within bandwidth age; and dummy variables for the presence of an elder male and an elder female and male in the household and the 





Table 12a Results from equation (3) indicating the effects of a difference in timing of receipt of the OAA on adolescent life-course 
circumstances with full sample† 
 
Elder male (EM) 
(1) 
Elder female and 
male (EFM) 
(2) 











α1 S.E. α2 S.E. β1 S.E. β 1+β2 S.E. β 1+β2+β3 S.E. 
Adolescents, 10-17 years            
Attends mainstream school -0.012 0.026 0.004 0.032 0.024 0.031 0.019 0.029 0.027 0.050 0.378 
Public school -0.025 0.027 **-0.070 0.034 **0.088 0.035 0.021 0.032 0.083 0.057 0.209 
Private school 0.013 0.024 **0.075 0.031 **-0.064 0.026 -0.002 0.027 -0.057 0.047 0.121 
Migrated for education 0.014 0.018 **0.067 0.027 0.010 0.021 0.025 0.022 **-0.070 0.030 0.030 
Attends religious school 0.024 0.015 **0.045 0.022 -0.018 0.019 *0.029 0.017 -0.020 0.030 0.152 
Domestic work (last week) -0.023 0.024 -0.037 0.029 0.023 0.027 0.005 0.027 0.038 0.041 0.029 
Unpaid economic work (last year) 0.019 0.030 0.003 0.040 -0.014 0.035 -0.009 0.036 -0.015 0.062 0.055 
Paid work (last year) 0.025 0.018 0.021 0.023 **-0.044 0.022 -0.025 0.020 -0.037 0.036 0.078 
Migrated for work 0.001 0.008 -0.008 0.011 0.006 0.011 0.009 0.010 -0.003 0.015 0.058 
Married 0.008 0.012 0.008 0.015 *0.024 0.014 **0.030 0.015 0.027 0.025 0.163 
Migrated for marriage -0.004 0.006 -0.006 0.007 **0.016 0.007 0.009 0.007 *0.025 0.014 0.064 
Girls, 10-17 years            
Attends mainstream school -0.024 0.035 0.014 0.044 **0.081 0.041 0.030 0.039 0.079 0.065 0.393 
Public school -0.050 0.035 -0.053 0.046 **0.100 0.045 0.012 0.041 **0.147 0.075 0.247 
Private school 0.026 0.026 *0.067 0.036 -0.019 0.029 0.018 0.029 -0.069 0.045 0.105 
Migrated for education 0.023 0.019 **0.071 0.030 -0.001 0.023 0.027 0.024 **-0.069 0.031 0.046 
Attends religious school 0.026 0.020 0.045 0.030 -0.029 0.027 0.030 0.023 -0.015 0.041 0.158 
Domestic work (last week) -0.014 0.021 -0.033 0.027 -0.003 0.027 0.003 0.027 0.000 0.044 0.016 
Unpaid economic work (last year) 0.026 0.039 0.019 0.049 -0.010 0.045 0.007 0.047 -0.018 0.073 0.058 
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Table 12a continued            
Paid work (last year) 0.027 0.024 0.007 0.027 **-0.074 0.030 -0.039 0.027 -0.047 0.047 0.060 
Migrated for work - - - - - - - - - - - 
Married -0.006 0.021 -0.022 0.024 0.038 0.024 0.029 0.024 0.036 0.041 0.255 
Migrated for marriage -0.009 0.012 -0.014 0.013 **0.035 0.014 0.015 0.014 *0.045 0.026 0.145 
Boys, 10-17 years            
Attends mainstream school 0.003 0.031 -0.001 0.041 -0.035 0.040 0.005 0.037 -0.020 0.068 0.373 
Public school -0.005 0.034 **-0.104 0.042 *0.078 0.044 0.026 0.043 0.038 0.070 0.186 
Private school 0.008 0.035 *0.102 0.043 ***-0.113 0.039 -0.021 0.041 -0.058 0.072 0.152 
Migrated for education 0.007 0.028 0.067 0.038 0.022 0.031 0.024 0.031 -0.070 0.046 0.024 
Attends religious school 0.022 0.019 *0.048 0.027 -0.006 0.022 0.029 0.020 -0.036 0.036 0.152 
Domestic work (last week) -0.040 0.039 -0.062 0.051 0.049 0.044 0.000 0.045 0.088 0.067 0.055 
Unpaid economic work (last year) 0.009 0.041 -0.043 0.056 -0.026 0.051 -0.040 0.050 -0.007 0.084 0.056 
Paid work (last year) 0.025 0.025 0.044 0.035 -0.018 0.032 -0.007 0.030 -0.035 0.051 0.109 
Migrated for work 0.001 0.015 -0.005 0.021 0.015 0.021 0.022 0.020 0.006 0.029 0.105 
Married 0.017 0.011 0.025 0.016 0.012 0.014 **0.028 0.014 0.010 0.021 0.094 
Migrated for marriage - - - - - - - - - - - 
Data source: CTALS 2017 †Full sample including households with widows and single women, n=3437 for all adolescents, n=1689 for girls and n=1748 for boys; for work 
participation variables, n=2975, 1531 and 1748, respectively. Robust standard errors are used throughout, clustered at the level of household. Statistical significance is 
indicated by * = 90%, ** = 95%, *** = 99%. All regressions include a third order polynomial of the age of the oldest elder and of the adolescent; and dummy variables for the 
presence of an elder above bandwidth age, education of household head, ethnicity/caste group, and VDC. 
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Table 18a Results from equation (3) indicating the effects of a difference in timing of receipt of the OAA on household income, expenditure and 
loans with full sample† 
 
Elder male (EM) 
(1) 














α1 S.E. α2 S.E. β1 S.E. β1+β2 S.E. β1+β2+β3 S.E. 
All adolescents, 10-17 years             
Household income (log) 0.037 0.050 **0.122 0.062 *0.109 0.056 **0.139 0.060 *0.174 0.096 0.113 
Household expenditure [partial] (log) **0.083 0.038 **0.103 0.046 0.015 0.043 0.046 0.048 0.002 0.064 0.097 
Adolescent education expenditure (log) 0.128 0.259 0.370 0.341 -0.188 0.315 0.377 0.313 0.025 0.512 0.233 
Recent loan value (log)†† 1.371 0.984 1.475 1.217 -1.491 1.128 1.468 1.170 -0.256 1.831 0.010 
Girls, 10-17 years            
Household income (log) 0.071 0.058 **0.180 0.073 *0.125 0.069 **0.161 0.070 0.138 0.111 0.132 
Household expenditure [partial] (log) **0.100 0.043 ***0.160 0.053 0.030 0.050 0.036 0.053 -0.038 0.076 0.115 
Adolescent education expenditure (log) 0.185 0.347 0.691 0.447 -0.219 0.410 0.157 0.411 0.393 0.618 0.238 
Recent loan value (log)†† -0.247 1.136 0.291 1.425 -1.043 1.359 1.308 1.349 -0.938 2.183 0.013 
Boys, 10-17 years            
Household income (log) 0.012 0.060 0.071 0.076 0.090 0.066 0.117 0.072 *0.203 0.120 0.095 
Household expenditure [partial] (log) 0.070 0.047 0.043 0.057 -0.001 0.052 0.051 0.059 0.034 0.080 0.086 
Adolescent education expenditure (log) 0.084 0.321 0.103 0.452 -0.158 0.397 0.554 0.388 -0.444 0.746 0.237 
Recent loan value (log)†† **2.962 1.204 *2.556 1.484 -1.699 1.353 1.834 1.415 0.768 2.231 0.011 
Data source: CTALS 2017 †Full sample including households with widows and single women, n=3437 for all adolescents, n=1689 for girls and n=1748 for boys. Robust 
standard errors are used throughout, clustered at the level of household. Statistical significance is indicated by * = 90%, ** = 95%, *** = 99%. All regressions include a 
third order polynomial of the age of the oldest elder and of the adolescent; and dummy variables for the presence of an elder above bandwidth age, education of household 
head, caste group, and VDC. ††The Tobit model is used to account for the large number of households with zero values; coefficients represent change in the latent variable; 
the pseudo R2 is given. 
 
